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23.

MACHIAVELLI

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THE PRINCE

BY NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI

LEVIATHAN,

Or, Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth
Ecclesiastical and Civil

BY THOMAS HOBBES



WILLIAM BENTON *Publisher*

ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, INC

CHICAGO LONDON TORONTO GENEVA SYDNEY

The text and annotations of *The Prince*, translated
by [illegible] in collaboration with
[illegible]
OR,



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Great Books
is published with the editorial advice of the faculties
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1952

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THE PRINCE

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI 1469-1527

PRACTICALLY nothing is known of Machiavelli before he became a minor official in the Florentine Government. His youth, however, was passed during some of the most tumultuous years in the history of Florence. He was born the year that Lorenzo the Magnificent came to power, subverting the traditional civil liberty of Florence while inaugurating a reign of unvalued luxury and of great brilliance for the arts. He was twenty five at the time of Savonarola's attempt to establish a theocratic democracy, although, from the available evidence, he himself took no part in it. Yet through his family he was closer to these events than many Florentine citizens. The Machiavellis for generations had held public office, and his father was a jurist and a minor official. Machiavelli himself, shortly after the execution of Savonarola, became Secretary of the Second Chancery, which was to make him widely known among his contemporaries as the "Florentine Secretary."

By virtue of his position Machiavelli served the "Ten of Liberty and Peace," who sent their own ambassadors to foreign powers, transacted business with the cities of the Florentine domain, and controlled the military establishment of Florence. During the fourteen years he held office, Machiavelli was placed in charge of the diplomatic correspondence of his bureau, served as Florentine representative on nearly thirty foreign missions, and attempted to organize a citizen militia to replace the mercenary troops.

As directed his more important missions, however, gave him an insight into the politics of Europe as well as of Italy. In 1500 he was sent to the court of the King of France, where he met the mightiest minister in Europe, Cardinal d'Amboise. On this occasion he began the observation and analysis of national political forces which were to find expression in his diplomatic reports. His *Report on France* was written after he had completed three assignments for his office in that country, the *Report*

on Germany was prepared as a result of a mission to the court of Emperor Maximilian.

The most important mission, in view of his later development as a political writer, was that, in 1502, to the camp of Cesare Borgia, Duke Valentino. Under the aegis of his father, Pope Alexander VI, Cesare was engaged in consolidating the Papal States, and Machiavelli was in attendance upon him at the time of his greatest triumph. Machiavelli had several audiences with Cesare and witnessed the intrigues culminating in the murder of his disaffected captains which he carefully described in the *Method Adopted by Duke Valentino to murder Vitellozzo Vitelli*. As the "Florentine Secretary," he was also present a few months later at Rome when Cesare came to ruin and disgrace upon the death of Alexander VI.

During his diplomatic career Machiavelli enjoyed one outstanding success. Largely through his efforts, Florence obtained the surrender of Pisa, which had revolted from Florentine rule and maintained its independence for years. Although he did not achieve any other diplomatic triumphs, he was esteemed for the excellence of his reports and is known to have had the confidence of the president of Florence, the Gonfalonier, Piero Soderini. But with the restoration of the Medici to power, in 1512, Machiavelli's public career came abruptly to an end. His efforts to ingratiate himself with the new masters proved ineffectual. Looked upon with disfavor as the ex gonfalonier's man, he was deprived of his office and exiled from the city for a year. He then fell under suspicion, although unjustly, of being implicated in a conspiracy against the new government. He was imprisoned and tortured on the rack and was released only when Giovanni de Medici became Pope.

mented that, possessing nothing but "knowledge of the State," he had no occasion for using it. The only remaining link with the official world was his friend, the Florentine

ambassador to the Pope, to whom he wrote of public affairs and of his private amorous adventures. His letters reveal, however, that he led a hidden life by night in his study "At the threshold," he wrote, "I take off my work-day clothes, filled with dust and mud, and don royal and curial garments. Worthily dressed, I enter into the ancient courts of the men of antiquity, where, warmly received, I feed on that which is my only food and which was meant for me. I am not ashamed to speak with them and ask them the reasons of their actions, and they, because of their humanity, answer me. Four hours can pass, and I feel no weariness, my troubles forgotten, I neither fear poverty nor dread death. I give myself over entirely to them. And since Dante says that there can be no science without retaining what has been understood, I have noted down the chief things in their conversation."

He 'conversed' most frequently with Livy, Aristotle, and Polybius, and composed his principal works upon politics—the *Discourses upon the First Decade of Livy*, and the *Prince* (1513). He intrigued to bring his work to the attention of the Medici rulers. He did not succeed in this, however, until he turned from politics to drama. The comedies he wrote during these years of retirement were acclaimed by the Flo-

rentine gentility. The *Mandragola* was so successful that it was performed before Pope Leo X in 1520.

Largely because of the fame he had acquired as a writer, Machiavelli was asked by the Medici rulers to give advice on the government of Florence. He used the occasion to restate and defend republican principles in his *Discourse on Reforming the State of Florence*. He was also commissioned to write a history of the city and produced his *Florentine History*. However, it was not until the last years of his life that he was recalled to an active role in public work. He was appointed by Pope Clement VII to organize a national militia, such as he had defended in his *Art of War*. But he received little help from the men with whom he had to work, and his efforts came to nothing when the troops of Emperor Charles V sacked Rome and put an end to all of Clement's plans.

Shortly before Machiavelli's death the Republic was re-established in Florence. Although he had never been able to regain public office in Florence under the Medici, he still seemed too close to them to be acceptable to the new republican government. His request to be reinstated in his old position as Florentine Secretary was refused. Machiavelli died a few days later on June 20, 1527.

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NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI TO THE MAGNIFICENT LORENZO DI PIERO DE' MEDICI

THOSE who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see him take most delight whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness.

Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.

And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance,

have not embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed to load and embellish their works, for I have wished either that no honour should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable.

Nor do I hold with those who regard it as presumption if a man of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes, because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves high upon the mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to be of the people.

Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I

THE PRINCE

CHAPTER I

HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES
THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS
THEY ARE ACQUIRED

ALL STATES, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either hereditary or acquired. Some are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince to whom they are added.

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I WILL leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones, for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force, and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have withstood the at-

tacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend, hence it happens that he will be more loved, and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him, and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the footing for another.

CHAPTER III

CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

IN THIS CHAPTER I SHALL DISCUSS

THE PRINCE WHO HAS TO
CONQUER NEW TERRITORIES

change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those

against them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces,

and to turn him out the first time it only needed Lodovico's own forces, because those who had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would not endure the ill treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico to raise insurrections on the borders, but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy, which followed from the causes above mentioned.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed, it remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did the king of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self government, and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the

greatest and most real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the

been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them, but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer remedy

attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants, and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him, whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot, therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, because

bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is extinguished, the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the

their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful

obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to these subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these measures, they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with the minor powers, without increasing their strength, they kept down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain

yet the merits of the Achæans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends with

prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to

remedy them, but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable, for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the

arise have been foreseen (which it is only to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, not to let them come to a point where it is not to be of advantage to others, moreover they wished to fight with

ever please them which is for ever in the hands of the wise ones of our time—Let us enjoy the benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with

Italy for the longest period, and you will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of divers elements

King Louis was brought into Italy by the

other matters he had not made some mistake. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,

of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchesi, the Pisans, the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected, for although they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it great authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprived himself of friends, he wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter of Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the malcontents of his own should have where to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him out to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed, but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so, if she could not then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he

destroyed the minor powers, he increased the

errors, if he had lived, were not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians, because, had he not aggrandized the Church nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them, but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except to become masters themselves there, also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians and to run counter to both they would not have had the same

reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the hat to Rouen: to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino,¹ as Cesare Bonaparte of the Duke of Alexander, said, all

did not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined, because that predominance has been brought about either by

¹ So called—in Italian—from the duchy of Valentinois, conferred on him by Louis XII.

astuteness or else by force, and both are dis-
trusted by him who has been raised to power

CHAPTER IV

WHY THE KINGDOM OF PARIUS, CONQUERED
BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE
SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have
had to hold a newly acquired state, some might
wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great
became the master of Asia in a few years, and
died whilst it was yet scarcely settled (whence
it might appear reasonable that the whole em-

I answer that the principalities of which one
has record are found to be governed in two
different ways either by a prince, with a body
of servants whose

the prince. Such barons have states and their
own subjects, who recognize them as lords and
hold them in natural affection. Those states
that are governed by a prince and his servants
hold their prince in more consideration, be-
cause in all the country there is no one who is

particular affection

The example of the kingdom of Darius

dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends
there different administrators, and shifts and
changes them as he chooses. But the king of
France is placed in the midst of an ancient body
of lords acknowledged by their own subjects,
and beloved by them, they have their own pre-

in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he
hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt
of those whom the lord has around him. Thus
arises from the reasons given above, for his min-

isters, being all slaves and bondmen, can only
be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can
expect little advantage from them when they
have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the
people with them, for the reasons assigned.
Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in
mind that he will find him united, and he will
have to rely more on his own strength than on
the revolt of others, but, if once the Turk has
been conquered, and routed in the field in such
a way that he cannot replace his armies, there
is nothing to fear but the family of the prince,
and this being exterminated, there remains no
one to fear, the others having no credit with
the people and as the conqueror did not rely
on them before his victory, so he ought not to
fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed
like that of France, because one can easily enter
there by gaining over some baron of the king-
dom, for one always finds malcontents and such
as desire a change. Such men, for the reasons
given, can open the way into the state and ren-
der the victory easy but if you wish to hold it
afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties,
both from those who have assisted you and
from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough
for you to have exterminated the family of the
prince because the lords that remain make
themselves the heads of fresh movements a-
gainst you, and as you are unable either to sit-
isfy or exterminate them that state is lost when
ever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the
nature of the government of Darius you will
find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and

unruined the empire the memory of them
passed away, and the Romans then became se-
cure possessors. And when fighting afterwards

amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed there, and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged

which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more, this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

WHENEVER those states which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside

ernment, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him, and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and

immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines

But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest, so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

LET no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state, because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, according as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these two things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside there in person

But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theæus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable, and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficulties they have in acquiring it arise in part from the new rules and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on

their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or have to depend on others—that is to say, whether, to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them, but when these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one, still it bears some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind. It is Hiero the Syracusan. This man rose from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity, for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made new ones,

and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring he had but little in keeping

CHAPTER VII

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

THOSE who solely by good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop, they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it, as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both for his security and his glory as also were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand simply upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position, because, unless they are men of great worth and ability it is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always lived in a private condition, besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then like all other things in nature which are born and grow rapidly cannot have their foundations and relations with other states fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them, unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid before they became princes, they must lay afterwards.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection,

with a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his

state during the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander VI, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church, and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by

upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by

the king came into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Roma

selves seize what he had won, and that the king

duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from that undertaking, hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonna parties in Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to

authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Paolo [Orsini]—whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of attention giving him money, apparel, and horses—the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at Sinigaglia. Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, the duke had laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the duchy of Urbino, and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence, and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco [de Lorqua], a swift

and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid, as

had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped,

he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany, for he already pos-

sed it. Driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines: and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies and sick unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure: and whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of Alexander, everything would have been easy to him. On the day that Julius II was elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame him, but rather it appears to me, as I have said, that I ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and far reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and only the shortness

of the life of Alexander and his own sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure himself in his new

friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius II, in whom he made a bad choice because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope, and he ought never to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio and Ascanio.¹ Any one of the others, on becoming Pope would have had to fear him. Rouen and the Spaniards excepted, the latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

ALTHOUGH a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when

¹ Julius II had been Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula. San Giorgio was Raffaele Riavis, and Ascanio was Cardinal Ascanio Sforza.

by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince of his country And speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them

Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject position This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous life Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of

be esteemed less than the most notable captain Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite wickednesses do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or to genius

In our times, during the rule of Alexander VI, Oliverotto da Fermo, having been left an

fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became the first man in his profession But it appearing to him a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelli, to seize Fermo So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for

it is to make himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose

soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people, these dead, he seized and held the principedom of that city without any civil commotion And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of Syracuse The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him with many hazards and dangers Yet it cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion, such methods may gain empire, but not glory Still if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should

in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horse men, his friends and retainers, and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably by the citizens of Fermo, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up

ments that are usual in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and

seated than soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on horse back, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia, as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that

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doubtful times of war I believe that this follows from severities being badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of

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they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily, and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits.

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flavour of them may last longer

And take all these things into consideration

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late for harsh measures, and mild ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them

CHAPTER IX

CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

BUT coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people, and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, self government, or anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity, for the nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and

without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because of their being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them, but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him, for they, being in these affairs more far seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways, they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel, and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour yourself, in adversity you have not to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they

them under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor, thus the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours, and the

prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them, but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.

Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his coun-

had been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that 'He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,' for this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates, wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his

rule personally or through magistrates in the latter case their government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance, and the prince has not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens had

the more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a

wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful

CHAPTER X

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED

IT is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of these principalities that is, whether a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clear I say that I consider those are able to support themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them, and I consider those always to have need of others who can not show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not hated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks

beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are supported, they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover have

many ordinances to uphold them

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only be driven off with disgrace, again, because that the affairs of this world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self interest will make them forget their prince, to this I answer that a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by

him to be too bold

Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and ready for the defence, and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince to hesitate, because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy, and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not fail to support and defend them.

CHAPTER XI

CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

IT ONLY remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without either, for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion, which are so all powerful, and of such a character that the principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. These princes alone have states and do not defend them, they have subjects and do not rule them, and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, although not

ruled do not care and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such

which I have discussed above in the actions of

rash man to discuss them

Nevertheless if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been called potentates but

labours

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong possessing all the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence and through the chastisements of Alexander the factions wiped out he also found the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only followed but improved upon and he intended to gain Bologna to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered with him and so much the more to his credit inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonna factions within the bounds in which he found them and although

Before Charles King of France, passed into Italy this country was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal anxieties: the one that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms the other that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary as it was for the defence of Ferrara and to keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of Rome who being divided into two factions Orsini and Colonna had always a pretext for disorder and standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope such as Sixtus [IV] yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness for in the ten years which is the average life of a pope he can with difficulty lower one of the factions and if so to speak, one pope should almost destroy the Colonna another would arise hostile to the Orsini who would support their opponents and yet would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy.

Alexander VI arose afterwards who of all the pontiffs that have ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to prevail and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino and by reason of the entry of the French he brought about all those things

them to have their own cardinals who caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it and the barons are compelled to support them and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope Leo found the pontificate most powerful and it is to be hoped that if others made it great in arms he will make it still greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.

CHAPTER XII

HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE,
AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

HAVING discussed particularly on the characteristics of such principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss and having considered in some degree the causes of their being made by things which are above them and by

which belong to each of them

We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his foundations well laid, other

wise it follows of necessity he will go to ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms, and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe, for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies, they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is, for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe, which I should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves yet when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand¹, and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not, if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions, but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person and perform the duty of captain, the republic has to send its citizens,

¹ With which to chalk up the bullets for his soldiers.

and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the command. And experi-

zens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely armed and quite free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,² and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved, but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy, Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Paolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the Florentines to keep in with

² As Sir John Hawkwood, the English leader of mercenaries, was called by the Italians.

him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebeians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains, but when they expanded, as under Carmignola, they had a taste of this mistake, for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no

was Albenigo da Conio, a native of the Romagna. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy, and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their

not give them any authority, so they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured, and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen

der to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino the Count of Piugliano, and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, happened afterwards at Vaila, where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal power in many others their citizens became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to enlist foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery

not attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments. At night, they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers, thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN

AUXILIARIES, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the most recent times, for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain, for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous, for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive.

fruit of his rash choice, because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of their troubles

The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not willing to quit, this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to the infidels

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the ruin is ready made, they are all united, all yield obedience to others, but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better opportunities are needed to injure you, they are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure you In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardly is most dangerous, in auxiliaries, valour The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to his own, and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions This duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers and with them he captured Imola and

Ursini and Vitelli, whom presently, on hankling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men And the difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever increasing, he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and

recent examples, but I am unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I have named above This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our Italian condottieri, was of no use, and it appearing to him that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament applicable to this sub-

weapons, which David rejected as soon as he had them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife In conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast

Charles VII, the father of King Louis XI, having by good fortune and valour liberated

cerning men at arms and infantry Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom, because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men at arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they can now conquer without them Hence it arises that the French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off well against others The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces And this example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of hectic fevers Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise, and

this insight is given to few And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire should be examined, it will be found ■ have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths, because from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its own forces, on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it And it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength And one's own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or dependants, all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries And the way to make ready one's own forces will be

ganized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself

CHAPTER XIV

THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

A PRINCE ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline, for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank And, on the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their states And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art, and what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan, and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which

ing in the one disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together And therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them He ought never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war, thus he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study

As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he accustoms his body to hardships, and learns some thing of the nature of localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care Which knowledge is useful in two ways Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better able to undertake its defence, afterwards, by means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study hereafter, because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage

Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him, ■ commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the rules of war, and when he was in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them "If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, how ought we to set about it? If they

armed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants Because, there be

any unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with

fruit of his rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

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Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the ruin is ready made, they are all united, all yield obedience to others, but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time

all at once to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardly is most dangerous, in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to his own, and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.

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But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering

warded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the first danger, recognizing this himself, and wish

it is recognized, except to his cost, if he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come to be more con-

people, thus it comes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few

We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have been considered mean the rest have failed Pope Julius the Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of France and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on his subjects for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long thriftiness The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal A prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him to govern

And if any one should say Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, and by being considered so, I answer Either you are a prince in fact, or in a way to become one In the first case this liberality is

considered very liberal, I reply Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or

belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by soldiers And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects you can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander because it does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it, it is only squandering your own that injures you

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor

for it is wiser to have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred

CHAPTER XVII

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED

COMING now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this

than the Florentine people who to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not

robberies for these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the individual only

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the imputation of cruelty,

great things with armies, who have been con-

owing to new states being full of dangers Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign owing to its being new, saying

*Res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moriri, et late fines custode tueri*²

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable

Upon this a question arises whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are ungrateful,

but when it approaches they turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined, because friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured and in time of need cannot be relied upon, and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage, but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred, because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss

But when a prince is with his army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated that having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to fight in foreign lands, no dis-

effect. And shortsighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of men, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain: this arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more licence than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Inasmuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio, but, he being under the control of the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others, he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted

¹ against my will my fate
A throne unsettled and an infant state
Bid me defend my realms with all my powers,
And guard with these severities my shores

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES
SHOULD KEEP FAITH

Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force: the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts, but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipline which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion, because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this nonobservance. Of this endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes, and he who has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler, and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone

who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims, for there never was a man who had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less, nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to his wishes, because he well understood this side of mankind.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.

And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to faith, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it.

For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above named five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them, and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody, because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it, and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there

only when the many have no ground to rest on

One prince¹ of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else

a time

CHAPTER XIX

THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above I have spoken of the more important ones the others I wish to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible, and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of which he must abstain And when neither their property nor honour is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean spirited, irresolute from all of which a prince should guard himself as from a rock, and he should endeavor

either to deceive him or to get round him

lent man and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty For this reason a prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from

ways remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by conspiracy, and even should affairs

outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has only to fear that they

him to accomplish, as I said above at length And one of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his removal, but when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite And as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful, because he who conspires can not act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage, so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him, but on the side of the prince there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to defend him, so that, adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime, because on account of it he has the people for an en-

Annibale Bentivoglio, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale), having been murdered by the Cameschi, who had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer Giovanni, who was in childhood immediately after his assassination

¹ Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor

the people rose and murdered all the *Ganneschi*. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those days in Bologna, which was so great that, although none remained there after the death of Annibale who were able to rule the state, the *Bolognese*, having information that there was one of the Bentivoglio family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in esteem, but when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and security of the king, of these the first is the parliament and its authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit in their mouths would be necessary to hold them in, and, on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the king, therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities

of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me, at the same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus they were Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended with the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many, for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people, because the people loved peace and for this reason they loved the unassuming prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training had no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the principality recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the people, a course which turned out advantageous to them or not, according as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, [Aurelius], Pertinax, and Alexander, being all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a

sad end except Marcus, he alone lived and died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people, and afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them, thus having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones: therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him unjudged, nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the army conspired against him and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious—men who to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of iniquity against the people, and all, except Severus, came to a bad end, but in Severus there was so

so much admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to imitate.

had been killed by the praetorian soldiers, and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two difficulties, one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor, the other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it

Caesar, and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague, which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had received from

the actions of this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox, he will find him feared and respected by every one and not hated by the army, and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his violence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a war like man, most enduring of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate

courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict them, but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare, he has only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard, which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and soldiers, but,

things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against and killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated and despised, the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial seat, he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may be added his own army this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting with dif-

this discourse to a conclusion by saying that

has to give them some indulgence, that is soon done, none of these princes have armies that are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire, and whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar, being entirely in the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly formed principality because the sons of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones, for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above named emperors, and it will be recognized also how it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the principality, and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of

Severus but he ought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm

CHAPTER XX

ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

1 SOME princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their subjects others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions others have fostered enmities against themselves, others have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their governments some have built fortresses, some have overthrown and destroyed them And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit

2 There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects, rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them because, by arming them those arms become yours those men who were distrusted become faithful and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects become your adherents And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite understand makes the former your dependants, and the latter considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you But when you disarm them you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you

rendered soft and effeminate, and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you

3 Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses, and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily This may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for today, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use, rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities, and although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state Such methods argue therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality, such methods for enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious

4 Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted and therefore for tune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise and form designs against him in order that he may have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised For this reason many consider that a wise prince, when he

the men of that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it, and these again, with time and opportunity, should be

more fidelity and assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by others But on this question

one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual, I will only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a principedom have been hostile, if they are of a disposition to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them, and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which in

easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under the former gov-

cesses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Città di Castello so that he might keep that state, Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it, the Bentivoglio returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances, if they do you good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more

than any other disorder in the state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not to be

ing foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forlì, when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed, for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus recover her state, and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her enemy were allied with foreigners. Therefore it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things considered then I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.

CHAPTER XXI

HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN

Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in Christendom, and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all

out any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations, thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater schemes he devoted himself with a pious cruelty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors, nor could

there be a more admirable example, nor one more rare Under this same cloak he assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France, and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of them And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against him

Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernaboda Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about And a prince ought, above all things, always to endeavour in every action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself in favour of one party against the other, which course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral because if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war strenuously, because in the first case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you Because he who conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial, and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand, court his fate

Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive out the Romans He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral, and on the other hand the Romans urged them to take up arms This question came to be discussed in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand neutral To this the Roman legate answered "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous, because by not interfering you will be

left, without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror" Thus it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with arms And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity, and men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard, especially to justice But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you become companions in a fortune that may rise again

In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him, and conquering it is impossible that he should not with your assistance, he remains in your discretion And here it is to be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above, because

and this alliance, which caused them to ally, could have been avoided But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of the parties

Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses, rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble without running into another, but prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of

ing up trade for fear of taxes, but the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way to honour his city or state

Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year, and as every city is divided into guilds or into societies, he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them sometimes and show himself an example of courtesy and liberality, nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything

CHAPTER XXII

CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

THE choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they are good or not according to their merit and not according to their rank

faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them

There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafrò as the servant of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to be a very clever man in having Venafrò

is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it follows necessarily that if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the second for whenever one has judgment to know good or bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the initiative yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct, thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest

But to enable a prince to form an opinion of

his servant there is one test which never fails, when you see the servant thinking more of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever be able to trust him because he who has the state of another in his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned

On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses sharing with him the honours and cares, and at the same time let him see that he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread changes. When therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other

CHAPTER XXIII

HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

I DO NOT wish to leave out an important branch of this subject for the danger from which

of themselves or within courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way so deceived in them that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the

you the truth does not offend you, but when every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates

he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these councillors separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them should know that the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred, outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on,

and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs to Maximilian the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the above, for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish, he ought rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it, but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.

And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression of his wisdom is

an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from him.

But if a prince who is not experienced should take counsel from more than one, he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.

CHAPTER XXIV

WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

THE previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to appear well established and render him at once more secure and fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than ancient blood, because men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further: they will also make the utmost defence

strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example, so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.

And if those seigniors are considered who

common defect in regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length, in the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom.

Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the

when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to fall because

only because that deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself, those only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour

CHAPTER XXV

WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them, and because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes ponder-

perhaps a little less

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows the plains, sweep-

men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain her

this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance to fortune in general

But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies entirely upon fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by various methods, one with caution, another with haste, one by force, another by skill, one by patience, another by its opposite, and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail, and similarly, two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other impetuous, all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows

and the other does not

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made but if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently

to leave it, and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not

were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France, nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover all the kingdom of Naples, on the other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him soldiers without manifestly offending him. Therefore Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff with simple human wisdom could have done, for if he had waited in Rome until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the contrary: but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.

I conclude therefore that fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill use her, and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.

CHAPTER XXVI

AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

HAVING carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a new prince, and whether there were the elements that would give an opportunity to a wise

and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.

And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses: that the Persians should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the soul of Cyrus, and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy should be reduced to the extremity she is now in, that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians, without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn over, and to have endured every kind of desolation.

Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him: so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal

cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God to send some one who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than in your illustrious house, with its valour and fortune, favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.

With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is necessary, and arms are hal-

I have directed your attention to urgent matters,

how extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has

may be considered very formidable, neverthe-

them For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Switzers are afraid of infantry when ever they encounter them in close combat Ow ing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish infantry And although a complete proof of this latter cannot be shown nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by

was not good, and none of us have known how to find a new one And nothing honours a man more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen Such things when they are well founded and dignified will make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in every form

Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats how superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and sublety But when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from the

up, all would have been over with them It is

need not create a new order of arms but a variation upon the old And these are the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new prince

Bologna Mestre

If, therefore your illustrious house wishes to follow those remarkable men who have re deemed their country, it is necessary before all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own forces because there can be no more faithful truer, or better soldiers And although singly they are good al together they will be much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and maintained at his expense Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended against foreigners by Italian valour

And although Swiss and Spanish infantry

prises are undertaken so that under its stand ard our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch

*l'irtu contro al Furore
Prenderà l'arce e fia il combatter corto
Che l'antica valore
Negli italici cuor non è ancor morto*

LEVIATHAN

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

THOMAS HOBBS 1588-1679

1600's later commented that he was thus born a twin with fear' and ever after 'abominated

disappeared as the result of a brawl at the church door. He entered Oxford at fourteen or fifteen, but found little to please him in the scholastic program based upon Aristotle. As he later declared in his *Autobiography* instead of studying, he 'fed his mind on maps and charts of earth and sky, tracked the sun in its path and followed Drake and Cavendish as they girdled the main." His opportunity to travel came upon graduation when he was appointed tutor to the Cavendish family, thus begin

as the companion and tutor to his young patron. He travelled through France and Italy, becoming acquainted with the customs and languages, and learning for the first time of the growing revolt against scholasticism. Upon his return he studied the ancient classical authors with a new zeal. Although he claimed that he read the Greek and Latin writers in order to polish his Latin and English style the first result of his studies reveals an interest in political problems. For his translation of Thucydides, which he submitted to his friend, Ben Jonson, for criticism of its style was published

describes the event as follows. He was twenty years old before he looked upon geometry, which happened accidentally being in a gentleman's library, . . . Euclid's *Elements* lay

open, and it was the 47th Prop., Lib. I. So he reads the proposition 'By G—,' says he, 'this is impossible.' So he reads the demonstration, which referred him back to another, which he also read, and *sic deinceps* that at last he was demonstratively convinced of that truth. That made him in love with geometry.' The object of his love, as he later declared, was 'not the theorems but the method of geometry, its art of reasoning." From that moment he never lost his interest in mathematics.

Recalled to the Cavendish family to tutor the new Earl of Devonshire, Hobbes devoted the next few years to training his young pupil in the classics: rhetoric, logic, astronomy, and the principles of law. In 1634 he accompanied him on an extensive tour of France and Italy. During this voyage he began his inquiries into natural philosophy, seeking out the secrets of matter and motion, whether on horseback, afloat, or on the road. He made the acquaintance of Mersenne in Paris and became a member of the intellectual circle of which the Minim father was the center. In Italy he visited Galileo, who, according to one rumor, suggested to him that ethics might be treated in the method of geometry. It was from the time of this voyage, Hobbes claimed, that he began to be numbered among the philosophers, and he returned home in 1637 prepared to expound his philosophical system in a tripartite treatise, on body, on man, and on society.

The rumblings of Civil War interrupted his plans for the orderly exposition of his ideas, and instead of his contemplated work, he produced the 'little treatise' on the *Elements of Law Natural and Politique* in which he defended the royal prerogative. Although it was

and last sojourn abroad and it lasted for eleven years, spent mostly in or about Paris. Well come back to Mersenne's scientific circle, he was included among those chosen to make pre-publication criticism of Descartes' *Meditations*. His criticism, however, proved to be rather a

cause of separation than of friendship. He continued his scientific inquiries, and a short treatise on optics, and a condensed statement of his doctrine on motion as applied to psychological phenomena were included among the tracts published by Mersenne. But it was above all to political problems that he devoted his attention. He formulated the first detailed statement of his political theory in the *De Cive*, published by Elzevier in 1647. At the same time he was appointed tutor in mathematics to the young Prince of Wales, later Charles II.

To reach a wider public than was possible for his treatise in Latin, Hobbes prepared to give a definitive expression to his political thought in English. He published in two volumes the 'little treatise' which had led to his

ments concerning Government and Society. Finally, in 1651, he published his *magnum opus*, the *Leviathan*. Its publication cost him the support of the royalist refugees, even though he presented the Prince of Wales with a special copy. Its doctrine angered the royalist Anglican divines and at the same time made him fear the action the Catholic authorities in France might take against him. He was, as he later wrote, 'forced to fly to England for refuge,' where, having made his submission to the Council of State, he was allowed to return to private life.

Renewing his ties with the Earl of Devon

shire, who had continued to send him his yearly pension, Hobbes fitted the final pieces into his philosophical system with the publication of the *De Corpore* (1655) and the *De Homine* (1658). The adverse reception of his works immediately plunged him into a series of controversies, which occupied him almost continuously from his seventieth year until his death at the age of ninety-one. He was particularly sensitive to attacks on his 'solutions' of mathe-

of Oxford. The controversy led to the exclusion of Hobbes from the Royal Society, which was founded at the time by Boyle and other friends of Wallis.

Although Hobbes regained royal favor after the accession of his former pupil as Charles II, his alleged atheism brought him under suspicion, and after 1666, when Parliament threatened action against the *Leviathan*, he was never able to get permission to print anything on ethical subjects. His Latin works, published after this time, were brought out in Amsterdam, and many of his writings were not made public until after his death.

In his last years Hobbes returned to the literary pursuits of his youth, composing his autobiography in Latin verse at the age of eighty-four and, the year following, translating both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. He died at the country house of his lifelong patron, December 4, 1679.

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To My Most Honored Friend
Mr. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN
of Godolphin

HONORED SIR,

YOUR most worthy brother, Mr Sidney Godolphin, when he lived, was pleased to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with real testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthiness of his person. For there is not any virtue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God or to the service of his country, to civil society or private friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inherent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to yourself, I humbly dedicate unto you this my discourse of Commonwealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great liberty, and on the other side for too much authority, 'tis hard to pass between the points of both undisturbed. But yet, methinks, the endeavour to advance the civil power should not be by the civil power condemned, nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that power too great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but (in the abstract) of the seat of power (like to those simple and impartial creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noise defended those within it, not because they were they, but there), offending none, I think, but those without, or such within (if there be any such) as favour them. That which perhaps may most offend are certain texts of Holy Scripture, alleged by me to other purposes than ordinarily they used to be by others. But I have done it with due submission, and also (in order to my subject) necessarily, for they are the outworks of the enemy, from whence they impugn the civil power. If notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse your self, and say I am a man that love my own opinions and think all true I say, that I honoured your brother, and honour you, and have presumed on that to assume the title, without your knowledge, of being, as I am,

SIR,

Your most humble, and most
obedient servant,
THO. HOBBS

Paris, April 13th, 1651

INTRODUCTION

NATURE (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part with in, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring, and the nerves but so many strings, and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of Nature, *man*. For

ment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to

to know are suggested unto it, are the memory, equity and laws, an artificial reason and will, concord, health, sedition, sickness, and civil

God in the Creation

To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider

First, the *matter* thereof and the *artificer* both which is *man*

Secondly, *how* and by what *covenants* it is made what are the *rights* and *just power or authority* of a *sovereign* and what it is that *preserveth* and *dissolveth* it.

Thirdly what is a *Christian Commonwealth*

Lastly, what is the *Kingdom of Darkness*

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired, not

by reading of books but of men. Consequently

thyself which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance either the barbarous state of men in power towards their inferiors, or to encourage men of low degree to a saucy behaviour towards their betters but to teach us that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth when he does think,

upon the like occasions only a few of the passions, which are the same in all men,—desire, fear, hope, etc., not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped etc. for these the constitution in individual, and particular education, do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge that the characters of man's heart, blotted

And though by men's actions we do discover their design sometimes yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distin

much trust or by too much diffidence, as he that reads is himself a good or evil man

not this or that particular man, but mankind which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science, yet, when I shall have set down my own reading orderly and perspicuously, the pains left another will be only to consider if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration

THE FIRST PART

Of Man

CHAPTER I

Of Sense

CONCEPTS, which are the first and most general notions of the mind, are derived from the senses.

THESE are the objects which worketh on the eyes, ears, and other organs of sense.

For there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.

To know the natural cause of sense is not very necessary to the business now in hand, and I have elsewhere written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of sense is the motion of the object which worketh on the eyes, ears, and other organs of sense.

smelling which pressure, by the mediation of

or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself which endeavour because outward, seemeth to be some

in a sound, to the nostril, in an odour, to the tongue and palate, in a savour and to the rest of the body in heat, cold, hardness softness, and such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All which qualities called *sensible* are in the object that causeth them but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed

are they anything else but diverse motions (for motion produceth nothing but motion). But

also we see or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies or objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses and in echoes by reflection we see they are where we know the thing we see is in one place, the appearance, in another. And though at some certain distance the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us, yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense in all cases is nothing else but original fancy caused (as I have said) by the pressure that is, by the motion of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs, there unto ordained.

But the philosophy schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and say for hearing and for seeing that the

into the eye as *seeing*. And for the cause of hearing, that the thing heard sendeth forth an *audible species* that is, an audible aspect, or

sendeth forth an *intelligible species*, that is, an intelligible being seen, which, coming into the understanding, makes us *understand*. I say not this, as disapproving the use of universities but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way what things would be amended in them, amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one

CHAPTER II

Of Imagination

THAT when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless

not only other men, but all other things, by themselves and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain and lassitude, think everything else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord, little considering whether it be not some other motion wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves consisteth. From hence it is that the schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them, ascribing appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their conservation (which is more than man has), to things inanimate, absurdly

When a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder it) eternally, and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees, quite extinguish it: and as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time after, so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in the internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, etc. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it the Latins call *imagination*, from the image made

proper to one sense as to another. Imagination, therefore, is nothing but *decaying sense*, and is found in men and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking.

The decay of sense in men waking is not the

ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible; there-

though the impression be made in the sense

obscured and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved: so that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place that which we look at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts, and as voices grow weak and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time our imagination of the past is weak, and we lose, for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many particular circumstances. This *decaying sense*, when we would express the thing itself (I mean *fancy* itself), we call *imagination*, as I said before. But when we would express the

imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is *simple imagination*, as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is *compounded*, as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person with the image of the actions of another man, as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander (which happeneth often to them that are much taken

impression made in sense as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark, though awake, have the images of lines and angles before his eyes; which kind of fancy

we call *dreams*. And these also (as all other imaginations) have been before, either totally or by parcels in the sense. And because in sense, the brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there can happen in sleep no imagination, and therefore no dream, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of man's body, which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the brain and other organs, when they be distempered do keep the same in motion, whereby the imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were waking, saving that the organs of sense being now benumbed, so as there is no new object which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a dream must needs be more clear in this silence of sense than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible, to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my part when I consider that in dreams I do not often nor constantly think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions that I do waking nor remember so long a train of coherent thoughts *dreaming* as at other times, and because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts I am well satisfied that, being awake, I know I dream not, though when I dream, I think myself awake.

And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body, diverse distempers must needs cause different dreams. And hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear and raiseth the thought and image of some fearful object the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal and that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body when we are awake so when we sleep the overheating of the same parts causeth anger and raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same manner, as natural kindness when we are awake causeth desire and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body, so also too much heat in those parts, while we sleep raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations, the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, and when we dream, at an other.

The most difficult discerning of a man's

dream from his waking thoughts is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts and whose conscience is much troubled, and that sleepeth without the circumstances of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chair. For he that taketh pains, and industriously lays himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him cannot easily think it other than a dream. We read of Marcus Brutus (one that had his life given him by Julius Caesar and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murdered him), how at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearful apparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision, but, considering the circumstances one may easily judge to have been but a short dream. For sitting in his tent pensive and troubled with the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him, which fear, as by degrees it made him wake so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to vanish and having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream, or anything but a vision. And this is no very rare accident for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be superstitious and possessed with fearful tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in churchyards, whereas it is either their fancy only, or else the knavery of such persons as make use of such superstitious fear to pass disguised in the night to places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from wit and sense did arise the greater part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and the like, and nowadays the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. For, as for witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any real power but yet that they are justly punished for the false belief they have that they can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can, their trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science. And for fairies and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has, I think been on purpose either taught, or not allowed to keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such conventions of ghostly men. Nevertheless there is no

doubt but God can make unnatural apparitions but that He does it so often as men need to fear such things more than they fear the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, in no point of Christian faith But evil men, under pretext that God can do anything, are so bold as to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue, it is the part of a wise man to believe them no further than right reason makes that which they say appear credible If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience

And this ought to be the work of the schools, but they rather nourish such doctrine For (not knowing what imagination or the senses are) what they receive they teach some saying that imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause, others that they rise most commonly from the will and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts, by the Devil, or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God and evil ones by the Devil Some say the senses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the common sense, and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood

The imagination that is raised in man (or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signs,

ceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech and of this kind of understanding I shall speak here after

CHAPTER III

Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations

By consequence, or train of thoughts, I understand that succession of one thought to another

which is called, to distinguish it from discourse in word, *mental discourse*

When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently But as we have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole or in parts, so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses The reason whereof is this All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense, and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense continue also together after sense in so much as the former coming again to take place and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plain table is drawn which way

another, succeedeth, it comes to pass in time that in the imagining of anything, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next, only this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another

This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts The first is *unguided* without

desire, or other passion, in which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a dream Such are commonly the thoughts of men that are not only without company, but also without care of anything, though even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony, as the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man, or in tune, to one that could not play And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft times perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought

of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me

that brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ, and that again the thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason and thence easily followed that malicious ques-

tion, and all this in a moment of time for thought is quick

The second is more constant, as being regulated by some desire and design For the impression made by such things as we desire or fear, is strong and permanent, or (if it cease for a time) of quick return so strong it is sometimes as to hinder and break our sleep From desire ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we aim at, and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean, and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power And because the end, by the greatness of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander they are quickly again reduced into the way

your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts

On a man and beast The other is, when imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it when we have it Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst lust, and anger In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but seeking, or the faculty of invention which the Latins call *sagacitas* and *solertia* a hunting out of the causes of some effect, present or past or of the effects of some present or past cause Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost, and from that place, and time, wherein he misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where and when he had it that is to say, to find some certain and limited time and place in which to begin a method of seeking Again from thence his thoughts run over the same places and times to find what action or other occasion might make him lose it This we call remembrance or calling to mind the Latins call *reminiscentia* as it were a re-conning of our former actions

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to seek, and then his thoughts run over all the parts

thereof in the same manner as one would sweep a room to find a jewel, or as a spaniel ranges the field till he find a scent, or as a man should run over the alphabet to start a rhyme

Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action, and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another, supposing like events will follow like actions As he that foresees what will become of a criminal re-cons what he has seen follow on the like crime before, having this order of thoughts, the crime, the officer the prison, the judge and the gallows Which kind of thoughts is called *foresight*, and *prudence* or *providence*, and sometimes *wisdom* though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious But this is certain by how much one man has more experience of things past than another, by so much also he is more prudent and his expectations the seldomer fail him The present only has a being in nature things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all, the future being but a fiction of the mind applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present, which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough And though it be called *prudence* when the event answereth our expectation yet in its own nature it is but *presumption* For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy The best prophet naturally is the best guesser and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at, for he hath most signs to guess by

A sign is the event antecedent of the consequent and contrarily, the consequent of the antecedent when the like consequences have been observed before and the oftener they have been observed, the less uncertain is the sign And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of business has most signs whereby to guess at the future time and consequently is the most prudent and so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of natural and extemporary wit, though perhaps many young men think the contrary

Nevertheless, it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast There be beasts that at a year old observe more and pursue that which is for their good more prudently than a child can do at ten

As prudence is a *presumption* of the future, contracted from the experience of time past so there is a presumption of things past taken from other things, not future, but past also For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come into civil war, and then to ruin, upon the sight of the ruins of any other state will guess the like war and the like courses have been there also But this conjecture has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the future, both being grounded only upon experience

There is no other act of man's mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so as to need no other thing to the exercise of it but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses Those other faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man only, are acquired and increased by study and industry, and of most men learned by instruction and discipline, and proceed all from the invention of words and speech For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts the mind of man has no other motion though by the help of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to distinguish men from all other living creatures

Whatsoever we imagine is *finite* Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call *infinite* No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive in finite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power When we say anything is in finite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing

honour Him Also because whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts, a man can have no thought representing any thing not subject to sense No man therefore can conceive anything but he must conceive it

and all in another place at the same time, nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philoso-

phers and deceived, or deceiving, Schoolmen

CHAPTER IV

Of Speech

THE INVENTION of printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of letters is no great matter But who was the first that found the use of letters is not known He that first

ory of time past, and the conjunction of man kind dispersed into so many and distant re

other organs of speech, whereby to make as many differences of characters to remember them But the most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of *speech* consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion, whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation, without which there had been amongst men neither Commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures

give him occasion, and to join them in such manner by degrees as to make himself understood, and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten as he had found use for, though not so copious as an orator or philosopher has need of For I do not find anything in the Scripture out of which, directly or by consequence, can be gathered that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations, much less the names of words and speech, as *general, special, affirmative, negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive*, all which are useful, and least of all, of *entity, intentionality, quiddity*, and other insignificant words of the school

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God every man was stricken for his rebellion with an oblivion of his former language And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into sev-

eral parts of the world, it must needs be that the diversity of tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them in such manner as need, the mother of all inventions, taught them, and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious

The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words, and that for two commodities, whereof one is the registering of the consequences of our thoughts, which being apt to slip out of our memory and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for marks or notes of remembrance. Another is when many use the same words to signify, by their connexion and order one to another, what they conceive or think of each matter, and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called *signs*. Special uses of speech are these. First, to register what by cogitation we find to be the cause of anything, present or past, and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect, which, in sum, is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which we have attained, which is to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes that we may have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong by the inconstancy of the signification of their words, by which they register for their conceptions that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically, that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for, and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern, and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects consisteth in the imposing of *names*, and the connexion of them.

Of names, some are *proper* and singular to

one only thing, as Peter, John, this man, this tree and some are *common* to many things, as man, horse, tree, every of which, though but one name, is nevertheless the name of diverse particular things, in respect of all which together, it is called a *universal*, there being nothing in the world universal but names, for the things named are every one of them individual and singular.

One universal name is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality, or other accident and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.

And of names universal, some are of more and some of less extent, the larger comprehending the less large, and some again of equal extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the name *body* is of larger signification than the word *man* and comprehendeth it, and the names *man* and *rational* are of equal extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here we must take notice that by a name is not always understood, as in grammar, one only word, but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all these words, *He that in his actions observeth the laws of his country* make but one name, equivalent to this one word, *just*.

By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of speech at all, (such as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb), if he be set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles (such as are the corners of a square figure), he may by meditation compare and find that the three angles of that triangle are equal to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shown him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle, but only to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three, and that that was all, for which he named it a triangle, will boldly conclude universally that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever, and register his invention in these general terms. *Every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles*. And thus the consequence found in

particular comes to be registered and remembered as a universal rule, and discharges our

here, and now to be true in all times and places

But the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so evident as in numbering. A natural fool that could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as *one, two, and three* may observe every stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say *one one one*, but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems there was a time when those names of number were not in use, and men were fain to apply their fingers of one or both hands to those things they desired to keep account of, and that thence it proceeded that now our numeral words are but ten, in any nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he has done much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers, much less of magnitudes of swiftness of force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being or well being of mankind.

When two names are joined together into a consequence, or affirmation, as thus, *A man is a living creature*, or thus, *If he be a man, he is a living creature* if the latter name *living creature* signify all that the former name *man* signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence, is true, otherwise false. For true and false are at tributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood. Error there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been, but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth.

Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will find himself entangled in words as a bird in lime

man that aspires to true knowledge examine the definitions of former authors, and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down or to make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering wheth

way to clear themselves, but spend time in flut

which way they came in. So that in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse, from which proceed all false and senseless tenets, which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation to be as much below the condition of ignorant men as men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err and as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more mad, than ordinary. Nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them but they are the money of fools that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject to names is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an account, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money *rationales*, and accounting *ratiocinatio* and that which we in bills or books of account call *items*, they called *nomina* that is, names and thence it seems to proceed that they extended the word *ratio* to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word, *logos*, for both speech and reason not that they thought there

was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech; and the act of reasoning they called *sylogism*, which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for diverse accidents, their names are (to show that diversity) diversely wrested and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to four general heads

First, a thing may enter into account for matter, or body, as *living, sensible, rational, hot, cold, moved, quiet*, with all which names the word *matter, or body*, is understood; all such being names of matter

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality which we conceive to be in it, as for *being moved, for being so long, for being hot*, etc., and then, of the name of the thing itself, by a little change or wresting, we make a name for that accident which we consider, and for *living* put into the account *life, for moved, motion, for hot, heat, for long, length*, and the like. And all such names are the names of the accidents and properties by which one matter and body is distinguished from another. These are called *names abstract* because severed, not from matter, but from the account of matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction as when anything is *seen* by us, we reckon not the thing itself, but the *sight*, the *colour*, the *idea* of it in the fancy, and when anything is *heard*, we reckon it not, but the *hearing* or *sound* only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the ear. And such are names of fancies

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to names themselves, and to speeches for, *general, universal, special, equivocal* are names of names. And *affirmation, interrogation, commandment, narration, syllogism, sermon, oration*, and many other such are names of speeches. And this is all the variety of names *positive*, which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to be. Or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be, or words and speech

There be also other names, called *negative*, which are notes to signify that a word is not the name of the thing in question, as these words *nothing, no man, infinite, indocible, three is not four*, and the like, which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of

reckoning, and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of anything; because they make us refuse to admit of names not rightly used.

All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by definition, whereof there have been abundance coined by Schoolmen and puzzled philosophers

Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent, as this name, an *incorporeal body*, or, which is all one, an *incorporeal substance*, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say a *quadrangle* is *round*, the word *round quadrangle* signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the words *impoured virtue, inblown virtue*, are as absurd and insignificant as a *round quadrangle*. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called by the name of *Parole* but by the name of *Verbe* often, yet *Verbe* and *Parole* differ no more but that one is Latin, the other French.

When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to understand it: *understanding* being nothing else but conception caused by speech. And therefore if speech be peculiar to man, as for ought I know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no understanding, though many think they understand then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man's mind, and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the passions.

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, *because* we all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are supposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affects are not our conceptions, when we conceive the same thing differently, we can hardly avoid difference.

ing of them For though the nature of that we conceive be the same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words, which, besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtues and vices for one man calleth *wisdom* what another calleth *fear*, and one *cruelly* what another *justice*, one *prodigality* what another *magnanimity*, and one *gravity* what another *stupidity*, etc And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination No more can metaphors and tropes of speech but these are less dangerous because they profess their *inconstancy*, which the other do not

CHAPTER V

Of Reason and Science

WHEN a man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from *addition* of parcels, or conceive a remainder, from *subtraction* of one sum from another which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole, or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part And though in some things, as in numbers, besides adding and subtracting, men name other operations, as *multiplying* and *dividing*, yet they are the

tions are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers, so

to make an affirmation, and two affirmations to make a syllogism, and many syllogisms to

add together pactions to find men's duties, and lawyers, laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men In sum, in what matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place

for reason, and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do

Out of all which we may define (that is to say determine) what that is which is meant by

when we reckon by ourselves, and *signifying*, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men

And as in arithmetic unpractised men must, and professors themselves may often, err, and cast up false, so also in any other subject of reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men may deceive themselves, and infer false conclusions, not but that reason itself is always *right reason*, as well as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art but no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty, no more than an account is therefore well cast up because a great many men have unanimously approved it And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord set up for right reason the reason of some arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a right reason constituted by Nature, so is it also in all debates of what kind soever and when men that think themselves wiser than all others clamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more but that things should be determined by no other men's reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned to use for trump on every occasion that suit whereof they have most in their hand For they do nothing else, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in their own controversies bewraying their want of right reason by the claim they lay to it

The use and end of reason is not the finding of the sum and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions and settled significations of names, but to begin at these, and proceed from one consequence to

grounded and inferred As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the

sums of all the bills of expense into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account, nor what it is he pays for, he advantages himself no more than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of the accountant's skill and honesty so also in reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of authors, and doth not fetch them from the first items in every reckoning (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour, and does not know anything, but only believeth.

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, as when upon the sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it, if that which he thought likely to follow follows not, or that which he thought likely to have preceded it hath not preceded it, this is called *error* to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false though it be commonly called *error* it is indeed an *absurdity* or senseless speech. For error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come, of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of \equiv is inconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound are those we call *absurd*, *insignificant* and *nonsense*. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a *round quadrangle* or *accidents of bread in cheese*, or *immaterial substances* or of a *free subject*, a *free will*, or any *free* but *free* from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd.

I have said before, in the second chapter, that a man did excel all other animals in this faculty, that when he conceived anything whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to general rules, called *theorems* or *aphorisms*, that is, he can reason, or reckon, not only in number, but in all other things whereof one may be added unto or subtracted from another.

But this privilege is allayed by another, and that is by the privilege of absurdity, to which

no living creature is subject, but men only. And of men, those are of all most subject to it that profess philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere, that there can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions or explanations of the names they are to use, which is a method that hath been used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made in disputable.

1 The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of method, in that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions, that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account without knowing the value of the numeral words, *one, two, and three*.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon diverse considerations, which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter, these considerations being diversely named, diverse absurdities proceed from the confusion and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore,

2 The second cause of absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of bodies to accidents, or of accidents to bodies, as they do that say, *faith is infused* or *inspired*, when nothing can be poured, or breathed into anything, but body, and that *extension is body*, that *phantasms are spirits* etc.

3 The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us to the accidents of our own bodies, as they do that say, *the colour is in the body*, *the sound is in the air* etc.

4 The fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies to names, or speeches, as they do that say that there be things *universal* that a *living creature is genus* or a *general thing* etc.

5 The fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents to names and speeches, as they do that say, *the nature of a thing is its definition*, *a man's command is his will*, and the like.

6 The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. For though it be lawful to say, for example, in common speech, *the way goeth*, or *leadeth hither*, or *thither* the proverb says *this or that* (whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak), yet in reckoning and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

7 The seventh, to names that signify nothing, but are taken up and learned by rote from the Schools, as *hypostatical*, *transubstantiate*

consubstantiate, eternal now, and the like canting of Schoolmen

To him that can avoid these things, it is not easy to fall into any absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account, wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid as both to mistake in geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

Industry first in apt imposing of names, and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another and so to syllogisms which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand, and that is it men call *science*. And whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable, science is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another, by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will or the like, another time because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes and by what manner, when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects

Children therefore are not endued with reason at all, till they have attained the use of speech, but are called reasonable creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little way, as in numbering to some degree, yet it serves them to little use in common life, in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends, but specially according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so far from it that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought concurring but for other sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progress in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children that, having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden

But yet they that have no science are in better and nobler condition with their natural prudence than men that, by misreasoning or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so far out of their way as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

To conclude, the light of humane minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity, reason is the *pace*, increase of science, the *way* and the benefit of mankind, the *end*. And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words are like *ignes fatui*, and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities, and their end, contention and sedition or contempt.

As much experience is *prudence*, so much science *sapience*. For though we usually have one name of *wisdom* for them both, yet the Latins did always distinguish between *prudentia* and *sapientia* ascribing the former to experience, the latter to science. But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms, and another to have added to that dexterity an acquired science of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversary, in every possible posture or guard. The ability of the former would be to the ability of the latter, as prudence to sapience, both useful, but the latter infallible.

fence, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary that either kills or disgraces him

The signs of science are some certain and infallible, some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the science of anything can teach the same, that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously. Another uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible. But in any business, whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed by, to forsake his own natural judgment, and be guided by general sentences read in authors and subject to many exceptions, is a sign of folly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry. And even of those men themselves

particular interest is concerned, having prudence enough for their private affairs, but in public they study more the reputation of their own wit than the success of another's business

CHAPTER VI

Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions, commonly called the Passions, and the Speeches by which they are expressed

THERE be in animals two sorts of motions peculiar to them. One called *vital*, begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life, such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc., to which motions there needs no help of imagination: the other is *animal* motion, otherwise called *voluntary* motion, as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, etc., and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion remaining after sense has been already said in

look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all, but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it *metaphorical motion*, which is but an absurd speech, for though words may be called metaphorical, bodies and motions can not.

That which men desire they are also said to love, and to hate those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing, save that by *desire* we always signify the absence of the object, by *love* most commonly the presence of the same. So also by *aversion*, we signify the absence, and by *hate*, the presence of the object.

Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men, as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration (which may also and more properly be called aversions from some what they feel in their bodies), and some other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from experience and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all or believe not to be, we can have no further desire than to taste and try. But aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Those things which we neither desire nor hate, we are said to contemn: *contempt* being nothing else but an immobility or contumacy of the heart in resisting the action of certain things, and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects, or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions: much less can all men consent in the desire of almost any one and the same object.

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth *good*: and the object of his hate and aversion, *evil*: and of his contempt, *vile* and *inconsiderable*. For these words of *good*, *evil* and *contemptible* are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so: nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the na-

of it insensible yet that doth not hinder but that such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion within the body of man before they appear in walking, speaking, striking and other visible actions, are commonly called *endeavour*.

This endeavour when it is toward some thing which causes it, is called *appetite*, or *de-*

aversion we have from the Latins, and they both of them signify the motions, one of ap-

ture of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man, where there is no Commonwealth, or, in a Commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof

The Latin tongue has two words whose significations approach to those of good and evil, but are not precisely the same, and those are *pulchrum* and *turpe*. Whereof the former signifies that which by some apparent signs promiseth good, and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for *pulchrum* we say in some things, *fair*, in others, *beautiful*, or *handsome*, or *gallant*, or *honourable*, or *comely*, or *amiable* and for *turpe*, *foul*, *deformed*, *ugly*, *base*, *nauseous*, and the like, as the subject shall require, all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the

delightful, and good as the means, which is called *utile*, profitable, and as many of evil for evil in promise is that they call *turpe*, evil in effect and end is *molestum*, unpleasant, troublesome, and evil in the means, *inutile*, unprofitable, hurtful

As in sense that which is really within us is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects but in appearance, to the sight, light and colour, to the ear, sound, to the nostril, odour, etc. so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour, which consisteth in appetite or aversion to or from the object moving. But the appearance or sense of that motion is that we

seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion,

pearance or sense of good, and molestation or displeasure, the appearance or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love is accompanied with some delight more or less;

and all hatred and aversion with more or less displeasure and offence

Of pleasures, or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; and those may be called *pleasures of sense* (the word *sensual*, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no place till there be laws). Of this kind are all operations and exonerations of the body, as also all that is pleasant, in the sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. Others arise from the ex-

those consequences, and are generally called *joy*. In the like manner, displeasures are some in the sense, and called *pain*, others, in the expectation of consequences, and are called *grief*

These simple passions called *appetite*, *desire*, *love*, *aversion*, *hate*, *joy*, and *grief* have their names for diverse considerations diversified. At first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself

For appetite with an opinion of attaining is called *hope*.

The same, without such opinion, *despair*.

Aversion, with opinion of hurt from the object, *fear*.

The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, *courage*.

Sudden courage, *anger*.

Constant hope, *confidence* of ourselves

Constant despair, *diffidence* of ourselves.

Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by injury, *indignation*

Desire of good to another, *benevolence*, *good will*, *charity*. If to man generally, *good nature*.

name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Contempt of little helps, and hindrances,
magnanimity

Magnanimity in danger of death, or wounds,
valour fortitude

Magnanimity in the use of riches *liberality*
Pusillanimity in the same, *wretchedness*,
miserableness, or *parimony*, as it is liked, or
disliked

Love of persons for society, *kindness*
Love of persons for pleasing the sense only,
natural lust

Love of the same acquired from rumination
that is, imagination of pleasure past, *luxury*

Love of one singularly, with desire to be sin-
gularly beloved, *the passion of love* The same,
with fear that the love is not mutual, *jealousy*

Desire by doing hurt to another to make him
condemn some fact of his own *vengefulness*

Desire to know why, and how, *curiosity* such
as is in no living creature but man so that man
is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also
by this singular passion from other animals in
whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures
of sense, by predominance, take away the care
of knowing causes, which is a lust of the mind,
that by a perseverance of delight in the con-
tinual and indefatigable generation of knowledge,
exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal
pleasure

Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind,
or imagined from tales publicly allowed, *religion*
not allowed, *superstition* And when the
power imagined is truly such as we imagine,
true religion

Fear without the apprehension of why, or
what, *panic terror* called so from the fables
that make Pan the author of them whereas in
truth there is always in him that so feareth
first, some apprehension of the cause, though
the rest run away by example, every one sup-
posing his fellow to know why And therefore
this passion happens to none but in a throng,
or multitude of people

Joy from apprehension of novelty, *admira-
tion* proper to man because it existeth the ap-
petite of knowing the cause

Joy arising from imagination of a man's own
power and ability is that exultation of the mind
which is called *glorying* which, if grounded
upon the experience of his own former actions,
is the same with *confidence* but if grounded on
the flattery of others, or only supposed by him-
self, for delight in the consequences of it, is
called *vain glory* which name is properly given,
because a well grounded confidence begetteth
attempt, whereas the supposing of power does

not, and is therefore rightly called *vain*

Grief, from opinion of want of power, is
called *dejection* of mind

The *vain glory* which consisteth in the feign-
ing or supposing of abilities in ourselves, which
we know are not, is most incident to young
men, and nourished by the histories or fictions
of gallant persons, and is corrected oftentimes
by age and employment

Sudden glory is the passion which maketh
those grimaces called *laughter*, and is caused
either by some sudden act of their own that
pleaseth them, or by the apprehension of some
deformed thing in another, by comparison
whereof they suddenly applaud themselves And
it is incident most to them that are conscious
of the fewest abilities in themselves who are
forced to keep themselves in their own favour
by observing the imperfections of other men
And therefore much laughter at the defects of
others is a sign of pusillanimity For of great
minds one of the proper works is to help and
free others from scorn and compare themselves
only with the most able

On the contrary, sudden dejection is the pas-
sion that causeth *weeping* and is caused by
such accidents as suddenly take away some
vehement hope or some prop of their power
and they are most subject to it that rely prin-
cipally on helps external, such as are women and
children Therefore, some weep for the loss of
friends, others for their unkindness, others for
the sudden stop made to their thoughts of re-
venge, by reconciliations But in all cases, both
laughter and weeping are sudden motions, cus-
tom taking them both away For no man laughs
at old jests, or weeps for an old calamity

Grief for the discovery of some defect of abil-
ity is *shame* is the passion that discovereth it
self in blushing, and consisteth in the apprehen-
sion of something dishonourable, and in young
men is a sign of the love of good reputation,
and commendable in old men is a sign of
the same but because it comes too late, not
commendable

The contempt of good reputation is called
impudence

Grief for the calamity of another is *pity* and
ariseth from the imagination that the like ca-
lamity may befall himself, and therefore is
called also *compassion* and in the phrase of this
present time a *fellow-feeling* and therefore for
calamity arising from great wickedness, the
best men have the least pity, and for the same
calamity, those have least pity that think them-
selves least obnoxious to the same

Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call *cruelty*, proceeding from security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Grief for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called *emulation*; but joined with endeavour to supplant or hinder a competitor, *envy*.

and evil consequences of the doing or omitting the thing propounded come successively into our thoughts, so that sometimes we have an appetite to it sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it, the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call *deliberation*.

Therefore of things past there is no deliberation because manifestly impossible to be changed nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so, because men know or think such deliberation vain. But of things possible, which we think possible, we may deliber-

This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears is no less in other living creatures than in man, and therefore beasts also deliberate.

Every deliberation is then said to end when

our appetite, or aversion

In deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the *will*, the act, not the faculty, of *willing*. And beasts that have deliberation must necessarily also have will. The definition of the will, given commonly by the Schools, that it is a *rational appetite* is not good. For if it were, then could

ing from a precedent deliberation, then the will

nition is the same that I have given here. *Will*, therefore, is the last appetite in deliberating. And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will once to do a thing, that never theless he forbore to do, yet that is properly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary, because the action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appetite. For if the intervening appetites make any action voluntary, then by the same reason all intervening aversions should make the same action involuntary, and so one and the same action should be both voluntary and involuntary.

By this it is manifest that, not only actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites to the thing propounded, but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or fear of those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions.

The forms of speech by which the passions are expressed are partly the same and partly different from those by which we express our thoughts. And first generally all passions may be expressed *indicatively* as, *I love, I fear, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command*; but some of them have particular expressions by themselves which nevertheless are not affirmations unless it be when they serve to make other inferences besides that of the passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed *subjunctively* which is a speech proper to signify suppositions, with their consequences, as, *If this be done, then this will follow*, and differs not from the language of reasoning, save that reasoning is in general words, but deliberation for the most part is of particulars. The language of desire, and aversion, is *imperative*, as, *Do this, forbear that*, which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is *command*, otherwise *prayer*, or else *counsel*. The language of vainglory, of indignation, pity and revengefulness, *optative*; but of the desire to know, there is a peculiar expression called *interrogative* as, *What is it when shall it, how is it done and why so?* Other language of the passions I find none for cursing, swearing, reviling and the like do not signify as speech, but as the actions of a tongue accustom'd.

These forms of speech, I say, are expressions or voluntary significations of our passions but certain signs they be not, because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims,

which we otherwise know the man to have

And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate, the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for

exceedeth the good, the whole is *apparent* or *seeming evil* so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself, and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others

Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that

but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear no more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know than enjoy, being joys that now are as incomprehensible as the word of Schoolmen, *beatifical vision* is unintelligible

by they signify the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called *μακαριςμος*, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions

CHAPTER VII

Of the Ends or Resolutions of Discourse

OF ALL discourse governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an end, either by attaining or by giving over. And in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time

If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be, or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you leave him in a presumption of *it will be* or, *it will not be*, or *it has been*, or, *has not been*. All which is

opinion. And that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good and evil, the same is alternate opinion in the enquiry of the truth of past and future. And as the last appetite in deliberation is called the *will* so the last opinion in search of the truth of past and future is called the *judgement*, or resolute and final sentence of him that discourseth. And as the whole chain of appetites alternate in the question of good or bad is called *deliberation* so the whole chain of opinions alternate in the question of true or false is called *doubt*

No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute

science it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse that this, or that, is has been, or will be, which is to know absolutely but only that if this be, that is, if this has been, that has been, if this shall be, that shall be, which is to know conditionally and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing

And therefore when the discourse is put in to speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of these again in to syllogisms, the end or last sum is called the *conclusion* and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called *science*. But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is

same fact, they are said to be *conscious* of it one to another, which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was and ever will be reputed a very evil act for any man to speak against his conscience, or to corrupt or force another so to do inasmuch that the plea of conscience has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards men made use of the same word metaphorically for the knowledge of their own secret facts and secret thoughts, and therefore it is rhetorically said that the conscience is a thou sand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently

in love with their own new opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that revered name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them, and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that they think so

When a man's discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called *opinion*, or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not, and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the person, and the resolution is called *belief*, and *faith* faith, in the man, belief, both of the man, and of the truth of what he says So that in belief are two opinions, one of the saying of the man, the other of his virtue. To have faith in, or trust to, or believe a man, signify the same thing, namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man but to believe what is said signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying But we are to observe that this phrase, *I believe in*, as also the Latin, *credo in*, and the Greek, πιστεύω ἐν, are never used but in the writings of divines Instead of them, in other writings are put *I believe him*, *I trust him*, *I have faith in him* *I rely on him*, and in Latin, *credo illi*, *fido illi*, and in Greek, πιστεύω αὐτῷ, and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith

But by believing in, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the person, but confession and acknowledgement of the doctrine For not only Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God as to hold all for truth they hear Him say, whether they understand it or not, which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever, but they do not all believe the doctrine of the Creed

From whence we may infer that when we

but from the authority and good opinion we have of him that hath said it, then is the speak-

And consequently, when we believe that the

word we take, and acquiesce therein And they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of God take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true or a false prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For if I should not believe all that is written by historians of the glorious acts of Alexander or Caesar, I do not think the ghost of Alexander or Caesar had any just cause to be offended, or anybody else but the historian If Livy say the gods made once a cow speak, and we believe it not, we distrust not God therein, but Livy So that it is evident that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason than what is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings, whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.

CHAPTER VIII

Of the Virtues commonly called Intellectual, and their contrary Defects

VIRTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence, and consisteth in comparison For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized And by *virtues intellectual* are always understood such abilities of the mind as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves, and go commonly under the name of a *good wit*, though the same word, *wit*, be used also to distinguish one certain ability from the rest

These virtues are of two sorts, *natural* and *acquired* By *natural*, I mean not that which a man hath from his birth for that is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues But I mean that wit which is gotten by use only, and ex-

succession of one thought to another); and steady direction to some approved end. On the contrary, a slow imagination maketh that defect or fault of the mind which is commonly called *dullness*, *stupidity*, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved

And this difference of quickness is caused by the difference of men's passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another. and therefore some men's thoughts run one way,

some another, and are held to and observe dif

like or what they serve for, or how they serve to such a purpose those that observe their similitudes in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others are said to have a *good wit* by which in this occasion is meant a *good fancy* But they that observe their differences

are said to have a *good judgement* and particularly in matter of conversation and business, wherein times places and persons are to be discerned this virtue is called *discretion* The former that is fancy, without the help of judgement is not commended as a virtue but the latter which is judgement and discretion is commended for itself without the help of fancy

end that is to say to some use to be made of them This done he that hath this virtue will be easily fitted with similitudes that will please not only by illustration of his discourse and adorning it with new and apt metaphors but also by the rarity of their invention But without steadiness, and direction to some end a great fancy is one kind of madness such as they have

sions and parentheses that they utterly lose themselves which kind of folly I know no particular name for but the cause of it is sometimes want of experience whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare which doth not so to others sometimes pusillanimity by which that seems great to him which other men think a trifle and whatsoever is new or great and therefore thought fit to be told withdraws a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse

In a good poem, whether it be epic or dramatic as also in sonnets epigrams and other pieces both judgement and fancy are required but the fancy must be more eminent because they please for the extravagancy, but ought not to displease by indiscretion

In a good history the judgement must be eminent because the goodness consisteth in the

method in the truth and in the choice of the actions that are most profitable to be known Fancy has no place but only in adorning the style

In orations of praise, and in invectives, the

ment does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable or culpable

In hortatives and pleadings as truth or disguise serveth best to the design in hand so is the judgement or the fancy most required

is so much use of fancy But for metaphors they are in this case utterly excluded For seeing they openly profess deceit to admit them into council or reasoning were manifest folly

And in any discourse whatsoever if the defect of discretion be apparent how extravagant soever the fancy be the whole discourse will

things holy prophane clean obscene grave and light without shame or blame which verbal discourse cannot do farther than the judgement shall approve of the time place and persons An anatomist or a physician may speak or write his judgement of unclean things because it is not to please but profit but for an

Again in professed remissness of mind and familiar company a man may play with the sounds and equivocal significations of words and that many times with countenance of extraordinary fancy but in a sermon or in public

When the thoughts of a man that has a design in hand running over a multitude of things observes how they conduce to that design or what design they may conduce unto

if his observations be such as are not easy, or usual, this wit of his is called *prudence*, and de-

of men as there is in their fancies and judgements, because the experience of men equal in age is not much unequal as to the quantity,

more than to draw a picture in little, or as great or greater than the life, are different degrees of art. A plain husbandman is more prudent in affairs of his own house than a Privy Counselor in the affairs of another man.

To prudence, if you add the use of unjust or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted

of unjust or dishonest helps. And that which the Latins call *versutia* (translated into English, *shifting*), and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity by engaging into a

As for *acquired wit* (I mean acquired by method and instruction), there is none but reason, which is grounded on the right use of speech, and produceth the sciences. But of reason and science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth chapters.

The causes of this difference of wits are in the passions, and the difference of passions proceedeth partly from the different constitution of the body, and partly from different education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less difference of men in their sight, hearing, or other senses than in their fancies and discretions. It proceeds, therefore, from the passions, which are different not only from the difference of men's complexions, but also from their

sion for any of these things, but is as men term

much judgement. For the thoughts are to the

have no desire is to be dead, so to have weak passions is dullness, and to have passions indifferently for everything, giddiness and distraction.

of the passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion proceedeth from the evil constitution of the organs of

of one and the same nature.

The passion whose violence or continuance maketh madness is either great vainglory, which is commonly called *pride* and *self-conceit*, or great dejection of mind.

Pride subjecteth a man to anger, the excess whereof is the madness called *rage* and *fury*. And thus it comes to pass that excessive desire of revenge, when it becomes habitual, hurteth the organs, and becomes *rage*, that excessive love, with jealousy, becomes also *rage*, excessive opinion of a man's own self, for divine inspiration, for wisdom, learning, form, and the like, becomes distraction and giddiness, the same joined with envy, *rage*, vehement opinion of the truth of anything, contradicted by others, *rage*.

Dejection subjects a man to causeless fears, which is a madness commonly called *melancholy*, apparent also in diverse manners, as in haunting of solitudes and graves, in superstitious behaviour, and in fearing some one, some another, particular thing. In sum, all passions that produce strange and unusual behaviour are called by the general name of *madness*. But of the several kinds of madness, he that would take the pains might enrol a legion. And if the excesses be madness, there is no doubt but the passions themselves, when they tend to evil, are degrees of the same.

For example, though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible always in one man by

any very extravagant action that proceedeth from such passion, yet when many of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough For what argument of madness can there be greater than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those by whom all their lifetime before they have been protected and secured from injury And if this be madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the midst of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him, yet he is well assured that part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea as any other part of the same quantity so also, though we perceive no great uneasiness in one or two men, yet we may be well assured that their singular passions are parts of the seditionous roaring of a troubled nation And if there were nothing else that betrayed their madness, yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves is argument enough If some man in Bedlam should entertain you with sober discourse, and you desire in taking leave to know what he were that you might another time requite his civility, and he should tell you he were God the Father, I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his madness

This opinion of inspiration, called commonly, *private spirit*, begins very often from some lucky finding of an error generally held by others, and not knowing, or not remembering, by what conduct of reason they came to so singular a truth, as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on, they presently admire themselves as being in the special grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally by his Spirit

Again, that madness is nothing else but too much appearing passion may be gathered out of the effects of wine, which are the same with those of the evil disposition of the organs For the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much is the same with that of mad men some of them raging, others loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their several domineering passions for the effect of the wine does but remove dissimulation, and take from them the sight of the deformity of their passions For, I believe, the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling

the vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publicly seen, which is a confession that passions unguided are for the most part mere madness

The opinions of the world, both in ancient and later ages, concerning the cause of madness have been two Some, deriving them from the passions, some, from demons or spirits, either good or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in such strange and uncouth manner as madmen use to do The former sort, therefore, called such men, *madmen* but the latter called them sometimes *demoniacs* (that is, possessed with spirits), sometimes *energumens* (that is, agitated or moved with spirits), and now in Italy they are called not only *pazzi*, madmen, but also *spiritati*, men possessed

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a city of the Greeks, at the acting of the tragedy of *Andromeda*, upon an extreme hot day whereupon a great many of the spectators, falling into fevers, had this accident from the heat and from the tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce iambs, with the names of Perseus and Andromeda, which, together with the fever, was cured by the coming on of winter and this madness was thought to proceed from the passion imprinted by the tragedy Likewise there reigned a fit of madness in another Grecian city which seized only the young maidens, and caused many of them to hang themselves Thus was by most then thought an act of the devil But one that suspected that contempt of life in them might proceed from some passion of the mind, and supposing they did not concern also their honour, gave counsel to the magistrates to strip such as so hanged themselves, and let them hang out naked Thus, the story says, cured that madness But on the other side, the same Grecians did often ascribe madness to the operation of the *Eumenides*, or *Furies*, and sometimes of *Ceres*, *Phœbus*, and other gods so much did men at tribute to phantasms as to think them aerial living bodies, and generally to call them spirits And as the Romans in this held the same opinion with the Greeks, so also did the Jews, for they called madmen *prophets*, or, according as they thought the spirits good or bad, *demoniacs*, and some of them called both prophets and demoniacs madmen; and some called the same man both demoniac and madman But for the Gentiles, it is no wonder, because diseases and health, vices and virtues, and many natural accidents were with them termed and wor

shipped as demons So that a man was to understand by *demon* as well sometimes an *ague* as a *devil* But for the Jews to have such opinion is somewhat strange For neither Moses nor Abraham pretended to prophesy by possession of a spirit, but from the voice of God, or by a vision or dream nor is there anything in his law, moral or ceremonial, by which they were taught there was any such enthusiasm, or any possession When God is said to take from the spirit that was in Moses, and give to the seventy elders, the spirit of God, taking it for the substance of God, is not divided¹ The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man mean a man's spirit inclined to godliness And where it is said, "Whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron"² is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments, but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of work In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an *unclean spirit* and so other spirits, though not always, yet as often as the virtue or vice, so styled is extraordinary and eminent Neither did the other prophets of the Old Testament pretend enthusiasm, or that God spoke in them, but to them, by voice, vision, or dream, and the burden of the Lord³ was not possession, but command How then

osity to search natural causes, and their placing felicity in the acquisition of the gross pleasures of the senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto For they that see any strange and unusual ability or defect in a man's mind, unless they see withal from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it natural and if not natural, they must needs think it supernatural, and then what can it be, but that either God or the Devil is in him? And hence it came to pass, when our Saviour was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him but the Scribes said he had Beelzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out devils, as if the greater madman had awed the lesser⁴ And that some said, "He hath a devil, and is mad", whereas others, holding him for a prophet, said, "These are not the words of one that hath a devil"⁵ So in the Old

Testament he that came to anoint Jeshu was a Prophet, but some of the company asked Jeshu, "What came that madman for?"⁶ So that, in sum, it is manifest that whosoever behaved himself in extraordinary manner was thought by the Jews to be possessed either with a good or evil spirit, except by the Sadducees, who erred so far on the other hand as not to believe there were at all any spirits, which is very near to direct atheism, and thereby perhaps the more provoked others to term such men *demoniacs* rather than madmen

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possessed, and not as if they were mad? To which I can give no other kind of answer but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth The Scripture was written to show unto men the kingdom of God, and to prepare their minds to become His obedient subjects leaving the world, and the philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men for the exercising of their natural reason Whether the earth's or sun's motion make the day and night, or whether the exorbitant actions of men proceed from passion or from the Devil, so we worship him not, it is all one, as to our obedience and subjection to God Almighty, which is the thing for which the Scripture was written As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease as to a person, it is the usual phrase of all that cure by words only, as Christ did, and enchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a devil or not For is not Christ also said to have rebuked the winds?⁷ Is not he said also to rebuke a fever?⁸ Yet this does not argue that a fever is a devil And whereas many of those devils are said to confess Christ, it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise than that those madmen confessed Him And whereas our Saviour speaketh of an unclean spirit that, hav

parable, alluding to a man that, after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them, and becomes seven times worse than he was So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture that requirerth a belief

¹ Numbers 11 25

² Exodus, 28 3

³ Mark, 3 11

⁴ John, 10 20

⁵ II Kings, 9 21

⁶ Matthew, 8 26.

⁷ Luke, 4 39

⁸ Matthew, 12 43

that demoniacs were any other thing but madmen

There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men, which may also be numbered amongst the sorts of madness, namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter by the name of absurdity

and repeat by rote, by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity And this is incident to none but those that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoolmen, or in questions of abstruse philosophy The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other egregious persons, counted idiots But to be assured their words are without anything correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples, which if any man require, let

the nature of Christ, transubstantiation, free will, etc., into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible, or into any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted withal

tion of the second causes, by which it may help it to work?" They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of Suarez's first book, *Of the Concourse Motion and Help of God* When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the question of transubstantiation, where after certain words spoken they that say, the whiteness roundness magnitude quality corruptibility all which are in corporeal, etc., go out of the wafer into the body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those

that this kind of absurdity may rightly be numbered amongst the many sorts of madness, and all the time that, guided by clear thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing or writing thus, but lucid intervals And thus much of the virtues and defects intellectual

CHAPTER IX

Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge

THERE are of knowledge two kinds, whereof one is knowledge of fact, the other, knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another The former is nothing else but sense and memory, and is *absolute knowledge*, as when we see a fact doing, or remember it done, and this is the knowledge required in a wit-ness The latter is called *science*, and is conditional, as when we know that *if the figure shown be a circle, then any straight line through the center shall divide it into two equal parts* And this is the knowledge required in a philosopher, that is to say, of him that pretends to reasoning

The register of knowledge of fact is called *history* whereof there be two sorts one called *natural history*, which is the history of such facts, or effects of Nature, as have no dependence on man's will, such as are the histories of metals, plants, animals, regions, and the like The other is *civil history*, which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in Commonwealths

The registers of science are such books as contain the demonstrations of consequences of one affirmation to another, and are commonly called *books of philosophy* whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the matter, and may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following table, [page 72]

CHAPTER X


Of Power Worth, Dignity Honour and Worthiness

THE POWER of a man to take it universally, is his present means to obtain some future apparent good, and is either original or instrumental

Natural power is the eminence of the faculties of body, or mind, as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility *Instrumental* are those powers which, acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and

bodies, which, the further they go make still the more haste

The greatest of human powers is that which



is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will, such as is the power of a Commonwealth or depending on the wills of each particular, such as is the power of a faction, or of diverse factions leagued Therefore to have servants is power, to have friends is power for they are strengths united

Also, riches joined with liberality is power, because it procureth friends and servants with out liberality, not so, because in this case they defend not, but expose men to envy, as a prey

Reputation of power is power, because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection

So is reputation of love of a man's country, called *popularity*, for the same reason

Also, what quality soever maketh a man be loved or feared of many, or the reputation of such quality, is power, because it is a means to have the assistance and service of many

Good success is power, because it maketh reputation of wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either fear him or rely on him

Affability of men already in power is in crease of power, because it gaineth love

Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power, because to prudent men we commit the government of ourselves more willingly than to others

Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those Commonwealths where it has privileges, for in such privileges consisteth their power

Eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence

Form is power, because being a promise of good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers

The sciences are small powers because not eminent, and therefore, not acknowledged in any man, nor are at all, but in a few, and in them, but of a few things For science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it

Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war, because they confer to defence and victory, are power, and though the true mother of them be science, namely, the mathematics, yet, because they are brought into the light by the hand of the artificer, they be esteemed (the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother) as his issue

The value or worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price, that is to say, so much as

would be given for the use of his power, and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another An able conductor of soldiers is of great price in time of war present or imminent, but in peace not so A learned and uncorrupt judge is much worth in time of peace, but not so much in war And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they can, yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others

The manifestation of the value we set on one another is that which is commonly called *honouring* and *dishonouring* To value a man at a high rate is to honour him, at a low rate is to dishonour him But high and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself

The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the Commonwealth, is that which men commonly call *dignity* And this value of him by the Commonwealth is understood by offices of command, judicature, public employment, or by names and titles introduced for distinction of such value

To pray to another for aid of any kind is to honour, because a sign we have an opinion he has power to help, and the more difficult the aid is, the more is the honour

To obey is to honour because no man obeys them who they think have no power to help or hurt them And consequently to disobey is to dishonour

To give great gifts to a man is to honour him, because it is buying of protection, and acknowledging of power To give little gifts is to dishonour him

To confess to another that he is greater than we are, is to honour, being a confession of greater power To arrogate is to dishonour

To show any sign of love or fear of another is to honour, for both to love and to fear is to value To contemn, or less to love or fear than he expects, is to dishonour, for it is under valuing

To praise, magnify, or call happy is to honour, because nothing but goodness, power, and felicity is valued To revile, mock, or pity is to dishonour

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency and humility.

is to honour him; as signs of fear to offend To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to dishonour

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to honour him, sign of opinion of his virtue and power To distrust, or not believe, is to dishonour

To hearken to a man's counsel, or discourse of what kind soever, is in honour, as a sign we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to dishonour

To do those things to another which he takes for signs of honour, or which the law or custom makes so, is to honour, because in approving the honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge To refuse to do them is to dishonour

To agree with in opinion is to honour, as being a sign of approving his judgement and wisdom To dissent is dishonour, and an upbraiding of error, and, if the dissent be in many things of folly

To imitate is to honour, for it is vehemently to approve To imitate one's enemy is to dishonour

To honour those another honours is to honour him, as a sign of approbation of his judgement To honour his enemies is to dishonour him

To employ in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to honour, as a sign of opinion of his wisdom or other power To deny employment in the same cases to those that seek it is to dishonour

All these ways of honouring are natural, and as well within, as without Commonwealths where he or they that have the supreme authority can make whatsoever they please to stand for signs of honour, there be other honours

A sovereign doth honour a subject with what soever title, or office, or employment, or action that he himself will have taken for a sign of his will to honour him

the king's horses, with a crown on his head, and a prince before him, proclaiming, "Thus shall it be done to him that the king will honour" And yet another king of Persia, or the

dition, that he should wear it as the king's fool and then it was dishonour So that of civil honour, the fountain is in the person of the Commonwealth, and dependeth on the will of the sovereign, and is therefore temporary and called civil honour, such as are magistracy, of fices, titles, and in some places coats and scutcheons painted and men honour such as have them, as having so many signs of favour in the Commonwealth, which favour is power

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality is an argument and sign of power

And therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of many is honourable, as arguments of power To be honoured of few or none, is dishonourable

Dominion and victory is honourable, because acquired by power and servitude, for need or fear, is dishonourable

Good fortune, if lasting, honourable, as a sign of the favour of God Ill fortune and losses, dishonourable Riches are honourable, for they are power Poverty, dishonourable Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence, are honourable, for they proceed from the conscience of power Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence, are dishonourable

Timely resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is honourable, as being the con-

tages for when a man has weighed things as

All actions and speeches that proceed, or seem to proceed, from much experience, science, discretion, or wit are honourable, for all these are powers Actions or words that proceed from error, ignorance, or folly, dishonourable

Gravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on something else, is honourable, because employment is a sign of

sand and other trash

To be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good is honourable, as a sign of the power for which he is conspicuous On the contrary, obscurity is dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous parents is honourable, because they the more easily attain the aids and friends of their ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage is dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from equity, joined with loss, are honourable, as signs of magnanimity for magnanimity is a sign of power. On the contrary, craft, shifting, neglect of equity, is dishonourable.

Covetousness of great riches, and ambition of great honours, are honourable, as signs of power to obtain them. Covetousness, and ambition of little gains, or preferments, is dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of honour whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power) be just or unjust for honour consisteth only in the opinion of power. Therefore, the ancient heathen did not think they dishonoured, but greatly honoured the gods, when they introduced them in their poems committing rapes, thefts, and other great, but unjust or unclean acts, in so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter as his adulteries nor in Mercury as his frauds and thefts, of whose praises, in a hymn of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning he had invented music at noon, and before night stolen away the cattle of Apollo from his herdsmen.

Also amongst men till there were constituted great Commonwealths it was thought no dishonour to be a pirate, or a highway thief, but rather a lawful trade, not only amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other nations, as is manifest by the histories of ancient time. And at this day, in this part of the world, private duels are and always will be, honourable, though unlawful, till such time as there shall be honour ordained for them that refuse, and ignominy for them that make the challenge. For duels also are many times effects of courage, and the ground of courage is always strength or skill, which are power, though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of dishonour, in one or both the combatants, who, engaged by rashness, are driven into the lists to avoid disgrace.

Scutcheons and coats of arms hereditary, where they have any eminent privileges, are honourable, otherwise not for their power consisteth either in such privileges, or in riches or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of honour, commonly called *gentry* has been derived from the ancient Ger-

mans. For there never was any such thing known where the German customs were unknown. Nor is it now anywhere in use where the Germans have not inhabited. The ancient Greek commanders, when they went to war, had their shields painted with such devices as they pleased, insomuch as an unpainted buckler was a sign of poverty, and of a common soldier, but they transmitted not the inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the marks of their families, but they were the images, not the devices of their ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Africa, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans only had that custom, from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain and Italy, when in great numbers they either aided the Romans or made their own conquests in these western parts of the world.

For Germany, being anciently, as all other countries in their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little lords, or masters of families, that continually had wars one with another, those masters, or lords, principally to the end they might, when they were covered with arms, be known by their followers, and partly for ornament, both painted their armor, or their scutcheon, or coat, with the picture of some beast, or other thing, and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the crest of their helmets. And this ornament both of the arms and crest descended by inheritance to their children, to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the old master, that is in say in Dutch, the *Here al* thought fit. But when many such families, joined together, made a greater monarchy, this duty of the herald in distinguish scutcheons was made a private office apart. And the issue of these lords is the great and ancient gentry, which for the most part bear living creatures noted for courage and rapine, or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars, palisades, and other notes of war nothing being then in honour, but virtue military. Afterwards, not only kings, but popular Commonwealths gave diverse manners of scutcheons to such as went forth to the war, or returned from it, for encouragement or recompense to their service. All which, by an observing reader, may be found in such ancient histories, Greek and Latin as make mention of the German nation and manners in their times.

Titles of honour, such as are *duke*, *count*, *marquis*, and *baron* are honourable, as signifying the value set upon them by the sovereign.

power of the Commonwealth which titles were in old time titles of office and command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans and French Dukes, in Latin, *duces*, being generals in war, counts, *comites* such as bore the general company out of friendship, and were left to govern and defend places conquered and pacified, marquises, *marchiones* were counts that governed the marches, or bounds of the Empire Which titles of duke, count, and marquis came into the Empire about the time of Constantine the Great from the customs of the German militia But *baron* seems to have been a title of the Gauls, and signifies a great man such as were the kings or princes' men whom they employed in war about their persons and seems to be derived from *uir* to *ber*, and *bar* that signified the same in the language of the Gauls, that *uir* in Latin and thence to *bero* and *baro* so that such men were called *berones* and after *barones*, and (in Spanish) *varones* But he that would know more, particularly the original of titles of honour, may find it, as I have done this in Mr Selden's most excellent treatise of that subject In process of time these offices of honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peaceable government, were turned into mere titles, serving, for the most part to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Commonwealth and men were made dukes, counts marquises, and barons of places, wherein they had neither possession nor command and other titles also were devised to the same end

Worthiness is a thing different from the worth or value of a man, and also from his merit or desert, and consisteth in a particular power or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy, which particular ability is usually named *fitness* or *aptitude*

For he is *worthiest* to be a commander, to be

and valuable for something else Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment that nevertheless can plead no right to

CHAPTER XI

Of the Difference of Manners

BY MANNERS, I mean not here decency of behaviour, as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the small morals, but those qualities of man kind that concern their living together in peace and unity To which end we are to consider that the felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied For there is no such *finis ultimus* (utmost aim) nor *summum bonum* (greatest good) as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers Nor can a man any more live whose desires are at an end than he whose senses and imaginations are at a stand Felicity is a continual progress of the desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter The cause whereof is that the object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of his future desire And therefore the voluntary actions and inclina-

partly from the difference of the knowledge or opinion each one has of the causes which produce the effect desired

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death And the cause of this is not all ways that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present without the acquisition of more And from hence it is that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by laws, or abroad by wars and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire, in some, of fame from new conquest, in others, of ease and sensual pleasure, in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind

Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power inclineth to contention, enmity, and war, because the way of one competitor to the attaining of his desire is to kill, subdue,

with the dead to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other

Desire of ease, and sensual delight disposeth men to obey a common power because by such desires a man doth abandon the protection that might be hoped for from his own industry and labour Fear of death and wounds disposeth to the same, and for the same reason On the contrary needy men and hardy, not contented with their present condition, as also all men that are ambitious of military command are inclined to continue the causes of war and to stir up trouble and sedition for there is no honour military but by war nor any such hope to mend an ill game as by causing a new shuffle

Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common power for such desire containeth a desire of leisure, and consequently protection from some other power than their own

Desire of praise disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value for of those men whom we condemn we condemn also the praises Desire of fame after death does the same And though after death there be no reward

the extreme torments of hell yet is not such tame vain because men have a present delight therein from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity

ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite disposeth to counterfeit love, but really secret hatred and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor that, in declining the sight of his creditor tacitly wishes him there where he might never see him more For benefits oblige, and obligation is thralldom and unrequitable obligation perpetual thralldom which is to one's equal, hateful But to have received benefits from one whom we acknowledge for superior inclines to love because the obligation

equal or inferior as long as there is hope of requital, disposeth to love for in the intent on of the receiver the obligation is of aid and service mutual from whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting the most

noble and profitable contention possible, where in the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it

To have done more hurt to a man than he can or is willing to expiate inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer For he must expect revenge or forgiveness both which are hateful

Fear of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate or to seek aid by society for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty

Men that distrust their own subtlety are in tumult and sedition better disposed for victory than they that suppose themselves wise or crafty For these love to consult the other, fearing to be circumvented to strike first And in sedition men being always in the precincts of battle, to hold together and use all advantages of force is a better stratagem than any that can proceed from subtlety of wit

inclined only to ostentation but not to attempt, because when danger or difficulty appears they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered

Vain glorious men such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men or the fortune of some precedent action without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves are inclined to rash engaging and in the approach of danger or difficulty to retire

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter of government are disposed to ambition Because without public employment in counsel or magistracy, the honour of their wisdom is lost And therefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition for eloquence seemeth wisdom both to themselves and others

Pusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution,

one way and the other are not great therefore not to resolve then is to lose the occasion by

quire the strength of many men at once for it

weakeneth their endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigour by reward

Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it, because the former

those men that have them. The two former, having given them caution against danger from him, the latter gives them caution against danger from others

Want of science, that is, ignorance of causes, disposeth or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advice and authority of others

men who on their own

others

at the call, without a perfect understanding of words, be detected

From the same it proceedeth that men give different names to one and the same thing from the difference of their own passions: as they that approve a private opinion call it *opinion*; but they that mislike it *heresy*; and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion, but has only a greater tincture of choler

From the same also it proceedeth that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one

suit, and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led per haps by the persuasion of one

Ignorance of the causes, and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice, disposeth a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions, in such manner as to think that unjust which it hath been the custom to punish, and that just which it hath been the custom to reward

good and evil manners but the correction they receive from their parents and masters, save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men

are not so, because grown strong and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, and to the law

the multitude of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and the sword: where as the doctrine of lines and figures is not so, because men care not, in that subject, what be truth, as a thing that crosses no man's ambition

as the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of geometry suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able

Ignorance of remote causes disposeth men to attribute all events to the causes immediate and instrumental: for these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to pass that

multitude, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the supreme authority, for fear of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon

Ignorance of natural causes disposeth a man to credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true, being unable to detect the truth

believe lies and tell them, and sometimes also to invent them

Anxiety for the future time disposeth men to inquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage

Cuniosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, is

law, that there is some cause whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal, which is it men call *God*. So that it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe there is one *God* eternal, though they cannot have any idea

of Him in their mind answerable to His nature

which determined the same to begin then when it did, rather than sooner or later

what there which men call *fire* and is the cause of the heat he feels, but cannot imagine what it is like, nor have an idea of it in his mind such as they have that see it so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call *God*, and yet not have an idea or image of Him in his mind

And they that make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them, as also

of the time to come for want of observation and memory of the order, consequence, and dependence of the things they see, man observeth how one event hath been produced by another, and remembereth in them antecedence and consequence, and when he cannot assure him-

to the authority of other men such as he thinks to be his friends and wiser than himself

The two first make anxiety For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter, it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come, so that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus For as Prometheus (which, interpreted, is the *prudent man*) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where an eagle, feeding on his liver, devoured in the day as much as was repaired in the night so that man, which looks too far before him in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day

And this seed of religion, having been observed by many, some of those that have observed it have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into laws, and to add to it, of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events by which they thought they should best be able to govern others and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers

in the dark, must needs have for object some

CHAPTER XII

Of Religion

SEEMING there are no signs nor fruit of religion but in man only, there is no cause to doubt but that the seed of religion is also only in man, and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other living creatures

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of man to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see, some more, some less, but all men so much as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune

Secondly, upon the sight of anything that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause

gods of the Gentiles), is very true But the acknowledging of one God eternal, infinite, and omnipotent may more easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies and their several virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come For he that, from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge

himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes, shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the heathen philosophers confessed) one First Mover, that is a first and an eternal cause

clines to fear and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things, and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods as there be men that feign them

And for the matter, or substance, of the in

man, and that the soul of man was of the same

such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature, because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification as *spirit* and *incorporeal* yet they can never have the imagination of anything answering to them and therefore, men that by their own meditation arrive to the acknowledgement of one in

by *spirit incorporeal* and then confess their definition to be unintelligible or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically with intention to make the Divine Nature understood, but *piously*, to honour Him with attributes of

invisible agents wrought their effects, that is to say, what immediate causes they used in bringing things *in* pass, men that know not what it is that we call *causing* (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guess by but by observ

cedent and subsequent event any dependence or connexion at all and therefore from the like

peian faction for their war in Africa, another Scipio, and others have done in diverse other occasions since In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them, as charming and conjuring (the liturgy of witches), insomuch as to believe they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or anything into any thing

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to powers invisible, it can be no other but such expressions of their reverence as they would use towards men gifts, petitions, thanks, submission of body, considerate addresses sober behaviour, premeditated words, swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises) by invoking them Beyond that, reason suggesteth nothing but leaves them either to rest there, or for further ceremonies to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves

good or evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular undertaking men are naturally at a stand, save that using *in* conjecture of the time to come by the time past, they are very apt, not only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, for prognostics of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostics from other men of whom they have once conceived a good opinion

And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion which, by reason of the different fancies,

part ridiculous to another

For these seeds have received culture from

sorts have done it with a purpose to make those men that relied on them the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society So that the religion of the former sort is a part of

human politics, and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings require of their subjects And the religion of the latter sort is *divine politics*, and containeth precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the kingdom of God Of the former sort were all the founders of Commonwealths, and the lawgivers of the Gentiles of the latter sort were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed Saviour, by whom have been derived unto us the laws of the kingdom of God

And for that part of religion which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of powers invisible, there is almost nothing that has a

The unformed matter of the world was a god by the name of Chaos

The heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, the winds were so many gods

Men, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, an onion, a leek, were deified Besides that, they filled almost all places with spirits called *demons* the plains, with Pan and Panises, or Satyrs, the woods with Fauns and Nymphs, the sea, with Tritons and other Nymphs every river and fountain, with a ghost of his name and with Nymphs, every house with its *Lares* or familiars, every man, with his *Genius* Hell,

such as are time, night, day, peace, concord, love, contention, virtue honour, health, rust, fever, and the like, which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall or withholding that good or evil, for or against which they prayed They invoked also their own wit, by the name of Muses, their own ignorance, by the name of Fortune, their own lust, by the name of Cupid, their own rage, by the name Furies, their own privy members by the name of Priapus, and attributed their pollutions to *incubi* and *succubæ*

by their aptness to attribute their fortune to causes on which there was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, instead of second causes, a kind of second and ministerial gods, ascribing the cause of fecundity to Venus, the cause of arts to Apollo, of subtilty and craft to Mercury, of tempests and storms to Æolus, and of other effects to other gods insomuch as there was amongst the heathen almost as great variety of gods as of business

And to the worship which naturally men conceived fit to be used towards their gods, namely, oblations, prayers, thanks, and the rest formerly named the same legislators of the Gentiles have added their images, both in pic-

turers, and revenues, set apart from all other human uses, that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their idols, as caverns, groves, ~~in~~ mountains, and whole islands, and have attributed to them, not only the shapes, ~~some~~ of some some of beasts, some of monsters but also of faculties and passions of men and ~~of~~ sense, speech, sex, lust, generosity, ~~and~~ only by mixing one with another to resemble the kind of gods, but also by ~~the~~ and women to beget mongrel gods and men

power or a cause of pleasure, and all such uses as amongst men are taken to be against law rather than against honesty.

Lastly to the common

gion of the Gentiles, partly upon pretended revelation, have added innumerable other ~~or~~ ~~or~~ divination, and made ~~or~~ find their fortune, ~~or~~ or senseless answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous oracles where answers were made ambiguous by descending the event both ways, or absurd, by evoking vapours of the place, which

frequent in sulphurous caverns* sometimes in the leaves of the Sibyls, of whose prophecies, like those perhaps of Nostradamus (for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times), there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman republic sometimes in the insignificant speeches of madmen, supposed to be possessed with a divine spirit, which possession they called *enthusiasm* and these kinds of foretelling events were accounted *theomancy*, or prophecy sometimes in the aspect of the stars at their nativity, which was called *horoscopy*, and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology sometimes in their own hopes and fears, called *thumomancy* or presage sometimes in the prediction of witches that pretend conference with the dead, which is called

times in dreams sometimes in croaking of ravens, or chattering of birds sometimes in the lineaments of the face, which was called *metoposcopy*, or by palmistry in the lines of the hand, in casual words called *omina* sometimes in monsters or unusual accidents, as eclipses, comets, rare meteors, earthquakes, inundations, uncouth births, and the like, which they called *portentia*, and *ostentia* because they thought them to portend or foreshow some great calamity

other such vain conceits So easy are men to be

and ignorance

And therefore the first founders and legislators of Commonwealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience and peace, have in all places taken care first, to imprint in their minds a belief that those precepts which they gave concerning religion might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some god or other spirit, or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals, that their laws might the more easily be received, so Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans from the nymph Egeria, and the first king and founder of the kingdom of Peru pretended himself and his wife to be the children of the sun, and

Mahomet, to set up his new religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost in

contagions of sickness, earthquakes, and each man's private misery came from the anger of the gods, and their anger from the neglect of their worship, or the forgetting or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required And though amongst the ancient Romans men were not forbidden to deny that which in the poets is written of the pains and pleasures after this life, which divers of great authority and gravity in that state have in their harangues openly derided, yet that belief was always more cherished, than the contrary

And by these, and such other institutions, they obtained in order to their end, which was the peace of the Commonwealth, that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or error in their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the

commotion against the state And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made no scruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of Rome itself, unless it had something in it that could not consist with their civil government, nor do we read that any religion was there forbidden but that of the Jews, who (being the

religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy

But where God himself by supernatural revelation had made to

of religion, and therefore the distinction of

gruity therein than that he that hath the general command of the whole army should have with

God both by nature and covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned another place

From the propagation of religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds or principles, which are only an opinion of a deity, and powers invisible and supernatural, that can never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new religions may again be made to spring out of them by the culture of such men as for such purpose are in reputation

For seeing all formed religion is founded at first upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person whom they believe not only to be a wise man and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man to whom God Himself vouchsafeth to declare His will supernaturally, it followeth necessarily when they that have the government of religion shall come to have either the wisdom of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected, or that they shall be unable to show any probable token of divine revelation that the religion which they desire to uphold must be suspected likewise and (without the fear of the civil sword) contradicted and rejected

That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom in him that formeth a religion or addeth to it when it is already formed, is the enjoining of a belief of contradictories for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true, and therefore to enjoin the belief of them is an argument of ignorance, which detects the author in that, and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernatural which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against natural reason

That which taketh away the reputation of sincerity in the doing or saying of such things as appear to be signs that what they require other men to believe is not believed by themselves, all which doings or sayings are therefore called scandalous because they be stumbling blocks that make men to fall in the way of religion as injustice, cruelty profaneness avarice, and luxury For who can believe that he that doth ordinarily such actions as proceed from any of these roots, believeth there is any such invisible power to be feared as he affright-

eth other men withal for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of love is the being detected of private ends as when the belief they require of others conduceth, or seemeth to conduce, to the acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or secure pleasure to themselves only or specially For that which men reap benefit by to themselves they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine calling can be no other than the operation of miracles, or true prophecy (which also is a miracle), or extraordinary felicity And therefore, to those points of religion which have been received from them that did such miracles, those that are added by such as approve not their calling by some miracle obtain no greater belief than what the custom and laws of the places in which they be educated have wrought into them For as in natural

their hearts

proved his calling to them by miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but forty days, revolted from the worship of the true God recommended to them by him, and, setting up^a a golden calf for their god, relapsed into the idolatry of the Egyptians from whom they had been so lately delivered And again, after Moses, Aaron Joshua, and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel were dead, another

of other people, and therefore cried out to Samuel to choose them a king after the manner of the nations^b So that justice failing faith also failed, inasmuch as they deposed their God from reigning over them

And whereas in the planting of Christian

^a Exodus 32 1, 2.

^b Judges 2 11

^c 1 Samuel, 8 3

religion the oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians increased wonderfully every day and in every place by the preaching of the Apostles and Evangelists, a great part of that success may reasonably be attributed to the contempt into which the priests of the *Catholick* had bro

avarice,

religion

the same *causes* abolished in England and many other parts of Christendom, insomuch as the failing of virtue in the pastors maketh faith fail in the people, and partly from bringing of the philosophy and doctrine of Aristotle into religion by the Schoolmen, from whence there arose so many *controversies*

as brought

ignorance

inclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own princes as in France and Holland, or with their will as in England

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for salvation, there be so many manifestly to the advantage of the Pope and of his spiritual subjects residing in the territories of other Christian princes that, were it not for the mutual emulation of those princes, they might without war or trouble exclude all foreign authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England For who is there that does not see to whose benefit it conduceth to have it believed that a *king* is *heretic*

u

be

be

ju

m

could or should the king be judged a heretic?

That a king, as Childeric of France, may be deposed by a Pope, as Pope Zachary. for no

Or who

does not see to whose profit redound the fees of

private Masses, and vales of purgatory, with

other signs of private interest enough to mortify

the more

tribute all the changes of religion in the world

to one and the same cause, and that is unpleas-

ing priests; and those not only amongst catho-

lics, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of reformation.

CHAPTER XIII

Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as concerning their Felicity and Misery

NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself

And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called *science*, which very few have and but in few things, as being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto That which may perhaps make such

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And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called *science*, which very few have and but in few things, as being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto That which may perhaps make such

hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no more to fear than another man's single power if one plant sow, build or possess a convenient seat others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive him not only of the fruit of his labour but also of his life or liberty And the invader again is in the like danger of another

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation that is by force or wiles

in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest which they pursue farther than their security requires if others that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds should not by invasion increase their power they would not be able, long time by standing only on their defence to subsist And by consequence such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him

Again men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them

mon power to keep them in quiet is far enough to make them destroy each other) to extort a greater value from his contempters by damage, and from others by the example

So that in the nature of man we find three

The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons wives children and cattle the second to defend them the third for trifles as a word a smile a dissident opinion and any other sign of undervalue either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends their nation, their profession or their name

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe they are in that condition which is called *war* and such a war is of every man against every man For war consisteth not in

battle only or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known and therefore the notion of *time* is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary All other time is *peace*

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war where every man is enemy to every man the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal In such condition there is no place for industry because the fruit thereof is uncertain and consequently no culture of the earth no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea no commodious building no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force no knowledge of the face of the earth no account of time no

ish and short

It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things that Nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another and he may therefore not trusting to this inference made from the

locks his doors and of his children and servants when he locks his chests Does he not there as

be made they cannot know nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it

It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time nor condition of war as this,

and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world but there are many places where they live so now For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate into a civil war.

But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings

ing their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war. But because they uphold there by the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.

To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law, where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct, but only that to be every man's that he can get, and

The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their

ture, whereof I shall speak more particularly in the two following chapters.

CHAPTER XIV

Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts

THE right of nature, which writers commonly call *jus naturale*, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the

unto

By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments, which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what

A law of nature, *lex naturalis*, is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject use to confound *jus* and *lex*, right and law yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear, whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every one,

that in such a condition every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature, which is to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is. by all

means we can to defend ourselves

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law *that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself* For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the gospel *Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them* And that law of all men, *quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*

To lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature, but only standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him, not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of right is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original.

Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it, or by transferring it to another. By simply *renouncing*, when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By *transferring*, when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned or granted away his right, then is he said to be *obliged*, or *bound* not to hinder those to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it and that he ought and it is his duty not to make void that voluntary act of his own and that such hindrance is *injustice*, and *injury*, as being *ine jure* the right being before renounced or transferred. So that *injury*, or *injustice*, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that which in the disputations of scholars is called *absurdity*. For as it is there called an absurdity to contradict what one maintained in the beginning, so in the world it is called *injustice*, and *injury* voluntarily to undo that

which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply renounceth or transferreth his right is a declaration, or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he doth so renounce or transfer, or hath so renounced or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only, or actions only, or, as it happeneth most often, both words and actions. And the same are the *bonds*, by which men are bound and obliged *bonds* that have their strength, not from their own nature (for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word), but from fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture.

Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it, it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to assent thereby at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment, both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience, as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded or imprisoned, as also because a man cannot tell when he seeth men proceed against him by violence whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive and end for which this renouncing and transferring of right is introduced is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the end for which those signs were intended, he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will, but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

The mutual transferring of right is that which men call *contract*.

There is difference between transferring of right to the thing, and transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the thing itself. For the thing may be delivered together with the translation of the right, as in buying and selling with ready money, or exchange of goods or lands, and it may be delivered some time after.

Again, one of the contractors may deliver the

thing contracted for on his part, and leave the

covenant or both parts may contract now to perform hereafter, in which cases he that is to

tary, violation of faith

When the transferring of right is not mutual, but one of the parties transferreth in hope to gain thereby friendship or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of charity, or magnanimity, or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion, or in hope of reward in heaven, this is not contract, but *gift, free gift, grace* which words signify one and the same thing

Signs of contract are either *express* or by *inference* Express are words spoken with understanding of what they signify and such words

promise.

Signs by inference are sometimes the consequence of words, sometimes the consequence of silence, sometimes the consequence of actions, sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action and generally a sign by inference, of any contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a free gift and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to come, as, *tomorrow I will give*, they are a sign I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some other act But if the words be of the time present, or past, as, *I have given, or do give to be delivered tomorrow*, then is my tomorrow's right given away today, and that by the virtue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will And there is a great difference in the signification of these words, *volo hoc tuum esse cras*, and *cras dabo*, that is, between *I will that this be thine tomorrow*, and, *I will give it thee tomorrow* for the word *I will*, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will present, but in the latter, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come and therefore the former words, being of the present, transfer a future right; the latter, that be of the

future, transfer nothing But if there be other signs of the will to transfer a right besides words, then, though the gift be free, yet may

run.

In contracts the right passeth, not only where the words are of the time present or past, but also where they are of the future, because all contract is mutual translation, or change of right, and therefore he that promiseth only, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the right should pass for unless he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of contract, a promise is equivalent to a covenant, and therefore obligatory

He that performeth first in the case of a contract is said to *merit* that which he is to receive by the performance of the other, and he hath it as *due* Also when a prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him only that winneth, or money is thrown amongst many to be enjoyed by them that catch it, though this be a free gift, yet so to win, or so to catch, is to merit, and to have it as due. For the right is transferred in the propounding of the prize, and in throwing down the money, though it be not determined to whom, but by the event of the contention But there is between these two sorts of merit this difference, that in contract I merit by virtue of my own power and the contractor's need, but in this case of free gift I am enabled to merit only by the benignity of

part with his right, but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine rather than another's. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schools between *meritum congrui*, and *meritum condigni* For God Almighty, having promised paradise to those men, hooked with carnal desires, that can walk through this world according to the precepts and limits prescribed by him, they say he that shall so walk shall merit paradise *ex congruo*. But because no man can demand a right to it by his own righteousness, or any other power

in himself, but by the free grace of God only, they say no man can merit paradise *ex con digno*. Thus I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction, but because disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own terms of art longer than it serves their turn, I will not affirm anything of their meaning only thus I say, when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth meriteth, and may claim the prize as due

If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspension, it is void but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void For he that performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power, which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed And therefore he which performeth first does but betray himself to his enemy, contrary to the right he can never abandon of defending his life and means of living

But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable, and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first is obliged so to do

The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the covenant made, as some new fact or other sign of the will not to perform, else it cannot make the covenant void For that which could not hinder a man from promising ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing

He that transferreth any right transferreth the means of enjoying it, as far as lieth in his power As he that selleth land is understood to transfer the herbage and whatsoever grows upon it, nor can he that sells a mill turn away the stream that drives it And they that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers, and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice

To make covenants with brute beasts is impossible, because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any transla

tion of right, nor can translate any right to another and without mutual acceptation, there is no covenant

To make covenant with God is impossible but by mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by revelation supernatural or by His lieutenants that govern under Him and in His name for otherwise we know not whether our covenants be accepted or not And therefore

by the law of nature, it is not the vow, but the law that binds them

The matter or subject of a covenant is always something that falleth under deliberation, for to covenant is an act of the will, that is to say, an act, and the last act, of deliberation and is therefore always understood to be something to come, and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth to perform

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible is no covenant But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible the covenant is valid and bindeth, though not to the thing itself, yet to the value, or, if that also be impossible, the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible for to more no man can be obliged

Men are freed of their covenants two ways, by performing or by being forgiven For performance is the natural end of obligation, and forgiveness the restitution of liberty, as being a retransferring of that right in which the obligation consisted

Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy, I am bound by it For it is a contract wherein one receiveth the benefit of life, the other is to receive money, or service for it, and consequently, where no other law (as in the condition of mere nature) forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is valid There fore prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it and if a weaker prince make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for fear, he is bound to keep it, unless (as hath been said before) there ariseth some new and just cause of fear to re

and what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break

A former covenant makes void a later For a man that hath passed away his right to one man today hath it not to pass tomorrow to another and therefore the later promise passeth no right, but is null

A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void For (as I have shown before) no man can transfer or lay down his

the promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right, nor is obliging For though a man may covenant thus, *unless I do so or so kill me*, he cannot covenant thus, *unless I do so or so, I will not resist you when you come to kill me* For man by nature choos-

criminals execution and prison, with armed men notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law by which they are condemned

A covenant to accuse oneself without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid For in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation and in the civil state the accusation is followed with punishment which, being force a man is not obliged not to resist The same is also true of the accusation of those by whose condemnation a man falls into misery, as of a father wife, or benefactor For the testimony of such an accuser, if it be not willingly given, is presumed to be corrupted by nature and therefore not to be received and where a man's testimony is not to be credited, he is not bound to give it Also accusations upon torture are not to be reputed as testimonies For torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination and search of truth and what is in that case confessed tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured, not to the informing of the torturers, and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient testimony for whether he

of their covenants, there are in man's nature but two imaginable helps to strengthen it And those are either a fear of the consequence of

breaking their word or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it This latter is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command or sensual pleasure, which are the greatest part of mankind The passion to be reckoned upon is fear, whereof there be two very general objects one, the power of spirits invisible, the other, the power of those men they shall there offend Of these two, though the former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear The fear of the former is in every man his own religion, which hath place in the nature of man before civil society The latter hath not so, at least not place enough to keep men to their promises because in the condition of mere nature, the inequality of power is not discerned, but by the event of battle So that before the time of civil society, or in the interruption thereof by war, there is nothing can strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the fear of that invisible power which they every one worship as God and fear as a revenger of their perfidy All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to civil power is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth which swearing, or *oath* is a form of speech, added to a promise, by which he that promiseth signifieth that unless he perform he renounceth the mercy of his God, or calleth to him for vengeance on himself Such was the heathen form, *Let Jupiter kill me else as I kill this beast* So is our form, *I shall do thus and thus so help me God* And thus, with the rites and ceremonies which every one useth in his own religion, that the fear of breaking faith might be the greater

By this it appears that an oath taken according to any other form, or rite, than his that sweareth is in vain and no oath, and that there is no swearing by anything which the swearer thinks not God For though men have some

swearing, but an impious custom, gotten by too much vehemence of talking

CHAPTER XV

Of Other Laws of Nature

FROM that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another such ^{such}

to and to
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th
are
of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war

And in this law of nature consisteth the fountain and original of *justice*. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is *unjust* and the definition of *injustice* is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust is just.

But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part (as hath been said in the former chapter), are invalid though the original of justice be the making of covenants, yet injustice actually there can be none till the cause of such fear be taken away, which, while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of *just* and *unjust* can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon and such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools for they say that *justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own*. And therefore where there is no *own* that is, no propriety, there is no injustice, and where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no Commonwealth, there is no propriety, all men having right to all things there fore where there is no Commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants, but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them and then it is also that propriety begins.

The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice, and sometimes also with his tongue, seriously alleging that every man's con

servation and consentment being committed to his own care, there could be no reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto and therefore also to make, or not make, keep, or not keep, covenants was not against reason when it conduced to one's benefit. He does not therein deny that there be covenants, and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept, and that such breach of them may be called injustice, and the observance of them justice but he questioneth whether injustice, taking away the fear of God (for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God), may not sometimes stand with that reason which dictateth to every man his own good, and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit as shall put a man in a condition to neglect not only the dispraise and revilings, but also the power of other men. The kingdom of God is gotten by violence but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? Were it against reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? And if it be not against reason, it is not against justice or else justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this, successful wickedness hath obtained the name of *virtue* and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a kingdom. And the heathen that believed that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter believed nevertheless the same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice, somewhat like to a piece of law in Coke's *Commentaries on Littleton* where he says if the right heir of the crown be attainted of treason, yet the crown shall descend to him, and so in *stante* the attainder be void from which instances a man will be very prone to infer that when the heir apparent of a kingdom shall kill him that is in possession, though his father, you may call it injustice, or by what other name you will, yet it can never be against reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves, and those actions are most reasonable that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutual, where there is no security of performance on either side, as when there is no civil power erected over the parties promising, for such promises are no covenants but either where one of the parties has performed already, or where there is a power to make him perform, there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to perform, or not. And I say it is not against rea

son For the manifestation whereof we are to consider, first, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding anything can be foreseen and reckoned on tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident, which he could not expect, arriving may turn it to his benefit, yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done Secondly, that in a condition of war, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himself from destruction without the help of confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the confederation that any one else does and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him can in reason expect no other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power He, therefore, that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defence but by the error of them that receive him nor when he is received be retained in it without seeing the danger of their error which errors a man can not reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security and therefore if he be left, or cast out of society, he perisheth, and if he live in society, it is by the errors of other men, which he could not foresee nor reckon upon, and consequently against the reason of his preservation, and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction forbear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves

As for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of heaven by any way, it is frivolous, there being but one way imaginable, and that is not breaking, but keeping of covenant

And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion, it is manifest that, though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary, and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason Justice therefore, that is to say, keeping of covenant, is a rule of reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and consequently a law of nature

There be some that proceed further and will not have the law of nature to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of man's life on earth, but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death, to which they think the breach

of covenant may conduce, and consequently be just and reasonable, such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebel against the sovereign power constituted over them by their own consent But because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death, much less of the reward that is then to be given to breach of faith, but only a belief grounded upon other men's saying that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those that knew them that knew others that knew it supernaturally, breach of faith cannot be called a precept of reason or nature

Others, that allow for a law of nature the keeping of faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons, as heretics, and such as use not to perform their covenant to others, and this also is against reason For if any fault of a man be sufficient to discharge our covenant made, the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindered the making of it

The names of *just* and *unjust*, when they are attributed to men, signify one thing, and when they are attributed to actions, another When they are attributed to men, they signify conformity, or inconformity of manners, to reason But when they are attributed to actions, they signify the conformity, or inconformity to reason, not of manners, or manner of life, but of particular actions A just man therefore is he that taketh all the care he can that his actions may be all just, and an unjust man is he that neglecteth it And such men are more often in our language styled by the names of *righteous* and *unrighteous* than *just* and *unjust*, though the meaning be the same Therefore a righteous man does not lose that title by one or a few unjust actions that proceed from sudden passion, or mistake of things or persons, nor does an unrighteous man lose his character for such actions as he does, or forbears to do, for fear because his will is not framed by the justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do That which gives to human actions the relish of justice is a certain nobleness or gallantry of courage, rarely found, by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life to fraud, or breach of promise This justice of the manners is that which is meant where justice is called a *virtue*; and injustice, a *vice*.

But the justice of actions denominates men, not just, but *guiltless* and the injustice of the same (which is also called injury) gives them but the name of *guilty*.

Again, the injustice of manners is the disposition or aptitude to do injury, & unjust

before it proceed to act, and without supposing any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action (that is to say, injury) supposeth an individual person injured namely him to whom the covenant was made and therefore many times the injury is received by one man when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger, if it be not done, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to obey, but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation, and therefore could not injure him. And so also in Commonwealths private men may remit to one another their debts, but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endamaged, because the detaining of debt is an injury to themselves, but robbery and violence are injuries to the person of the Commonwealth.

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to the doer, is no injury to him. For if he that doeth it hath not passed away his original right to do what he please by some antecedent covenant, there is no breach of covenant, and therefore no injury done him. And if he have then his will to have it done, being signified, is a release of that covenant, and so again there is no injury done him.

Justice of actions is by writers divided into *commutative* and *distributive* and the former they say consisteth in proportion arithmetical the latter in proportion geometrical. Commutative, therefore they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for and distributive, in the distribution of equal benefit to men of equal merit. As if it were injustice to sell dear

they be contented to give. And merit (besides that which is by covenant, where the performance on one part meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative, not distributive) is not due by justice, but is rewarded of grace only. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice is the justice of a contractor, that is, a performance of covenant in buying and selling, hiring and letting to hire, lending and borrowing, exchanging, bartering and other acts of contract.

And distributive justice, the justice of an arbitrator, that is to say, the act of defining what is just. Wherein, being trusted by them that

make him arbitrator, if he perform his trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own and this is indeed just distribution, and may be called, though improperly, distributive justice, but more properly *equity*, which also is a law of nature, as shall be shown in due place.

As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant,

no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of mutual help, nor of reconciliation of one man to another, and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature which commandeth men to seek peace. The breach of this law is called *ingratitude* and hath the same relation to grace that injustice hath to obligation by covenant.

A fifth law of nature is *compliance*, that is to say, that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof we may consider that there is in men's aptness to society a diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections, not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an edifice. For as that stone which by the asperity and irregularity of figure takes more room from others than itself fills, and for the hardness

those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary, and for the stubbornness of his passions cannot be corrected, is to be left or cast out of society as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing every man not only by right, but also by necessity of nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation he that shall oppose himself against it for things superfluous is guilty of the war that thereupon is to follow,

modi); the contrary, *stubborn, insociable, forward, intractable.*

A sixth law of nature is this, *that upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that, repenting, desire it.* For pardon is nothing but granting of peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear, yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time is sign of an aversion to peace, and therefore contrary to the law of nature.

A seventh is *that in revenges* (that is, retribution of evil for evil), *men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow.* Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example and profit to come is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of an other, tending to no end (for the end is always somewhat to come), and glorying to no end is vain glory, and contrary to reason, and to hurt without reason tendeth to the introduction of war, which is against the law of nature, and is commonly styled by the name of *cruelty*.

And because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight, insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life than not to be revenged, we may in the eighth place, for a law of nature, set down this precept *that no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred or contempt of another.* The breach of which law is commonly called *contumely*.

The question who is the better man has no place in the condition of mere nature, where (as has been shown before) all men are equal. The inequality that now is has been introduced by the laws civil. I know that Aristotle in the first book of his *Politics*, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy; others to serve, meaning those that had

often, or almost at any time, get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged or if nature have made men unequal, yet because men that think themselves equal will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth law of nature, I put this *that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature.* The breach of this precept is *pride*.

On this law dependeth another *that at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest.* As it is necessary for all men that seek peace to lay down certain rights of nature; that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list, so is it necessary for man's life to retain some as right to govern their own bodies, enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place, and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law that commandeth the acknowledgement of natural equality, and therefore also against the law of nature. The observers of this law are those we call *modest*, and the breakers *arrogant* men. The Greeks call the violation of this law *πλεονεξία*, that is, a desire of more than their share.

Also, if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature that he deal equally between them. For without that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war. He therefore that is par-

nature, is the cause of war

The observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called *equity*, and (as I have said before) distributive justice: the violation,

is not only against reason, but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish that had not rather govern themselves than be governed by others: nor when the wise, in their own conceit, contend by force with them who distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or

thing permit, without stint, otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right. For otherwise the distribution is unequal, and contrary to equity.

But some things there be that can neither be divided nor enjoyed in common. Then, the law

of nature which prescribeth equity requireth that the entire right or else (making the use alternate) the first possession be determined by lot For equal distribution is of the law of nature and other means of equal distribution can not be imagined

Of lots there be two sorts, *arbitrary* and *natural* Arbitrary is that which is agreed on by the competitors, natural is either *primogeniture* (which the Greek calls *ἀναρχία* which sig

It is also a law of nature that all men that mediate peace be allowed safe conduct For the law that commandeth peace as the end commandeth intercession, as the means and to intercession the means is safe conduct

And because, though men be never so willing to observe these laws there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a man's action first whether it were done, or not done, secondly if done whether against the law or not against the law, the former whereof is called a question of fact the latter a question of right therefore unless the parties to the question covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of an other they are as far from peace as ever This other to whose sentence they submit, is called an *arbitrator* And therefore it is of the law of nature that they that are at controversy submit their right to the judgement of an arbitrator

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause and if he were never so fit yet equity allowing to each party equal benefit if one be admitted to be judge the other is to be admitted also and so the controversy that is the cause of war remains against the law of nature

For the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received for arbitrator to whom greater profit or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party than of the other for he hath taken though an unavoidable bribe yet a bribe and no man can be obliged to trust him And thus also the controversy and the condition of war remaineth, contrary to the law of nature

And in a controversy of fact, the judge being to give no more credit to one than to the other, if there be no other arguments must give credit to a third or to a third and fourth or more

for else the question is undecided, and left to force contrary to the law of nature

These are the laws of nature dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes, and which only concern the doctrine of civil society There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men, as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance, which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the law of nature hath forbidden, but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place

And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature to be taken notice of by all men whereof the most part are too busy in getting food and the rest too negligent to understand yet to leave all men inexcusable they have been contracted into one easy sum intelligible even to the meanest capacity and that is *Do not that to another which thou wouldest not have done to thyself* which sheweth him

to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions and self love may add nothing to the weight and then there is none of these laws of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable

The laws of nature oblige in *foro interno* that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place but in *foro externo* that is to the putting them in act, not always For he that should be modest and tractable and perform all he promises in such time and place where no man else should do so should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature which tend to nature's preservation And again he that having sufficient security that others shall observe the same laws towards him, observes them not himself, seeketh not peace but war and consequently the destruction of his nature by violence

And whatsoever laws bind in *foro interno* may be broken not only by a fact contrary to the

nal for injustice ingratitude arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons and the rest can never be made lawful For it can never

be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it.

The same laws, because they oblige only to a desire and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour, he that endeavoureth their performance fulfilth them, and he that fulfilleth the law is just.

And the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. *Good* and *evil* are names that signify our appetites and aversions, which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men are different and diverse men differ not only in their judgement on the senses of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable or disagreeable

to the sense of common life. Now

evil from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, private appetite is the measure of good and evil and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace, which (as I have shown before) are *justice*, *gratitude*, *modesty*, *equity*, *mercy*, and the rest of the laws of

therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature is the true moral philosophy. But the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowl-

the degree of daring, made fortitude, or not the cause, but the quantity of a gift, made liberality.

These dictates of reason men used to call by the name of *laws*, but improperly for they are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas *law*, properly, is the word

called *laws*.

CHAPTER XVI

Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated

A *PERSON* is he whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.

When they are considered as his own, then is he called a *natural person*; and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is he a *feigned or artificial person*.

The word *person* is Latin, instead whereof the Greeks have *πρόσωπον*, which signifies the face, as *persona* in Latin signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage, and sometimes more particularly that part of it which disguiseth the face, as a mask or vizard and from the stage hath been translated to any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals as theatres. So that a person is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation, and to personate is to act or represent himself or another, and he that acteth another is said to bear his person, or act in his name (in which sense Cicero useth it where he says, *Unus sustineo tres personas, mei, adversarii, et judicis*—I bear three persons, my own, my adversary's, and the judge's), and is called in diverse occasions, diversely, as a representer, or representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like.

Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person is the actor, and he that owneth his words and actions is the author, in which case the actor acteth by authority. For

the author. And as the right of possession is called *dominion*, so the right of doing any action is called *authority*. So that by authority is always understood a right of doing any act; and *done by authority*, done by commission or license from him whose right it is.

From hence it followeth that when the actor maketh a covenant by authority, he bindeth thereby the author no less than if he had made it himself, and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly (Chapter xiv) of the nature of covenants between man and man in

their natural capacity ■ true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their commission, but no further

And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril For no man ■ obliged by a covenant whereof he is not author, nor consequently by ■ covenant made against or beside the authority he gave

When the actor doth anything against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the law of nature for though the action be against the law of nature, yet it is not his, but, contrarily, to refuse to do it is against the law of nature that forbiddeth breach of covenant

And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word, in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged for the covenant made with the author is not valid without his counter-assurance But if he that so covenanteth knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance than the actor's word, then is the covenant valid, because the actor in this case maketh himself the author And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor, so when the

sonated by a rector, master, or overseer But things inanimate cannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to their actors yet the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are owners or governors of those things And therefore such things cannot be personated before there be some state of civil government

Likewise children fools, and madmen that have no use of reason may be personated by guardians, or curators, but can be no authors during that time of any action done by them, longer than (when they shall recover the use of reason) they shall judge the same reasonable Yet during the folly he that hath right of governing them may give authority to the guardian But this again has no place but in a state civil, because before such estate there is no dominion of persons

An idol, or mere figment of the brain, may

be personated, as were the gods of the heathen, which, by such officers as the state appointed, were personated, and held possessions and other goods, and rights, which men from time to time dedicated and consecrated unto them But idols cannot be authors for an idol is nothing The authority proceeded from the state, and therefore before introduction of civil government the gods of the heathen could not be personated

The true God may be personated As He was first, by Moses, who governed the Israelites, that were not his, but God's people, not in his own name, with *hoc dicit Moses* but in God's name, with *hoc dicit Dominus* Secondly, by the Son of Man, His own Son, our blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jews and induce all nations into the kingdom of his Father, not as of himself, but as sent from his Father And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking and working in the Apostles, which Holy Ghost was a Comforter that came not of himself, but was sent and proceeded from them both

A multitude of men are made *one* person when they are by one man, or one person, represented, so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular For it is the *unity* of the representer, not the *unity* of the represented, that maketh the person one And ■ ■ the representer that beareth the person, and but one person and unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude

And because the multitude naturally is not one, but many, they cannot be understood for one, but many authors, of everything their representative saith or doth in their name, every

men, the voice of the greater number must be considered as the voice of them all For if the lesser number pronounce, for example, in the affirmative, and the greater in the negative, there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the affirmatives, and thereby the excess of negatives standing uncontradicted, are the only voice the representative hath

And a representative of even number, especially when the number ■ not great whereby the contradictory voices are oftentimes equal, is

therefore oftentimes mute and incapable of action. Yet in some cases contradictory voices equal in number may determine a question, as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemn not, do absolve, but not on the contrary condemn, in that they absolve not. For when a cause is heard, not to condemn is to absolve, but on the contrary to say that not ab-

are equal, the not decreeing execution is a decree of dilation.

Or if the number be odd, as three, or more, men or assemblies, whereof every one has, by a negative voice, authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative voices of the rest,

this number is no representative; because by the diversity of opinions and interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute person and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a multitude, especially in time of war.

Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called, which I have before defined to be him that owneth the action of another simply. The second is he that owneth an action or covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at or before a certain time. And these authors conditional are generally called *sureties*, in Latin, *fidejussores* and *sponsores*, and particularly for debt, *prædes*, and for appearance before a judge or magistrate, *vades*.

THE SECOND PART

Of Commonwealth

CHAPTER XVII

Of the Causes Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth

THE final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation and of a more contented life thereby, that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters

For the laws of nature, as *justice equity, modesty mercy* and in sum, *doing to others as we would be done to* of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions that carry us to *partiality, pride revenge,* and the like And covenants without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, or

families, to rob and spoil one another has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of nature that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honour, and men observed no other laws therein but the laws of honour, that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives and instruments of husbandry And as small families did then so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater

families (for their own security), enlarge their dominions upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion or assistance that may be given to invaders, endeavour as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbours by open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly, and are remembered for it in after ages with honour

Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men that gives them this security because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other make the advantage of strength so great as is sufficient to carry the victory, and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear, and is then sufficient when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt

And be there never so great a multitude yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use

very few that agree together, but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other for their particular interests For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same, and then there neither would be, nor need to be, any

desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed and directed by one judgement for a limited time, as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy, yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves.

It is true that certain living creatures as bees and ants, live sociably one with another (which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures), and yet have no other direction than their particular judgements and appetites nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another what he thinks expedient for the common benefit and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know why mankind can

Secondly, that amongst these creatures the

is eminent

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do not see nor think they see, any fault in the administration of their common business whereas amongst men there are very many that think themselves wiser and abler to govern the public better than the rest, and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way, and thereby bring it in to distraction and civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice in making known to one another their desires and other affections,

apparent greatness of good and evil, discontenting men and troubling their peace at their pleasure.

Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury and damage, and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows whereas man is then

most troublesome when he is most at ease, for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern the Commonwealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural, that of men is by covenant only, which is artificial and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit.

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person, and everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be author of what soever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace, safety, and defence.

than consent, or concord, it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every

in like manner This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the Commonwealth, which, to define it, is *one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall*

think expedient for their peace and common defence.

And he that carryeth this person is called *sovereign*, and said to have *sovereign power*, and every one besides, his *subject*.

The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways One, by natural force as when a man

dueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition The other, is when men

wealth, or Commonwealth by *institution*, and the former, a Commonwealth by *acquisition* And first, I shall speak of a Commonwealth by institution

CHAPTER XVIII

Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution

A COMMONWEALTH is said to be instituted when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative, every one, as well he that voted for it as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgements of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men

From this institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood they are not obliged by former covenant to anything repugnant hereunto And consequently they that have already instituted a Commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgements of one, can not lawfully make a new covenant amongst themselves to be obedient to any other, in anything whatsoever, without his permission And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to another man, or other assembly of men for they are bound, every man to every man, to own and be reputed author of all that he that already is their sovereign shall do and judge fit to be

done, so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made in that man, which is injustice and they have also every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign be killed or punished by him for such attempt, he is author

ity, he is also upon that title unjust And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign a new covenant, made, not with men, but with God, this also is unjust for there is no covenant with God but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person, which none doth but God's lieutenant who hath the sovereignty under God But this pretence of covenant with God is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders' own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition

Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign, and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand is manifest, because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant, or he must make a several covenant with every man With the whole, as one party, it is impossible, because as yet they are not one person and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of every one of them in particular Besides, if any one or more of them pretend a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at his institution, and others or one other of his subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case no judge to decide the controversy it returns therefore to the sword again, and every man recovereth the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution

way of precedent covenant The opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth that covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword, that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men, that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united But when an assembly of men is made sovereign, then no man imagineth any such covenant to have passed in the institution for no man is so dull as to say, for example the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions, which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people That men see not the

participate than of monarchy, which they despair to enjoy

Thirdly because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign he that dissented must now consent with the rest, that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted to stand to what the major part should ordain and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any of their decrees he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly And whether he be of the congregation or not, and whether his consent

Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted it follows that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice For he that doth anything by authority from another doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth but by this institution of a Commonwealth every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth, and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign complaineth of that whereof he himself is author, and therefore

justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished For seeing every subject is author of the actions of his sovereign, he punisheth another for the actions committed by himself

And because the end of this institution is the peace and defence of them all, and whosoever has right to the end has right to the means, it belongeth of right to whatsoever man or assembly that hath the sovereignty to be judge both of the means of peace and defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same, and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord at home, and hostility from abroad, and when peace and security are lost, for the recovery of the same And therefore,

Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace, and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal in speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published For the actions of men proceed from their opinions and in the well governing of opinions consisteth the well governing of men's actions in order to their peace and concord And though in matter of doctrine nothing ought to be regarded but the truth, yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by peace For doctrine repugnant to peace can no more be true than peace and concord can be against the law of nature It is true that in a Commonwealth, where by the negligence or unskillfulness of governors and teachers false doctrines are by time generally received, the contrary truths may be generally offensive yet the most sudden and rough bustling in of a new truth that can be does never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the war For those men that are so remissly governed that they dare take up arms to defend or introduce an opinion are still in war, and their condition, not peace, but

hath the sovereign power to be judge, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines, as

thing necessary to peace, thereby to prevent discord and civil war

Seventhly, is annexed to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules whereby every man may know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow subjects and thus it men call *propriety*. For before constitution of

understood to have power to use such means as

cording to the law he hath formerly made, or if there be no law made, according as he shall

sign power, is the act of that power, in order to the public peace. These rules of propriety (or *meum* and *uum*) and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects are the civil laws that is to say, the laws of each Commonwealth in particular, though the name of *civil law* be now restrained to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome, which being the head of a great part of the world, her laws at that time were in these parts the civil law

Eighthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the right of judicature, that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies which may arise concerning law, either civil or natural, or concerning fact. For without the decision of controversies, there is no protection of one subject against the injuries of another, the laws concerning *meum* and *uum* are in vain and to every man remaineth, from the natural and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of

they look for from others, and how little they value other men, from whence continually arise amongst them, emulation, quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a common enemy, it is necessary that there be laws of honour, and a public rate of the worth of such men as have deserved or are able to deserve well of the Commonwealth, and that there be force in the hands of some or other to put those laws in execution. But it hath already been shown that not only the whole militia, or forces of the Commonwealth, but also the judicature of all controversies, is annexed to the sovereignty. To the sovereign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of honour, and to appoint what order of

by a man may discern in what man, or assembly of men, the sovereign power is placed and resideth. For these are incommunicable and inseparable. The power to coin money, to dispose of the estate and persons of infant heirs, to have pre-emption in markets, and all other statute prerogatives may be transferred by the sovereign, and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained. But if he transfer the militia, he retains the judicature in vain, for want of execution of the same.

For that end, and to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof. For the power by which the people are to be defended consisteth in their armies, and the strength of an army in the union of their strength under one command, which command the sovereign instituted therefore hath because the command of the militia without other institution maketh him that hath it sovereign. And therefore, who soever is made general of an army, he that hath the sovereign power is always generalissimo.

Tenthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the choosing of all counsellors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, both in peace and war. For seeing the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and defence, he is

cannot stand for unless this division precede, division into opposite armies can never happen

If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England that these powers were divided between the King and the Lords and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided and fallen into this Civil War; first between those that disagreed in politics, and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion, which have so instructed men in this point of sovereign right that there be few now in England that do not see that these rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged at the next return of peace, and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten, and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been.

And because they are essential and inseparable rights, it follows necessarily that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms renounced, and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to him that

thereunto

This great authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them that say of sovereign kings, though they be *singulis majores*, of greater power than every one of their subjects yet they be *universis minores*, of less power than them all together. For if by *all together*, they mean not the collective body as one person, then *all together* and *every one* signify the same, and the speech is absurd. But if by *all*

sovereign's power, and so again the speech is absurd, which absurdity they see well enough when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the people, but in a monarch they see it not, and yet the power of sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

And as the power, so also the honour of the

presence of the master, the servants are equal, and without any honour at all, so are the subjects, in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the stars in presence of the sun.

But a man may here object that the condition

of subjects is very miserable, as being obnoxious to the lusts and other irregular passions of him or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands. And commonly they that live under a monarch think it the fault of monarchy; and they that live under the government of democracy, or other sovereign assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of Commonwealth, whereas the power in all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same, not considering that the estate of man can never be without some incommodity or other, and that the greatest that in any form of government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries and horrible calamities that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless men without subjection to laws and a coercive power to tie their hands from rapine and revenge, nor considering that the greatest pressure of sovereign governors proceedeth, not from any delight or profit they can expect in the damage or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour consisteth their own strength and glory, but in the restiveness of themselves that, unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of peace that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses (that is their passions and self love) through which every little payment appeareth a great grievance, but are

CHAPTER XIX

Of the Several Kinds of Commonwealth by Institution, and of Succession to the Sovereign Power

THE difference of Commonwealths consisteth in the difference of the persons

and into that assembly either every man hath

the representative must needs be one man, or more; and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one

man, then is the Commonwealth a *monarchy* when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a *democracy* or popular Commonwealth when an assembly of a part only, then it is called an *aristocracy*. Other kind of Commonwealth there can be none for either one, or more or all must have the sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire.

There be other names of government in the histories and books of policy, as *tyranny* and *oligarchy* but they are not the names of other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under

that want of government is any new kind of

liberty may, if they please, give authority to one man to represent them every one as well as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever, and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good to a monarch as absolutely as to any other representative. Therefore where there is already erected a sovereign power, there can be no other representative of the same people but only to certain particular ends, by the sovereign limited. For that were to erect two

thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd to think that a sovereign assembly inviting the people of their dominion to send up their deputies with power to make known their advice or desires should therefore hold such deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representative of the people, so it is absurd also to think the same in a monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth should of late be so little observed that in a monarchy he that had the sovereignty from a descent of six hundred years was alone called sovereign had the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects and was unquestionably taken by them for their king was notwithstanding never considered as their representative, that name without contra-

dition passing for the title of those men which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions and give him if he permitted it their advice. Which may serve as an admonition for those that are the true and absolute representative of a people, to instruct men in the nature of that office, and to take heed how they admit of any other general representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the trust committed to them.

The difference between these three kinds of Commonwealth consisteth, not in the difference of power, but in the difference of convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people, for which end they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe first that whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is one of that assembly that bears it beareth also his own natural person. And though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest yet he is more or no less careful to procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends, and for the most part, if the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private for the passions of men are commonly more potent than their reason. From whence it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches strength and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor or contemptible, or too weak through want or dissension to maintain a war against their enemies whereas in a democracy or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt or ambitious as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action or a civil war.

Secondly that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom when, and where he pleaseth and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action and with as much secrecy as he will. But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none are admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge and are to give their advice in long discourses which may, and do commonly, excite men to action, but not govern them in

it For the understanding is by the flame of the passions never enlightened, but dazzled nor in there any place or time wherein an assembly can receive counsel with secrecy, because of their own multitude

Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no other inconstancy than that of human nature, but in assemblies, besides that of nature, there ariseth an inconstancy from the number For the absence of a few that would have the resolution, once taken, continue firm (which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments), or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes today all that was concluded yesterday

Fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy or interest, but an assembly may, and that to such a height as may produce a civil war

Fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience, that any subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth which I confess is a great and inevitable inconvenience But the same may as well happen where the sovereign power is in an assembly for their power is the same, and they are as subject to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a monarch by flatterers, and becoming one another's flatterers, serve one another's covetousness and ambition by turns And whereas the favourites of monarchs are few, and they have none else to advance but their own kindred, the favourites of an assembly are many, and the kindred much more numerous than of any monarch Besides, there is no favourite of a monarch which cannot as well succour his friends as hurt his enemies but orators, that is to say, favourites of sovereign assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save For to accuse requires less eloquence (such is man's nature) than to excuse, and condemnation, than absolution, more resembles justice

Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discern between good and evil and consisteth in this, that the use of his power must be in the hand of another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to govern by his right and in his name as curators and protectors of his person and authority But

be pretended must arise from the contention of those that, for an office of so great honour and profit, may become competitors To make it appear that this inconvenience proceedeth not from that form of government we call monarchy, we are to consider that the precedent monarch hath appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant successor, either expressly by testament, or tacitly by not controlling the custom in that case received and then such inconvenience, if it happen, is to be attributed, not to the monarchy, but to the ambition and injustice of the subjects, which in all kinds of government, where the people are not well instructed in their duty and the rights of sovereignty, is the same Or else the precedent monarch hath not at all taken order for such tuition, and then the law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule, that the tuition shall be in him that hath by nature most interest in the preservation of the authority of the infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death or diminution For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit and promotion, to put an infant into the power of those that can promote themselves by his destruction or damage is not tuition, but treachery So that sufficient provision being taken against all just quarrel about the government under a child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the public peace, it is not to be attributed to the form of

to consultations of peace, and war, and making of laws, in the same condition as if the government were in a child For as a child wants the judgement to dissent from counsel given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advice of them, or him, to whom he is committed, so an assembly wanteth the liberty to dissent from the counsel of the major part, be it good or bad And as a child has need of a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person and authority, so also in great Commonwealths the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have need of *custodes libertatis*, that is, of dictators, or protectors of their authority; which are as much as temporary monarchs to whom for a time they may commit the entire exercise of their power; and have, at the end of that time, been oftener deprived thereof than infant kings by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors

Though the kinds of sovereignty be, as I have now shown, but three, that is to say, mon

archy, where one man has it, or democracy, where the general assembly of subjects hath it, or aristocracy, where it is in an assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest yet he that shall consider the particular Commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other forms arising from these mingled together As for example elective kingdoms where kings have the

not supreme, that is to say, not sovereign The sovereignty therefore was always in that assembly which had the right to limit him, and by

lead their armies, but the sovereignty was in the *Ephors*

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman people governed the land of Judea, for example, by a president, yet was not Judea therefore a democracy, because they were not governed by any assembly into which any of them had right to enter, nor by an aristocracy, because they were not governed by any assembly into which any man could enter by their election

popular or aristocratical Commonwealth subdue an enemy's country, and govern the same by a president, procurator, or other magistrate, this may seem perhaps, at first sight, to be a

kings sovereigns, but ministers of them that have the sovereign power, nor are those provinces which are in subjection to a democracy or aristocracy of another Commonwealth democratically or aristocratically governed, but monarchically

And first, concerning an elective king whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendom at this day, or to certain years or months as the dictator's power amongst the Romans, if he have right to appoint his successor he is no more elective but hereditary But if he have no power to elect his successor, then there is some other man, or assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the Commonwealth dieth and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of war If it be known who have the power to give the sovereignty after his death it is known also that the sovereignty was in them before for none have right to give that which they have not right to possess, and keep to themselves, if they think good But if there be none that can give the sovereignty after the decease of him that was first elected then his power, may he be obliged by the law of nature, to provide, by establishing his successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the government from relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war And consequently he was, when elected, a sovereign absolute

Secondly, that king whose power is limited is not superior to him or them, that have the power to limit it, and he that is not superior is

participating in the government was a monarch For though where the people are governed by an assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a democracy or aristocracy yet when they are governed by an assembly not of their own choosing, it is a monarchy, not of one man over another man, but of one people over another people

Of all these forms of government, the matter being mortal, so that not only monarchs, but also whole assemblies die, it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men that as there was order taken for an artificial man, so there be order also taken for an artificial eternity of life without which men that are governed by an assembly should return into the condition of war in every age, and they that are governed by one man as soon as their governor dieth This artificial eternity is that which men call the right of succession

There is no perfect form of government, which is not of these three

foreign at his pleasure, and consequently the right is in himself And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choice, then is the Commonwealth dissolved, and the right is in him that can get it, contrary to the intention of them that did institute the Commonwealth for their perpetual, and not temporary, security

In a democracy, the whole assembly cannot fail unless the multitude that are to be governed fail And therefore questions of the right

of succession have in that form of government no place at all

In an aristocracy, when any of the assembly dieth, the election of another into his room be longeth to the assembly, as the sovereign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all counsel lers and officers For that which the representa tive doth, as actor, every one of the subjects

their authority that the election is made, and by the same it may, when the public shall require it, be recalled

The greatest difficulty about the right of succession is in monarchy and the difficulty aris eth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor, nor many times who it is whom he hath appointed For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination than every man is accustomed to use As to the question who shall appoint the

princes have not the sovereign power in propriety, but in use only), we are to consider that either he that is in possession has right to dispose of the succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved multitude For the death of him that hath the sovereign power in propriety leaves the multitude without any sovereign at all, that is, without any representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all and therefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch, every man having equal right to submit himself to such as he thinks best able to protect him, or, if he can, protect himself by his own sword, which is a return to confusion and to the condition of a war of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first institution Therefore it is manifest that by the institution of monarchy, the disposing of the successor is always left to the judgement and will of the present possessor

And for the question which may arise sometimes, who it is that the monarch in possession hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power, it is determined by his express words and testament, or by other tacit signs sufficient

By express words, or testament, when it is

does not of itself imply the children or nearest kindred of a man, but whomsoever a man shall any way declare he would have to succeed him in his estate If therefore a monarch declare expressly that such a man shall be his heir, either

wanting other natural signs of the will are to be followed whereof the one is custom And therefore where the custom is that the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of kindred hath right to the succession, for that, if the will of him that was in possession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his lifetime And likewise where the custom is that the next of the male kindred succeedeth, there also the right of succession is in the next of the kindred male, for the same reason And so it is if the custom were to advance the female For whatsoever custom a man may by a word control, and does not, it is a natural sign he would have that custom stand

But where neither custom nor testament hath preceded, there it is to be understood, first, that a monarch's will is that the government remain monarchical, because he hath approved that government in himself Secondly, that a child of his own, male or female, be preferred before any other, because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature to advance their own children than the children of other men, and of their own, rather a male than a female, because men are naturally fitter than women for actions of labour and danger Thirdly, where his own issue faileth, rather a brother than a stranger, and so still the nearer in blood rather than the more remote, because it is always presumed that the nearer of kin is the nearer in affection, and it is evident that a man receives always, by reflection, the most honour from the greatness of his nearest kindred

But if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose of the succession by words of contract, or testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience for he may sell or give his right of

guage) do commonly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his subjects, which is indeed a great inconvenience but it proceed eth not necessarily from the subjection to a stranger's government, but from the unskilfulness of the governors, ignorant of the true rules

of politics And therefore the Romans, when they had subdued many nations, to make their government digestible were wont to take away that grievance as much as they thought necessary by giving sometimes to whole nations, and sometimes to principal men of every nation they conquered, not only the privileges, but also the name of Romans, and took many of them into

sentence of the sovereign Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth he unlawfully breaketh but when the sovereign, who is the actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the author of such absolution

But the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both His power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another he cannot forfeit it he cannot be accused by any of his subjects of injury he cannot be punished by them he is judge of what is necessary for peace, and judge of doctrines he is sole legislator, and supreme judge of controversies, and of the times and occasions of war and peace to him it be longeth to choose magistrates, counsellors, commanders, and all other officers and ministers, and to determine of rewards and punishments, honour and order The reasons whereof are the same which are alleged in the precedent chapter for the same rights and consequences of sovereignty by institution

likelihood prevented the civil wars which make both those kingdoms, at this present, miserable It is not therefore any injury to the people for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will, though by the fault of many princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the lawfulness of it this also is an argument that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdom to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the right of succession may descend upon them yet this by all men is accounted lawful

CHAPTER XX

Of Dominion Paternal and Despotical

A COMMONWEALTH by acquisition is that where the sovereign power is acquired by force and it is acquired by force when men singly, or many together by plurality of voices, for fear of death or bonds do authorise all the actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power

And this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from sovereignty by institution only in this, that men who choose their sovereign do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute but in this case they subject themselves to him they are afraid of In both cases they do it for fear which is to be noted by them that hold all such covenants as proceed from fear of death or violence, void which, if were true, no man in any kind of Commonwealth could be obliged to obedience It is true that in a Commonwealth once instituted, or acquired, promises proceeding from fear of death or violence are no covenants, nor obliging when the thing promised is contrary to the laws, but the reason is not because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth hath no right in the thing promised Also, when he may lawfully perform and doth not, it is not the invalidity of the covenant that absolveth him, but the

so derived from the generation as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him but from the child's consent, either express or by other sufficient arguments declared For as to the generation God hath ordained to man a helper, and there be always two that are equally parents the dominion therefore over the child should belong equally to both, and he be equally subject to both which is impossible, for no man can obey two masters And whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man only as being of the more excellent sex, they misreckon in it For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman as that the right can be determined without war In Commonwealths this controversy is decided by the civil law and for the most part, but not always, the sentence is in favour of the father, because for the most part Commonwealths have been erected by the fathers not by the mothers of families But the question lieth now in the case of man and wife

dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the contract. We find in history that the Amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue male should be sent back, but the female remain with themselves so that the dominion of the females was in the mother.

If there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who is the father unless it be declared by the mother, and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will, and consequently hers. Again, seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother, so as she may either nourish or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the mother, and is therefore obliged to obey her rather than any other, and by consequence the dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find and nourish it, the dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved, because preservation of life being the end for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him.

If the mother be the father's subject, the child is in the father's power, and if the father be the mother's subject (as when a sovereign queen marrieth one of her subjects), the child is subject to the mother, because the father also is her subject.

If a man and a woman, monarchs of two several kingdoms, have a child, and contract concerning who shall have the dominion of him, the right of the dominion passeth by the contract. If they contract not, the dominion followeth the dominion of the place of his residence. For the sovereign of each country hath dominion over all that reside therein.

He that hath the dominion over the child hath dominion also over the children of the child, and over their children's children. For he that hath dominion over the person of a man hath dominion over all that is his, without which dominion were but a title without the effect.

The right of succession to paternal dominion proceedeth in the same manner as doth the right of succession to monarchy, of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.

Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers call *despotic*, from *Δεσπότης*, which signifieth a lord or

master, and is the dominion of the master over his servant. And this dominion is then acquired to the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth, either in

use thereof at his pleasure. And after such covenant made, the vanquished is a servant, and not before: for by the word *servant* (whether it be derived from *servire*, to serve, or from *servare*, to save, which I leave to grammarians to dispute) is not meant a captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him. For such men, commonly called *slaves*, have no obligation at all, but may break their bonds, or the prison, and kill, or carry away captive their master, justly: but one that, being taken, hath corporal liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is trusted by him.

conquered, that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight, but because he cometh in and submiteth to the victor, nor is the victor obliged by an enemy's rendering himself, without promise of life, to spare him for this his yielding to discretion, which obliges not the victor longer than in his own discretion he shall think fit.

And that which men do when they demand, as it is now called, *quarter* (which the Greeks called *Ζωπία*, taking alive) is to evade the present fury of the victor by submission, and to

sity, and his service due, when the victor hath trusted him with his corporal liberty. For slaves that work in prisons, or fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their task-masters.

The master of the servant is master also of all

ing and authorising whatsoever the master shall do. And in case the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise pun-

ish him for his disobedience, he is himself the author of the same, and cannot accuse him of injury

In sum, the rights and consequences of both paternal and despotical dominion are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution, and for the same reasons which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. So that for a man that is monarch of diverse nations, whereof he hath in one the sovereignty by institution of the people assembled, and in another by conquest, that is by the submission of each particular, to avoid death or bonds, to demand of one nation more than of the other, from the title of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an act of ignorance of the rights of sovereignty For the sovereign is absolute over both alike, or else there is no sovereignty at all, and so every man may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war

By this it appears that a great family, if it be not part of some Commonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of sovereignty, a little monarchy, whether that family consist of a man and his children, or of a man and his servants, or of a man and his children and servants together, wherein the father or master is the sovereign But yet a family is not properly a Commonwealth, unless it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as he shall think best, in the same manner as a very small company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their arms and demand quarter, or run away rather than be put to the sword And thus much shall suffice concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction, of sovereign rights, from the nature, need and designs of men in erecting of Commonwealths, and putting themselves under monarchs or assemblies entrusted with power enough for their protection

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point To Moses the children of Israel say thus. "Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee, but let not God speak to us, lest we die" This is absolute obedience to Moses Concerning the right of kings, God Himself, by the mouth of Samuel, saith, "This shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you He shall take your sons, and set them

to drive his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots, and gather in his harvest, and to make his engines of war, and instruments of his chariots, and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his cooks, and bakers He shall take your fields, your vine yards, and your olive yards, and give them to his servants He shall take the tithe of your corn and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants He shall take your man servants, and your maid servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his business He shall take the tithe of your flocks, and you shall be his servants"

This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, *you shall be his servants* Again, when the people heard what power their king was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, We will be as all other nations, and our king shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars" Here is confirmed the right that sovereigns have, both to the militia and to all judicature, in which is contained as absolute power as one man can possibly transfer to another Again, the prayer of King Solomon to God was this Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discern between good and evil It belongeth therefore to the sovereign to be judge, and to prescribe the rules of discerning good and evil which rules are laws, and therefore in him is the legislative power Saul sought the life of David yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his servants would have done it, David forbade them, saying, 'God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anointed of God' For obedience of servants St Paul saith, "Servants obey your masters in all things," and, "Children obey your parents in all things" There is simple obedience in those that are subject to paternal or despotical dominion Again, "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chair, and therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do" There again is simple obedience And St Paul, 'Warn them that they subject themselves to princes, and to those that are in authority, and obey them' This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour Himself ac-

* I Samuel, 8. 11. 17

* Ibid. 8. 19, 20

* I Kings, 3. 9

* I Samuel, 24. 6

* Colossians, 3. 22.

* Ibid. 3. 20

* Matthew, 23. 2, 3.

* Titus, 3. 1

* Exodus, 20. 19

we use to say they are not at liberty to move in such manner as without those external impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the thing it self, we use not to say it wants the liberty, but the power, to move, as when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness.

And according to this proper and generally

tion is not subject to impediment and therefore, when it is said for an man's

by any law or covenant to give it. So when we speak freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronounciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the words *free will*, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man, which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to do.

Fear and liberty are consistent as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will, it is therefore the action of one that was free. A man sometimes pays his debt, only for fear

water that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel, so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do, which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty, and yet because every act of man's will and every desire and inclination proceedeth from some cause and that from another cause, in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes), proceed from necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity of all men's voluntary actions would appear manifest. And therefore God, that seeth and disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will is accompanied

with the necessity of doing that which God will, and no more, nor less. For though men may do many things which God does not command, nor is therefore author of them, yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to anything, of which appetite God's will is not the cause. And did not His will assure the necessity of man's will, and consequently of all that on man's will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of God. And this shall suffice as to the matter in hand of that natural liberty, which only is properly called *liberty*.

But as men, for the attaining of peace and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a *Commonwealth*, so also have they made artificial chains, called *civil laws* which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power, and at the other end to their own ears. These bonds in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.

In relation to these bonds only it is that I am to speak now of the liberty of subjects. For seeing there is no Commonwealth in the world

pretermitted, men have the liberty of doing what their own reasons shall suggest for the most profitable to themselves. For if we take liberty in the proper sense for corporal liberty, that

it is no less absurd for men to demand as they do that liberty by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is thus is it they demand, not knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them without a sword in the hands of a man, or men to cause those laws to be put in execution. The liberty of a subject lieth therefore only in those things which, in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath pretermitted such as is the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another, to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit, and the like.

Nevertheless we are not to understand that by such liberty the sovereign power of life and

death is either abolished or limited For it has been already shown that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice or injury, because every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth so that he never wanteth right to any thing, otherwise than as he himself is the subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature And therefore it may and doth often happen in Commonwealths that a subject may be put to death by the command of the sovereign power and yet neither do the other wrong, as when Jephthah caused his daughter to be sacrificed in which, and the like cases he that so dieth had liberty to do the action for which he is nevertheless, without injury, put to death And the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince that putteth to death an innocent subject For though the action be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equity (as was the killing of Uriah by David), yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God

and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature Which distinction, David himself when he repented the fact evidently confirmed, saying, 'To thee only have I sinned' In the same manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their Commonwealth for ten years thought they committed no injustice, and yet they never questioned what crime he had done but what hurt he would do nay, they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom, and every citizen bringing his oyster shell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actually accusing him sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of justice, and sometimes a scurrilous jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a jest of it And yet a man can not say the sovereign people of Athens wanted right to banish them, or an Athenian the liberty to jest, or to be just

The liberty whereof there is so frequent and
same For as amongst masterless men, there is

perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, no inheritance to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father, no propriety of goods or lands, no security, but a full and absolute liberty in every particular man so in states and Commonwealths not dependent on one another, every Commonwealth not every man,

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tion of a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours round about The Athenians and Romans were free, that is, free Commonwealths not that any particular men had the liberty to resist their own representative, but that their representative had the liberty to resist, or invade, other people There is written on the turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS, yet no man can thence infer that a particular man has more liberty or immunity from the service of the Commonwealth there than in Constantinople Whether a Commonwealth be monarchical or popular, the freedom is still the same

But it is an easy thing for men to be deceived

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same error is confirmed by the authority of such in reputation for their writings on this subject, it is no wonder if it produces sedition and change of government In these western parts of the world we are made to receive our opinions concerning the institution and rights of Commonwealths from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men Greeks and Romans, that, living under popular states, derived those rights, not from the principles of nature, but transcribed them into their books out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, which were popular, as the grammarians describe the rules of language out of the practice of the time, or the rules of poetry out of the poems of Homer and Virgil And because the Athenians were taught (to keep them from desire of changing their government) that they were freemen, and all that lived under monarchy were slaves, therefore Aristotle puts it down in his *Politics* "In democracy, liberty is to be supposed for it is commonly held that no man is free in any other government" And as Aristotle, so Cicero and other writers have grounded their civil doctrine on the opinions of

¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk VI, 2

the Romans, who were taught to hate monarchy at first, by them that, having deposed

Latin authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit, under a false show of liberty, of favouring tumults and of licentious controlling the actions of their sovereigns, and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood, as I think I may truly say there was never anything so dearly bought as these western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues

To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject, that is to say, what are the things which though commanded by the sovereign, he may nevertheless without injustice refuse to do, we are to consider what rights we pass away when we make a Commonwealth, or which is all one, what liberty we deny our selves by owning all the actions, without exception of the man or assembly we make our

his own for all men equally are by nature free And because such arguments must either be drawn from the express words, "I authorise all his actions," or from the intention of him that submitteth himself to his power (which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submitteth) the obligation and liberty of the subject is to be derived either from those words, or others equivalent, or else from the end of the institution of sovereignty namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and the defence against a common enemy

First therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution is by covenant of every one to every one

covenant be transferred I have shown before, in the fourteenth Chapter, that covenants not to defend a man's own body are void Therefore,

If the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill, wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those that assault him, or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing without which he cannot live, yet hath that man the liberty to disobey

If a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or

his authority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not bound (without assurance of pardon) to confess it because no man, as I have shown in the same chapter, can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself

Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words, "I authorise, or take upon me, all his actions", in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty for by allowing him to kill me I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me It is one thing to say, "Kill me, or my fellow, if you please", another thing to say "I will kill myself, or my fellow" It followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves either to kill himself or any other man and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the sovereign, to execute any dangerous or dishonourable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission, but on the intention which is to be understood by the end thereof When therefore our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained then there is no liberty to refuse otherwise, there is

refusal with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice, as when he submitteth a sufficient soldier in his place for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Commonwealth And there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness not only to women (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected), but also to men of feminine courage When armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away yet when they do it not out of treachery but fear they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably For the same reason, to avoid battle is not injustice, but cowardice But he that enrolleth himself a soldier, or taketh impressed money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature, and is obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run from it with

purpose or courage to preserve, was in vain

To resist the sword of the Commonwealth in defence of another man, guilty or innocent no man hath liberty, because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protect

ing us, and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government. But in case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the liberty then to join together and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have, for they but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent. There was indeed in justice in the first breach of their duty, their bearing of arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be only to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them to whom it is offered the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting or defending the rest unlawful.

As for other liberties they depend on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do, or forbear, according to his own discretion. And therefore such liberty is in some places more, and in some less, and in some times more, in other times less, according as they that have the sovereignty shall think most convenient. As for example, there was a time when in England a man might enter into his own land, and dispossess such as wrongfully possessed it, by force. But in aftertimes that liberty of forcible entry was taken away by a statute made by the king in Parliament. And in some places of the world men have the liberty of many wives, in other places, such liberty is not allowed.

If a subject have a controversy with his sovereign of debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporal or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent law,

seeing the sovereign demandeth by force of a former law, and not by virtue of his power, he declareth thereby that he requireth no more than shall appear to be due by that law. The suit therefore is not contrary to the will of the sovereign, and consequently the subject hath the

consequently, he that brings an action against

renounce or transfer the sovereignty to another. For in that he might openly (if it had been his will), and in plain terms, have renounced or transferred it and did not, it is to be understood it was not his will, but that the grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a liberty and the sovereign power, and therefore the sovereignty is still retained, and consequently all those powers which are necessary to the exercising thereof, such as are the power of war and peace, of judicature, of appointing officers and counsellors, of levying money, and the rest named in the eighteenth Chapter.

The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. The sovereignty is the soul of the Common wealth, which, once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it. The soul is dead.

it. And though sovereignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortal, yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death by foreign war, but also through the ignorance and passions of men it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by intestine discord.

If a subject be taken prisoner in war, or his

tion, and, having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him, because he had no other way to preserve himself. The case is the same if he be detained on the same terms in a foreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the liberty of his body, he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection, and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

If a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty, both for himself and his heirs, his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature, because,

though nature may declare who are his sons, and who are the nearest of his kin, yet it dependeth on his own will, as hath been said in the precedent chapter, who shall be his heir. If therefore he will have no heir, there is no sovereignty, nor subjection. The case is the same if he die without known kindred, and without declaration of his heir. For then there can no heir be known, and consequently no subjection be due.

If the sovereign banish his subject, during the banishment he is not subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travel, is still subject, but it is by contract between sovereigns, not by virtue of the covenant of subjection. For whosoever entereth into another's dominion is subject to all the laws thereof, unless he have a privilege by the amity of the sovereigns, or by special license.

If a monarch subdued by war render himself subject to the victor, his subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own body, he is not understood to have given away the right of sovereignty, and therefore his subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his. For, his right remaining, the question is only of the administration, that is to say, of the magistrates and officers, which if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those which he himself had formerly appointed.

CHAPTER XXII

Of Systems Subject Political, and Private

HAVING spoken of the generation, form, and power of a Commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of systems, which resemble the similar parts or muscles of a body natural. By systems I understand

man, or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole number. All other are irregular.

Of regular, some are *absolute* and *independent*, subject to none but their own representative: such are only Commonwealths, of which I have spoken already in the five last precedent chapters. Others are *dependent*: that is to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which every one, as also their representative, is subject.

Of systems subordinate, some are *political*, and some *private*. Political (otherwise called *bodies politic* and *persons in law*) are those which are made by authority from the sovereign power of the Commonwealth. Private are those which are constituted by subjects amongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger. For no authority derived from foreign power, without the dominion of another, is public there, but private.

And of private systems, some are *lawful*, some *unlawful*. Lawful are those which are allowed by the Commonwealth, all other are unlawful. Irregular systems are those which, having no representative, consist only in course of people, which if not forbidden by the Commonwealth, nor made on evil design (such as are conflux of people to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end), are lawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are unlawful.

In bodies politic the power of the representative is always limited: and that which prescribeth the limits thereof is the power sovereign. For power unlimited is absolute sovereignty. And the sovereign, in every Commonwealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects, and therefore no other can be representative of any part of them, but so far forth as he shall give leave: and to give leave to a body politic of subjects to have an absolute representative, to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the Commonwealth, and to divide the dominion, contrary to their peace and defence, which the sovereign cannot be understood to do, by any grant that does not plainly and directly discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of words are not the signs of his will, when other consequences are signs of the contrary, but rather signs of error and misreckoning, to which all mankind is too prone.

The bounds of that power which is given to the representative of a body politic are to be taken notice of from two things. One is their

there needs no writing, because the power of the representative has there no other bounds but such as are set out by the unwritten law of nature, yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can

neither be remembered without letters, nor taken notice of, unless such letters be patent, that they may be read to them, and withal sealed, or testified, with the seals or other permanent signs of the authority sovereign

And because such limitation is not always easy or perhaps possible to be described in writing, the ordinary laws, common to all subjects, must determine what the representative may lawfully do in all cases where the letters themselves are silent. And therefore

In a body politic, if the representative be one man, whatsoever he does in the person of the body which is not warranted in his letters, nor by the laws, is his own act, and not the act of the body, nor of any other member thereof besides himself because further than his letters or the law's limit, he representeth no man's person, but his own. But what he does according to these is the act of every one for of the act of the sovereign every one is author, because he is their representative unlimited, and the act of him that recedes not from the letters of the sovereign is the act of the sovereign, and therefore every member of the body is author of it

But if the representative be an assembly, whatsoever that assembly shall decree, notwithstanding by their letters or the laws, is the act of the assembly, or body politic, and the act of every one by whose vote the decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present voted to the contrary, nor of any man absent, unless he voted it by procuration. It is the act of the assembly because voted by the major part, and if it be a crime the assembly may be punished, as far forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their letters (which is to such artificial and fictitious bodies, capital) or, if the assembly have a common stock, wherein none of the innocent members have propriety, by pecuniary mulct. For from corporal penalties nature hath exempted all bodies politic. But they

sequently are not involved in their votes

If the person of the body politic, being in one man, borrow money of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same body (for no letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to men's

error, commonly incident to human nature, and an insufficient sign of the will of the granter, or if it be avowed by him, then is the representer sovereign, and falleth not under the present question, which is only of bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the representative himself because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the letters, and to the qualification of the body, understandeth those only for his debtors that are engaged, and seeing the representer can engage himself, and none else, has him only for debtor, who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock, if there be any, or, if there be none, out of his own estate

If he come into debt by contract, or mulct, the case is the same.

votes to the borrowing of it, or to the contract that made it due, or to the fact for which the mulct was imposed, because every one of those in voting did engage himself for the payment for he that is author of the borrowing is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when paid by any one, he be discharged

it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet be cause in lending he voteth the borrowing, he contradiceth his former vote, and is obliged by the latter, and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common

means to pay, and not being enforced, did nevertheless through his own folly lend his money.

It is manifest by this that in bodies politic subordinate, and subject to a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only lawful, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation

sponsible for crimes committed by others such. But in a sovereign assembly that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there denies their sovereignty, and also because whatsoever is commanded by the sovereign power is

as to the subject (though not so always in the sight of God) justified by the command for of such command every subject is the author

The variety of bodies politic is almost infinite for they are not only distinguished by the several affairs for which they are constituted where in there is an unspeakable diversity but also by the times places and numbers, subject to many limitations And as to their affairs some are ordained for government as first, the government of a province may be committed to an assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the votes of the major part and then this assembly is a body politic and their power limited by commission This word *province* signifies a charge or care of business which he whose business it is committeth to another man to be administered for and under him and therefore when in one Commonwealth there be diverse countries that have their laws distinct one from another or are far distant in place the administration of the government being committed to diverse persons those countries where the sov-

those that assented and not of any that dissented or were absent for the reasons before alleged Also that an assembly residing out of the bounds of that colony whereof they have the government cannot execute any power over the persons or goods of any of the colony to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the colony itself as having no jurisdiction nor authority elsewhere but are left to the remedy which the law of the place alloweth them And though the assembly have right to impose a mulct upon any of their members that shall break the laws they make yet out of the

ernment over the persons of men

And generally in all bodies politic if any particular member conceive himself injured by the body itself the cognizance of his cause belongeth to the sovereign and those the sovereign hath ordained for judges in such causes or shall ordain for that particular cause and not to the body itself For the whole body is in this case

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to each plantation send one governor for though every man where he can be present by nature desires to participate of government yet where they cannot be present they are by nature also inclined to commit the government of their common interest rather to a monarchical than a popular form of government which is also evident in those men that have great private estates who when they are un-

tative is an assembly of all the members that is to say such a one as every one that adventureth his money may be present at all the deliberations and resolutions of the body if they will themselves For proof whereof we are to consider the end for which men that are merchants and may buy and sell export and import their merchandise according to their own discretions do nevertheless bind themselves up in one corporation It is true there be few merchants that with the merchandise they buy at home can freight a ship to export it or with that they buy abroad to bring it home and have therefore

in fact yet we may suppose the government of a province or colony committed to an assembly and when it is that which in this place I have to say is this that whatsoever debt is by that assembly contracted or whatsoever unlawful act is decreed is the act only of

incorporating is to make their gain the greater, which is done two ways by sole buying and

sole selling, both at home and abroad. So that

home, and sole selling abroad. For at homethere
is but one buyer, and abroad but one that sel-
leth, both which is gainful to the merchant, be-
cause thereby they buy at home at lower, and

are gainful to the adventurers

Of this double monopoly one part is disad-
vantageous to the people at home the other to
foreigners. For at home by their sole exporta-
tion they set what price they please on the hus-
bandry and handiworks of the people, and by
the sole importation, what price they please on
all foreign commodities the people have need
of, both which are ill for the people. On the
contrary, by the sole selling of the native com-
modities abroad, and sole buying the foreign
commodities upon the place, they raise the price
of those, and abate the price of these, to the dis-
advantage of the foreigner. For where but one
sellethe, the merchandise is the dearer, and where
but one buyeth, the cheaper. Such corporations
therefore are no other than monopolies, though
they would be very profitable for a Common-
wealth, if, being bound up into one body in for-
eign markets they were at liberty at home, every
man to buy and sell at what price he could.

The end then of these bodies of merchants,
being not a common benefit to the whole body
(which have in this case no common stock, but
what is deducted out of the particular adven-
tures, for building, buying, victualling and man-
ning of ships), but the particular gain of every
adventurer, it is reason that every one be ac-
quainted with the employment of his own, that
is, that every one be of the assembly that shall
have the power to order the same, and be ac-
quainted with their accounts. And therefore the
representative of such a body must be an assem-
bly, where every member of the body may be
present at the consultations, if he will.

If a body politic of merchants contract a debt

his debt, but only from the common stock, if
there be any

If the Commonwealth impose a tax upon the
body, it is understood to be laid upon every mem-
ber proportionably to his particular adventure
in the company. For there is in this case no other
common stock, but what is made of their par-
ticular adventures.

If a mulct be laid upon the body for some
unlawful act, they only are liable by whose votes
the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it
was executed, for in none of the rest is there
any other crime but being of the body, which,
if a crime, because the body was ordained by
the authority of the Commonwealth, is not his.

If one of the members be indebted to the body,
he may be sued by the body, but his goods can
not be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the
authority of the body, but only by authority of
the Commonwealth. For if they can do it by their
own authority, they can by their own authority
give judgement that the debt is due, which is
as much as to be judge in their own cause.

These bodies made for the government of
men, or of traffic, be either perpetual, or for a
time prescribed by writing. But there be bodies
also whose times are limited, and that only by
the nature of their business. For example, if a
sovereign monarch, or a sovereign assembly,
shall think fit to give command to the towns
and other several parts of their territory to send
to him their deputies to inform him of the con-
dition and necessities of the subjects, or to ad-
vise with him for the making of good laws, or
for any other cause, as with one person repre-
senting the whole country, such deputies, hav-
ing a place and time of meeting assigned them,
are there, and at that time, a body politic, repre-
senting every subject of that dominion, but it is
only for such matters as shall be propounded
unto them by that man, or assembly, that by the
sovereign authority sent for them, and when it
shall be declared that nothing more shall be
propounded, nor debated by them, the body is
dissolved. For if they were the absolute repre-
sentative of the people, then were it the sover-
eign assembly, and so there would be two sover-
eign assemblies, or two sovereigns, over the
same people which cannot consist with their
peace. And therefore where there is once a sov-
ereignty, there can be no absolute representa-
tion of the people, but by it. And for the limits

their private laws, but considereth them as so
many particular men, obliged every one to the

of how far such a body shall represent the whole people, they are set forth in the writing by which they were sent for. For the people cannot choose their deputies to other intent than *is in the writing directed to them from their sovereign expressed*

Private bodies regular and lawful are those that are constituted without letters, or other written authority, saving the laws common to all other subjects. And because they be united in one person representative, they are held for regular, such as are all families, in which the father or master ordereth the whole family. For he obligeth his children, and servants, as far as the law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions which the law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestic government, they are subject to their fathers and masters, as to their immediate sovereigns. For the father and master being before the institution of Commonwealth absolute sovereigns in their own families, they lose afterward no more of their authority than the law of the Commonwealth taketh from them.

Private bodies regular, but unlawful, are those that unite themselves into one person representative, without any public authority at all, such as are the corporations of beggars, thieves and gypsies, the better to order their trade of begging and stealing: and the corporations of men that by authority from any foreign person unite themselves in another's dominion, for the easier propagation of doctrines, and for making a party against the power of the Commonwealth.

Irregular systems, in their nature but leagues, or sometimes mere concourse of people without union to any particular design, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding only from a similitude of wills and inclinations, become lawful, or unlawful, according to the lawfulness or unlawfulness, of every particular

trust: and therefore leagues between Commonwealths, over whom there is no human power established to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful, but also profitable for the time they last. But leagues of the subjects of one and the same Commonwealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the sovereign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice, and, in case the design of them be evil or unknown to the Commonwealth, unlawful. For all uniting of strength by private men is, if for evil intent, unjust, if for intent unknown,

unlawful, as being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular interest. But if he whose private interest is to be debated and judged in the assembly make as many friends as he can, in him it is no injustice, because in this case he is no part of the assembly. And though he hire such friends with money, unless there be an express law against it, yet it is not injustice. For sometimes, as men's manners are, justice cannot be had without money, and every man may think his own cause just till it be heard and judged.

In all Commonwealths, if a private man entertain more servants than the government of his estate and lawful employment he has for them requires, it is faction, and unlawful. For having the protection of the Commonwealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in nations not thoroughly civilized, several numerous families have lived in continual hostility and invaded one another with private force, yet it is evident enough that they have done unjustly, or else that they had no Commonwealth.

And as factions for kindred: so also factions for government of religion, as of Papists, Protestants, etc. or of state, as patricians and plebeians of old time in Rome, and of aristocrats and democrats of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the sword out of the hand of the sovereign.

Concourse of people in an irregular system, the lawfulness or unlawfulness whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawful, and manifest, the concourse is lawful, as the usual meeting of men at church, or at a public show, in usual numbers: for if the num-

unnecessary, and savour of unlawful design, and are for that cause unlawful, and go commonly by the name of factions, or conspiracies. For a league being a connexion of men by covenants, if there be no power given to any one man or assembly (as in the condition of mere nature) to compel them to performance, is so long on ly valid as there ariseth no just cause of dis-

bers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them is to be judged conscious of an unlawful and tumultuous design. It may be lawful for a thousand men to join in a petition to be delivered to a judge or magistrate, yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous assembly, because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the assembly unlawful, but such a number as the present officers are not able to suppress and bring to justice.

When an unusual number of men assemble against a man whom they accuse, the assembly is an unlawful tumult, because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus, where Demetrius and a great number of other men, brought two of Paul's companions before the magistrate, saying with one voice, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians"; which was their way of demanding justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine as was against their religion and trade. The occasion here, considering the laws of that people, was just, yet was their assembly judged unlawful, and the magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words, "If Demetrius and the other work men can accuse any man of any thing, there be pleas, and deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an assembly lawfully called. For we are in danger to be accused for this day's sedition, because there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this concourse of people." Where he calleth an assembly whereof men can give no just account, a *sedition*, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning systems, and assemblies of people, which may be compared, as I said, to the similar parts of man's body: such as be lawful, to the muscles, such as are unlawful, to wens, biles, and apostems, engendered by the unnatural conflux of evil humours.

CHAPTER XXIII

Of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power

ministers

¹ Acts, 19. 40.

A *public minister* is he that by the sovereign, whether a monarch or an assembly, is employed in any affairs, with authority to represent in that employment the person of the Commonwealth. And whereas every man or assembly that hath sovereignty representeth two persons, or, as the more common phrase is, has two capacities, one natural and another politic; as a monarch hath the person not only of the Commonwealth, but also of a man, and a sovereign assembly hath the person not only of the Commonwealth, but also of the assembly, they that be servants to them in their natural capacity are not public ministers, but those only that serve them in the administration of the public business. And therefore neither ushers, nor sergeants, nor other officers that wait on the assembly for no other purpose but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an aristocracy or democracy, nor stewards, chamberlains, cofferers, or any other officers of the household of a monarch, are public ministers in a monarchy.

Of public ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general administration, either of the whole dominion or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a protector, or regent, may be committed by the predecessor of an infant

shall give, be in the king's name, and not inconsistent with his sovereign power. Of a part, or province; as when either a monarch or a sovereign assembly shall give the general charge thereof to a governor, lieutenant, prefect or viceroy: and in this case also, every one of that province is obliged to all he shall do in the name of the sovereign, and that not incompatible with the sovereign's right. For such protectors, viceroys, and governors have no other right but what depends on the sovereign's will, and no commission that can be given them can be interpreted for a declaration of the will to transfer the sovereignty, without express and per-

natural.

Others have special administration, that is to say, charges of some special business, either at home or abroad: as at home, first, for the economy of a Commonwealth, they that have authority concerning the treasury, as tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or whatsoever public revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the accounts

thereof are public ministers *ministers* because they serve the person representative, and can do nothing against his command nor without his authority *public* because they serve him in his political capacity

But a soldier without command though he fight for the Commonwealth does not therefor represent the person of it because there is none to represent it to For every one that hath command represents it to them only whom he commandeth

They also that have authority to teach or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the sovereign power and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just and unjust thereby to render them more apt to live in godliness and in peace amongst themselves and resist the public enemy, are public ministers *ministers* in that they do it not by their own authority but by another's and public because they do it or should do it, by no authority but that of the sovereign The monarch or the sovereign assembly only hath immediate authority from God to teach and instruct the people and no man but the sovereign receiveth his power *Dei gratia* simply that is to say from the favour of none but God all other receive theirs from the favour and providence of God and their sovereigns as in a monarchy *Dei gratia et regis* or *Dei providentia et voluntate regis*

They also to whom jurisdiction is given are public ministers For in their seats of justice

their judges are but ministers of him or them that

consequently in the same controversy there may be two judges one of fact another of law

And in both these controversies there may arise a controversy between the party judged and the judge which because they be both subjects to the sovereign ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by consent of both for no man can be judge in his own cause But the sovereign is already agreed on for judge by them both and is therefore either to hear the cause, and determine it himself or appoint for

judge such as they shall both agree on And this agreement is then understood to be made between them diverse ways as first if the defendant be allowed to except against such of his judges whose interest maketh him suspect them (for as to the complainant he hath already chosen his own judge), those which he excepteth not against are judges he himself agrees on Secondly if he appeal to any other judge he can appeal no further for his appeal is his choice Thirdly if he appeal to the sovereign himself and he by himself or by delegates which the parties shall agree on give sentence that sentence is final for the defendant is judged by his own judges, that is to say by himself

These properties of just and rational judicature considered I cannot forbear to observe the excellent constitution of the courts of justice established both for common and also for public pleas in England By *common pleas* I mean those where both the complainant and defendant are subjects and by *public* (which are also called *pleas of the crown*) those where the complainant is the sovereign For whereas there were two orders of men whereof one was *lords* the other *commons* the lords had this privilege, to have for judges in all capital crimes none but lords and of them as many as would be present which being ever acknowledged as a privilege of favour their judges were none but such as they had themselves desired And in all controversies every subject (as also in civil controversies the lords) had for judges men of the country where the matter in controversy lay against which he might make his exceptions

ingalleged by the party why these sentences should not be final These public persons with authority from the sovereign power either to instruct or judge the people are such members of the Commonwealth as may fitly be compared to the organs of voice in a body natural

Public ministers are also all those that have authority from the sovereign to procure the execution of judgements given to publish the sovereign's commands, to suppress tumults to apprehend and imprison malefactors and other acts tending to the conservation of the peace For every act they do by such authority is the act of the Commonwealth and their service answerable to that of the hands in a body natural

Public ministers abroad are those that represent the person of their own sovereign to foreign states Such are ambassadors, messengers,

agents, and heralds, sent by public authority, and on public business.

But such as are sent by authority only of some private party of a troubled state, though they be received, are neither public nor private ministers of the Commonwealth, because none of their actions have the Commonwealth for author. Likewise, an ambassador sent from a

to him in his natural capacity, is a private person. Also if a man be sent into another country, secretly to explore their counsels and strength, though both the authority and the business be public, yet because there is none to take notice of any person in him, but his own, he is but a private minister, but yet a minister of the Commonwealth, and may be compared to an eye in the body natural. And those that are appointed to receive the petitions or other informations of the people, and are, as it were, the public ear, are public ministers and represent their sovereign in that office.

Neither a counsellor, nor a council of state, if we consider it with no authority of judicature or command, but only of giving advice to the sovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a public person. For the advice is addressed to the sovereign only, whose person cannot in his own presence be represented to him by another. But a body of counsellors are never without some other authority, either of judicature or of immediate ad-

to the people, as a council, but when they appoint judges, or hear causes, or give audience to ambassadors, it is in the quality of a minister of the people and in an aristocracy the council of state is the sovereign assembly itself, and gives counsel to none but themselves.

CHAPTER XXIV

Of the Nutrition and Procreation of a Commonwealth

THE NUTRITION of a Commonwealth consisteth

ed by nature to those commodities which, from

the two breasts of our common mother, land and sea, God usually either freely giveth or for labour selleth to mankind

For the matter of this nutriment consisting in animals, vegetables, and minerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of the earth, so as there needeth no more but the labour and industry of receiving them. In so much as plenty dependeth, next to God's favour, merely on the labour and industry of men.

This matter, commonly called *commodities*, is partly native and partly foreign *native*, that which is to be had within the territory of the

except it be of very vast extent, that produceth all things needful for the maintenance and motion of the whole body, and few that produce not something more than necessary, the superfluous commodities to be had within become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by just war, or by labour. For a man's labour also is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing and there have been Commonwealths that, having no more territory than hath served them for habitation, have nevertheless not only maintained, but also increased their power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the manufactures, whereof the materials were brought in from other places.

The distribution of the materials of this nourishment is the constitution of *mine*, and *thine*,

shown, a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, and therefore everything is his that getteth it and keepeth it by force; which is neither tainty passion.

pleading attributeth all propriety to the law civil. "Let the civil law," saith he, "be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, not to say oppressed, and there is nothing that any man can be sure to receive from his ancestor, or leave to his children." And again "Take away the civil law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another man's." Seeing therefore the introduction of propriety is an effect of Commonwealth, which can do nothing but by

the person that represents it, it is the act only of the sovereign, and consisteth in the laws, which none can make that have not the sovereign power. And this they well knew of old, who called that *Nómos* (that is to say, *distribution*), which we call *law*, and defined justice by distributing to every man his own.

In this distribution, the first law is for division of the land itself wherein the sovereign as-

common good. The children of Israel were a Commonwealth in the wilderness, but wanted the commodities of the earth till they were masters of the Land of Promise, which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the priest, and Joshua their general, who when there were twelve tribes making them thirteen by subdivision of the tribe of Joseph, made nevertheless but twelve portions of the land, and ordained for the tribe of Levi no land, but assigned them the tenth part of the whole fruits, which division was therefore arbitrary. And though a people coming into possession of a land by war do not always exterminate the ancient inhabitants, as did the Jews, but leave to many, or most, or all of them their estates, yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the

use of them and not to exclude their sovereign,

understood as done in order to the same and

monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust and of the law of nature, but this is not enough to authorize any subject, either to make war upon, or so much as to accuse of injustice, or any way speak evil of their sovereign, because they

have authorized all his actions, and, in bestowing the sovereign power, made them their own. But in what cases the commands of sovereigns are contrary to equity and the law of nature is to be considered hereafter in another place.

In the distribution of land, the Commonwealth itself may be conceived to have a portion, and possess and improve the same by their representative, and that such portion may be made sufficient to sustain the whole expense to the common peace and defence necessarily required, which were very true, if there could be any representative conceived free from human passions and infirmities. But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of public land, or of any certain revenue for the Commonwealth, is in vain, and tendeth to the dissolution of government, and to the condition of mere nature, and war, as soon as ever the sovereign power falleth into the hands of a monarch, or of an assembly, that are either too negligent of money or too hazardous in engaging the public stock into a long or costly war. Commonwealths

hours, the public riches cannot be limited by other limits than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in England, there were by the Conqueror diverse lands reserved to his own use (besides forests and chases, either for his recreation or for preservation of woods), and diverse services reserved on the land he gave his subjects, yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in his public, but in his natural capacity for he and his successors did, for all that, lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects' land when they judged it necessary. Or if those public lands and services were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Commonwealth, it was contrary to the scope of the institution, being (as it appeared by those ensuing taxes) insufficient and (as it appears by the late small revenue of the Crown) subject to alienation and diminution. It is therefore in vain to assign a portion to the Commonwealth, which may sell or give it away, and does sell and give it away when it is done by their representative.

As the distribution of lands at home, so also

some of them would be drawn for gain both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Commonwealth, and hurt themselves by import

ing such things as, pleasing men's appetites, be nevertheless noxious, or at least unprofitable to

Further, seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a Commonwealth that every man have a propriety in a portion of land, or in some few commodities, or a natural property in some useful art, and there is no art in the world but is necessary either for the being or well being almost of every particular man, it is necessary that men distribute that which they can spare, and transfer their propriety therein mutually

signs they shall be understood for valid And for the matter and distribution of the nourishment to the several members of the Commonwealth thus much, considering the model of the whole work, is sufficient

By *concoction* I understand the reducing of all commodities which are not presently consumed, but reserved for nourishment in time to come to something of equal value, and withal so portable as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place to the end a man may have in what place soever such nourishment as the place affordeth And this is nothing else but gold, and silver, and money For gold and silver, being, as it happens, almost in all countries of the world highly valued is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between nations, and money, of what matter soever coined by the sovereign of a Commonwealth, is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else between the subjects of that Commonwealth By the means of which measures all commod

dence, and the same passeth from man to man within the Commonwealth, and goes round about, nourishing as it passeth, every part thereof, in so much as this concoction is, as it were, the sanguification of the Commonwealth for natural blood is in like manner made of the fruits of the earth and, circulating, nourisheth by the way every member of the body of man

by the power of one nor of a few Common wealths, as being a common measure of the commodities of all places But base money may easily be enhanced or abased Secondly, they have the privilege to make Commonwealths move and stretch out their arms, when need is, into foreign countries, and supply, not only private subjects that travel, but also whole armies with provision But that coin, which is not considerable for the matter, but for the stamp of the place being unable to be hence

many times of those that have it

The conduits and ways by which is conveyed to the public use are of two sorts one, that conveyeth it to the public coffers the other, that issueth the same out again for public payments Of the first sort are collectors, receivers, and treasurers, of the second are the treasurers again, and the officers appointed for payment of several public or private ministers And in this also the artificial man maintains his resemblance with the natural, whose veins, receiving the blood from the several parts of the body, carry it to the heart where, being made vital, the heart by the arteries sends it out again, to enliven and enable for motion all the members of the same

The procreation or children of a Commonwealth are those we call *plantations*, or *colonies* which are numbers of men sent out from the Commonwealth under a conductor or governor to inhabit a foreign country, either formerly void of inhabitants, or made void then by war And when a colony is settled, they are either a Commonwealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their sovereign that sent them (as hath been done by many Commonwealths of ancient time), in which case the Commonwealth from which they went was called their *metropolis* or mother, and requires no more of them than fathers require of the children whom they emancipate and make free from their do-

selves but provinces, and parts of the Common

or letters, by which their sovereign authorized them to plant

CHAPTER XXV

Of Counsel

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by the ordinary and inconstant use of words appeareth in nothing more than in the confusion of counsels and commands, arising from the imperative manner of speaking in them both and in many other occasions besides. For the words *do this* are the words not only of him that commandeth but also of him that giveth counsel, and of him that exhorteth, and yet there are but few that see not that these are very different things, or that cannot distinguish between them when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the speech is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding those phrases in men's writings, and being not able or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the precepts of counsellors for the precepts of them that command and make the same

terms of commanding, counselling and exhorting their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus

Command is where a man saith 'Do this,' or 'Do not this,' without expecting other reason than the will of him that says it. From this it followeth manifestly that he that commandeth pretendeth the advantage of himself

Counsel is where a man saith, 'Do,' or 'Do not this,' and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident that he that giveth counsel pretendeth only (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him to whom he giveth it.

Therefore between counsel and command, one great difference is that command is directed to a man's own benefit, and counsel to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what he is commanded, as when he hath covenanted to obey but he cannot be obliged to do what he is counselled, because the hurt of not following it is his own, or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the counsel turned into the nature of a command. A third difference

between them is that no man can pretend a right to be of another man's counsel, because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himself

This also is incident to the nature of counsel, that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it cannot in equity accuse or punish it for to ask counsel of another is to permit him to give such counsel

cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the proposition in debate. For if the sense of the assembly can be taken notice of before the debate be ended, they should neither ask nor take any further counsel for the sense of the assembly is the resolution of the debate and end of all deliberation. And generally he that demandeth counsel is author of it, and therefore cannot punish it, and what the sovereign cannot, no man else can. But if one subject giveth counsel to another to do anything contrary to the laws, whether that counsel proceed from evil intention or from ignorance only, it is punishable by the Commonwealth, because ignorance of the law is no good excuse where every man is bound to take notice of the laws to which he is subject.

Exhortation and *dehortation* is counsel, accompanied with signs in him that giveth it of vehement desire to have it followed or to say it more briefly, counsel vehemently pressed. For he that exhorteth doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tie himself therein to the rigor of true reasoning, but encourages him he counselleth to action as he that dehortheth deterreth him from it. And therefore they have in their speeches a regard to the common passions and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons, and make use of similitudes, metaphors, examples and other tools of oratory, to persuade their hearers of the utility, honour, or justice of following their advice.

From whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehoration is directed to the good of him that giveth the counsel, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a counsellor, who, by the definition of counsel, ought to regard, not his own benefit, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his counsel to his own benefit is manifest enough

by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial giving thereof, which being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentally to the good of him that is counselled, or not at all

Secondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation lieth only where a man is to speak to a multitude, because when the speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him and examine his reasons more rigorously than can be done in a multitude, which are too many to enter into dispute and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once

Thirdly, that they that exhort and dehort, where they are required to give counsel are corrupt counsellors and, as it were, bribed by their own interest For though the counsel they give

his family or a leader in an army, his exhortations and dehortations are not only lawful, but also necessary and laudable but when they are no more counsels but commands which when they are for execution of sour labour, sometimes necessity, and always humanity, requireth to be sweetened in the delivery by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of counsel rather than in harsher language of command

Examples of the difference between command and counsel we may take from the forms of speech that express them in Holy Scripture 'Have no other Gods but me', 'Make to thy self no graven image Take not God's name in vain Sanctify the Sabbath', 'Honour thy parents Kill not Steal not,' etc are commands because the reason for which we are to obey them is drawn from the will of God our King whom we are obliged to obey But these words, 'Sell all thou hast, give it to the poor, and follow me,' are counsel, because the reason

ass tied, and her coit, loose her, and bring her to me,' are a command for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their master but these words, 'Repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus,' are counsel, because the reason why we should so do tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebel, but of ourselves, who have no other means of avoiding the pun-

ishment hanging over us for our sins

As the difference of counsel from command hath been now deduced from the nature of counsel, consisting in a deducing of the benefit or hurt that may arise to him that is to be counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth, so may also the differences between apt and inept counsellors be derived from the same For experience being but memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and counsel but the speech whereby that experience is made known to another, the virtues and defects of counsel are the same with the virtues and defects intellectual and to the person of a Commonwealth, his counsellors serve him in the place of memory and mental discourse But with this resemblance of the Commonwealth to a natural man, there is one dissimilitude joined, of great importance which is that a natural man receiveth his experience from the natural objects of sense, which work upon him without passion or interest of their own, whereas they that give counsel to the representative person of a Commonwealth may have, and have often, their particular ends and passions that render their counsels always suspected, and many times unfaithful And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good counsellor that his ends and interest be not inconsistent with the ends and interest of him he counselleth

Secondly, because the office of a counsellor, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it in such manner as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently informed, he ought to propound his advice in such form of speech as may make the truth most evidently appear, that is to say, with as firm ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit And therefore rash and unevident inferences, such as are fetched only from examples, or authority of books and are not arguments of what is good or evil, but witnesses of fact or of opinion, obscure, confused and ambiguous expressions, also all metaphorical speeches tending to the stirring up of passion (because such reasoning and such expressions are useful only to deceive or to lead him we counsel towards other ends than his own), are repugnant to the office of a counsellor

Thirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience and long study and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the administration of a great Commonwealth are necessary to be known, no

man is presumed to be a good counsellor but in such business as he hath not only been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on and considered. For seeing the business of a Commonwealth is this, to preserve the people in peace at home, and defend them against foreign invasion, we shall find it requires great knowledge of the disposition of mankind, of the rights of government, and of the nature of equity, law, justice, and honour, not to be attained without study, and of the strength, commodities, places, both of their own country and their neighbours, as also of the inclinations and designs of all nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to without much experience. Of which things, not only the whole sum, but every one of the particulars requires the age and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for counsel, as I have said before (Chapter VIII), is judgement. And the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some, to one kind of study or business, and of others, to another. When for the doing of anything there be infallible rules (as in engines and edifices, the rules of geometry), all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel that has learned or found out the rule. And when there is no such rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of business has therein the best judgement, and is the best counsellor.

Fourthly, to be able to give counsel to a Commonwealth, in a business that hath reference to another Commonwealth, it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences and letters that come from thence, and with all the records of treaties and other transactions of state between them, which none can do but such as the representative shall think fit. By which we may see that they who are not called to counsel can have no good counsel in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a man is better counselled by hearing them apart than in an assembly, and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with eye or no or with their hands or feet, not moved by their own sense but by the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole assembly, by contradiction, or for fear of appearing duller in apprehension than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an assembly of many there cannot choose but be some whose interests

are contrary to that of the public, and these their interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and eloquence draws others into the same advice. For the passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand, in assembly are like many brands that inflame one another (especially when they blow one another with orations) to the setting of the Commonwealth on fire, under pretence of counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine, when there is need, the truth or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent interruptions and objections, which cannot be done in an assembly, where in every difficult question a man is rather astonished and dazzled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the politics, and give not their advice with care of the business propounded, but of the applause of their motley orations, made of the diverse colored threads or shreds of authors, which is an impertinence, at least, that takes away the time of serious consultation, and in the secret way of counselling apart is easily avoided. Fourthly, in deliberations that ought to be kept secret, whereof there be many occasions in public business, the counsels of many, and especially in assemblies, are dangerous, and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of counsel from a great assembly of counsellors, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his children, disposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his business by the help of many and prudent counsellors, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best as he that useth able seconds at tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best that useth his own judgement only, as he that has no second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed counsel, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly, out of envy or interest, retarded by the part dissenting does it worst of all, and like one that is c

the ball, though by good players, yet in a wheel barrow, or other frame, heavy of itself, and regarded also by the inconcurrent judgements and endeavours of them that drive it, and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it, and most of all, when there is one or more amongst them that desire to have humlose And though it be true that many eyes see more than one, yet it is not to be understood of many counsellors, but then only when the final resolution is in one man Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in diverse lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit they that desire not to miss their mark, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never run but with one and therefore no great popular Commonwealth was ever kept up, but either by a foreign enemy that united them, or by the reputation of some one eminent man amongst them, or by the secret counsel of a few, or by the mutual fear of equal factions, and not by the open consultations of the assembly And as

CHAPTER XXVI

Of Civil Laws

knowledge of particular laws belongeth to them

of the study of the law

And first it is manifest that law in general is

persona civitatis, the person of the Common weath

Which considered, I define civil law in this manner *Civil law is to every subject those rules which the Commonwealth hath commanded him by word writing or other sufficient sign of the will to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong, that is to say, of what is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule*

In which definition there is nothing that is not at first sight evident For every man seeth that some laws are addressed to all the subjects in general, some to particular provinces, some to particular vocations, and some to particular men and are therefore laws to every of those to whom the command is directed, and to none else As also, that laws are the rules of just and unjust nothing being reputed unjust that is not contrary to some law Likewise, that none can make laws but the Commonwealth, because our subjection is to the Commonwealth only, and that commands are to be signified by sufficient signs because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced ought to be acknowledged for truth Now I deduce from it this that followeth

1 The legislator in all Commonwealths is only the sovereign be he one man, as in a monarchy or one assembly of men, as in a democracy or aristocracy For the legislator is he that maketh the law And the Commonwealth only prescribes and commandeth the observation of those rules which we call *law* therefore the Commonwealth is the legislator But the Commonwealth is no person, nor has capacity to do anything but by the representative, that is, the sovereign and therefore the sovereign is the sole legislator For the same reason, none can abrogate a law made, but the sovereign, because a law is not abrogated but by another law that forbiddeth it to be put in execution

2 The sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is not subject to the civil laws For having power to make and repeal laws he may, when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new, and consequently he was free before For he is free that can be free when he will nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself, because he that can bind can release, and therefore he that is bound to himself only is not bound

3 When long use obtaineth the authority of a law, it is not the length of time that maketh the authority, but the will of the sovereign sig

nified by his silence (for silence is sometimes an

unjust actions and unjust sentences go uncontrolled a longer time than any man can remember And our lawyers account no customs law but such as are reasonable and that evil customs are to be abolished but the judgement of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, be longeth to him that maketh the law, which is the sovereign assembly or monarch

4 The law of nature and the civil law contain each other and are of equal extent For the

Chapter), are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience When a Commonwealth is once settled then

power that obliges men to obey them For in the differences of private men to declare what is equity what is justice, and what is moral virtue,

to say, performance of covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a dictate of the law of nature But every subject in a Commonwealth hath covenanted to obey the civil law, either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the representative itself one by one when subdued by the sword, they promise obedience that they may receive life, and therefore obedience to the civil law is part also of the law of nature Civil and natural law are not different kinds, but different parts of law, whereof one part, being written, is called *civil* the other unwritten, *natural* But the right of nature, that is, the natural liberty of man, may by the civil law be abridged and restrained nay, the end of making laws is no other but such restraint, without which there

cannot possibly be any peace And law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particular men in such manner as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together against a common enemy

5 If the sovereign of one Commonwealth subdue a people that have lived under other written laws, and afterwards govern them by the same laws by which they were governed before, yet those laws are the civil laws of the victor and not of the vanquished Commonwealth For the legislator is he, not by whose authority the laws were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be laws And therefore where there be diverse provinces within the dominion of a Commonwealth, and in those provinces diversity of laws, which commonly are called the customs of each several province, we are not to understand that such customs have their force only from length of time but that they were anciently laws written, or otherwise made known, for the constitutions and statutes of their sovereigns, and are now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of time, but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns But if an unwritten law, in all the provinces of a dominion shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof, that law can be no other but a law of nature, equally obliging all mankind

6 Seeing then all laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and force from the will of the Commonwealth, that is to say from the will of the representative, which in a monarchy is the monarch, and in other Commonwealths the sovereign assembly, a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence in several Commonwealths, directly or by consequence making the legislative power depend on private men or subordinate judges As for example, that the common law hath no controller but the Parliament, which is true only where a parliament has the sovereign power, and cannot be assembled nor dissolved, but by their own discretion For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to control them, and consequently to control their controllings And if there be no such right, then the controller of laws is not *parlamentum* but *rex in parlamento* And where a parliament is sovereign, if it should assemble never so many or so wise men from the countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause yet there is no man will believe that such an assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves

a legislative power *Item*, that the two arms of a Commonwealth are force and justice, the first whereof is in the king, the other deposited in the hands of the Parliament. As if a Commonwealth could consist where the force were in any hand which justice had not the authority to command and govern

7 That law can never be against reason, our

the law. And it is true, but the doubt is of whose reason it is that shall be received for law. It is not meant of any private reason, for then there would be as much contradiction in the laws as there is in the Schools, nor yet, as Sir Edward Coke makes it, an "Artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience," as his was. For it is possible long study may increase and confirm erroneous sentences, and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin. And of those that study and observe with equal time and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain, discordant, and therefore it is not that *juris prudentia*, or wisdom of subordinate judges, but the reason of this our artificial man the Commonwealth, and his command, that maketh law, and the Commonwealth being in their representative but one person, there cannot easily arise any

the sovereign (which is the person of the Commonwealth) is he that judgeth, the subordinate judge ought to have regard to the reason which moved his sovereign to make such law, that his sentence may be according thereunto, which then is his sovereign's sentence, otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.

8 From this, that the law is a command, and a command consisteth in declaration or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by voice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand that the command of the Commonwealth is law only to those that have means to take notice of it. Over natural fools, children, or madmen there is no law, no more than over brute beasts, nor are they capable of the title of just or unjust, because they had never power to make any covenant or to understand the consequences thereof, and consequently never took upon them to authorize the actions of any sovereign, as they must do that make to themselves a Common

wealth. And as those from whom nature or accident hath taken away the notice of all laws in general, so also every man, from whom any accident not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take notice of any particular law, is excused if he observe it not, and to speak properly, that law is no law to him. It is therefore necessary to consider in this place what arguments and signs be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the law, that is to say, what is the will of the sovereign, as well in monarchies as in other forms of government.

And first, if it be a law that obliges all the subjects without exception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a law of nature. For whatsoever men are to take knowledge of for law, not upon other men's words, but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men, which no law can be, but the law of nature. The laws of nature therefore need not any publishing nor proclamation, as being contained in this one sentence, approved by all the world, *Do not that to another which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thyself*.

Secondly, if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man, and be not written nor published by word, then also it is a law of nature, and known by the same arguments and signs that distinguish those in such a condition from other subjects. For whatsoever law is not written, or some way published by him that makes it law, can be known no way but by the reason of him that is to obey it, and is therefore also a law not only civil, but natural. For example, if the sovereign employ a public minister, without written instructions what to do, he is obliged to take for instructions the dictates of reason. As if he make a judge, the judge is to take notice that his sentence ought to be according to the reason of his sovereign, which being always understood to be equity, he is bound to it by the law of nature. Or if an ambassador, he is, in all things not contained in his written instructions, to take for instruction that which reason dictates to be most conducing to his sovereign's interest, and so of all other ministers of the sovereignty, public and private. All which instructions of natural reason may be comprehended under one name of *fidelity*, which is a branch of natural justice.

The law of nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other laws to be made known to every man that shall be obliged to obey them,

either by word, or writing, or some other act known to proceed from the sovereign authority. For the will of another cannot be understood but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose, which in the person of the Commonwealth is to be supposed always consonant to equity and reason. And in ancient time, before letters were in common use, the laws were many times put into verse, that the rude people, taking pleasure in singing or reciting them, might the more easily retain them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon adviseth a man to bind the Ten Commandments

home and upon the way, at going to bed and at rising from bed, and to write it upon the posts and doors of their houses, and to assemble the

force enough to secure their unjust designs, and convey them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for laws what they please without or against the legislative authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a declaration of the law, but also sufficient signs of the author and authority. The author or legislator is supposed in every Commonwealth to be evident, because he is the sovereign, who, having been constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. And though the ignorance and security of men be such, for the most part, as that when the memory of the first constitution of their Commonwealth is worn out, they do not consider by whose power they use to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry protected, and to be righted when injury is done them, yet because no man that considers can make question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the sovereignty is placed. And it is a dictate of natural reason, and consequently an evi-

sieth in the evidence of the authority derived

I say, not authorized for the verification is but the testimony and record, not the authority of the law, which consisteth in the command of the sovereign only.

If therefore a man have a question of injury, depending on the law of nature, that is to say, on common equity, the sentence of the judge, that by commission hath authority to take cognizance of such causes, is a sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individual case. For though the advice of one that professeth the study of the law be useful for the avoiding of contention, yet it is but advice: it is the judge must tell men what is law, upon the hearing of the controversy.

But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written law, every man by recourse to the registers by himself or others may, if he will, be sufficiently informed, before he do such injury, or commit the crime, whether it be an injury or not, nay, he ought to do so: for when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about

mined by the written law, which he may by himself or others see and consider, if he complain before he consults with the law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men than to demand his own right.

If the question be of obedience to a public officer, to have seen his commission with the public seal, and heard it read or to have had

concern his own future actions.

The legislator knows, and the laws either by writing or by the light of nature sufficiently published, there wanteth yet another very material circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the letter, but the intendment, or

dependeth on the authority sovereign, and the interpreters can be none but those which the sovereign, to whom only the subject oweth obedience, shall appoint. For else, by the craft

¹ Proverbs, 7 3

² Deuteronomy, 11 19

³ Ibid 31 12

of an interpreter, the law may be made to bear a sense contrary to that of the sovereign, by which means the interpreter becomes the legislator

All laws, written and unwritten have need of interpretation. The unwritten law of nature, though it be easy to such as without partiality and passion make use of their natural reason, and therefore leaves the violators thereof with out excuse, yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self love, or some other passion, it is now become of all laws the most obscure, and has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters. The written laws, if they be short, are easily mis

many words, can be well understood without a perfect understanding of the final causes for which the law was made: the knowledge of which final causes is in the legislator. To him therefore there cannot be any knot in the law insoluble, either by finding out the ends to undo it by, or else by making what ends he will (as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot) by the legislative power, which no other interpreter can do.

The interpretation of the laws of nature in a Commonwealth dependeth not on the books of moral philosophy. The authority of writers, without the authority of the Commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law, be they never so true. That which I have written in this treatise concerning the moral virtues, and of their necessity for the procuring and maintaining

by the sovereign power that it is law otherwise, it were a great error to call the laws of nature unwritten law: whereof we see so many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one another and of themselves.

The interpretation of the law of nature is the sentence of the judge constituted by the sovereign authority to hear and determine such controversies as depend thereon, and consisteth in the application of the law to the present case. For in the act of judicature the judge doth no more but consider whether the demand of the party be consonant to natural reason and equity, and the sentence he giveth is therefore the interpretation of the law of nature, which inter

pretation is authentic, not because it is his private sentence, but because he giveth it by authority.

But because there is no judge subordinate, nor sovereign, but may err in a judgement of equity, if afterward in another like case he find it

a law to other judges, though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong sentence given by authority of the sovereign if he know and allow it, in such laws as are mutable, be a constitution of a new law in cases in which every little circumstance is the same, yet in laws immutable, such as are the laws of nature, they are no laws to the same or other judges in the like cases for ever after. Princes succeed one another, and one judge passeth, another cometh, nay, heaven and earth shall pass, but not one title of the law of nature shall pass: for it is the eternal law of God. Therefore all the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been cannot altogether make a law contrary to natural equity. Nor any examples of former judges can war

sake, it is against the law of nature to punish the innocent, and innocent is he that acquitted himself judicially and is acknowledged for innocent by the judge. Put the case now that a man is accused of a capital crime, and seeing the power and malice of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of judges, runneth away for fear of the event, and afterwards is taken and brought to a legal trial, and maketh it

damnation of the innocent. I may therefore that there is no place in the world where this can be an interpretation of a law of nature, or be made a law by the sentences of precedent judges that had done the same. For he that judged it first judged unjustly, and no injustice can be a pattern of judgement to succeeding judges. A written law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying: but that flying for fear of injury should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime judicially, is contrary to the

nature of a presumption, which hath no place after judgement given Yet this is set down by a great lawyer for the common law of England 'If a man,' saith he, "that is innocent be accused of felony, and for fear flyeth for the same, albeit he judiciously acquitteth himself of the fel

proof against the presumption in law, grounded upon his flight' Here you see an innocent man, judiciously acquitted, notwithstanding his innocency (when no written law forbade him to fly) after his acquittal, upon a presumption in law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath If the law ground upon his flight a presumption of the fact, which was capital, the sentence ought to have been capital if the presumption were not of the fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no law of England nor is the condemnation grounded upon a presumption of law but upon the pre

man ought to bring with him to the seat of jus-

but this is enough to show that though the sentence of the judge be a law to the party pleading yet it is no law to any judge that shall succeed him in that office

In like manner, when question is of the meaning of written laws, he is not the interpreter of them that writeth a commentary upon them For commentaries are commonly more subject to cavil than the text, and therefore need other commentaries and so there will be no end of such interpretation And therefore unless there be an interpreter authorized by the sovereign, from which the subordinate judges are not to recede, the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges, in the same manner as they are in cases of the unwritten law, and their sentences are to be taken by them that plead for laws in that particular case, but not to bind other judges in like cases to give like judgements For a judge may err in the interpretation even of

written laws, but no error of a subordinate judge can change the law, which is the general sentence of the sovereign

In written laws men use to make a difference between the *letter* and the *sentence* of the law and when by the *letter* is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, it is well distinguished For the significations of almost all words are either in themselves, or in the metaphorical use of them, ambiguous, and may be drawn in argument to make many senses, but there is only one sense of the law But if by the letter be meant the literal sense, then the letter and the sentence or intention of the law is all one For the literal sense is that which

it were a great contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the sovereign He ought therefore, if the word of the law do not fully authorize a reasonable sentence, to supply it with the law of nature, or if the case be difficult, to respite judgement till he have received more ample authority For example, a written law ordaineth that he which is thrust out of his house by force shall be restored by force It happens that a man by negligence leaveth his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no special law ordained It is evident that this case is contained in the same law, for else there is no remedy for him at all, which is to be supposed against the intention of the legislator A

In this case neither shall the letter of the law be followed to the condemnation of the innocent, nor shall the judge give sentence against the evidence of the witnesses, because the letter of the law is to the contrary but procure of the sovereign that another be made judge, and himself witness So that the incommmodity that follows the bare words of a written law may lead him to the intention of the law, whereby to interpret the same the better, though no incommmodity can warrant a sentence against the law For every judge of right and wrong is not judge of what is commodious or incommodious to the Commonwealth

The abilities required in a good interpreter of the law, that is to say, in a good judge, are not the same with those of an advocate namely, the study of the laws For a judge as he ought to take notice of the fact from none but the wit

clared to him by some that have authority from the sovereign power to declare them; and need not take care beforehand what he shall judge, for it shall be given him what he shall say concerning the fact, by witnesses, and what he shall say in point of law, from those that shall in their pleadings show it, and by authority interpret it upon the place. The Lords of Parliament in England were judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them, yet few of them were much versed in the study of the laws, and fewer had made profession of them, and though they consulted with lawyers that were appointed to be present there for that purpose, yet they alone had the authority of giving sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trials of right, twelve men of the common people are the judges and give sentence, not only of the fact, but of the right, and pronounce simply for the complainant or for the defendant, that is to say, are judges not only of the fact, but also of the right, and in a question of crime, not only determine whether done or not done, but also whether it be murder, homicide, felony, assault, and the like, which are determinations of law but because they are not supposed to know the law of themselves, there is one that hath authority to inform them of it in the particular case they are to judge of. But yet if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby in any penalty, unless it be made appear they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.

other men's writings, but on the goodness of a man's own natural reason and meditation, is

riches and preterments. A truly, to be able in

ply what he hath heard.

on nature, but on the scope of the writer, and

is subservient in every man's proper method. In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of civil laws.

1. *The edicts, constitutions, and epistles of the prince*, that is, of the emperor, because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these are the proclamations of the kings of England.

2. *The decrees of the whole people of Rome*, comprehending the Senate, when they were put to the question by the Senate. These were laws, at first, by the virtue of the sovereign power residing in the people; and such of them as by the emperors were not abrogated remained laws by the authority imperial. For all laws that bind are understood to be laws by his authority that has power to repeal them. Somewhat like to these laws are the Acts of Parliament in England.

3. *The decrees of the common people*, excluding the Senate, when they were put to the question by the tribune of the people. For such of them as were not abrogated by the emperors, remained laws by the authority imperial. Like to these were the orders of the House of Commons in England.

4. *Responsum consulta*, the orders of the Senate because when the people of Rome grew so numerous as it was inconvenient to assemble them, it was thought fit by the emperor that men should consult the Senate instead of the people and these have some resemblance with the Acts of Council.

5. *The edicts of praetors*, and in some cases of the aediles such as are the chief justices in the courts of England.

6. *Responsa prudentum*, which were the sentences and opinions of those lawyers to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret the law, and to give answer to such as in matter of law demanded their advice, which answers the judges in giving judgement were obliged by the constitutions of the emperor to observe and should be like the reports of cases judged, if other judges be by the law of England bound to observe them.

to ask advice.

7. Also, *unwritten customs*, which in their own nature are an imitation of law, by the tacit consent of the emperor, in case they be not

natural but also *moral laws*, consisting in the moral virtues, as justice, equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace and charity, of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Positive are those which have not been from eternity, but have been made laws by the will of those that have had the sovereign power over others, and are either written or made known to men by some other argument of the will of their legislator

Again, of positive laws some are *human*, some *divine* and of human positive laws, some are *distributive*, some *penal* *Distributive* are those that determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to every man what it is by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands or goods, and a right or liberty of action and these speak to all the subjects *Penal* are those which declare what penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the law, and speak to the ministers and officers ordained for execution For though every one ought to be informed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression, nevertheless the command is not addressed to the delinquent (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himself), but to public ministers appointed to see the penalty executed And these penal laws are for the most part written together with the laws distributive, and are sometimes called *judgements* For all laws are general judgements, or sentences of the legislator, as also every particular judgement is a law to him whose case is judged

Divine positive laws (for natural laws, being eternal and universal, are all divine) are those which, being the commandments of God not from all eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but only to a certain people or to certain persons, are declared for such by those whom God hath authorized to declare them But this authority of man to declare what be these positive laws of God how can it be known? God may command a man, by a supernatural way, to deliver laws to other men, But because it is of the essence of law that he who is to be obliged be assured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God, how can a man without supernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the declarer? And how can he be bound to obey them? For the first question, how a man can be assured of the revelation of an other without a revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently impossible for though a man may be induced to believe such revelation, from

the miracles they see him do, or from seeing the extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the extraordinary wisdom, or extraordinary felicity of his actions, all which are marks of God's extraordinary favour, yet they are not assured evidences of special revelation Miracles are marvellous works; but that which is marvellous to one may not be so to another Sanctity may be feigned, and the visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason that an other has had a supernatural revelation of God's will but only a belief, every one, as the signs thereof shall appear greater or lesser, a firmer or a weaker belief

But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them, it is not so hard For if the law declared be not against the law of nature, which is undoubtedly God's law, and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it for men's belief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary or extraordinary Faith of supernatural law is not a fulfilling but only an assenting to the same, and not a duty that we exhibit to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom He pleaseth, as also unbelief is not a breach of any of His laws but a rejection of them all, except the laws natural But this that I say will be made yet clearer by the examples and testimonies concerning this point in Holy Scripture The covenant God made with Abraham in a supernatural manner was thus, "This is the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee Abraham's seed had not this revelation nor were yet in being, yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for God's law which they could not be but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents, who (if they be subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have sovereign power over their children and servants Again, where God saith to Abraham, In thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed for I know thou wilt command thy children and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe righteousness and judgement," it is manifest the obedience of his family, who had no revelation depended on their former obligation to obey their sovereign At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God, the people were forbidden to approach

on pain of death; yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared in them for God's law. Upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, "Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee, but let not God speak to us, lest we die"? By which two places it sufficiently appeareth that in a Commonwealth a subject that has no certain and assured revelation particularly to himself concerning the will of God is to obey for such the command of the Commonwealth: for if men were at liberty to take for God's commandments their own dreams and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men, scarce two men would agree upon what is God's commandment, and yet in respect of them every man would despise the commandments of the Commonwealth. I conclude, therefore, that in

clared to be so by the laws of the Commonwealth. Which also is evident to any man's reason, for whatsoever is not against the law of nature may be made law in the name of them that have the sovereign power, and there is no reason men should be the less obliged by it when it is propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend other commandments of God than are declared for such by the Commonwealth. Christian states punish those that revolt from Christian religion, and all other states, those that set up any religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Commonwealth, it is equity (which is the law of nature, and therefore an eternal law of God) that every man equally enjoy his liberty.

There is also another distinction of laws into *fundamental* and *not fundamental* but I could never see in any author what a fundamental law signifieth. Nevertheless one may very reasonably distinguish laws in that manner.

For a fundamental law in every Commonwealth is that which, being taken away, the Commonwealth faileth and is utterly dissolved, as a building whose foundation is destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is that by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever

election of officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the public good. Not fundamental is that, the abrogating whereof

draweth not with it the dissolution of the Commonwealth; such as are the laws concerning controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the division of laws.

I find the words *lex civilis* and *jus civile*, that

gation, and takes from us the liberty which the law of nature gave us. Nature gave a right to every man to secure himself by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour by way of prevention but the civil law takes away that liberty, in all cases where the protection of the law may be safely stayed for. Inasmuch as *lex* and *jus* are as different as obligation and liberty.

Likewise laws and charters are taken promiscuously for the same thing. Yet charters are donations of the sovereign; and not laws, but exemptions from law. The phrase of a law is *jubeo, injungo* I command and enjoin the phrase of a charter is *dedi, concessi*, I have given, I have granted but what is given or granted to a man is not forced upon him by a law. A law may be made to bind all the subjects of a Commonwealth a liberty or charter is only to one man or some one part of the people. For to say all the people of a Commonwealth have liberty in any case whatsoever is to say that, in such case, there hath been no law made; or else, having been made, is now abrogated.

CHAPTER XXVII

Of Crimes, Excuses, and Extenuations

A sin is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator. For such contempt is a breach of all his laws at once, and therefore may consist, not only in the commission of a fact, or in the speaking of words by the laws forbidden, or in the omission of what the law commandeth, but also in the intention or

by force or fraud, is no breach of the law, that saith, "Thou shalt not covet". nor is the pleas-

both of man and every other living creature, as to make it a sin were to make sin of being a man. The consideration of this has made me think them too severe, both to themselves and others, that maintain that the first motions of the mind, though checked with the fear of God, be sins. But I confess it is safer to err on that hand than on the other.

A *crime* is a sin, consisting in the committing by deed or word of that which the law forbiddeth, or the omission of what it hath commanded. So that every crime is a sin, but not every sin a crime. To intend to steal or kill is a sin, though it never appear in word or fact.

served in the word *ἀμαρτία*, and *ἐγκλημα*, or *δύνα*, whereof the former (which is translated *sin*) signifieth any swerving from the law what soever, but the two latter (which are translated *crime*) signify that sin only whereof one man may accuse another. But of intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for human accusation. In like manner the Latins by *peccatum* which is *sin* signify all manner of deviation from the law, but by *crimen* (which word they derive from *cerno*, which signifies *to perceive*) they mean only such sins as may be made appear before a judge, and therefore are not mere intentions.

From this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, may be inferred, first, that wherelaw ceaseth, sin ceaseth. But because the law of nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude, arrogance, and all facts contrary to any moral virtue can never cease to be sin. Secondly, that the civil law ceasing, crimes cease for there being no other law remaining but that of nature, there is no place for accusa-

ly, that when the sovereign power ceaseth, crime also ceaseth for where there is no such power, there is no protection to be had from the law, and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power for no man in the institution of

But this is to be understood only of those that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the power that protected them for that was a crime from the beginning.

The source of every crime is some defect of the understanding, or some error in reasoning, or some sudden force of the passions. Defect in the understanding is *ignorance*, in reasoning, *erroneous opinion*. Again, ignorance is of three sorts, of the law, and of the sovereign, and of the penalty. Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man, because every man that hath attained to the use of reason is supposed to know he ought not to do to another what he would not have done to himself. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do anything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man come from the Indies hither, and persuade men here to receive a new religion, or teach them anything that tendeth to disobedience of the laws of this country, though he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not only because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in another namely, that coming from

binding

In the like manner, if the civil law of a man's own country be not so sufficiently declared as he may know it if he will nor the action against the law of nature, the ignorance is a good excuse in other cases ignorance of the civil law excuseth not.

Ignorance of the sovereign power in the place of a man's ordinary residence excuseth him not, because he ought to take notice of the power by which he hath been protected there.

Ignorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuseth no man for in breaking the law, which without a fear of penalty to follow were not a law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is, because whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it, but punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the laws in every Commonwealth, which punishment, if it be determined already by the law, he is subject to that, if not, then is he subject to arbitrary punishment. For it is

reason that he which does injury, without other limitation than that of his own will, should suffer punishment without other limitation than that of his will whose law is thereby violated

But when a penalty is either annexed to the crime in the law itself, or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases, there the delinquent is excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown if not great enough to deter men from the action, is an invitation to it because when men compare the benefit of their injustice with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves and therefore when they are punished more than the law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished for the same crime, it is the law that tempted and deceiveth them

No law made after a fact done can make it a crime because if the fact be against the law of nature the law was before the fact, and a positive law cannot be taken notice of before it be made and therefore cannot be obligatory. But when the law that forbiddeth a fact is made before the fact be done, yet he that doth the fact is liable to the penalty ordained after, in case no lesser penalty were made known before, neither by writing nor by example, for the reason immediately before alleged

From defect in reasoning (that is to say, from error), men are prone to violate the laws three ways. First, by presumption of false principles as when men, from having observed how in all places and in all ages unjust actions have been authorised by the force and victories of those who have committed them and that, potent men breaking through the cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort and those that have failed in their enterprises have been esteemed the only criminals, have thereupon taken for principles and grounds of their reasoning that justice is but a vain word that whatsoever a man can get by his own industry and hazard is his own and the practice of all nations can not be unjust that examples of former times are good arguments of doing the like again, and many more of that kind which being granted, no act in itself can be a crime, but must be made so, not by the law, but by the success of them that commit it, and the same fact be virtuous or vicious as fortune pleaseth, so that what Marius makes a crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Cæsar (the same laws standing) turn again into a crime, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of the Commonwealth

Secondly, by false teachers that either mis-

interpret the law of nature, making it thereby repugnant to the law civil, or by teaching for laws such doctrines of their own, or traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a subject

resolving what to do such as are they that have both a great opinion of their own understanding and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but only common experience and a good natural wit whereof no man thinks himself unprovided whereas the knowledge of right and wrong, which is no less difficult, there is no man will pretend to without great and long study. And of those defects in reasoning, there is none that can excuse, though some of them may extenuate, a crime in any man that pretendeth to the administration of his own private business, much less in them that undertake a public charge, because they pretend to the reason upon the want whereof they would ground their excuse

Of the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime, one is vainglory, or a foolish overrating of their own worth, as if difference of worth were an effect of their wit, or riches, or blood or some other natural quality, not depending on the will of those that have the sovereign authority. From whence proceedeth a presumption that the punishments ordained by the laws, and extended generally to all subjects ought not to be inflicted on them with the same rigor they are inflicted on poor, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of the vulgar

Therefore it happeneth commonly that such as value themselves by the greatness of their wealth adventure on crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment by corrupting public justice, or obtaining pardon by money or other rewards

And that such as have multitude of potent friends, and popular men that have gained reputation amongst the multitude, take courage to violate the laws from a hope of oppressing the power to whom it belongeth to put them in execution

And that such as have a great and false opinion of their own wisdom take upon them to reprehend the actions and call in question the authority of them that govern and so to unsettle the laws with their public discourse, as that nothing shall be a crime but what their own designs require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men to be prone to all such crimes

■ consist in craft, and in deceiving of their neighbours, because they think their designs are too subtle to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own wisdom. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of Commonwealth (which can never happen without a civil war), very few are left alive long enough to see their new designs established, so that the benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity and such as would least have wished ■ which argues they were not so wise as they thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed do commonly deceive themselves, the darkness in which they believe they be hidden being nothing else but their own blindness, and are no wiser than children that think all hid by hiding their own eyes.

And generally all vainglorious men, unless they be withal timorous, are subject to anger, as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt the ordinary liberty of conversation, and there are few crimes that may not be produced by anger.

As for the passions, of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness, what crimes they are apt to produce is so obvious to every man's experience and understanding as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man and all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindered but by extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those things men hate, they find a continual and unavoidable molestation, whereby either a man's patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him: the former is difficult, the latter is many times impossible without some violation of the law. Ambition and covetousness are passions also that are perpetually incumbent and pressing, whereas reason is not perpetually present to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easy or uncertain punishments.

Of all passions, that which inclineth men least to break the laws is fear. Nay, excepting some generous natures, it is the only thing (when there is appearance of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws) that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a crime may be committed through fear.

For not every fear justifies the action it pro-

ducesseth, but the fear only of corporeal hurt, which we call *bodily fear*, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape but by wounding him that assaulteth him, if he wound him to death, this is no crime, because no man is supposed, at the making of a Commonwealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life or limbs, where the law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man because from his actions or his threatenings I may argue he will kill me when he can (seeing I have time and means to demand protection from the sovereign power) is a crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace, or some little injuries, for which they that made the laws had assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of reason to take notice of, and is afraid unless he revenge it he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others, and to avoid this, breaks the law, and protects himself for the future by the terror of his private revenge. This is a crime for the hurt is not corporeal, but fantastical, and (though, in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custom not many years since begun, amongst young and vain men) solight as a gallant man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear of spirits, either through his own superstition or through too much credit given to other men that tell him of strange dreams and visions, and thereby be made believe they will hurt him for doing or omitting diverse things which, nevertheless, to do or omit is contrary to the laws, and that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be excused by this fear, but is a crime. For, as I have shown before in the second Chapter, dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the impressions our senses had formerly received waking, and, when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be real visions, and therefore he that presumes to break the law upon his own or another's dream or pretended vision, or upon other fancy of the power of invisible spirits than is permitted by the Commonwealth, leaveth the law of nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the unagery of his own or another private man's brain, which he can never know whether it significeth anything or nothing, nor whether he that tells his dream say true or lie, which if every private man should have leave to do (as they must, by the law of nature, if any one have

it), there could no law be made to hold, and so all Commonwealth would be dissolved

From these different sources of crimes, it appears already that all crimes are not, as the Stoics of old time maintained, of the same alloy. There is place, not only for *excuse*, by which that which seemed a crime is proved to be none at all, but also for *extenuation*, by which the crime, that seemed great, is made less. For

observed, yet it does not follow that all crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked, which the Stoics, not observing, held it a great crime to kill a hen, against the law, as to kill one's father.

That which totally excuseth a fact, and takes away from it the nature of a crime, can be none but that which, at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the law. For the fact committed once against the law, if he that committed it be obliged to the law, can be no other than a crime.

The want of means to know the law totally excuseth for the law whereof a man has no means to inform himself is not obligatory. But the want of diligence to enquire shall not be considered as a want of means, nor shall any man that pretendeth to reason enough for the government of his own affairs be supposed to want means to know the laws of nature, because they are known by the reason he pretends to. Only children and madmen are excused from offences against the law natural.

Where a man is captive or in the power of

tion of the law ceaseth because he must obey the enemy, or die, and consequently such obedience is no crime for no man is obliged (when the protection of the law faileth) not to protect himself by the best means he can.

If a man by the terror of present death be compelled to do a fact against the law, he is totally excused, because no law can oblige a

the law, as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtain for money, nor charity, or in defence of his life, snatch away another man's sword, he is totally excused for the reason next before alleged.

Again, facts done against the law, by the authority of another, are by that authority excused against the author, because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another that is but his instrument but it is not excused against a third person thereby injured, because in the violation of the law both the author and actor are criminals. From hence it followeth that when that man or assembly that hath the sovereign power commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former law, the doing of it is totally excused for he ought not to condemn it himself, because he is the author, and what cannot justly be condemned by the sovereign cannot justly be punished by any other. Besides, when the sovereign commandeth anything to be done against his own former law, the command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the law.

If that man or assembly that hath the sovereign power disclaim any right essential to the sovereignty, whereby there accrue to the subject any liberty inconsistent with the sovereign power that is to say, with the very being of a Commonwealth, if the subject shall refuse to

to take notice of what is inconsistent with the sovereignty, because it was erected by his own consent and for his own defence, and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it was granted through ignorance of the evil consequence thereof. But if he not only disobey, but also resist a public minister in the execution of it, then it is a crime, because he might have been righted, without any breach of the peace, upon complaint.

The degrees of crime are taken on diverse

places, and persons

The same fact done against the law, if it pro-

When a man is destitute of food or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himself any other way but by some fact against

upon all temptations, a contempt of all laws, whereas in the latter case the apprehension of danger that makes a man fly renders him more obedient for the future. A crime which we know

encourages him to commit the same again, but he that doth it by error, after the error shown him, is conformable to the law

He whose error proceeds from the authority of a teacher, or an interpreter of the law publicly authorised, is not so faulty as he whose error proceedeth from a peremptory pursuit of his

ished in other men, is a greater crime than if there have been many precedent examples of impunity. For those examples are so many hopes of impunity, given by the sovereign himself and because he which furnishes a man

fender with the whole

A crime arising from a sudden passion is not so great as when the same ariseth from long meditation for in the former case there is a

a total excuse for all the time between the first knowing of the law, and the commission of the fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation,

a fact done against it is a greater crime than where men are left without such instruction to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and

interruption of their callings, and be informed by private men for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity, but in the former there is apparent negligence, which is not without some contempt of the sovereign power

Those facts which the law expressly condemneth but the lawmaker by other manifest signs of his will tacitly approveth are lesser crimes than the same facts condemned both by the law and lawmaker. For seeing the will of the law maker is a law, there appear in this case two contradictory laws which would totally excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the sovereign's approbation by other arguments than are expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent, not only to the

the law condemneth duels, the punishment is made capital on the contrary part, he that refuseth duel is subject to contempt and scorn, without remedy, and sometimes by the sovereign himself thought unworthy to have any charge or preferment in war if thereupon he accept duel, considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the sovereign power he ought not in

revenges or any other kind of disobedience, but a care in governors not to countenance any thing obliquely which directly they forbid. The examples of princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been more potent to govern their actions than the laws themselves. And though

dounds to the damage of many is greater than when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore when a fact hurteth not only in the present, but also by example in the future, it is a greater crime than if it hurt only in the present for the former is a fertile crime, and multiplies so the hurt of many, the latter is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the Commonwealth is a greater fault in an authorised preacher than in a private person so also is it to live profanely, in

continently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever Likewise in a professor of the law, to maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakening of the sovereign power is a greater crime than in another man also in a man that hath such reputation for wisdom as that his counsels are followed or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the law is a greater crime than the same fact in another for such men not only commit crime, but teach it for law to all other men And generally all crimes are the greater by the scandal they give, that is to say by becoming stumbling blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry before them

Also facts of hostility against the present state of the Commonwealth are greater crimes than the same acts done to private men for the dam-

tempts upon the representative of the Commonwealth, be it a monarch or an assembly and all endeavours by word or deed to diminish the authority of the same, either in the present time or in succession which crimes the Latins understand by *crimina læsæ majestatis* and consist in design or act, contrary to a fundamental law

Likewise those crimes which render judgements of no effect are greater crimes than injuries done to one or a few persons as to receive money to give false judgement or testimony is a greater crime than otherwise to deceive a man of the like or a greater sum, because not only he has wrong, that falls by such judgements, but all judgements are rendered useless, and occasion ministered to force and private revenges

Also robbery and depredation of the public

person or his seal because the fraud thereof extendeth to the damage of many

Of facts against the law done to private men, the greater crime is that where the damage, in the common opinion of men, is most sensible And therefore

To kill against the law is a greater crime than any other injury, life preserved

And to kill with torment, greater than simply to kill

ror of death or wounds, than by clandestine surreption

And by clandestine surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained

And the violation of chastity by force, greater than by flattery

And of a woman married, than of a woman not married

For all these things are commonly so valued,

of mankind

And therefore the offence men take from contumely, in words or gesture, when they produce no other harm than the present grief of him that is reproached hath been neglected in the laws of the Greeks Romans, and other both ancient and modern Commonwealths, supposing the true cause of such grief to consist, not in the contumely (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own virtue), but in the pusillanimity of him that is offended by it

Also a crime against a private man is much aggravated by the person, time, and place For to kill one's parent is a greater crime than to kill another for the parent ought to have the honour of a sovereign (though he have surrendered his power to the civil law), because he had it originally by nature And to rob a poor man is a greater crime than to rob a rich man, because it is to the poor a more sensible damage

And a crime committed in the time or place appointed for devotion is greater than if committed at another time or place for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the law

Many other cases of aggravation and extenuation might be added but by these I have set down it is obvious to every man to take the altitude of any other crime proposed

Lastly, because in almost all crimes there is

monwealth, is called *public crime*, and when

pleas As in an accusation of murder, if the accuser be a private man, the plea is a private plea, if the accuser be the sovereign, the plea is a public plea

CHAPTER XXVIII

Of Punishments and Rewards

A *punishment* is an evil inflicted by public authority on him that hath done or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law, to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience

Before I infer anything from this definition, there are some things to be considered.

1. It is supposed bound by covenant not to resist violence, and consequently it cannot be intended that he gave any right to another to lay

himself. Also he obligeth himself to assist him that hath the sovereignty in the punishing of another, but of himself not. But to covenant to assist the sovereign in doing hurt to another is also to be considered.

grounded on any concession or gift of the subjects. But I have also shown formerly that before the institution of Commonwealth, every man had a right to everything and to do what soever he thought necessary to his own preservation, subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order to it.

2. I give the sovereign that right, but only, in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own as he should think fit for the preservation of them all so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only, and, excepting the limits set him by natural law, as entire as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of every one against his neighbour.

From the definition of punishment, I infer, first, that neither private revenges nor injuries of private men can properly be styled punishment, because they proceed not from public authority.

Secondly, that to be neglected and unpunished by the public favour is not a punishment, because no new evil is thereby on any man inflicted, he is only left in the estate he was in before.

Thirdly, that the evil inflicted by public authority, without precedent public condemnation, is not to be styled by the name of punishment, but of a hostile act, because the fact for which a man is punished ought first to be judged by public authority to be a transgression of the law.

Fourthly, that the evil inflicted by public authority

not for author the person condemned, and therefore are not acts of public authority.

Fifthly, that all evil which is inflicted without intention or possibility of disposing the delinquent or, by his example, other men to obey the laws is not punishment, but an act of hostility, because without such an end no hurt done is contained under that name.

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions there be annexed by nature diverse hurtful consequences, as when a man in assaulting another is himself slain or wounded, or when he falleth into sickness by the doing of some unlawful act, such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a punishment divine, yet it is not contained in the name of punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the authority of man.

Seventhly, if the harm inflicted be less than the benefit of contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition, and is rather the price or redemption than the punishment of a crime because it is of the nature of punishment to have for end the disposing of men to obey the law, which end (if it be less than the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.

Eighthly, if a punishment be determined and prescribed in the law itself, and after the crime committed there be a greater punishment inflicted, the excess is not punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing the aim of punishment is not a revenge, but terror, and the terror of a great punishment unknown is taken away by the declaration of a less, the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment. But where there is no punishment at all determined by the law, there whatsoever is inflicted hath the nature of punishment. For he that goes about the violation of a law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary punishment.

Ninthly, harm inflicted for a fact done be-

fore there was a law that forbade it is not punishment, but an act of hostility: for before the law, there is no transgression of the law but punishment supposeth a fact judged to have been a transgression of the law, therefore harm inflicted before the law made is not punishment, but an act of hostility.

Tenthly, hurt inflicted on the representative of the Commonwealth is not punishment, but an act of hostility because it is of the nature of punishment to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority only of the representative itself.

Lastly, harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy falls not under the name of punishment because seeing they were either never subject to the law, and therefore cannot transgress it, or having been subject to it, and pro-

lawful. From whence it followeth that if a subject shall by fact or word wittingly and deliberately deny the authority of the representative of the Commonwealth (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for treason), he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the representative will for in denying subjection, he denies such punishment as by the law hath been ordained, and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Commonwealth, that is, according to the will of the representative. For the punishments set down in the law are to subjects, not to enemies, such as are they that, having been by their own act subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the sovereign power.

The first and most general distribution of punishments is into *divine* and *human*. Of the former I shall have occasion to speak in a more convenient place hereafter.

Human are those punishments that be inflicted by the commandment of man; and are either corporal, or pecuniary, or ignominy, or

stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body as were before lawfully enjoyed.

capital are stripes, wounds, chains, and any other corporal pain not in its own nature mor-

tal. For if upon the infliction of a punishment death follow, not in the intention of the inflicter, the punishment is not to be esteemed capital, though the harm prove mortal by an accident not to be foreseen, in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.

Pecuniary punishment is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a sum of mon-

ly forbid the fact but only to those that are not able to pay the money: except where the law is natural, or part of religion, for in that case it is not an exemption from the law, but a transgression of it. As where a law exacteth a pecuniary mulct of them that take the name of God in vain, the payment of the mulct is not the price of a dispensation to swear, but the punishment of the transgression of a law indispensable. In like manner if the law impose a sum of money to be paid to him that has been injured, this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him, and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.

Ignominy is the infliction of such evil as is made dishonourable, or the deprivation of such good as is made honourable by the Commonwealth. For there be some things honourable by nature, as the effects of courage, magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body and mind others made honourable by the Commonwealth, as badges, titles, offices, or any other singular mark of the sovereign's favour. The former, though they may fail by nature or accident, cannot be taken away by a law, and therefore the loss of them is not punishment. But the latter may be taken away by the public authority that made them honourable, and are properly punishments: such are, degrading men condemned, of their badges, titles, and offices, or declaring them incapable of the like in time to come.

Imprisonment is when a man is by public authority deprived of liberty, and may happen from two diverse ends, whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused, the other is the inflicting of pain on a man condemned. The

soever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds or restraint before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the law of nature. But the latter is punishment because evil, and inflicted by public authority for somewhat that has by the same authority been judged a transgression of the law. Under this word *imprisonment* I comprehend all restraint of motion caused by an external obstacle, be it a house, which is called by the general name of a prison, or an island, as when men are said to be confined to it, or a place where men are set to work, as in old time men have been condemned to quarries, and in these times to galleys, or be it a chain or any other such impediment.

Exile (banishment) is when a man is for a crime condemned to depart out of the dominion of the Commonwealth, or out of a certain part thereof, and during a prefixed time, or forever, not to return into it, and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a punishment, but rather an escape, or a public commandment to avoid punishment by flight. And Cicero says there was never any such punishment ordained in the city of Rome, but calls it a refuge of men in danger. For if a man banished be nevertheless permitted to enjoy his goods, and the revenue of his lands, the mere change of air is no punishment, nor does it tend to that benefit of the Commonwealth for which all punishments are ordained: that is to say, to the forming of men's wills to the observation of the law, but many times to the damage of the Commonwealth. For a banished man is a lawful enemy of the Commonwealth that banished him, as being no more a member of the same. But if he be withal deprived of his lands, or goods, then the punishment lieth not in the exile, but is to be reckoned amongst punishments pecuniary.

All punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the law of nature for punishment is only for transgression of the law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. It is therefore a violation, first, of that law of nature which forbideth all men, in their revenges, to look at any thing but some future good for there can ar

of evil for good. And thirdly, of the law that commandeth equity, that is to say, an equal distribution of justice, which in punishing the innocent is not observed.

But the infliction of what evil soever on an innocent man that is not a subject, if it be for the benefit of the Commonwealth, and without violation of any former covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For all men that are not subjects are either enemies, or else they have

the victor make distinction of nocent and innocent as to the time past nor has other respect of mercy than as it conduceth to the good of his own people. And upon this ground it is that also in subjects who deliberately deny the authority of the Commonwealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended not only to the fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of the fact for which they are afflicted because the nature of this offence consisteth in the renouncing of subjection, which is a relapse into the condition of war commonly called *rebellion* and they that so offend, suffer not as subjects, but as enemies. For rebellion is but war renewed.

Reward is either of gift or by contract. When by contract it is called *salary* and *wages* which is benefit due for service performed or promised. When of gift it is benefit proceeding from the grace of them that bestow it, to encourage or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the sovereign of a Commonwealth appointeth a salary to any public office he that receiveth it is bound in justice to perform his office, otherwise, he is bound only in honour to acknowledgement and an endeavour of requital. For though men have no lawful remedy when they be commanded to quit their private business to serve the public, without reward or salary, yet they are not bound thereto by the law of nature, nor by the institution of the Commonwealth unless the service cannot otherwise be done, because it is supposed the sovereign may make use of all their means inasmuch as the most common soldier may demand the wages of his warfare as a debt.

The benefits which a sovereign bestoweth on a subject, for fear of some power and ability he hath to do hurt to the Commonwealth, are not

long as they are obedient be protected thereby, the punishment of the innocent is a rendering

properly rewards for they are not salaries, be cause there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the

in the person of the Commonwealth, makes for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himself, and encour age not to obedience, but, on the contrary, to the continuance and increasing of further extortion

And whereas some salaries are certain, and proceed from the public treasury, and others uncertain and casual, proceeding from the execution of the office for which the salary is ordained, the latter is in some cases hurtful to the Commonwealth as in the case of judicature For where the benefit of the judges, and ministers of a court of justice, consisteth for the multitude of causes that are brought to their cognizance, there must needs follow two inconveniences one is the nourishing of suits, for the more suits the greater benefit and another that depends on that, which is contention about jurisdiction, each court drawing to itself as many causes as it can But in offices of execution there are not those inconveniences, because their employment cannot be increased by any endeavour of their own And thus much shall suffice for the nature of punishment and reward, which are, as it were, the nerves and tendons that move the limbs and joints of a Commonwealth

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government, together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to LEVIATHAN, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and

earth to be compared with him He is made so as not to be afraid He seeth every high thing below him, and is king of all the children of pride But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other earthly creatures are, and because there is that in heaven, though not on earth, that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought to obey, I shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases and the causes of his mortality, and of what laws of nature he is bound to obey

CHAPTER XXIX

Of Those Things That Weaken or Tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth

THOUGH nothing can be immortal which mortals make, yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to their Commonwealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internal diseases For by the nature of their institution, they are designed to live as long as mankind, or as the laws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men as they are the matter but as they are the makers and orderers of them For men, as they be come at last weary of irregular jostling and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edifice, so for want both of the art of making fit laws to square their actions by, and also of humility and patience suffer the rude and cumbersome points of their present greatness to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able architect be compiled into any other than a crazy building, such as, hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity

Amongst the infirmities therefore of a Commonwealth, I will reckon in the first place those that arise from an imperfect institution, and resemble the diseases of a natural body, which proceed from a defectuous procreation

Of which this is one that a man to obtain a kingdom is sometimes content with less power than to the peace and defence of the Commonwealth is necessarily required From whence it cometh to pass that when the exercise of the power laid by is for the public safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of an unjust act, which disposeth great numbers of men when occasion is presented, to rebel, in the same manner as the bodies of children gotten by diseased parents are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into boils and scabs And when kings deny themselves some such necessary power, it is not always (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake, but many times out of a hope to recover

der to the good of their own subjects let slip

few occasions to weaken the estate of their neighbours So was Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second by the Pope, the subjection of ecclesiastics in the Commonwealth having been dispensed with by William the Conqueror at his reception, when he took an oath not to infringe the liberty of the Church And so were the barons, whose power was by William Rufus, to have their help in transferring the succession from his elder brother to himself increased to a degree inconsistent with the sovereign power, maintained in their rebellion against King John by the French

to the whole power, which first caused the seditions of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturninus, and others, and afterwards the wars between the senate and the people under Marius and Sylla, and again under Pompey and Cæsar, to the extinction of their democracy and the setting up of monarchy

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one only action, which was that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the war for the island of Salamis, and yet thereby, if Solon had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a madman, and in verse, propounded it to the people that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readiness, even at the gates of their city such damage, or shifts, are all Commonwealths forced to that have their power never so little limited

In the second place, I observe the diseases of a Commonwealth that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is that every private man is judge of good and evil actions This is true in the condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws, and also under civil government in such cases as are not determined by the law But otherwise, it is manifest that the measure of good and evil actions is the civil law, and that

science is sin, and it dependeth on the precept of the law

the conscience may be erroneous Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason, yet it is not so with him that lives in a Commonwealth, because the law is the public conscience by which he hath already undertaken to be guided Otherwise in such diversity as there is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the Commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes

It hath been also commonly taught that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion Which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his faith, or why every Christian should not be also a prophet, or why any man should take the law of his country rather than his own inspiration for the

to the dissolution of all civil government Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us, which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty, and yet are not supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concur to every effect, unobservable Faith and sanctity are indeed not very frequent, but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways by which God worketh them in His elect, at such time as He thinketh fit And these three opinions, pernicious to peace and government, have in this part of the world proceeded chiefly from the tongues and pens of unlearned divines, who, joining the words of Holy Scripture together otherwise than is agreeable to reason do what they can to make men think that sanctity and natural reason cannot stand together

of nature, because such laws be divine and can not by any man or Commonwealth be abrogated But to those laws which the sovereign himself,

Another doctrine repugnant to civil society is that whatsoever a man does against his con-

that is, which the Commonwealth, maketh, he is not subject For to be subject to laws is to be subject to the Commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to himself, which is not subjection, but freedom from the laws Which error, because it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him, which is to make a new sovereign, and again for the same reason a third to punish the second, and so continually without end, in the confusion and dissolution of the Commonwealth

A fifth doctrine that tendeth in the dissolution of a Commonwealth is that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods, such as excludeth the right of the sovereign Every man has indeed a propriety that excludes the

right to the same But if the right of the sovereign also be excluded, he cannot perform the office they have put him into, which is to defend them both from foreign enemies and from the injuries of one another, and consequently there is no longer a Commonwealth

And if the propriety of subjects exclude not the right of the sovereign representative to their goods, much less to their offices of judicature or execution in which they represent the sover-

Commonwealth but to dissolve it, for powers

laws, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the legislative power

And as false doctrine, so also orientures the example of different government in a neigh-

manner of the nations so also the lesser cities of Greece were continually disturbed with seditions of the aristocratical and democratical factions, one part of almost every Commonwealth desiring to imitate the Lacedæmonians, the other, the Athenians And I doubt not but many men have been contented to see the late troubles in England out of an imitation of the

Low Countries, supposing there needed no more to grow rich than to change, as they had done, the form of their government For the constitution of man's nature is of itself subject to desire novelty when therefore they are provoked to the same by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them not to be content with those

having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nails till they can endure the smart no longer

mies, receive withal a pleasing idea of all they have done besides, and imagine their great prosperity not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular form of government, not considering the frequent seditions and civil wars produced by the imperfection of their policy From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their kings, because the Greek and Latin writers in their books and discourses

opinion that the subjects in a popular Commonwealth enjoy liberty, but that in a monarchy they are all slaves I say, they that live under a monarchy conceive such an opinion, not they that live under a popular government for they find no such matter In sum, I cannot imagine how anything can be more prejudicial to a monarchy than the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without present applying such cor-

and is in such an estate as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a dog so when a monarchy is once bitten is the quick by those

democratical writers that continually snarl at that estate, it wanteth nothing more than a strong monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain *tyrannophobia* or fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor

As there have been doctors that hold there be three souls in a man, so there be also that think there may be more souls, that is, more sovereigns, than one in a Commonwealth, and set up a supremacy against the sovereignty, canons against laws, and a ghostly authority against the civil, working on men's minds with words and distinctions that of themselves signify nothing, but bewray, by their obscurity, that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another kingdom, as it were a kingdom of faeries, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest that the civil power and the power of the Commonwealth is the same thing and that supremacy, and the power of making canons, and granting faculties implieth a Commonwealth, it followeth that where one is sovereign, another supreme, where one can make laws, and another make canons, there must needs be two Commonwealths, of one and the same subjects, which is a kingdom divided in itself, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of *temporal* and *ghostly*, they are still two kingdoms and every subject is subject to two masters. For seeing the ghostly power chal- lengeth the right to declare what is sin, it challengeth by consequence to declare what is law, ~~an~~ being nothing but the transgression of the law, and again, the civil power challenging to declare what is law, every subject must obey two masters, who both will have their commands be observed as law, which is impossible. Or, if it be but one kingdom, either the civil, which is the power of the Commonwealth, must be subordinate to the ghostly, and then there is no sovereignty but the ghostly or the ghostly must be subordinate to the temporal, and then there is no supremacy but the temporal. When therefore these two powers oppose one another, the Commonwealth cannot but be in great danger of civil war and dissolution. For the civil authority being more visible, and standing in the clearer light of natural reason, cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people and the spiritual, though it stand in the darkness of School distinctions and hard words, yet, because the fear of darkness and ghosts is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to trouble, and sometimes to destroy, a Commonwealth. And this is a disease which not unfily may be

compared to the epilepsy, or falling sickness (which the Jews took to be one kind of possession by spirits), in the body natural. For as in this disease there is an unnatural spirit or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the nerves and, moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the soul in the brain, and thereby causeth violent and irregular motions, which men call convulsions, in the parts, in- so- much as he that is seized therewith falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses so also in the body politic, when the spiritual power moveth the members of a Commonwealth by the terror of punishments and hope of rewards, which are the nerves of it, otherwise than by the civil power, which is the soul of the Commonwealth, they ought to be moved, and by strange and hard words suffocates their understanding it must needs thereby distract the people, and either overwhelm the Commonwealth with oppression, or cast it into the fire of a civil war.

Sometimes also in the merely civil govern- ment there be more than one soul as when the power of levying money, which is the nutritive faculty, has depended on a general assembly, the power of conduct and command, which is the motive faculty, on one man, and the power of making laws which is the rational faculty, on the accidental consent not only of those two, but also of a third this endangereth the Commonwealth, sometimes for want of consent to

monarchy yet the truth is that it is not one in dependent Commonwealth but three independ- ent factions, nor one representative person, but three. In the kingdom of God there may be three persons independent without breach of unity in God that reigneth, but where men reign, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the king bear the person of the people, and the general assembly bear also the person of the people, and another assembly bear the person of a part of the people, they are not one person, nor one sovereign,

side, with a head, arms, breast, and stomach of his own if he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

Hitherto I have named such diseases of a Commonwealth as are of the greatest and most present danger. There be other, not so great, which nevertheless are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising money for the necessary uses of the Commonwealth, especially in the approach of war. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion that every subject hath of a propriety in his lands and goods exclusive of the sovereign's right to the use of the same. From whence it cometh to pass that the sovereign power, which foreseeeth the necessities and dangers of the Commonwealth, finding the passage of money to the public treasury obstructed by the tenacity of the people, whereas it ought to extend itself, to encounter and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth itself as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by stratagems of law to obtain little sums, which, not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply or perish, and, being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper, or else the Commonwealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this distemper very aptly to an ague, wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed, the veins which by their natural course empty themselves into the heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplied from the arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction and trembling of the limbs, and afterwards a hot and strong endeavour of the heart to force a passage for the blood, and before it can do that, contenteth itself with the small refreshments of such things as cool for a time, till, if nature be strong enough, it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venom into sweat, or, if nature be too weak, the patient dieth.

Again, there is sometimes in a Common

wealth too much abundance in one or a few private men, by monopolies or by farms of the public revenues, in the same manner as the blood in a pleurisy, getting into the membrane of the breast, breedeth there an inflammation,

tion of his fidelity, is a dangerous disease because the people, which should receive their motion from the authority of the sovereign, by the flattery and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the laws to follow a man of whose virtues and designs they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of more danger in a popular government than in a monarchy, because an army is of so great force and multitude as it may easily be made believe they are the people. By this means it was that Julius Cæsar, who was set up by the people against the senate, having won to himself the affections of his army, made himself master both of senate and people. And this proceeding of popular and ambitious men is plain rebellion, and may be resembled to the effects of witchcraft.

Another infirmity of a Commonwealth is the immoderate greatness of a town, when it is able to furnish out of its own circuit the number and expense of a great army, as also the great number of corporations, which are as it were many lesser Commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man. To which may be added, the liberty of disputing against absolute power by pretenders to political prudence, which though bred for the most part in the lees of the people, yet animated by false doctrines are perpetually meddling with the fundamental laws, to the molestation of the Commonwealth, like the little worms which physicians call *ascarides*.

We may further add the insatiable appetite, or *bulimia* of enlarging dominion, with the incurable wounds thereby many times received from the enemy, and the *uens* of ununited conquests, which are many times a burden, and with less danger lost than kept, as also the *lethargy* of ease, and *consumption* of riot and vain expense.

Lastly, when in a war, foreign or intestine, the enemies get a final victory so as, the forces of the Commonwealth keeping the field no

himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the Commonwealth, which expiring, the members are governed by it no more than the carcass of a man by his departed, though immortal, soul.

that wants protection may seek it anywhere,

is able but when the power of an assembly

sovereignty to re-enter

CHAPTER XXX

Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative

ly the procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God the Author of that law, and to none but Him. But by *safety* here is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to

protect on from injuries when they shall complain but by a general providence, contained in public instruction, both of doctrine and example, and in the making and executing of good laws to which individual persons may ap-

by dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition and calamity of a war with every other man, which is the greatest evil that can hap-

deserteth the means deserteth the ends, and he deserteth the means that, being the sovereign, acknowledgeth himself subject to the civil laws, and renounceth the power of supreme judicature, or of making war or peace by his own authority, or of judging of the necessities of the Commonwealth, or of levying money and soldiers when and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary, or of making officers and ministers both of war and peace, or of appointing teachers, and examining what doctrines are conformable or contrary to the defence, peace, and good of the people. Secondly,

it is against his duty to let the people be ignorant or misinformed of the grounds and reasons of those his essential rights, because thereby men are easy to be seduced and drawn to resist him when the Commonwealth shall require their use and exercise.

And the grounds of these rights have the rather need to be diligently and truly taught because they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment. For a civil law that shall forbid rebellion (and such is all resistance to the essential rights of sovereignty) is not, as a civil law, any obligation but by virtue only of the law of nature that forbiddeth the violation of faith, which natural obligation, if men know not, they cannot know the right of any law the sovereign maketh. And for the punishment, they take it but for an act of hostility, which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour, by acts of hostility, to avoid.

As I have heard some say that *justice* is but a word, without substance, and that whatsoever a man can by force or art acquire to himself, not only in the condition of war, but also in a Commonwealth is his own, which I have already shown to be false: so there be also that maintain that there are no grounds, nor principles of reason, to sustain those essential rights which make sovereignty absolute. For if there were, they would have been found out in some place or other: whereas we see there has not

grounds or principles of reason so to build a house as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time and industry produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well building is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious men that had long studied the nature of materials, and the diverse effects of figure and proportion, long after mankind began, though poorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute Commonwealths, imperfect and apt to relapse into disorder, there may principles of reason be found out by industrious meditation to make their constitution excepting by external violence, everlasting. And such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: which, whether they come not into the sight of those that have power to make use of them, or be neglected by them or not concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very

little. But supposing that these of mine are not such principles of reason; yet I am sure they are principles from authority of Scripture, as I shall make it appear when I shall come to speak of the kingdom of God, administered by Moses, over the Jews, His peculiar people by covenant.

But they say again that though the principles be right, yet common people are not of capacity

all men know that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them

covereth their errors, and thereby lesseneth their authority: whereas the common people's minds, unless they be tainted with dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public authority shall be im-

be in innumerable places at one and the same

so consonant to reason that any unprejudicated man needs no more to learn it than to hear it? I conclude therefore that in the instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty, there is no difficulty, whilst a sovereign has his power entire, but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Commonwealth, and consequently, it is his duty to cause them so to be instructed, and not only his duty, but his benefit also, and security against the danger that may arrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion.

And, to descend to particulars, the people

own, nor, whatsoever present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they, to desire change. For the prosperity

and concord of the subjects: nor do the people flourish in a monarchy because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they shall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience to do no more than reform the

preach of the first of God's Commandments for there God says, *Non habebis Deos alienos* "Thou shalt not have the Gods of other nations"; and in another place concerning kings, that they are gods.

Secondly, they are to be taught that they ought not to be led with admiration of the virtue of any of their fellow subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Commonwealth, nor of any assembly, except the sovereign assembly, so as to defer to them any obedience or honour appropriate to the sovereign only, whom, in their particular stations, they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveyed by them from the sovereign authority. For that sovereign cannot be imagined to love his people as he ought that is not jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of popular men to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have

the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the Ten Commandments.

one man or an assembly of men; or to argue and dispute his power, or any way to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into contempt with his people, and their obedience, in which the safety of the Commonwealth consisteth, slackened. Which doctrine the third Commandment by resemblance pointeth to.

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor, when it is taught, remember it, nor after one generation past so much as know in whom the sovereign power is placed, without setting

apart from their ordinary labour some certain times in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them, it is necessary that some such times be determined wherein they may assemble together, and, after prayers and

the authority that maketh them laws To this end had the Jews every seventh day a Sabbath, in which the law was read and expounded, and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind that their king was God, that having created

bour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoiced in God, to take joy also in them selves by lawful recreation So that the first table of the Commandments is spent all in setting down the sum of God's absolute power, not only as God, but as King by pact, in peculiar, of the Jews, and may therefore give light to those that have sovereign power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects

And because the first instruction of children dependeth on the care of their parents, it is necessary that they should be obedient to them whilst they are under their tuition, and not only so but that also afterwards as gratitude requireth, they acknowledge the benefit of their education by external signs of honour To which end the

lose the honour due unto them for their education For to relinquish such right was not necessary to the institution of sovereign power, nor would there be any reason why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them than from other men And this accordeth with the fifth Commandment

Again, every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught, which consisting in taking from no man what is his is as much as to say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbours, by violence or fraud, of anything which by the sovereign authority is theirs Of

things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life and limbs, and in the next degree in most men, those that concern conjugal affection, and after them riches and means of living Therefore the people are to be taught to abstain from violence to one another's person by private revenges, from violation of conjugal honour, and from forcible rapine and fraudulent surreption of one another's goods For which purpose also it is necessary they be shown the evil consequences of false judgment, by corruption either of judges or witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and justice becomes of no effect all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandments

Lastly, they are to be taught that not only the unjust facts, but the designs and intentions to do them, though by accident hindered are in justice, which consisteth in the privacy of the

is reduced all to this one commandment of mutual charity, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self' as the sum of the first table is reduced to 'the love of God whom they had then newly received as their king

As for the means and conduits by which the people may receive this instruction, we are to search by what means so many opinions contrary to the peace of mankind, upon weak and false principles, have nevertheless been so deeply rooted in them I mean those which I have in the precedent chapter specified as that men shall judge of what is lawful and unlawful, not by the law itself, but by their own consciences, that is to say, by their own private judgements that subjects sin in obeying the commands of the Commonwealth, unless they themselves have first judged them to be lawful that their propriety in their riches is such as to exclude the dominion which the Commonwealth hath over the same that it is lawful for subjects to kill such as they call tyrants that the sovereign power may be divided, and the like which come to be instilled into the people by this means 'They whom necessity or covetousness keepeth attent on their trades and labour, and they, on the other side, whom superfluity or sloth carrieth after their sensual pleasures (which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of mankind), being diverted from the deep meditation which the learning of truth, not only in the matter of natural justice, but also of all other sciences necessarily requireth, receive the notions of their duty

chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from such of their neighbours or familiar acquaintance as having the faculty of discoursing readily and plausibly seem wiser and better learned in cases of law and conscience than themselves. And the divines, and such others as make show of learning, derive their knowledge from the universities, and from the schools of law, or from the books which by men eminent in those schools and universities have been published. It is therefore manifest that the instruction of the people dependeth wholly on the right teaching of youth in the universities. But are not, may some man say, the universities of England learned enough already to do that? Or is it, you will undertake to teach the universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer that till towards the latter end of Henry the

trines maintained by so many preachers against the sovereign power of the king and by so many lawyers and others that had their education there, is a sufficient argument that, though the universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of opinions it is most certain that they have not been sufficiently instructed, and it is no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtle liquor wherewith they were first seasoned against the civil authority. But to the latter question, it is not fit nor needful for me to say either aye or no. For any man that sees what I am doing may easily perceive what I think.

The safety of the people requireth further,

and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them, so as the great may have no greater hope of impunity, when they do violence dishonour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these does the like to one of them. For in this consisteth equity, to which, as being a precept of the law

but there be some that are also against private persons. Those that concern the Commonwealth only may without breach of equity be pardoned, for every man may pardon what is done against himself, according to his own discretion. But an offence against a private man cannot in equity

be pardoned without the consent of him that is injured, or reasonable satisfaction.

The inequality of subjects proceedeth from the acts of sovereign power, and therefore has

or great persons is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aids they give to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do are not extenuated, but aggravated, by the greatness of their persons, because they have least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great proceed in this manner. Impunity maketh insolence, insolence, hatred and hatred, an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness, though with the ruin of the Commonwealth.

To equal justice appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes, the equality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the equality of the debt that every man oweth to the Commonwealth for his defence. It is not

the Jews did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one hand and hold the sword in the other, or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the impositions that are laid on the people by the sovereign power are nothing else but the wages due to them that hold the public sword to defend private men in the exercise of several trades and callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor and rich, the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his, saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own persons, but for many more. Which considered, the equality of imposition consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there that

more protection from the Commonwealth than the other? But when the impositions are laid upon those things which men consume, every man payeth equally for what he useth, nor is

the Commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men

And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to maintain themselves by their labour, they ought not to be left to the charity of private persons, but to be provided for, as far forth as the necessities of nature re-

such uncertain charity

But for such as have strong bodies the case is otherwise, they are to be forced to work, and to avoid the excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be such laws as may encourage all manner of arts, as navigation, agriculture,

where nevertheless they are not to exterminate those they find there, but constrain them to in-

by a good law, I mean not a just law for no law can be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done by such power is warranted and owned by every one of the people, and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in the laws of a Commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming, what soever the gamesters all agree on is injustice to none of them. A good law is that which is needful, for the good of the people, and withal perspicuous

such a motion as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness, or indiscretion, as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a law that is not needful, having not the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be conceived to be good when it is for the benefit of the sovereign, though it be not necessary for the people, but it is not so. For the good of the sovereign and people cannot be separated

sovereign that has weak subjects, and a weak people whose sovereign wanteth power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws, but traps for money which, where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, are superfluous, and where it is not acknowledged, insufficient to defend the people.

The perspicuity consisteth not so much in the words of the law itself, as in a declaration of the causes and motives for which it was made. That is it that shows us the meaning of the legislator, and the meaning of the legislator known, the law is more easily understood by few than many words. For all words are subject to ambiguity, and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the law is multiplication of ambiguity besides it seems to imply, by too much diligence, that whosoever can evade the words is without the compass of the law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary processes. For when I consider how short were the laws of ancient times, and how they grew by degrees still longer, methinks I see a contention between the penners and pleaders of the law, the former seeking to circumscribe the latter, and the latter to evade their circumscriptions, and that the pleaders have got the victory. It belongeth therefore to the office of a legislator (such as is in all Commonwealths the supreme representative, be it one man or an assembly) to make the reason perspicuous why the law was made, and the body of the law itself as short, but in as proper and significant terms, as may be.

It belongeth also to the office of the sovereign to make a right application of punishments and rewards. And seeing the end of punishing is not revenge and discharge of choler, but correction either of the offender or of others by his example, the severest punishments are to be inflicted

they are committed by sons, servants, or favour

great fear, great need, or from ignorance wheth-

many times for lenity, without prejudice to the Commonwealth, and lenity, when there is such place for it, is required by the law of nature. The punishment of the leaders and teachers in a commotion, not the poor seduced people, when they are punished, can profit the Commonwealth by their example. To be severe to the people is to punish that ignorance which may in great part be imputed to the sovereign, whose fault it was they were no better instructed.

In like manner it belongeth to the office and duty of the sovereign to apply his rewards all ways so as there may arise from them benefit to the Commonwealth wherein consisteth their use and end, and is then done when they that have well served the Commonwealth are, with as little expense of the common treasury as is possible, so well recompensed as others thereby

buy with money or preferment, from a popular ambitious subject to be quiet and desist from making ill impressions in the minds of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past), nor a sign of gratitude, but of fear, nor does it tend to the benefit, but to the damage of the public. It is a contention with ambition, like that of Hercules with the monster Hydra, which, having many heads, for every one that was vanquished there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornness of one popular man

facture, so also malice increaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a civil war may be deferred by such ways as that, yet the danger grows still the greater, and the public ruin more assured. It is therefore against the duty of the sovereign, to whom the public safety is committed, to reward those that aspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of their country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater

wealth. For this word *counsell* (*consilium*, corrupted from *considium*) is of a large signification, and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit together, not only to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of facts

past, and of law for the present. I take it here in the first sense only and in this sense, there is no choice of counsel, neither in a democracy nor aristocracy, because the persons counselling are members of the person counselled. The choice of counsellors therefore is proper to monarchy, in which the sovereign that endeavour eth not to make choice of those that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his of

who expecteth benefit from public troubles, but

are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expenses, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know who has most knowledge of the public affairs is yet harder, and they that know them need them a great deal the less. For to know who knows the rules almost of any art is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art, because no man can be assured of the truth of another's rules but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any art are much conversing in it and constant good effects of it. Good counsel comes not by lot, nor by inheritance, and therefore there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble in matter of state, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortress, unless we shall think there needs no method in the study of the politics, as there does in the study of geometry, but only to be lookers on, which is not so. For the politics is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of Europe it hath been taken for a right of certain persons to have place in the highest council of state by inheritance, it is derived from the conquests of the ancient Germans, wherein many absolute lords, joining to-

ing, between their posterity and the posterity of their subjects, which privileges being inconsistent with the sovereign power, by the favour of the sovereign they may seem to keep, but contending for them as their right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour than adhereth naturally to their abilities.

And how able soever be the counsellors in any

affair, the benefit of their counsel is greater when they give every one his advice, and the reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an assembly by way of orations, and when they have premeditated, than when they speak on the sudden, both because they have more time to survey the consequences of action, and are less sub-

tions and complaints of the people of each province, who are best acquainted with their own

without those essential rights, as I have often before said the Commonwealth cannot at all subsist

A commander of an army in chief, if he be not popular, shall not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his army, and consequently cannot perform that office with good success. He must therefore be industrious, valiant, af-

soldiers both desire and courage to recommend themselves to his favour, and protects the se-

hands of an assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the people, both that they be good conductors and faithful subjects, to whom the sovereign commits his armies

just as to side with their captain though they love him, against their sovereign, when they love not only his person but also his cause. And therefore those who by violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful sovereign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been always put to the trouble

Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are comprehended in that law which is commonly called the law of nations. I need not say anything in this place, because the law of nations and the law of nature is the same thing. And every sovereign hath the same right in procuring the safety of his people, that any particular man can have in procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law that dictateth to men that have no civil government what they ought to do, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common

laws, such of them as oblige all individuals, as

discourse

CHAPTER XXXI

Of the Kingdom of God by Nature

THAT the condition of mere nature, that is to say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs that neither are sovereigns nor subjects, is anarchy and the condition of war: that the precepts, by which men are guided to avoid that condition, are the laws of nature: that a Commonwealth without sovereign power is but a word without substance and cannot stand: that subjects owe to sovereigns simple obedience in all things wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the laws of God, I have sufficiently proved in that which I have already written. There wants only for the entire knowledge of civil duty, to know what are those laws of God. For without

necessary to know what are the laws divine. And seeing the knowledge of all law dependeth

on the knowledge of the sovereign power, I shall say something in that which followeth of the KINGDOM OF GOD

"God is King, let the earth rejoice,"¹ saith the psalmist And again, "God is King though the nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the cherubim, though the earth be moved"² Whether men will or not, they must be subject always to the divine power By denying the existence or providence of God, men may shake off their ease, but not their yoke But to call this power of God, which extendeth itself not only to man, but also to beasts, and plants, and bodies inanimate, by the name of *kingdom*, is but a metaphorical use of the word For he only is properly said to reign that governs his subjects by his word and by promise of rewards to those that obey it, and by threatening them with punishment that obey it not Subjects therefore in the kingdom of God are not bodies inanimate, nor creatures irrational; because they understand no precepts as his nor atheists, nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of mankind, because they acknowledge no word for his, nor have hope of his rewards,

subjects, all the rest are to be understood as enemies

To rule by words requires that such words be manifestly made known, for else they are no laws for to the nature of laws belongeth a suffi-

is, proclamation or promulgation by the voice of man But God declareth His laws three ways; by the dictates of natural reason, by revelation, and by the voice of some man to whom, by the operation of miracles, he procureth credit with the rest From hence there ariseth a triple word of God, *rational, sensible, and prophetic*, to which correspondeth a triple hearing *right reason, sense supernatural, and faith* As for sense supernatural, which consisteth in revelation or inspiration, there have not been any universal laws so given, because God speaketh not in that manner but to particular persons, and to diverse men diverse things

From the difference between the other two kinds of God's word, *rational and prophetic*, there may be attributed to God a twofold king-

dom *rational and prophetic* again, *right reason*; and *prophetic*, wherein having chosen out one peculiar nation, the Jews, for His subjects, He governed them, and none but them, not only by natural reason, but by positive laws, which He gave them by the mouths

laws, is to be derived, not from His creating them as beasts and plants,

reign right ariseth from pact to show how the same right may arise from nature requires no more but to show in what case it is never taken away Seeing all men by nature had right to all things, they had right every one to reign over all the rest But because this right could not be obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that right, to set up men, with sovereign authority, by common consent, to rule and defend them whereas if there had been any man of power irresistible, there had been no reason why he should not by that power have ruled and defended both himself and them

Creator and gracious, but as omnipotent And though punishment be due for sin only, because by that word is understood affliction for sin, yet the right of afflicting is not always derived from men's sin, but from God's power.

This question *why evil men often prosper, and good men suffer adversity*, has been much disputed by the ancient, and is the same with this of ours *by what right God dispenseth the*

which is more, of the saints, concerning the Divine Providence. "How good," saith David, "is the God of Israel to those that are upright in heart, and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well nigh slipped, for I was grieved at the wicked, when I saw the ungodly in such prosperity."³ And Job, how earnestly

¹ Psalms, 97 1.

² *Ibid*, 99 1.

³ Psalms, 73 13

does he expostulate with God for the many afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his righteousness? This question in the case of Job is decided by God Himself not by arguments derved from Job's sin, but His own power. For where as the friends of Job drew their arguments from his affliction to his sin and he defended himself by the conscience of his innocence, God Himself

foundations of the earth,"¹ and the like, both approved Job's innocence and reproved the erroneous doctrine of his friends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour concerning the man that was born blind, in these words. Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers, but that the works of God might be made manifest in him.² And though it be said, that death entered into the world by sin,³ (by which is meant that if Adam had never sinned,

not sin

Having spoken of the right of God's sovereignty grounded only on nature, we are to consider next what are the divine laws, or dictates of natural reason, which laws concern either the natural duties of one man to another, or the honour naturally due to our Divine Sovereign. The first are the same laws of nature, of which I have spoken already in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters of this treatise, namely, equity, justice, mercy, humility, and the rest of the moral virtues. It remaineth therefore that we consider what precepts are dictated to men by their natural reason only, without other word of God, touching the honour and worship of the Divine Majesty.

Honour consisteth in the inward thought

appearing in the words and actions of men are called *worship* which is one part of that which the Latins understand by the word *cultus* for

labour we bestow upon them as a natural effect, or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour according to their own wills. In the first sense the labour bestowed on the earth is called *culture* and the education of children, a culture of their minds. In the second sense, where men's wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by force, but by complaisance, it signifieth as much as courting, that is, winning of favour by good offices, as by praises, by acknowledging their power, and by whatsoever

of God

From internal honour, consisting in the opinion of power and goodness, arise three passions, *love*, which hath reference to goodness, and *hope* and *fear* that relate to power and three parts of external worship, *praise* magnifying and *blessing* the subject of praise being goodness, the subject of magnifying and blessing being power, and the effect thereof felicity. Praise and magnifying are signified both by words and actions by words, when we say a man is good or great, by actions, when we thank him for his bounty, and obey his power. The opinion of the happiness of another can only be expressed by words.

There be some signs of honour, both in attributes and actions, that be naturally so as amongst attributes, *good* just liberal and the like, and amongst actions, *prayers* thanks and *obedience*. Others are so by institution, or custom of men, and in some times and places are honourable in others, dishonourable in others,

And of arbitrary worship, there be two differences for sometimes it is *commanded* sometimes *voluntary* worship commanded, when it is such as he requirerth who is worshipped free, when it is such as the worshipper thinks fit

Again, there is a *public* and a *private* worship
Public is the worship that a Commonwealth
performeth, as one person Private is that which
a private person exhibiteth Public, in respect
of the whole Commonwealth, is free, but in
respect of particular men it is not so Private is
in secret free, but in the sight of the multitude
it is never without some restraint, either from
the laws or from the opinion of men, which
is contrary to the nature of liberty

ceeds from our duty and is directed according
to our capacity by those rules of honour that
reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the
more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of
damage or in thankfulness for good already re-
ceived from them

That we may know what worship of God is
taught us by the light of nature, I will begin
with His attributes Where first, it is manifest,
we ought to attribute to Him *existence* for no
man can have the will to honour that which he
thinks not to have any being

Secondly, that those philosophers who said
the world or the soul of the world, was God
spake unworthily of Him, and denied His ex-
istence for by God is understood the cause of
the world, and to say the world is God is to say
there is no cause of it, that is, no God

Thirdly, we say the world was not created,
but eternal, seeing that which is eternal has no
cause, is to deny there is a God

is the root of honour

finite is less than we can, because to finite is
easy to add more

Therefore to attribute *figure* to Him is not
honour, for all figure is finite

Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have
an idea of Him in our mind, for whatsoever
we conceive is finite

Nor to attribute to Him *parts* or *totality*,
which are the attributes only of things finite

Nor to say He is in this or that place, for
whatsoever is in place is bounded and finite.

Nor that He is *moved* or *resteth*, for both
these attributes ascribe to Him place

Nor that there be more gods than one, be-
cause it implies them all finite, for there can
not be more than one infinite

Nor to ascribe to Him (unless metaphorical-
ly, meaning not the passion, but the effect) pas-
sions that partake of grief, as *repentance*, *an-*
ger *mercy* or of want, as *appetite*, *hope*, *desire*,
or of any passive faculty for passion is power
limited by somewhat else

And therefore when we ascribe to God a *will*
it is not to be understood, as that of man, for a
rational appetite, but as the power by which He
effecteth everything

Likewise when we attribute to Him *sight*
and other acts of sense as also *knowledge* and
understanding, which in us is nothing else but
a tumult of the mind raised by external things
that press the organical parts of man's body
for there is no such thing in God, and, being
things that depend on natural causes, cannot
be attributed to Him

He that will attribute to God nothing but
what is warranted by natural reason must either
use such negative attributes as *infinite* *eternal*
incomprehensible or superlatives, as *most high*
most great, and the like, or indefinite, as *good*
just, *holy*, *creator* and in such sense as if He
meant not to declare what He is (for that were
to circumscribe Him within the limits of our
fancy), but how much we admire Him, and
how ready we would be to obey Him which is
a sign of humility, and of a will to honour Him
as much as we can for there is but one name to
signify our conception of His nature, and that
is *I AM*, and but one name of His relation to us,
and that is *God*, in which is contained father,
king, and lord

Concerning the actions of divine worship, it
is a most general precept of reason that they be
signs of the intention to honour God, such as
are, first, *prayers* for not the carvers, when
they made images, were thought to make them
gods, but the people that prayed to them

Secondly, *thanksgiving*, which differeth from
prayer in divine worship no otherwise than that

Thirdly, *gifts*, that is to say, *sacrifices* and
oblations, if they be of the best, are signs of

that God only knoweth the heart and that no man's wit or strength can protect a man against God's vengeance on the perjured

Fifthly, it is a part of rational worship to

as much as in vain and it is to no purpose un

His honour, for it is supposed that in this natural kingdom of God, there is no other way to know anything but by natural reason, that is, from the principles of natural science, which are so far from teaching us anything of God's nature, they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature living

God that tend not to His honour, but to the honour of our own wits and learning, and are nothing else but inconsiderate and vain abuses of His sacred name

Sixthly, in prayers, thanksgiving, offerings and sacrifices, it is a dictate of natural reason that they be every one in his kind the best and most significant of honour. As, for example, that prayers and thanksgiving be made in words and phrases not sudden, nor light, nor plebeian, but beautiful and well composed, for else we do not God as much honour as we can. And therefore the heathens did absurdly to worship images for gods, but their doing it in verse, and with music, both of voice and instruments, was reasonable. Also that the beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the gifts they offered, and their actions in worshipping, were full of submis

case to the laws of nature) is the greatest worship of all. For as obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice, so also to set light by His commandments is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the laws of that divine worship which natural reason dictateth to private men

done differently by different men cannot be said to be a public worship. And therefore, where many sorts of worship be allowed, proceeding from the different religions of private men, it cannot be said there is any public worship, nor that the Commonwealth is of any religion at all.

And because words (and consequently the attributes of God) have their signification by agreement and constitution of men, those attributes are to be held significative of honour that men intend shall so be, and whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no law but reason, may be done by the will of the Commonwealth by laws civil. And because a Commonwealth hath no will nor makes no laws but those that are made by the will of him or them that have the sovereign power, it followeth that those attributes which the sovereign ordaineth in the worship of God for signs of honour ought to be taken and used for such by private men in their public worship.

But because not all actions are signs by constitution, but some are naturally signs of honour, others of contumely, these latter, which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence, cannot be made by human power a part of divine worship, nor the former, such as are decent, modest, humble behaviour, ever be separated from it. But whereas there be an infinite number of actions and gestures of an indifferent nature, such of them as the Commonwealth shall ordain to be publicly and universally in use, as signs of honour and part of God's worship, are to be taken and used for such by the subjects. And that which is said in the Scripture, "It is better to obey God

the procuring others to honour Him is lost.
Lastly, obedience to His laws (that is, in this

man in this life that is not the beginning of so

the pains annexed to it, and these pains are the natural punishments of those actions which are the beginning of more harm than good. And hereby it comes to pass that intemperance is naturally punished with diseases, rashness, with mischances, injustice, with the violence of ene

ing punishments are consequent to the breach of laws, natural punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the laws of nature, and therefore follow them as their natural, not arbitrary, effects.

And thus far concerning the constitution, nature, and right of sovereigns, and concerning the duty of subjects, derived from the principles of natural reason. And now, considering how different this doctrine is from the practice of the greatest part of the world, especially of these western parts that have received their

moral learning from Rome and Athens, and how much depth of moral philosophy is required in them that have the administration of the sovereign power, I am at the point of believing this my labour as useless as the Commonwealth of Plato: for he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of state, and change of governments by civil war, ever to be taken away till sovereigns be philosophers. But when I consider again that the science of natural justice is the only science necessary for sovereigns and their principal ministers, and that they need not be charged with the sciences mathematical, as by Plato they are, further than by good laws to encourage men to the study of them, and that neither Plato nor any other philosopher hitherto hath put into order, and sufficiently or probably proved all the theorems of moral doctrine, that men may learn thereby both how to govern and how to

the exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice.

THE THIRD PART

Of a Christian Commonwealth

CHAPTER XXXII

Of the Principles of Christian Politics

I HAVE derived the rights of sovereign power, and the duty of subjects, hitherto from the principles of nature only, such as experience has found true, or consent concerning the use of words has made so, that is to say, from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from definitions of such words as are essential to all political reasoning, universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which is the nature and rights of a Christian Commonwealth, whereof there dependeth much upon supernatural revelations of the will of God, the ground of my discourse must be not only the natural word of God, but also the propheticall

Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses and experience, nor that which is the undoubted word of God, our natural reason. For they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Saviour, and therefore not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in God's word above reason, that is to say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated or confuted yet there is nothing contrary to it, but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilful interpretation, or erroneous ratiocination.

Therefore when anything therein written is too hard for our examination, we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic of scholastic subtleties.

swallowed whole have the virtue to cure, but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.

But by the captivity of our understanding is

not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man, but of the will to obedience where obedience is due. For sense, memory, understanding, reason and opinion are not in our power to change but all ways and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will of them. We then captivate our understanding and reason when we forbear contradiction, when we so speak as, by lawful authority, we are commanded, and when we live accordingly, which, in sum, is trust and faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken.

When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately or by mediation of another man, to whom He had formerly spoken by Himself immediately. How God speaketh to a man immediately may be understood by those well enough to whom He hath so spoken, but how the same should be understood by another is hard if not impossible, to know. For if a man pretend to me that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce to oblige me to believe it. It is true that if he be my sovereign he may oblige me to obedience so as not by act or word to declare I believe him not, but not to think any otherwise than my reason persuades me. But if one that hath not such authority over me shall pretend the same, there is nothing that exacteth either belief or obedience.

For to say that God hath spoken to him in

dream is no more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him, which is not of force to win belief from any man that knows dreams are for the most part natural, and may proceed from

former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from self-conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a man's own goodness, or other virtue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary revelation. To say he hath seen a vision, or heard a voice, is to say that he dreamed between sleeping and waking; for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can allege no natural and sufficient reason. So that though God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration, yet He obliges no man to believe He hath so done to him that pretends it, who, being a man, may err and, which is more, may lie.

How then can he to whom God hath never revealed His will immediately (saving by the way of natural reason) know when he is to obey or not to obey His word, delivered by him that says he is a prophet? Of four hundred prophets, of whom the King of Israel asked counsel concerning the war he made against Ramoth Gilead, only Micaiah was a true one. The prophet that was sent to prophesy against the altar set up by Jeroboam, though a true prophet, and that by two miracles done in his presence appears to be a prophet sent from God, was yet deceived by another old prophet that persuaded him, as from the mouth of God, to eat and drink with him. If one prophet deceive another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God by other way than that of reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scripture that there be two marks by which together, not asunder, a true prophet is to be known. One is the doing of miracles, the other is the not teaching any other religion than that which is already established. Asunder, I say, neither of these is sufficient. "If a prophet rise amongst you, or a dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle, and the miracle come to pass, if he say, Let us follow strange gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, etc. But that prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to you to revolt from the Lord your God." In which words two things are to be observed, first, that God will not have miracles alone serve for arguments to approve the

prophet's calling, but (as it is in the third verse) for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to Himself. For the works of the Egyptian sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were great miracles. Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the king or him that governeth by the king's authority, he that doth such miracle is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make trial of their allegiance. For these words, *revolt from the Lord your God*, are in this place equivalent to *revolt from your king*. For they had made God their king by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only, for he only spake with God, and from time to time declared God's commandments to the people. In like manner, after our Saviour Christ had made his Disciples acknowledge him for the Messiah (that is to say, for God's anointed, whom the nation of the Jews daily expected for their king, but refused when he came), he omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. "Thereshall arise," saith he, "false Christs, and false prophets, and shall do great wonders and miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very elect." "By which it appears that false prophets may have the power of miracles, yet are we not to take their doctrine for God's word. St. Paul says further to the Galatians that 'if himself or an angel from heaven preach another Gospel to them than he had preached, let him be accursed.' That Gospel was that Christ was King, so that all preaching against the power of the king received, in consequence to these words, is by St. Paul accursed. For his speech is addressed to those who by his preaching had already received Jesus for the Christ, that is to say, for King of the Jews.

And as miracles, without preaching that doctrine which God hath established, so preaching the true doctrine, without the doing of miracles, is an insufficient argument of immediate revelation. For if a man that teacheth not false doctrine should pretend to be a prophet without showing any miracle, he is never the more to be regarded for his pretence, as is evident by Deuteronomy, 18. 21, 22. "If thou say in thy heart, How shall we know that the word (of the prophet) is not that which the Lord hath spoken? When the prophet shall have spoken in the name of the Lord, that which shall not come to pass, that is the word which the Lord hath not

¹ 1 Kings, 22.

² Ibid. 13.

³ Deuteronomy, 13. 1-5.

⁴ Matthew, 24. 24.

⁵ Galatians, 1. 8.

spoken but the prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart, fear him not" But a man may here again ask When the prophet hath foretold a thing, how shall we know whether it will come to pass or not? For he may foretell it as a thing \square arrive after a certain long time, longer than the time of man's life, or in definitely, that it will come to pass one time or other in which case this mark of a prophet is

showing of a present miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true prophet, that is to say, immediate revelation, to be acknowledged, neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he saith

Seeing therefore miracles now cease, we have

as \square it is conformable to the Holy Scriptures which since the time of our Saviour supply the place and sufficiently recompense the want of all other prophecy, and from which, by wise and learned interpretation, and careful ratiocination all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without enthusiasm or supernatural inspiration, may easily be deduced And this Scripture is it out of which I am to take the principles of my discourse concerning the rights of those that are

ter of the books, writers, scope and authority of the Bible

CHAPTER XXXIII

Of the Number Antiquity Scope, Authority, and Interpreters of the Books of Holy Scripture

Reverend

which men are in conscience bound to observe, are laws, the question of the Scripture is the question of what \square law throughout all Christendom, both natural and civil For though it be not determined in Scripture what laws every Christian king shall constitute in his own

dominions, yet it is determined what laws he shall not constitute Seeing therefore I have already proved that sovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators, those books only are canonical, that is, law, in every nation, which are established for such by the sovereign authority It is true that God \square the Sovereign of all sovereigns and therefore, when he speaks to any subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly potentate command to the contrary But the question is not of obedience to God, but of *when* and *what* God hath said which, to subjects that have no supernatural revelation, cannot be known but by that nat

gation, I can acknowledge no other books of the Old Testament to be Holy Scripture but those which have been commanded to be acknowledged for such by the authority of the Church of England What books these are is sufficiently known without a catalogue of them here, and they are the same that are acknowledged by St Jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobias, the first and the second of Maccabees (though he had seen the first in Hebrew), and the third and fourth of Esdras, for Apocrypha Of the canonical, Josephus a learned Jew, that wrote in the time of the Emperor Domitian, reckoneth twenty two, making the number agree with the Hebrew alphabet St Jerome does the same, though they reckon them in different manner For Josephus numbers five books of Moses, thirteen of prophets that writ the history of their own times (which how it agrees with the prophets' writings contained in the Bible we shall see here after) and four of Hymns and moral precepts But St Jerome reckons five Books of Moses, eight of prophets, and nine of other Holy Writ which he calls of *Hagiographa* The Septuagint, who were seventy learned men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy, king of Egypt, to translate the Jewish law out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left us no other for Holy Scripture in the Greek tongue but the same that are received in the Church of England

As for the books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for canon by all Christian churches, and by all sects of Christians that admit any books at all for canonical

Who were the original writers of the several books of Holy Scripture has not been made

evident by any sufficient testimony of other history, which is the only proof of matter of fact; nor can be by any arguments of natural reason for reason serves only to convince the truth, not of fact, but of consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in this question must be that which is held out unto us from the books themselves and this light, though it show us not the writer of every book, yet it is not unuseful to give us knowledge of the time wherein they were written.

And first, for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of Moses, no more than these titles, the Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, the Book of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings, are arguments sufficient to prove that they were written by Joshua, by the Judges, by Ruth, and by the Kings. For in titles of books, the subject is marked as often as the writer. The *History* of Livy denotes the writer, but the *History* of Scanderberg is denominated from the subject. We read in the last chapter of Deuteronomy concerning the sepulchre of Moses, "that no man knoweth of his sepulchre to this day," that is, to the day wherein those words were written. It is therefore manifest that those words were written after his interment. For it were a strange interpretation to say Moses spake of his own sepulchre (though

the law, which is contained, as it seemeth, in the 11th of Deuteronomy, and the following chapters to the 27th, which was also commanded to be written on stones, in their entry into the land of Canaan. And thus did Moses himself write, and deliver to the priests and elders of Israel, to be read every seventh year to all Israel, at their assembling in the feast of tabernacles. And thus is that law which God commanded that their kings (when they should have established that form of government) should take a copy of from the priests and Levites, and which Moses commanded the priests and Levites to lay in the side of the Ark, and the same which, having been lost, was long time after found again by Hilkiah, and sent to King Josias, who, causing it to be read to the people, renewed the covenant between God and them.

That the Book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua may be gathered out of many places of the book itself. Joshua had set up twelve stones in the midst of Jordan, for a monument of their passage, of which the writer saith thus, "They are there unto this day," for *unto this day* is a phrase that signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of man. In like manner, upon the saying of the Lord that He had rolled off from the people the re-

whole Pentateuch, was written by some other man, but the rest not. Let us therefore consider that which we find in the Book of Genesis, "And Abraham passed through the land to the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh, and the Canaanite was then in the land," which must needs be the words of one that wrote when the Canaanite was not in the land, and consequently not of Moses, who died before he came into it. Likewise Numbers, 21:14, the writer citeth another more ancient book, entitled, *The Book of the Wars of the Lord*, wherein were registered the acts of Moses, at the Red Sea, and at the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident that the five Books of Moses were written after his time, though

So also the name of the valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the camp, the writer saith, "remaineth unto this day," which must needs be therefore long after the time of Joshua. Arguments of this kind there be many other, as Joshua, 8:29, 13:13, 14:14, 15:63.

The same is manifest by like arguments of the Book of Judges, 1:21, 26:4, 24:10, 4:15, 19:18, 6, and Ruth, 1:1, but especially Judges, 18:30, where it is said that Jonathan and his sons were priests to the tribe of Dan, until the day of the captivity of the land.

That the Books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there are the like arguments, 1 Samuel, 5:5, 7:13, 15:27, 6, and 30:25, where, after David had adjudged equal part of the spoils to them that guarded the ammuni-

have written as for example, the volume of

* Deuteronomy, 34:6.

* Genesis, 12:6.

* Deuteronomy, 21:9, 10.

* Ibid., 31:26.

* II Kings, 22:8.

* Ibid., 23:13.

* Joshua, 4:9.

* Ibid., 5:9.

* Ibid., 7:26.

Perez uzzah, the writer saith it is called so "to this day" "the time therefore of the writing of that book must be long after the time of the fact, that is, long after the time of David

1 Kings, 11 13, 9 21, 10 12, 12 19, II Kings, 2 23, 10 27, 14 7, 16 6, 17 23, 17 34, 17 41, and I Chronicles, 4 41, 5 26 It is argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in Babylon that the history of them is continued till that time For the facts registered are always more ancient than the register, and much more ancient than such books as make mention of and quote the register, as these books do in diverse places, referring the reader to the chronicles of the Kings of Judah, to the chronicles of the Kings of Israel, to the books of the prophet Samuel, of the prophet Nathan, of the prophet Ahijah, to the vision of Jehoiada, to the books of the prophet Sereiah, and of the prophet Addo

The Books of Esdras and Nehemiah were written certainly after their return from captivity, because their return, the re-edification of the walls and houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the covenant, and ordination of their policy are therein contained

The history of Queen Esther is of the time of the Captivity, and therefore the writer must have been of the same time, or after it

The Book of Job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written and though it appear sufficiently that he was no feigned person, yet the book itself seemeth not to be a history, but a treatise concerning a question in ancient time much disputed *why wicked men have often prospered in this world and good men have been afflicted*, and it is the more probable, because from the beginning to the third verse of the third chapter, where the complaint of Job beginneth, the Hebrew is (as St Jerome testifies) in prose, and from thence to the sixth verse of the last chapter in hexameter verses, and the rest of that chapter again in prose So that the dispute is all in verse, and the prose is added, but as a preface in the beginning and an epilogue in the end But verse is no

usual style of such as either are themselves in great pain, as Job, or of such as come to comfort them, as his friends but in philosophy, especially moral philosophy, in ancient time frequent

The Psalms were written the most part by David, for the use of the choir To these are added some songs of Moses and other holymen, and some of them after the return from the Captivity, as the 137th and the 126th, whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now hath, after the return of the Jews from Babylon

to have been collected by Solomon, rather than by Agur, or the mother of Lemuel, and that,

The Books of Ecclesiastes and the Canticles have nothing that was not Solomon's, except it be the titles or inscriptions For The Words of the Preacher, the Son of David, King in Jerusalem, and The Song of Songs, which is Solomon's, seem to have been made for distinction's sake, then, when the books of Scripture were gathered into one body of the law, to the end that not the doctrine only, but the authors also might be extant

Of the Prophets, the most ancient are Zephaniah, Jonas, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah, who lived in the time of Amaziah and

stroyed, but a history or narration of his forwardness and disputing God's commandments, so that there is small probability he should be the author, seeing he is the subject of it But the Book of Amos is his prophecy

Jeremiah, Obadiah, Nahum and Habakkuk prophesied in the time of Josiah

Ezekiel, Daniel, Haggai, and Zechariah, in the Captivity

When Israel and Judah were in Babylon

Testament was set forth, in the form we have it, after the return of the Jews from their Captivity in Babylon, and before the time of Ptole

¹ II Samuel 6 8

² Ezekiel, 14 14, and James, 5 11

maus Philadelphus, that caused it to be translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out of Judea for that purpose. And if the books of Apocrypha (which are recommended to us by the Church, though not for canonical, yet for profitable books for our instruction) may in this point be credited, the Scripture was set forth in the form we have it

saith thus, 'Thy law is burnt, therefore no man knoweth the things which thou hast done, or the works that are to begin. But if I have found grace before thee, send down the holy spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done in the world, since the beginning, which were written in thy law, that men may find thy path, and that they which will live in the latter days, may live.' And verse 45 "And it came to pass, when the forty days were fulfilled, that the Highest spake, saying, The first that thou hast written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it, but keep the seventy last, that thou mayst deliver them only to such as be wise among the people." And thus much concerning the time of the writing of the books of the Old Testament.

The writers of the New Testament lived all in less than an age after Christ's ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been his Disciples, except St Paul and St Luke, and consequently whatsoever was written by them is as ancient as the time of the Apostles. But the time wherein the books of the New Testament were received and acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing is not altogether so ancient. For, as the books of the Old Testament are derived to us from no higher time than that of Esdras, who by the direction of God's spirit retrieved them when they were lost: those of the New Testament, of which the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private man's hand, cannot be derived from a higher time than that wherein the governors of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to us as the writings of those Apostles and disciples under whose names they go. The first enumeration of all the books, both of the Old and New Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, supposed to be collected by Clement the First (after St Peter), Bishop of Rome. But because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the Council of Laodicea is the first we know that recommended the Bible to the then Christian churches for the writings

of the apostles. And the same Council valued on the great doctors of the Church as no more to esteem emperors, though Christian, for the shepherds of the people, but for sheep, and emperors not Christian, for wolves, and endeavoured to pass their doctrine, not for counsel and information, as preachers, but for laws, as absolute governors, and thought such frauds as tended to make the people the more obedient to Christian doctrine to be pious, yet I am persuaded they did not therefore falsify the Scriptures, though the copies of the books of the New Testament were in the hands only of the ecclesiastics, because if they had had an intention so to do, they would surely have made them more favorable to their power over Christian princes and civil sovereignty than they are. I see not therefore any reason to doubt but that the Old and New Testament, as we have them now, are the true registers of those things which were done and said by the prophets and Apostles. And so perhaps are some of those books which are called *Apocrypha*, if left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews that were not perfect in the Greek tongue. For the seventy interpreters that converted the Bible into Greek were all of them Hebrews, and we have extant the works of Philo and Josephus, both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek. But it is not the writer but the authority of the Church that maketh a book canonical. And although these books were written by diverse men, yet it is manifest the writers were all endued with one and the same spirit, in that they conspire to one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the rights of the Kingdom of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For the book of Genesis deriveth the genealogy of God's people from the creation of the world to the going into Egypt: the other four Books of Moses contain the election of God for their King, and the laws which he prescribed for their government: the Books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the time

blessed Saviour, God the Son, whose coming was foretold in the books of the prophets, after

them and their successors for the direction of the Jews and for the invitation of the Gentiles. In sum, the histories and the prophecies of the Old Testament and the gospels and epistles of the New Testament have had one and the same scope, to convert men to the obedience of God: 1 in Moses and the priests, 2 in the man Christ, and 3 in the Apostles and the successors to apostolical power. For these three at several times did represent the person of God: Moses, and his successors the high priests, and kings of Judah, in the Old Testament; Christ Himself, in the time he lived on earth; and the Apostles, and their successors, from the day of Pentecost (when the Holy Ghost descended on them) to this day.

It is a question much disputed between the diverse sects of Christian religion, from whence the Scriptures derive their authority, which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, how we know them to be the word of God, or, why we believe them to be so, and the difficulty of resolving it ariseth chiefly from the

Christians believe it) but those to whom God Himself hath revealed it supernaturally, and

reasons, there can be rendered no one general answer for them all. The question truly stated is *by what authority they are made law*.

As far as they differ not from the laws of nature, there is no doubt but they are the law of God, and carry their authority with them, legible to all men that have the use of natural reason: but this is no other authority than that of all other moral doctrine consonant to reason, the dictates whereof are laws, not made, but eternal.

If they be made law by God Himself, they are of the nature of written law, which are laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently

published them as no man can excuse himself by saying he knew not they were His.

He therefore to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed that they are His, nor that those that published them were sent by Him, is not obliged to obey them by any authority but his whose commands have already the force

force of laws, it must be some other authority derived from God, either private or public: if private, it obliges only him to whom in particular God hath been pleased to reveal it. For if every man should be obliged to take for God's law what particular men, on pretence of private inspiration or revelation, should obtrude upon him (in such a number of men that out of pride and ignorance take their own dreams, and extravagant fancies, and madness for testimonies of God's spirit, or, out of ambition, pretend to such divine testimonies, falsely

Church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a Commonwealth of Christians, called a *Commonwealth* because it consisteth of men united in one person, their sovereign, and a *Church* because it consisteth in Christian men, united in one Christian sovereign. But if the Church be not one person, then it hath no authority at all, it can neither command nor do any action at all, nor is capable of having any power or right to anything: nor has any will, reason, nor voice, for all these qualities are personal. Now if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one Commonwealth, they are not one person, nor is there a universal Church that hath any authority over them, and

shall think expedient or necessary for the common good

Which question cannot be resolved without a power of interpreting law, a judicial authority, whose power is not to be questioned, but whose power is to make law, and whose power is to approve or disapprove the interpretation of the same

CHAPTER XXXIV

Of the Signification of Spirit Angel, and Inspiration in the Books of Holy Scripture

SEEING the foundation of all true ratiocination is the constant signification of words which, in the doctrine following, dependeth not (as in natural science) on the will of the writer, nor (as in common conversation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture, it is necessary, before I proceed any further, to determine, out of the Bible the meaning of such words as by their ambiguity may render what I am to infer upon them obscure or disputable. I will begin with the words *body* and *spirit* which in the language of the Schools are termed *substances corporeal* and *incorporeal*

The word *body* in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which filleth or occupieth some certain room or imagined place, and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the *universe*. For the universe, being the aggregate of all bodies there is no real part thereof that is not also body nor anything properly a body that is not also part of that aggregate of all bodies, the universe. The same also, because bodies are subject to change that is to say, to variety of appearance to the sense of living creatures, is called *substance*, that is to say, subject to various accidents as sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still, and to seem to our senses sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometimes of one colour,

gans of our sense, we attribute to alterations of the bodies that operate, and call them *accidents* of those bodies. And according to this acceptation of the word, *substance* and *body* signify the same thing, and therefore *substance incorporeal* are words which, when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an *incorporeal body*.

But in the sense of common speech, *body* is that which is sensible to the sense of their eyes, to hinder them from a farther prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, *air* and *aerial substances* use not to be taken for bodies, but, as often as men are sensible of their effects, are called *wind*, or *breath*, or (because the same are called in the Latin *spiritus*) *spirits* as when they call that aerial substance which in the body of any living creature gives it life and motion, *vital* and *animal spirits*. But for those idols of the brain which represent bodies

the organs of our sense. And men that are otherwise employed than to search into their causes know not of themselves what to call them, and may therefore easily be persuaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to call them *bodies* and think them made of air compacted by a power supernatural, because the sight judges them corporeal, and some to call them *spirits* because the sense of touch discerneth nothing, in the place where they appear, to resist their fingers so that the proper signification of *spirit* in common speech is either a

inclination of the mind as when for the disposition to control the sayings of other men, we say, a *spirit of contradiction*, for a disposition to uncleanness, an *unclean spirit* for perverseness, a *froward spirit* for sullenness, a *dumb spirit* and for inclination to godliness and God's service, the *Spirit of God* sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when great wisdom is called the *spirit of wisdom*, and madmen are said to be possessed with a *spirit*

Other signification of *spirit* I find nowhere any, and where none of these can satisfy the sense of that word in Scripture, the place fall eth not under human understanding and our

incorporeal, and so the place is above our understanding that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place or that has not dimension, and whatsoever has dimension is body. But the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place, where when the earth was covered with waters, as in the beginning, God intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth the like words, "I will bring my Spirit upon the earth, and the waters shall be diminished" * in which place by Spirit

work

Pharaoh calleth the wisdom of Joseph the Spirit of God. Exod. 31. 3. 6. and 35. 31.

mean, saith God, to all that are wise hearted, whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom, to make Aaron garments, to consecrate him. Where extraordinary understanding, though but in making garments, as being the gift of God, is called the Spirit of God. The same is found again, Exod. 31. 3. 6. and 35. 31. And Isaiah, 11. 2, 3, where the prophet, speaking of the Messiah, saith, "The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel, and fortitude, and the spirit of the fear of the Lord." Where manifestly is meant, not so many ghosts, but so many eminent graces that God would give him.

In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary zeal and courage in the defence of God's people is called the Spirit of God; as when it excited Othniel, Gideon, Jephtha, and Samson to deliver them from servitude, Judges, 3. 10, 6. 34.

* Genesis, 1. 2

* Genesis, 8. 1

* Ibid., 41. 38

11. 29, 13. 25, 14. 6, 19. And of Saul, upon the news of the insolence of the Ammonites towards the men of Jabesh Gilead, it is said that "The Spirit of God came upon Saul, and his anger" (or, as it is in the Latin, *his fury*) "was kindled greatly." * Where it is not probable was meant a ghost, but an extraordinary zeal to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites. In like manner by the Spirit of God that came upon Saul, when he was amongst the prophets that praised God in songs and music, * to be understood, not a ghost, but an unexpected and sudden zeal to join with them in their devotion.

The false prophet Zedekiah saith to Micaiah, "Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee?" * Which cannot be understood of a ghost, for Micaiah declared before the kings of Israel and Judah the event of the battle as from a vision and not as from a spirit speaking in him.

of prediction, yet their knowledge of the future was not by a ghost within them, but by some supernatural dream or vision.

It is said, "God made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils (*spiraculum vite*) the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." * There the breath of life inspired by God is far more than that God gave

was in the wheels," is equivalent to, "the wheels were alive." And "the spirit entered into me, and set me on my feet," * that is, "I recovered my vital strength", not that any ghost or incorporeal substance entered into and possessed his body.

In the eleventh chapter of Numbers, verse 17, "I will take," saith God, "of the spirit which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear the burden of the people with thee", that is, upon the seventy elders where upon two of the seventy are said to prophesy in the camp, of whom some complained, and Joshua desired Moses to forbid them, which Moses would not do. Whereby it appears that Joshua knew not they had received authority

* 1 Samuel, 11. 6.

* Ibid., 19. 20

* 1 Kings, 22. 24

* Genesis, 2. 7

* Job, 27. 3

* Ezekiel, 2. 30.

so to do, and prophesied according to the mind of Moses, that is to say, by a *spirit* or *authority* subordinate to his own

In the like sense we read that "Joshua was full of the spirit of wisdom, because Moses had laid his hands upon him" ^a that is, because he was ordained by Moses to prosecute the work he had himself begun (namely, the bringing of God's people into the promised land) but, prevented by death, could not finish

In the like sense it is said, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his" ^b not meaning thereby the *ghost* of Christ, but a *submission* to his doctrine As also, 'Hereby you shall know the Spirit of God every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God', ^c by which is meant the spirit of unfeigned Christianity, or submission to that main article of Christian faith, that *Jesus is the Christ*, which cannot be interpreted of a ghost

Likewise these words, "And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost" ^d (that is, as it is expressed, Matthew, 4. 1, and Mark, 1. 12, "of the Holy Spirit") may be understood for *zeal* to do the work for which he was sent by God the Father but to interpret it of a ghost is to say that God Himself (for so our Saviour was) was filled with God, which is very improper and insignificant How we came to translate *spirits* by the word *ghosts*, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven nor earth, but the imaginary inhabitants of man's brain, I examine not but this I say, the word *spirit* in the text signifieth no such thing, but either properly a real substance or, metaphorically, some extraordinary ability or affection of the mind or of the body

The Disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea ^e supposed him to be a *spirit*, meaning thereby an aerial body, and not a phantasm for it is said they all saw him, which cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain (which are not common to many at once, as visible bodies are, but singular, because of the differences of fancies), but of bodies only In like manner, where he was taken for a spirit, by the same Apostles ^f so also when St Peter was delivered out of prison, it would not be believed, but when the maid said he was at the door, they said it was his angel, ^g by which must be

meant a corporeal substance, or we must say the disciples themselves did follow the common opinion of both Jews and Gentiles that some such apparitions were not imaginary, but real, and such as needed not the fancy of man for their existence these the Jews called *spirits* and *angels*, good or bad, as the Greeks called the same by the name of *demons* And some such apparitions may be real and substantial, that is to say, subtle bodies, which God can form by the same power by which He formed all things, and make use of as ministers and messengers (that is to say, angels), to declare His will, and execute the same when He pleaseth in extraordinary and supernatural manner But when He hath so formed them they are substances, endued with dimensions, and take up room, and can be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to bodies, and therefore are not ghosts *incorporeal*, that is to say, ghosts that are in *no place*, that is to say, that are *nowhere*, that is to say, that, seeming to be *somewhat*, are *nothing* But if corporeal be taken in the most vulgar manner, for such substances as are perceptible by our external senses, then is substance *incorporeal* a thing not imaginary, but real,

vision

Concerning the creation of angels, there is nothing delivered in the Scriptures That they are spirits is often repeated but by the name of *spirit* is signified both in Scripture and vulgarly, both amongst Jews and Gentiles, sometimes thin bodies, as the air, the wind, the spirits vital and animal of living creatures, and sometimes the images that rise in the fancy in dreams and visions, which are not real substances, nor last any longer than the dream or vision they ap-

will, they are not improperly termed Gods

^a Deuteronomy, 34. 9.

^b Romans, 8. 9.

^c 1 John, 4. 2.

^d Luke, 4. 1.

^e Matthew, 14. 26 and Mark, 6. 49.

^f Luke, 24. 3. 7.

^g Acts, 12. 15.

and out of them framed their opinions of demons, good and evil, which because they seemed to subsist really, they called *substances*, and be

cause they could not feel them with their hands, *incorporeal* so also the Jews upon the same ground, without anything in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion (except the sect of the Sadducees) that those apparitions, which it pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancy of men, for His own service, and therefore called them His *angels*, were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God, whereof those which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the *angels of God*, and those they thought would hurt them, they called *evil angels*, or *evil spirits*, such as was the spirit of Python, and the spirits of madmen, of lunatics and epileptics for they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases, *demoniacs*.

But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where angels are mentioned, we shall find that in most of them, there can nothing else be understood by the word *angel*, but some image raised, supernaturally, in the fancy, to signify the presence of God in the execution of some supernatural work; and therefore in the rest, where their nature is not expressed, it may be understood in the same manner.

For we read that the same apparition is called not only an *angel*, but *God*, where that which is called the angel of the Lord, saith to Hagar, "I will multiply thy seed exceedingly";¹ that is, *angel* is the same as *God*.

from heaven, or rather, nothing else but a voice supernatural, testifying God's special presence there. Why therefore may not the angels that appeared to Lot, and are called *men*,² and to whom, though they were two, Lot speaketh as but to one,³ and that one as God (for the words are, "Lot said unto them, Oh not so my Lord"),⁴ be the same as *God*.

As thus from slaying Isaac, there was no apparition, but a voice, which nevertheless was called properly enough a *messenger* or *angel* of God, because it declared God's will supernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing

any permanent ghosts. The angels which Jacob saw on the ladder of heaven⁵ were a vision of his sleep, therefore only fancy and a dream, yet

appeared to me in my sleep. For an apparition made to a man in his sleep is that which all men call a *dream*, whether such dream be natural or supernatural and that which there Jacob calleth an angel was God Himself, for the same angel saith, "I am the God of Bethel".

Also the angel that went before the army of Israel to the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is the Lord Himself,⁶ and He appeared not in the form of a beautiful man, but in form, by day, of a "pillar of cloud," and, by night, in form of a "pillar of fire,"⁷ and yet this pillar

Moses⁸

There you see motion and speech, which are commonly attributed to angels, attributed to a cloud, because the cloud served as a sign of God's presence, and was no less an angel than if it had had the form of a man or child of never so great beauty, or wings, as usually they are painted, for the false instruction of common people. For it is not the shape, but their use, that makes them angels. But their use is to be significations of God's presence in supernatural operations, as when Moses had desired

ment where the name of *angel* is found would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I say there is no text in that part of the Old Testament which the Church of England holdeth for canonical from which we can conclude there is, or hath been created, any permanent thing (understood by the name of *spirit* or *angel*) that hath not quantity, and that may

¹ *Ibid*, 28 12.

² *Ibid*, 31 11.

³ *Ibid*, 31 13.

⁴ Exodus, 14 19.

⁵ *Ibid*, 13 21.

⁶ *Ibid*, 33 2.

⁷ *Ibid*, 33 14.

¹ Genesis, 16 7, 10.

² *Ibid*, 19 10.

³ *Ibid*, 19 18.

⁴ Genesis, 22 11.

not be by the understanding divided, that is to say, considered by parts, so as one part may be in one place, and the next part in the next place to it, and, in sum, which is not (taking *body* for that which is somewhat or somewhere) corporeal, but in every place the sense will bear the interpretation of angel for messenger, as

and Michael, yet it is clear out of the text itself that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an angel, but as a prince¹ and that Gabriel (as

names, which are useful only to the short memories of mortals. Nor in the New Testament is there any place out of which it can be proved that angels (except when they are put for such men as God hath made the messengers and ministers of His word or works) are things permanent, and withal incorporeal. That they are permanent may be gathered from the words of our Saviour himself where he saith it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, "Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels"², which place is manifest for the permanence of evil angels (unless we might think the name of Devil and his angels may be understood of the Church's adversaries

as are all things incorporeal. Angels therefore are not thence proved to be incorporeal. In like manner where St. Paul says, "Know ye not that we shall judge the angels?"³ And II Peter, 2. 4. "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down into hell", and "And the angels that kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgement of the last day"⁴, though it prove the permanence of angelical nature, it confirmeth

also their materiality. And, "In the resurrection men do neither marry, nor give in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven"⁵ but in the resurrection men shall be permanent, and not incorporeal, so therefore also are the angels.

There be diverse other places out of which may be drawn the like conclusion. To men that understand the signification of these words, *substance* and *incorporeal* (as *incorporeal* is taken not for subtle body, but for *not body*), they imply a contradiction inasmuch as to say, an angel or spirit is in that sense an incorporeal

ment, and the nature of dreams and visions that

and commandments known to mankind, and chiefly to His own people. But the many places of the New Testament, and our Saviour's own words, and in such texts wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have extorted from my feeble reason an acknowledgement and belief that there be also angels substantial and permanent. But to believe they be in no place, that is to say, nowhere, that is to say, nothing, as they, though indirectly, say that will have them incorporeal, cannot by Scripture be evinced.

On the signification of the word *spirit* dependeth that of the word *inspiration*, which must either be taken properly, and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and subtile air or wind in such manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath, or if spirits be not corporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a phantasm, which is improper to say, and im-

it is said that God inspired into man the

whether that breath were real or seeming, but only as it is "that he gave him life, and breath", that is, made him a living creature. And where

¹ Daniel, 12. 1

² Matthew, 25. 41

³ I Corinthians, 6. 3

⁴ Jude, 1. 6

⁵ Matthew, 22. 30

⁶ Genesis, 2. 7

⁷ Acts, 17. 25

it is said "all Scripture is given by inspiration from God,"¹ speaking there of the Scripture of the Old Testament, it is an easy metaphor to signify that God inclined the spirit or mind of those writers to write that which should

He thought requisite for the performance of their apostleship

CHAPTER XXXV

Of the Signification in Scripture of Kingdom of God, of Holy, Sacred, and Sacrament

THE *kingdom of God* in the writings of divines, and specially in sermons and treatises of devotion, is taken most commonly for eternal felicity,

men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit,² by the *Holy Spirit* is meant the voice of God in a dream or vision supernatural, which is not inspiration nor when our Saviour, breathing on His Disciples, said, "Receive the Holy Spirit, was that breath the Spirit, but a sign of the spiritual graces he gave unto them. And though it be said of many, and of our Saviour Himself, that he was full of the Holy Spirit, yet that fullness is not to be understood for infusion of the substance of God, but

but never for the monarchy, that is to say, the sovereign power of God over any subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper

pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions,"³ we are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his Spirit were like water, subject to effusion or infusion, but as if God had promised to give them prophetic dreams and visions. For the proper use of the word *infused*, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it, for those graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried hither and thither, and to be poured into men as into barrels.

In the same manner, to take *inspiration* in the proper sense, or to say that good spirits entered into men to make them prophesy, or evil spirits into those that became phrenetic, lunatic, or epileptic, is not to take the word in the sense of the Scripture, for the Spirit there is taken for the power of God, working by causes to us unknown. As also the *wind* that is there said to fill the house wherein the Apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost⁴ is not to be understood for the *Holy Spirit*, which is the Deity itself, but for an external sign of God's special working on their hearts to effect in them the internal graces and holy virtues

dom properly so named, constituted by the votes of the people of Israel in peculiar manner, where in they chose God for their king by covenant made with Him, upon God's promising them the possession of the land of Canaan, and but seldom metaphorically, and then it is taken for dominion over sin (and only in the New Testament), because such a dominion as that every subject shall have in the kingdom of God, and without prejudice to the sovereign.

From the very creation, God not only reigned over all men naturally by His might, but also had peculiar subjects, whom He commanded by a voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner He reigned over Adam and gave him commandment to abstain from the tree of cognizance of good and evil, which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof took upon him to be as God, judging between good and evil, not by his Creator's commandment, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of eternal life, wherein God had at first created him and afterwards God punished his posterity for their vices, all but eight persons, with a universal deluge, and in these eight did consist the then kingdom of God.

After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and to make a covenant with him in these words, "I will establish my covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee in their

¹ II Timothy, 3. 16

² I Peter, 1. 21

³ Joel, 2. 28.

⁴ Acts, 2. 2.

land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession"¹ In this covenant Abraham promiseth for himself and his posterity to obey, as God, the Lord that spake to him, and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession And for a memorial and a token of this covenant, he ordaineth the sacrament of circumcision² This is it which is called the *Old Covenant*, or *Testament*, and containeth a contract between God and Abraham, by which Abraham obligeth himself and his posterity in a peculiar manner to be subject to God's positive law, for to the law moral he

over the seed of Abraham, which in the renewing of the same covenant by Moses at Mount Sinai is expressly called a peculiar kingdom of God over the Jews and it is of Abraham, not of Moses, St Paul saith that he is the father of the faithful,³ that is, of those that are loyal and do not violate their allegiance sworn to God, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the New Covenant by baptism

This covenant at the foot of Mount Sinai was renewed by Moses where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in this manner, "If you will obey my voice indeed, and

holy nation For a peculiar people, the vulgar Latin hath, *peculium de cunctis populis* the English translation made in the beginning of the reign of King James hath, a "peculiar treasure unto me above all nations", and the Geneva French, "the most precious jewel of all nations"⁴ But the truest translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St Paul himself where he saith,⁵ alluding to that place, that our blessed Saviour "gave Himself for us, that He might purify us to Himself, a peculiar [that is, an extraordinary] people" for the word is in the Greek *ἑκλεκτός*, which is opposed commonly to the word *κοινός* and as this signifieth ordinary, quotidian, or, as in the Lord's Prayer, of daily use, so the other signifieth that which is *superplus*, and *stored up*, and enjoyed

in a special manner, which the Latins call *peculium* and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God rendereth of it, which

so that you are mine, but in a special manner for they are all mine, by reason of my power, but you shall be mine by your own consent and covenant," which is an addition to his ordinary title to all nations

The same is again confirmed in express words in the same text, "Ye shall be to me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation" The vulgar Latin hath it, *regnum sacerdotale*, to which agreeth the translation of that place, *sacerdotium regale*, a regal priesthood, as also the institution itself, by which no man might enter into the *sanctum sanctorum*, that is to say, no man

Peter, nor with the exercise of the high priesthood For there was never any but the high priest only that was to inform the people of God's will, nor any convocation of priests ever allowed to enter into the *sanctum sanctorum*

is said in the text, is God's, but all the earth is not called *holy*, but that only which is set apart

to) for their civil government and the regulating of their behaviour, not only towards God their king, but also towards one another in

sole viceroy, or lieutenant

¹ Genesis, 17. 7, 8.

² *Ibid*, 16. 11.

³ Romans 4. 11.

⁴ Exodus, 19. 5.

⁵ Titus, 2. 14.

⁶ 1 Peter, 2. 9.

voice of the people, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them¹. Out of which it is evident that God Himself was then their king, and Samuel did not command the people, but only delivered to them that which God from

a real, not a metaphorical kingdom, and so taken, not only in the Old Testament, but the New. When we say, 'For thine is the kingdom, the power and glory forever and ever' of

fluous to say in our prayer, "Thy kingdom come," unless it be meant of the restoration of that kingdom of God by Christ which by revolt of the Israelites had been interrupted in the

And after the Israelites had rejected God, the prophets did foretell His restitution, as, "Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem,"² where he speaketh expressly of His reign in Zion and Jerusalem, that is, on earth. And, "And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion"³ this Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the earth. And, 'As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arm, and with fury poured out, I will rule over you',⁴ and, 'I will cause you to pass under the rod,

tinued

There be so many other places that confirm this interpretation that it were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives too much light to Christian kings to see their right of ecclesiastical government. This they have observed, that instead of a *sacerdotal kingdom*, translate, a *kingdom of priests* for they may as well translate a *royal priesthood* as it is in St Peter, into a *priesthood of kings*. And whereas, for a *peculiar people*, they put a *precious jewel*, or *treasure*, a man might as well call the special regiment or company of a general the general's precious jewel, or his treasure.

In short, the kingdom of God is a civil kingdom, which consisted, first, in the obligation of the people of Israel to those laws which Moses

with me by Moses, and broke in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your election of me by Saul.

end⁵. This is also a kingdom upon earth, for the claim whereof, as an enemy to Caesar, he was put to death, the title of his cross was *Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews*, he was crowned in scorn with a crown of thorns, and for the proclaiming of him, it is said of the Disciples 'That they did all of them contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying there was another King, one Jesus'.⁶ The kingdom therefore of God is

kingdom having been cast off in the election of Saul, the prophets foretold, should be restored by Christ, and the restoration whereof we daily pray for when we say in the Lord's Prayer, "Thy kingdom come", and the right whereof we acknowledge when we add, 'For thine is the kingdom, the power and glory forever and ever'.

¹ 1 Samuel, 8 7

² *Ibid* 12 13

³ Isaiah 24 23

⁴ Micah, 4 7

⁵ Ezekiel, 20 33

⁶ *Ibid*, 20 37

⁷ Luke, 1 32, 33

⁸ Acts, 17 7

not a kingdom which God by His lieutenants or vicars, who deliver His commandments to the people, did exercise on earth, there would not have been so much contention and war about

denied it them.

Out of this literal interpretation of the kingdom of God ariseth also the true interpretation of the word *holy*. For it is a word which in God's kingdom answereth to that which men in their kingdoms use to call *public*, or the *king's*.

The king of any country is the public person, or representative of all his own subjects. And God the king of Israel was the *Holy One* of Israel. The nation which is subject to one earthly sovereign is the nation of that sovereign, that is, of the public person. So the Jews, who were God's nation, were called a *holy nation*.¹ For by *holy* is always understood either God Himself or that which is God's in propriety, as by *public* is always meant either the person of the Commonwealth itself, or something that is so the Commonwealth's as no private person can claim any propriety therein.

Therefore the Sabbath (God's day) is a *holy day*, the Temple (God's house), a *holy house*, sacrifices, tithes, and offerings (God's tribute), *holy duties*, priests, prophets, and anointed kings, under Christ (God's ministers), *holy men*, the celestial ministering spirits (God's messengers), *holy angels*, and the like. And wheresoever the word *holy* is taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety gotten by consent. In saying "Hallowed be Thy name," we do but pray to God for grace to keep the first Commandment of having no other Gods but Him. Mankind is God's nation in propriety but the Jews only were a *holy nation*. Why, but because they became his propriety by covenant?

And the word *profane* is usually taken in the Scripture for the same with *common*, and con-

led such goodly lives, as if they had forsaken all worldly designs, and wholly devoted and given themselves to God. In the proper sense, that which is made *holy* by God's appropriating or separating it to his own use is said to be *sanctified* by God, as the seventh day in the fourth

men, and given to God, so as to be used only in his public service, is called also *sacred*, and said

matter of sacraments

Of *holiness* there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for the service of God,

yet more holy, and amongst the priests the high priest was the most holy. So the land of Judea was the Holy Land, but the Holy City wherein God was to be worshipped was more holy, and again, the Temple more holy than the city, and the *sanctum sanctorum* more holy than the rest of the Temple.

A *sacrament* is a separation of some visible thing from common use, and a consecration of it to God's service, for a sign either of our admission into the kingdom of God, to be of the number of his peculiar people, or for a commemoration of the same. In the Old Testament the sign of admission was *circumcision*, in the New Testament, *baptism*. The commemoration

from the bondage of sin by our blessed Saviour's death upon the cross. The sacraments of admission are but once to be used, because there needs but one admission; but because we have need of being often put in mind of our deliverance and of our allegiance, the sacraments of commemoration have need to be reiterated. And these are the principal sacraments and, as were, the solemn oaths we make of our allegiance. There be also other consecrations that

circumcision and the Passover; nor are there any other in the New Testament but baptism and the Lord's Supper.

¹ Exodus, 19. 6.

CHAPTER XXXVI

Of the Word of God, and of Prophets

WHEN there is mention of the *word of God* or of *man*, it doth not signify a part of speech, such as grammarians call a noun or a verb, or any simple voice, without a contexture with other words

vocabulary and signifies a word, our *λέξις* (Greek, *λογος*) that is, some speech discourse, or saying

Again, if we say the *word of God* or of *man*, it may be understood sometimes of the speaker as the words that God hath spoken, or that a

the Bible, 'The words of the days of the kings of Israel, or Judah,' it is meant that the acts that were done in those days were the subject of those words and in the Greek, which, in the Scripture retaineth many Hebraisms, by the *word of God* is oftentimes meant, not that which

usually call divinity as is manifest by the places following Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold and said it was necessary that the word of God should first have been spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge your selves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles That which is here called the *word of God* was the doctrine of Christian re

this life is meant the doctrine of the Gospel, as is evident by what they did in the Temple and is expressed in the last verse of the same chapter 'Daily in the Temple, and in every house, they ceased not to teach and preach Christ Jesus' in which place it is manifest that Jesus Christ was the subject of this 'word of life', or, which is all one, the subject of the words of this life eternal that our Saviour offered them So the word of God is called *the word of the*

Gospel, because it containeth the doctrine of

from the dead Also, when any one heareth the word of the kingdom, that is the doctrine of the kingdom taught by Christ Again, the same word is said 'to grow and to be multiplied,' which to understand of the evangelical doctrine is easy, but of the voice or speech of God, hard and strange In the same sense the

manifest in this latter sense (where it is taken for the doctrine of Christian religion) that the whole Scripture is the word of God but in the former sense not so For example though these words 'I am the Lord thy God' etc, to the end of the Ten Commandments, were spoken by God to Moses, yet the preface, 'God spake these words and said,' is to be understood for the words of him that wrote the holy history The *word of God* as it is taken for that which He hath spoken, is understood sometimes properly, sometimes metaphorically Properly, as the words He hath spoken to His prophets meta

word of God And in the same sense it is said,

His power and 'The worlds were framed by the word of God,' and many other places to the same sense as also amongst the Latins, the name of *fate* which signifieth properly *the word spoken* is taken in the same sense

Secondly, for the effect of His word that is to say, for the thing itself, which by His word is affirmed, commanded, threatened, or promised, as where Joseph is said to have been kept

^a Romans, 10 8, 9

^b Matthew, 13 19.

^c Acts, 12 24

^d 1 Timothy, 4 1

^e Genesis, 1

^f John, 1 3

^g Hebrews, 1 3

^h *Ibid* 11 3

ⁱ Acts, 13 46.

^j *Ibid* 5 20

^k *Ibid* 15 7

not a kingdom which God by His lieutenants or vicars, who deliver His commandments to the people, did exercise on earth, there would not have been so much contention and war about who it is by whom God speaketh to us, neither would many priests have troubled themselves with spiritual jurisdiction, nor any king have denied it them.

Out of this literal interpretation of the kingdom of God ariseth also the true interpretation of the word *holy*. For it is a word which in God's kingdom answereth to that which men in their kingdoms use to call *public*, or the *king's*.

The king of any country is the public person, or representative of all his own subjects. And God the king of Israel was the *Holy One* of Israel. The nation which is subject to one earthly sovereign is the nation of that sovereign, that is, of the public person. So the Jews, who were God's nation, were called a *holy nation*. For by *holy* is always understood either God Himself or that which is God's in propriety, as by *public* is always meant either the person of the Commonwealth itself, or something that is so the Commonwealth's as no private person can claim any propriety therein.

Therefore the Sabbath (God's day) is a *holy day*, the Temple (God's house), a *holy house*, sacrifices, tithes, and offerings (God's tribute), *holy duties*, priests, prophets, and anointed kings, under Christ (God's ministers), *holy men*, the celestial ministering spirits (God's messengers), *holy angels*, and the like. And wheresoever the word *holy* is taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety gotten by consent. In saying "Hallowed be Thy name," we do but pray to God for grace to keep the first Commandment of having no other Gods but Him. Mankind is God's nation in propriety, but the Jews only were a *holy nation*. Why, but because they became his propriety by covenant?

And the word *profane* is usually taken in the Scripture for the same with *common*, and con-

Commandment; and as the elect in the New

men, and given to God, so as to be used only in his public service, is called also *sacred*, and said to be *consecrated*, as temples, and other houses of public prayer, and their utensils, priests, and ministers, victims, offerings, and the external matter of sacraments.

Of *holiness* there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for the service of God, there may be some set apart again for a nearer and more especial service. The whole nation of the Israelites were a people *holy* to God, yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a *holy* tribe, and amongst the Levites the priests were yet more *holy*, and amongst the priests the high priest was the most *holy*. So the land of Judea was the *Holy Land*, but the *Holy City* wherein God was to be worshipped was more *holy*, and again, the Temple more *holy* than the city, and the *sanctum sanctorum* more *holy* than the rest of the Temple.

A *sacrament* is a separation of some visible

memoration of the same. In the Old Testament the sign of admission was *circumcision*, in the New Testament, *baptism*. The commemoration of it in the Old Testament was the eating (at a certain time, which was anniversary) of the Paschal Lamb, by which they were put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their bondage in Egypt, and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the Lord's Supper, by which we are put in mind of our deliverance from the bondage of sin by our blessed Saviour's death upon the cross. The sacraments of admission are but once to be used, because there needs but one admission, but because we have need of being often put in mind of our deliverance and of our allegiance, the sacraments of commemoration have need to be reiterated. And these are the principal sacraments and, as it were, the solemn oaths we make of our allegiance. There be also other consecrations that

themselves to God. In the proper sense, that which is made *holy* by God's appropriating or separating it to his own use is said to be *sanctified* by God, as the seventh day in the fourth

nation¹ Also they that in Christian congregations taught the people are said to prophesy² In the like sense it is that God saith to Moses concerning Aaron, 'He shall be thy spokesman to the people, and he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him instead of God'³ that which here is *spokesman* is Exodus, 7. 1, interpreted *prophet* 'See,' saith God, 'I have made thee a god to Pharaoh and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet' In the sense of speaking from man to God Abraham is called a prophet where God in a dream speaketh to Abimelech in this manner, 'Now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a prophet, and shall pray for thee', whereby may be also gathered that the name of *prophet* may be given not improperly to them that in Christian churches have a calling to say public prayers for the

foretold to them, but also all those impostors that pretend by the help of familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination of events past, from false causes, to foretell the like events in time to come of which (as I have declared already in the twelfth Chapter of this discourse) there be many kinds who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men a greater reputation of prophecy by one casual event that may be but wrested to their purpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings Prophecy is not an art, nor, when it is taken for prediction, a constant vocation, but an extraordinary and temporary employment from God, most often of good men, but sometimes also of the wicked The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a phantasm of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore a prophetess, for neither had she any science whereby she could raise such a phan-

called a prophetess⁴ So is it also to be taken where St Paul saith, 'Every man that prayeth or prophesieth with his head covered,' etc., 'and every woman that prayeth or prophesieth with her head uncovered' for prophecy in

by which he fell And for incoherent speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for one sort of prophecy, because the prophets of their oracles, intovicated with a spirit or vapor from the cave of the Pythian Oracle at Delphi, were for the time really mad and spake like madmen of whose loose words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort as all bodies are said to be made of *materia prima* In the Scripture I find it also so taken in these words, 'And the evil spirit came upon Saul, and he prophesied in the midst of the house'

in the honor of their gods, were called *ates*, prophets, as is well enough known by all that are versed in the books of the Gentiles and as is evident where St Paul saith of the Cretans that a prophet of their own said they were liars⁵ not that St Paul held their poets for prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word *prophet* was commonly used to signify them that celebrated the honour of God in verse

When by *prophecy* is meant prediction, or foretelling of future contingents not only they were prophets who were God's spokesmen, and foretold those things to others which God had

And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word *prophet* yet is that the most frequent in which it is taken for him to whom God speaketh immediately that which the prophet is to say from Him is some other man or to the people And hereupon a question may be asked, in what manner God speaketh to such a prophet Can it, may some say, be properly said that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said He hath a

¹ John 11. 51

² I Corinthians, 14. 3

³ Exodus, 4. 16

⁴ Genesis 20. 7

⁵ I Samuel 10. 5, 6, 10.

⁶ Exodus 15. 20

⁷ I Corinthians, 11. 4, 5.

⁸ Titus 1. 12.

⁹ I Samuel, 18. 10

¹⁰ Psalms, 93. 9.

clare, as far as our capacity can conceive His almighty power. But if it were to be taken in the strict and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all other parts of man's body that he had also the same use of them which we have, which would be many of them so uncomely as it would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to Him. There-

and the ways whereby He doth this are many, and to be sought only in the Holy Scripture, where though many times it be said that God spake to this and that person, without declaring in what manner, yet there be again many places that deliver also the signs by which they were to acknowledge His presence and commandment, and by these may be understood how He spake to many of the rest.

In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah is not expressed, nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out of his own country to Sichem in the land of Canaan, and then God is said to have appeared to him.¹ So there is one way whereby God made His presence manifest, that is, by an apparition, or vision. And again, the word of the Lord came to Abraham in a vision,² that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of God's presence, appeared as God's messenger to speak to him. Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham by an apparition of three angels,³ and to Abimelech in a dream,⁴ to Lot by an apparition of two angels,⁵ and to Hagar by the apparition of one angel,⁶ and to Abraham again by the apparition of a voice from heaven,⁷ and to Isaac in the night⁸ (that is, in his sleep, or by dream), and to Jacob in a dream,⁹ that is to say (as are the words of the text), "Jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder," etc. And in a vision of angels,¹⁰ and to Moses in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush,¹¹ and after the time of Moses, where the manner how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testa-

ment is expressed, He spake always by a vision, or by a dream, as to Gideon, Samuel, Elijah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the prophets, and often in the New Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the Evangelist in the Apocalypse.

Only to Moses He spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai, and in the Taber-

prophets of a more eminent place and degree in God's favour, and God Himself in express words declareth that to other prophets He spake in dreams and visions, but to His servant Moses in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these: "If there be a prophet among you, I the Lord will make Myself known to him in a vision, and will speak unto him in a dream. My servant Moses is not so, who is faithful in all my house, with him I will speak

and was therefore a vision, though a more clear vision than was given to other prophets. And comfortable hereunto, where God saith, "If there arise amongst you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams,"¹² the latter word is but the interpretation of the former. And, "Your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions,"¹³ where again, the word *prophesy* is expounded by dream and vision. And in the same manner it was that God spake to S-

generally the prophets extraordinary in the

inations in every true prophet were supernatural, but in false prophets were either natural or feigned.

The same prophets were nevertheless said to

¹ Numbers, 11 6, 7, 8

² Exodus, 33 17

³ Deuteronomy, 13 1.

⁴ Joel, 2 28

⁵ 1 Kings, 3 15

¹ Genesis, 12. 7

² Genesis, 15. 1

³ Ibid, 18 1

⁴ Ibid, 20 3.

⁵ Ibid, 19 1

⁶ Ibid, 21 17

⁷ Ibid, 22 11

⁸ Ibid, 26 24.

⁹ Ibid, 28 12.

¹⁰ Ibid, 32 1

¹¹ Exodus, 3. 2

speaking by the spirit, as where the prophet, speaking of the Jews, saith, "They made their hearts hard as adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in His Spirit by the former prophets"¹ By which it is manifest that speaking by the spirit or inspiration was not a particular manner of God's speaking, different from vision, when they that were said to speak by the Spirit were extraordinary prophets, such as for every new message were to have a particular commission or, which is all one, a new dream or vision.

Of prophets that were so by a perpetual calling in the Old Testament, some were *supreme* and some *subordinate* supreme were first Moses, and after him the high priests, every one for his time, as long as the priesthood was royal, and after the people of the Jews had rejected

And when God was to be consulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the

it alone, because he saw an advantage upon his enemies² And in the same chapter Saul asketh counsel of God In like manner King David,

mandeth the priest to bring him the ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in Keilah or

kings, who enquired of God on an extraordinary occasions how they were to carry themselves, or what event they were to have, were all sovereign prophets But in what manner God spake unto them is not manifest To say that when Moses went up to God in Mount

Sinai it was a dream, or vision, such as other prophets had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between Moses and other prophets.³ To say God spake or appeared as He is in His own nature is to deny His infiniteness, invisibility, incomprehensibility. To say he spake by inspiration, or infusion of the Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses equal with Christ, in whom only the Godhead, as St Paul speaketh, dwelleth bodily⁴ And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy Spirit, as it signifieth the graces or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing to him supernatural For God disposeth men to piety, justice, mercy, truth, faith, and all manner of virtue, both moral and intellectual, by doctrine, example, and by several occasions, natural and ordinary

was both God that spake, and the prophet to whom He spake

To subordinate prophets of perpetual calling, I find not any place that proveth God spake to them supernaturally, but only in such manner

assist in constitution, instruction, education, and the occasions and invitements men have to Christian virtues, yet it is truly attributed to the operation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, which we in our language call the Holy Ghost for there is no good inclination that is not of the operation of God But these operations are not always supernatural When therefore a prophet is said to speak in the spirit, or by the Spirit of God, we are to understand no more but that he speaks according to God's will, declared by the supreme prophet. For the most common acceptance of the word *spirit* is in the signification of a man's intention, mind, or disposition

In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself that prophesied in the camp of the Israelites In what manner God spake to them is declared in the eleventh Chapter of Numbers, verse 25 "The Lord came down in

¹ Numbers, 12 6, 7, 8

² Colossians, 2 9.

¹ Zechariah, 7 12.

² I Samuel, 13 9

³ *Ibid*, 14 18

⁴ *Ibid*, 14 19

⁵ I Samuel, 23 2.

⁶ *Ibid*, 23 11

⁷ I Kings, 2 27.

⁸ *Ibid*, 2 35

a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy elders. And it came to pass, when the spirit rested upon them, they prophesied, and did not cease." By which it is manifest, first, that their prophesying to the people was subservient and subordinate to the prophesying of Moses, for that God took of the spirit of Moses to put upon them, so that they prophesied as Moses would have them otherwise they had not been suffered to prophesy at all. For there was a complaint made against them to Moses,¹ and Joshua would have Moses to have forbid den them which he did not, but said to Joshua, "Be not jealous in my behalf." Secondly, that the Spirit of God in that place signifieth nothing but the mind and disposition to obey and assist Moses in the administration of the government. For if it were meant they had the substantial Spirit of God, that is, the divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in no less manner than Christ himself, in whom only the Spirit of God dwelt bodily. It is meant therefore of the gift and grace of God, that guided them to co-operate with Moses, from whom their spirit was derived. And it appeareth that they were such as Moses himself should appoint for elders and officers of the people: for the words are, "Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be elders and officers of the people."² where, *thou knowest* is the same with *thou appointest* or *hast appointed* to be such. For we are told before that Moses, following the counsel of Jethro his father in law, did appoint judges and officers over the people such as feared God,³ and of these were those seventy whom God, by putting upon them Moses' spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the administration of the kingdom: and in this sense the spirit of God is said presently upon the anointing of David to have come upon David, and left Saul,⁴ God giving His graces to him. He chose to govern His people, and taking them away from him He rejected. So that by the spirit is meant inclination to God's service, and not any supernatural revelation.

God spake also many times by the event of lots, which were ordered by such as He had put in authority over His people. So we read that God manifested by the lots which Saul caused to be drawn the fault that Jonathan had committed in eating a honeycomb, contrary to the

oath taken by the people.⁵ And God divided the land of Canaan amongst the Israelites by the "lots that Joshua did cast before the Lord in Shiloh."⁶ In the same manner it seemeth to be that God discovered the crime of Achan.⁷ And these are the ways whereby God declared His will in the Old Testament.

All which ways He used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary, by a vision of an angel, to Joseph, in a dream, again to Paul, in the way to Damascus in a vision of our Saviour, and to Peter in the vision of a sheet let down from heaven with diverse sorts of flesh of clean and unclean beasts, and in prison, by

carrot, by lot.

Seeing then all prophecy supposeth vision or dream (which two, when they be natural, are the same), or some especial gift of God so rarely observed in mankind as to be admired where observed, and seeing as well such gifts as the most extraordinary dreams and visions may proceed from God, not only by His supernatural and immediate, but also by his natural operation, and by mediation of second causes, there is need of reason and judgement to discern between natural and supernatural gifts, and between natural and supernatural visions or dreams. And consequently men had need to be very circumspect, and wary, in obeying the voice of man that, pretending himself to be a prophet, requires us to obey God in that way which he in God's name telleth us to be the way to happiness. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity pretends to govern them, that is to say, to rule and reign over them, which is a thing that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected of am-

it them already in the institution of a Commonwealth, as when the prophet is the civil sovereign, or by the civil sovereign authorized. And if this examination of prophets and spirits were not allowed to every one of the people, it had been to no purpose to set out the marks by which every man might be able to distinguish between those whom they ought, and those whom they ought not to follow. Seeing there-

¹ Numbers, 11. 27

² *Ibid*, 11. 16.

³ Exodus, 18. [24. 25]

⁴ 1 Samuel, 16. 13, 14

⁵ 1 Samuel, 14. 43.

⁶ Joshua, 18. 10.

⁷ *Ibid*, 7. 16, etc.

fore such marks are set out to know a prophet

against prophets, and so much greater a number ordinarily of false prophets than of true, every one is to beware of obeying their directions at their own peril And first, that there were many more false than true prophets appears by this, that when Ahab consulted four hundred prophets, they were all false impostors, but only one Micaiah.* And a little before the time of the Captivity the prophets were generally liars "The prophets," saith the Lord by Jeremiah, "prophecy lies in my name I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, nor spake unto them they prophesy to you a false vision, a thing of naught, and the deceit of their heart"† Inasmuch as God commanded the people by the mouth of the prophet Jeremiah not to obey them "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the words of the prophets that prophesy to you They make you vain they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord"‡

Seeing then there was in the time of the Old

the four hundred, and such giving of the lie to one another, as in Jeremiah, 14 14, and such controversies in the New Testament at this day amongst the spiritual prophets every man then was, and now is, bound to make use of his natural reason to apply to all prophecy those rules which God hath given us to discern the true from the false Of which rules, in the Old Testament one was conformable doctrine to that

one only mark, and that was the preaching of this doctrine *that Jesus is the Christ*, that is, the King of the Jews, promised in the Old Testament Whosoever denied that article, he was a false prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to work, and he that taught it was a true prophet For St John, speaking expressly

of the means to examine spirits, whether they be of God or not, after he had told them that there would arise false prophets, saith thus, 'Hereby know ye the Spirit of God Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God',* that is, is approved and allowed as a prophet of God not that he is a godly man, or one of the elect for this that he confesseth, professeth, or preacheth Jesus to be the Christ, but for that he is a prophet avowed For God sometimes speaketh by prophets whose persons He hath not accepted, as He did by Baalam, and as He foretold Saul of his death by the Witch of Endor Again in the next verse, 'Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of Christ And this is the spirit of Antichrist'† So that the rule is perfect on both sides that he is a true prophet which preacheth the Messiah already come, in the person of Jesus, and he a false one that denieth him come, and looketh for him in some future impostor that shall take upon him that

is to say, who it is that is God's vicergerent on earth, and hath next under God the authority of governing Christian men, and to observe for a rule that doctrine which in the name of God he hath commanded to be taught, and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those doctrines which pretended prophets, with miracle or without, shall at any time advance and if they find it contrary to that rule, to do as they did that came to Moses and complained that there were some that prophesied in the camp whose authority so to do they doubted of, and leave to the sovereign, as they did to Moses,

to obey them as men to whom God hath given a part of the spirit of their sovereign For when Christian men take not their Christian sovereign for God's prophet, they must either take

witch them by slander of the government in-

* Deuteronomy, 13 1, etc.

† 1 John, 4 1, etc.

‡ 1 Kings, 22

§ Jeremiah, 14 14.

¶ Ibid, 23 16.

duce all order, government, and society to the first chaos of violence and civil war.

CHAPTER XXXVII

Of Miracles and their Use

By *Miracles* are signified the admirable works of God and therefore they are also called *wonders*. And because they are for the most part done for a signification of His commandment in such occasions as, without them, men are apt to doubt (following their private natural reasoning) what He hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly, in Holy Scripture, called *signs*, in the same sense as they are called by the Latins, *ostenta* and *portenta*, from showing and foreshignifying that which the Almighty is about to bring to pass.

To understand therefore what is a miracle, we must first understand what works they are which men wonder at and call admirable. And there be but two things which make men wonder at any event: the one is if it be strange, that is to say, such as the like of it hath never or very rarely been produced, the other is if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by natural means, but only by the immediate hand of God. But when we see some possible natural cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done, or if the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a natural means thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a miracle.

Therefore, if a horse or cow should speak, it were a miracle, because both the thing is strange and the natural cause difficult to imagine; so also were it to see a strange deviation of nature in the production of some new shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other animal, engenders his like, though we know no more how this

be so changed, because we see it often it is no miracle: and yet we know no more by what operation of God the one is brought to pass than the other.

The first rainbow that was seen in the world

should be no more a universal destruction of the world by water. But at this day, because they are frequent, they are not miracles, neither to them that know their natural causes, nor to them

who know them not. Again, there be many rare works produced by the art of man, yet when we know they are done, because thereby we know also the means how they are done, we count them not for miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God, but by mediation of human industry.

Furthermore, seeing admiration and wonder is consequent to the knowledge and experience wherewith men are endued, some more, some less, it followeth that the same thing may be a miracle to one, and not to another. And thence

and moon have been taken for supernatural works by the common people, when nevertheless there were others could, from their natural causes, have foretold the very hour they should arrive; or, as when a man, by confederacy and secret intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant, unwary man, thereby tells him what he has done in former time, it seems to him a miraculous thing, but amongst wise and cautelous men, such miracles as those cannot easily be done.

Again, it belongeth to the nature of a miracle that it be wrought for the procuring of credit to God's messengers, ministers, and prophets, that thereby men may know they are called, sent, and employed by God, and thereby be the better inclined to obey them. And therefore,

cause He does it at the prayer or word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt, by the hand of Moses, were properly miracles, because they were done with intention to make the people of Israel believe that Moses came unto them, not

he had in his hand into a serpent, and again so
Exodus, 4. 1.

fathers had appeared unto him ^a and if that were not enough, He gave him power to turn their waters into blood And when he had done these miracles before the people, it ^b said that "they believed him" ^c Nevertheless, for fear of Pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him There fore the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh and the Egyptians tended all to make the Israelites believe in Moses, and were properly miracles In likemanner if we consider all the miracles done by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the prophets till the Captivity, and those of our Saviour and his Apostles afterwards, we shall find their end was always to beget or confirm belief that they came not of their own motion, but were sent by God We may further observe in Scripture that the end of miracles was to beget belief, not universally in all men, elect and reprobate, but in the elect only, that is to say, in such as God had determined should become His subjects For

go and when he let them go at last, not the miracles persuaded him, but the plagues forced him to it So also of our Saviour it is written

power, which, to say, were blasphemy against God nor that the end of miracles was not to convert incredulous men to Christ, for the end of all the miracles of Moses, of the prophets of our Saviour, and of his Apostles was to add men to the Church

wherein this rather had rejected They that, expounding this place of St Mark, say that this word, "He could not," ^d is put for, "He would not," do it without example in the Greek tongue (where *would not* is put sometimes for

could not, in things inanimate that have no will, but *could not for would not*, never), and thereby lay a stumbling block before weak Christians, as if Christ could do no miracles but amongst the credulous

From that which I have here set down, of the nature and use of a miracle, we may define it thus *a miracle is a work of God (besides His operation by the way of nature, ordained in the Creation) done for the making manifest to His elect the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation*

And from this definition, we may infer first, that in all miracles the work done is not the effect of any virtue in the prophet, because it is the effect of the immediate hand of God, that is to say, God hath done it, without using the prophet therein as a subordinate cause

Secondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit can do a miracle For it must either be by virtue of some natural science or by incantation, that is, virtue of words For if the enchanters do it by their own power independent, there is some power that proceedeth not from God, which all men deny, and if they do it by power given them, then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but natural, and consequently no miracle

incantation As, for example, when we read that after the rod of Moses being cast on the

to attribute miracles to enchantments, that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of words, and think the same very well proved out of this and other such places? And yet there is no place of Scripture that telleth us what an enchantment is If therefore enchantment be not, as many think it, a working of strange effects by spells and words, but imposture and delusion wrought by ordinary means, and so far from supernatu-

^a Exodus, 7 11.

^b Ibid. 7 22.

^c Ibid. 8 7

^d Ibid. 4 5

^e Ibid. 4 31

^f Matthew, 13 58

^g Mark, 6 5

ral, as the impostors need not the study so much of natural causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of mankind, to do them, those texts that seem to countenance the power of magic, witchcraft, and enchantment must needs have another sense than at first sight they seem to bear

For it is evident enough that words have no effect but on those that understand them, and then they have no other but to signify the intentions or passions of them that speak, and thereby produce hope, fear, or other passions, or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a rod seemeth a serpent, or the waters blood, or any other miracle seemeth done by enchantment, if it be not to the edification of God's people, not the rod, nor the water, nor any other thing is enchanted, that is to say, wrought upon by the words, but the spectator. So that all the miracle consisteth in this, that the enchanter has deceived a man which is no miracle, but a very easy matter to do

For such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge of natural causes, and of the nature and interests of men as by innumerable and easy tricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power before it was

wonders by the power at least of the Devil. A man that hath practised to speak by drawing in of his breath (which kind of men in ancient time were called *ventriquir*) and so make the weakness of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of speech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men believe it is a voice from heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them. And for a

past, to tell them that against the law of nature, and yet there be many that by such means as that obtain the reputation of being conjurers. But it is too long a business to reckon up the several sorts of those men which the Greeks called *thaumaturgi*, that is to say, workers of things wonderful, and yet these do all they do by their own single dexterity. But if we look upon the impostures wrought by confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be

done that is impossible to be believed. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm, will deceive many; but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witness, will deceive many more.

In this aptitude of mankind to give too hasty belief to pretended miracles, there can be no better nor I think any other caution than that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses (as

any for prophets that teach any other religion than that which God's lieutenant, which at

fore in his time, and Aaron and his successors in their times, and the sovereign governor of God's people next under God Himself, that is to say, the head of the Church in all times, are to be consulted what doctrine he hath established before we give credit to a pretended miracle or prophet. And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle, we must both see it done and use all means possible to consider whether it be really done, and not only so, but whether it be such as no man can do the like by his natural power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God. And in this also we must have recourse to God's lieutenant, to whom in all doubtful cases we have submitted our private judgements. For example, if a man pretend that after certain words spoken over a piece of bread, that presently God hath made it not bread, but a god, or a man, or both, and nevertheless it looketh still as like bread as ever it did, there is no reason for any man to think it really done, nor consequently to fear him till he enquire of God by his vicar or lieutenant whether it be done or not. If he say not, then followeth that which Moses saith, 'he hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him.' If he say it is done, then he is not to contradict it. So also if we see not, but only hear tell of a miracle, we are to consult the lawful Church, that is to say, the lawful head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And this is chiefly the case of men that in these days live under Christian sovereigns. For in these times I do not know one man that ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm or at the word or prayer of a man, that a man endued but with

¹ Deuteronomy, 18. 22.

a mediocrity of reason would think supernatural and the question is no more whether what we see done be a miracle, whether the miracle we hear, or read of, were a real work, and not the act of a tongue or pen, but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lie. In which question we are not every one to make our own private reason or conscience, but the public reason, that is, the reason of God's supreme lie

peace and defence. A private man has always the liberty, because thought is free, to believe or not believe in his heart those acts that have been given out for miracles, according as he shall see what benefit can accrue, by men's belief, to those that pretend or countenance them, and thereby conjecture whether they be miracles or lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the private reason must submit to the public, that is to say, to God's lieutenant. But who is this lieutenant of God, and head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place hereafter.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

Of the Signification in Scripture of Eternal Life, Hell, Salvation, the World to Come, and Redemption

THE maintenance of civil society depending on justice, and justice on the power of life and death, and other less rewards and punishments residing in them that have the sovereignty of the Commonwealth, it is impossible a Commonwealth should stand where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now seeing eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal torment a greater punishment than the death of nature, it is a thing worthy to be well considered of all men that desire, by obeying authority, to avoid the calamities of confusion and

not allowed him. And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, "lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live forever." By which it seemeth to me (with submission nevertheless both in this, and in all questions whereof the determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the Commonwealth whose subject I am) that Adam, if he had not sinned, had had an eternal life on earth, and that mortality entered upon himself, and his posterity, by his first sin. Not that actual death then entered, for Adam then could never have had children, whereas he lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he died. But where it is said, "In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," it must needs be meant of his mortality and certitude of death. Seeing then eternal life was lost by Adam's forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancel that forfeiture was to recover thereby that life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that believe in him, and therefore recovered to all believers that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam. And in this sense it is that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth "As by the offence of one, judgement came upon all men to condemna

came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that eternal life which Christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alleged seem to make it on earth. For if, as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited Paradise and eternal life on earth, even so in Christ all shall be made alive, then all men shall be made to live on earth, for else the comparison were not proper. Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the Psalmist, "Upon Zion God commanded the blessing, even life for evermore," for Zion is in Jerusalem upon

And first we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life as, had he not broken

² Genesis, 3. 22.

³ Iba, 2. 17.

⁴ Romans, 5. 18, 19.

⁵ I Corinthians, 15. 21, 22.

⁶ Psalms, 133. 3.

⁷ Revelation, 2. 7.

his life was to have been on earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed again by St John, where he saith, "I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband" and again, verse 10, to the same effect, as if he should say, the new Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, at the coming again of Christ shall be." *John 19:14*

And the same Jesus, who is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up into heaven" *Acts 1:11*. Which soundeth as if they had said he should come down to govern them under his Father eternally here, and not take them up to govern them.

And the Jews on earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour, "that in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are the angels of God in heaven," is a description of an eternal life, resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of marriage. For seeing Adam and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on earth eternally in their individual persons, it is manifest they should not continually have procreated their kind. For if immortals should have generated, as mankind doth now, the earth in a small time would not have been able to afford them place to stand on. The Jews that asked our Saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many brothers should be in the resurrection, knew not what were the consequences of life eternal and therefore our Saviour puts them in mind of this consequence of immortality, that there shall be no generation, and consequently no marriage, no more than there is marriage or generation among the angels. The comparison between that eternal life

main dead for a time, namely, till the resurrection. For as death is reckoned from the con-

¹ *Ibid*, 21. 2.

² Acts, 1. 11.

³ Matthew, 22. 30.

Christ

That the place where men are to live eternally, after the resurrection, in the heavens, meaning by *heaven* those parts of the world which are the most remote from earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars, in another high,

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Samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortal man for their king after the manner of other nations. And when our Saviour Christ by the preaching of his ministers shall have persuaded the Jews to return, and called the Gentiles to his obedience, then shall there be a new kingdom of heaven, because our King shall then be God, whose throne is heaven, without any necessity evident in the Scripture that man shall

en, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man, that is in heaven" *John 6:33*. Where I observe, by the way, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the

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One to see corruption," saith they were spoken, not of David, but of Christ, and to prove it,

not to ascend till the general day of judgement, yet their souls were in heaven as soon as they were departed from their bodies, which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our

⁴ John, 3. 13.

⁵ Psalm, 16. 10.

⁶ [Acts, 2. 27.]

⁷ *Ibid*, 2. 34.

he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living, for they all live to him¹ But if these words be to be understood only of the immortality of the soul, they prove not at all that which our Saviour intended to prove, which was the resurrection of the body, that is to say, the immortality of the man Therefore our Saviour meaneth that those patriarchs were immortal, not by a property consequent to the essence and nature of mankind, but by the will of God, that was pleased of His mere grace to bestow eternal life upon the faithful And though at that time the patriarchs and many other faithful men were dead, yet as it is in the text, they 'lived to God', that is, they were written in the Book of Life with them that were absolved of their sins, and ordained to life eternal at the resurrection That the soul of man is in its own nature eternal, and a living creature independent on the body, or that any mere man is immortal, other wise than by the resurrection in the last day, except Enos and Elias, is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture The whole fourteenth Chapter of Job, which is the speech not of his friends, but of himself, is a complaint of this mortality of nature, and yet no contradiction of the immortality at the resurrection "There is hope of a tree" on the he "f t h e a d n T l k

tells us that it is at the general resurrection For in his second Epistle, third Chapter, verse 7, he saith that 'the heavens and the earth that are now, are reserved unto fire against the day of judgement and perdition of ungodly men,' and, verse 12, 'looking for and hasting to

heavens, and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness' Therefore where Job saith, "man riseth not till the heavens be no more," it is all one, as if he had said the immortal life (and *soul* and *life* in the Scripture do usually signify the same thing) beginneth not in man

till the resurrection and day of judgement, and hath for cause, not his specifical nature and generation, but the promise For St Peter says not, 'We look for new heavens, and a new earth [from nature];' but 'from promise'

Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of diverse evident places of Scripture, in the thirty fifth Chapter of this book that the kingdom of God is a civil Commonwealth, where God Himself is sovereign, by virtue first of the Old, and since of the New, Covenant, wherein He reigneth by His vicar or lieutenant, the same places do therefore also prove that after

most men a novelty, I do but propound it, maintaining nothing in this or any other paradox of religion, but attending the end of that

or rejected, and whose commands, both in speech and writing, whatsoever be the opinions of private men, must by all men, that mean to be protected by their laws be obeyed For the

under God have the sovereign power

As the kingdom of God and eternal life, so also God's enemies and their torments after judgement, appear by the Scripture to have their

called in Scripture by words that signify *under ground* which the Latins read generally *infer nus* and *inferi* and the Greeks *ᾗδης*, that is to say, a place where men cannot see, and contain eth as well the grave as any other deeper place But for the place of the damned after the resurrection it is not determined neither in the Old nor New Testament by any note of situation but only by the company as that it shall be where such wicked men were, as God in former times in extraordinary and miraculous manner had destroyed from off the face of the earth as, for example, that they are in *Inferno*, in Tar

¹ Luke, 20 37, 38

² Job, 14 7

also compared to the habitation of the damned.

trine concerning demons), and after them the Romans, called *Tartarus*, of which Virgil says,

*Bis patet in praeceptis, tantum tendisque sub umbras,
Quantus ad aethereum caeli suspectus Olympum*

for that is a thing the proportion of earth to heaven cannot bear but that we should believe them there, indefinitely, where those men are, on whom God inflicted that exemplary punishment.

And here again the place of the damned of men), were for their wicked life destroyed by the general deluge, the place of the damned is therefore also sometimes marked out

hold the giants groan under water, and they that dwell with them." Here the place of the

giants for thee and here again the place of the damned, if the sense be literal, is to be under water

Thirdly, because the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, by the extraordinary wrath of God, were consumed for their wickedness with fire

fire, and a fiery lake as in the Apocalypse, 21. 8, "But the ungodly, and unbelievers, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone; which is the second death."

So that it is manifest that hell fire, which is here expressed by metaphor, from the real fire of Sodom, signifieth not any certain kind or place of torment, but is to be taken indefinitely for destruction, as it is in Revelation, 20, at the fourteenth verse, where it is said that "Death and hell were cast into the lake of fire"; that is to say, were abolished and destroyed; as if after the day of judgement there shall be no more dying, nor no more going into hell, that is, no

more going to Hades (from which word perhaps our word *hell* is derived), which is the same with no more dying.

Fourthly, from the plague of darkness inflicted on the Egyptians, of which it is written, "They saw not one another, neither rose any man from his place for three days; but all the children of Israel had light in their dwellings"; the place of the wicked after judgement is called *utter darkness*, or, as it is in the original, *darkness without*. And so it is expressed where the king commandeth his servants, "to bind hand and foot the man that had not on his wedding garment and to cast him into," εἰς τὸ σκοτεινὸν τὸ ἔξωτερον, "external darkness," or "darkness without" which, though translated "utter darkness," does not signify *how great*, but *where* that darkness is to be, namely, with out the habitation of God's elect

Lastly, whereas there was a place near Jerusalem called the *Valley of the Children of Hinnon*, in a part whereof called *Tophet* the Jews

grievous punishments, and wherein Josiah had burnt the priests of Moloch upon their own altars, as appeareth at large in II Kings, Chapter 23, the place served afterwards to receive the filth and garbage which was carried thither out of the city, and there used to be fires made, from time to time, to purify the air and take away the stench of carrion. From this abominable

the fires from time to time there burning, we have the notion of everlasting and unquenchable fire

Seeing now there is none that so interprets the Scripture as that after the day of judgement the wicked are all eternally to be punished in the Valley of Hinnon, or that they shall so rise again as to be ever after underground or under-water, or that after the resurrection they shall no more see one another, nor stir from one place to another, it followeth, methinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning hell fire is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense to be enquired after (for of all metaphors there is some real ground, that may be expressed in proper words), both of the place of hell, and the na-

³ Exodus, 10. 23.

⁴ Matthew, 22. 13.

ture of hellish torments and tormenters

And first for the tormenters, we have their nature and properties exactly and properly de-

11. *Abaddon*, set not forth to us dilly individual

cause thereby they seem to be the proper names of demons, and men are the more easily seduced to believe the doctrine of devils, which at that time was the religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses and of Christ

And because by the *Enemy* the *Accuser*, and *Destroyer* is meant the enemy of them that shall be in the kingdom of God, therefore if the kingdom of God after the resurrection be upon the earth (as in the former chapter I have shown by Scripture it seems to be), the enemy and his kingdom must be on earth also For so also was it in the time before the Jews had deposed God For God's kingdom was in Palestine, and the nations round about were the kingdoms of the Enemy, and consequently by Satan is meant any earthly enemy of the Church

The torments of hell are expressed sometimes by "weeping, and gnashing of teeth," as Matthew, 8. 12, sometimes, by "the worm of conscience," as Isaiah, 66. 24, and Mark, 9. 44, 46, 48, sometimes, by fire, as in the place now quoted, "where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched," and many places besides sometimes, by "shame, and contempt," as, "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth

whereas St Paul, to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith that "the body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption, it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory, it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power", glory and power cannot

ing may be called an *everlasting death* yet it cannot well be understood of a *second death* The fire prepared for the wicked is an everlasting fire that is to say, the estate where in no man can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the resurrection, shall endure for ever, and in that sense the fire shall be unquenchable, and the torments everlasting but it cannot thence be inferred that he who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure and resist them so as to be eternally burnt and tortured, and yet never be destroyed nor die And though there be many places that affirm everlasting fire and torments, into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever, yet I find none that affirm there shall be an eternal life therein of any individual person, but to the contrary, an everlasting death, which is the second death "For after death and the grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in them, and every man be judged according to his works, death and the grave shall also be cast into the lake of fire This is the second death" Whereby it is evident that there is to be a second death of every one that shall be condemned at the day of judgment, after which he shall die no more

The joys of life eternal are in Scripture comprehended all under the name of *salvation*, or *being saved* To be saved is to be secured, either respectively, against special evils, or absolutely, against all evil comprehending want, sickness, and death itself And because man was created in a condition immortal, not subject to corruption, and not subject to death, neither to death

accident to those who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but have also for enemy the eternal king of the saints, God Almighty And amongst these bodily pains is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second death For though the Scripture be clear for a universal resurrection, yet we do not read that to any of the reprobate is promised an eternal life For

¹ Daniel 12. 2

the evil and calamities that sin hath brought upon us And therefore in the Holy Scripture, remission of sin, and salvation from death and misery, is the same thing as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who, having cured a man sick of the palsy, by saying, "Son be of good

² I Corinthians, 15. 42, 43

³ Revelation, 20. 13, 14

torgiven thee, or, Arise and walk ;^a signifying thereby that it was all one, as to the saving of the sick, to say, "Thy sins are forgiven," and "Arise and walk", and that he used that form of speech only to show he had power to forgive sins. And it is besides evident in reason that since death and misery were the punishments of sin, the discharge of sin must also

is called our Saviour

Concerning particular salvations, such as are understood, "as the Lord liveth that saveth Israel,"^b that is, from their temporary enemies, and, "Thou art my Saviour, thou savest me

interest to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind

by men for their perpetual security against enemies and want, it seemeth that this salvation should be on earth. For by salvation is set forth unto us a glorious reign of our king by conquest, not a safety by escape and therefore there where we look for salvation, we must look also for triumph, and before triumph, for victory, and before victory, for battle, which cannot well be supposed shall be in heaven. But how good soever this reason may be, I will not trust to it without very evident places of Scripture. The state of salvation is described at large, Isaiah, 33, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.

broken.

"But there the glorious Lord will be unto us

^a Matthew, 9. 2.

^b Ibid, 9. 5.

^c I Samuel, 14. 39.

^d II Samuel, 22. 3.

^e II Kings, 13. 5.

a place of broad rivers and streams; wherein shall go no galley with oars, neither shall gallant ship pass thereby

the sail then is the prey of a great spoil divided, the lame take the prey

"And the inhabitant shall not say, I am sick; the people that shall dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity"

In which words we have the place from whence salvation is to proceed, "Jerusalem, a quiet habitation", the eternity of it, "a tabernacle that shall not be taken down," etc ; the Saviour of it, "the Lord, their judge, their lawgiver, their king, he will save us"; the salvation, "the Lord shall be to them as a broad moat of swift waters," etc , the condition of their enemies, "their tacklings are loose, their masts weak, the lame shall take the spoil of them"; the condition of the saved, "The inhabitant shall not say, I am sick", and lastly, all this is comprehended in forgiveness of sin, "the people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity". By which it is evident that salvation shall be on earth, then, when God shall reign, at the coming again of Christ, in Jerusalem, and from Jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of the Gentiles that shall be received into God's kingdom: as is also more expressly declared by the same prophet, "And they" (that is, the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) "shall bring all your brethren for an offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord, as the children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the Lord. And I will also take of them for priests and for Levites, saith the Lord".^a whereby it is manifest that the chief seat of God's kingdom, which is the place from whence the salvation of us that were Gentiles shall proceed, shall be Jerusalem: and the same is also confirmed by our Saviour, in his discourse with the woman of Samaria concerning the place of God's worship, to whom he saith that the Samaritans worshipped they knew not what, but the Jews worshipped what they knew, "for salvation is of the Jews"^b (*ex Judæis*, that is, begins at the Jews): as if he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom I will save you,

^a Isaiah, 66. 20, 21.

^b John, 4. 22.

as we do that know it shall be by one of the tribe of Judah, a Jew, not a Samaritan And therefore also the woman not impertinent ly answered him again We know the Messias shall come So that which our Saviour saith

Salvation is from the Jews is the same that Paul says The gospel is the power of God to salvation to every one that believeth to the Jew first, and also to the Greek For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith, ¹ from the faith of the Jew to the faith of the Gentile In the like sense the prophet Joel describing the day of judgement that God would shew wonders in heaven and in earth blood and fire and pillars of smoke The sun should be turned to darkness and the moon into blood before the great and terrible day of the Lord come ² He addeth and it shall come to pass that whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved For in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be salvation ³ And Obadiah verse 17 saith the same Upon Mount Z on shall be deliverance and there shall be holiness and the house of Jacob shall possess their possessions that is the possessions of the heathen which possessions he expresseth more particularly in the following verses by the mount of Esau the land of the Philistines the fields of Ephraim of Samaria Gilead and the cities of the South and concludes with these words the kingdom shall be the Lord s All these places are for salvation and the kingdom of God after the day of judgement upon earth On the other side I have not found any text that can probably be drawn to prove any ascension of the saints into heaven that is to say, into any *calum empyreum* or other ethereal

From thusthat hath been said of the kingdom of God and of salvation is not hard to interpret what is meant by the *world to come* There are three worlds mentioned in the Scripture, the old world the present world and the world to come Of the first St Peter speaks If God spared not the old world but saved Noah the

world ⁴ For He came only to teach men the way of salvation and to renew the kingdom of His Father by His doctrine Of the world to come St Peter speaks, Nevertheless we according to his promise look for new heavens and a new earth ⁵ This is that world wherein Christ coming down from heaven in the clouds with great power and glory shall send His angels and shall gather together his elect, from the four winds and from the uttermost parts of the earth and thenceforth reign over them under his Father everlastingly

Salvation of a sinner supposeth a precedent *redemption* for he that is once guilty of sin is obnoxious to the penalty of the same and must pay or some other for him such ransom as he that is offended and has him in his power shall require And seeing the person offended is Almighty God in whose power are all things such ransom is to be paid before salvation can be acquired as God hath been pleased to require By this ransom is not intended a satisfaction for sin equivalent to the offence which no sinner for himself nor righteous man can ever be able to make for another the damage a man does to another he may make amends for by restitution or recompense but sin cannot be taken

not in that sense satisfy for the sins of men, as

¹ Romans 1 16 17

² Joel 2 30 31

³ 1b d 2 32

⁴ II Peter 2 5

⁵ John 18 36

⁶ II Peter 3 13

subjects of it are men, and a *Church*, for that the subjects thereof are Christians *Temporal* and *spiritual* government are but two words brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their lawful sovereign. It is true that the bodies of the faithful, after the resurrection, shall be not only spiritual, but eternal,

that governor must be *one*, or else there must needs follow faction and civil war in the Commonwealth between the Church and State, between spiritualists and temporalists, between the sword of justice and the shield of faith, and, which is more, in every Christian man's own breast between the Christian and the man. The doctors of the Church are called pastors, so also are civil sovereigns: but if pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there may be one chief pastor, men will be taught contrary doctrines, whereof both may be, and one must be, false. Who that one chief pastor is, according to the law of nature, hath been already

CHAPTER XL

Of the Rights of the Kingdom of God, in Abraham, Moses the High Priests, and the Kings of Judah

THE FATHER of the faithful, and first in the

to him by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law, they were already obliged, and need ed not have been contracted withal, by promise of the land of Canaan. Nor was there any con

God that which in the name of God was com manded him, in a dream or vision, and to de liver it to his family and cause them to observe the same

In this contract of God with Abraham, we may observe three points of important consequence in the government of God's people. First, that at the making of this covenant God spoke only to Abraham, and therefore contract ed not with any of his family or seed otherwise than as their wills (which make the essence of all covenants) were before the contract involved in the will of Abraham, who was therefore supposed to have had a lawful power to make them perform all that he covenanted for them. According whereunto God saith, 'All the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him, for I know him that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord.' From whence may be concluded this first point, that they to whom God hath not spoken immediately are to receive the positive commandments of God from their sovereign, as the family and seed of Abraham did from Abraham their father and lord and civil sovereign. And consequently in every Commonwealth, they who have no supernatural revelation to the contrary ought to obey the laws of their own sovereign in the external acts and profession of religion. As for the inward thought and belief of men, which human governors can take no notice of (for God only knoweth the heart), they are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will and of the power of God, and consequently fall not under obligation.

From whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawful for Abraham, when any of his subjects should pretend private vision or spirit, or other revelation from God, for the countenancing of any doctrine which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed or adhered to any such pretender, to punish them, and consequently that it is lawful now for the sovereign to punish any man that shall oppose his private spirit against the laws: for he hath the same place in the Commonwealth that Abraham had in his own family.

There ariseth also from the same a third point, that as none but Abraham in his family, so none but the sovereign in a Christian Commonwealth, can take notice what is or what is not the word of God. For God spoketh only to Abraham, and it was he only that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family: and therefore also, they that have the place of Abraham in a Commonwealth are the only interpreters of what God hath spoken.

¹ Genesis, 18, 18, 19

The same covenant was renewed with Isaac, and afterwards with Jacob, but afterwards no more till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians and arrived at the foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by Moses (as I have said before, Chapter thirty five), in such manner as they became from that time forward the peculiar kingdom of God, whose lieutenant was Moses for his own time and the succession to that office was settled upon Aaron and his heirs after him to be to God a sacerdotal kingdom forever.

By this constitution, a kingdom is acquired to God. But seeing Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites as a successor to the right of Abraham, because he could not claim it by

pendent yet merely upon the opinion they had of his sanctity, and of the reality of his conferences with God, and the verity of his miracles, which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to take anything for the law of God which he propounded to them in God's name. We are therefore to consider what other ground there was of their obligation to obey him. For it could not be the commandment of God that could oblige them, because God spoke not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses himself: and our Saviour saith of himself, "If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true";¹ much less if Moses bear witness of himself, especially in a claim of kingly power over God's people, ought his testimony to be received. His authority therefore, as the authority of all other princes, must be grounded on the consent of the people and their promise to obey him. And so it was for "the people when they saw the thunders, and the lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet, and the

to them for the commandment of God.

And notwithstanding the covenant constituteth a sacerdotal kingdom, that is to say, a kingdom hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be understood of the succession after Moses should

be dead. For whosoever ordereth and establisheth the policy as first founder of a Commonwealth, be it monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, must needs have sovereign power over the people all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that power all his own time is evidently affirmed in the Scripture. First, in the

unto the Lord, thou and Aaron, Nadab and

who was alone called up to God (and not Aaron, nor the other priests, nor the seventy elders, nor the people who were forbidden to come up), was alone he that represented to the Israelites

Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and there was under His feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone,"² etc., yet this was not till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to the people the words which God had said to him. He only went for the business of the people, the others, as the nobles of his retinue, were admitted for honour to that special grace which was not allowed to the people, which was, as in the verse after appeareth, to see God and live. "God laid not His hand upon them, they saw God, and did eat and drink" (that is, did live), but did not carry any commandment from Him to the people. Again, it is everywhere said, "The Lord spake unto Moses," as in all other occasions of government, so also in the ordering of the ceremonies of religion, contained in the 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st chapters of Exodus, and throughout Leviticus; to Aaron, seldom. The calf that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the question of the authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriam's mutiny against Moses, was judged by God Himself for Moses.³ So also in the question between Moses and the people, who had the right of governing the people, when Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly "gathered themselves together against Moses, and against Aaron, and said unto them, ye take

¹ John, 5. 31.

² Exodus, 20. 18, 19.

³ Ibid., 24. 1, 2.

⁴ Ibid., 24. 9. [10].

⁵ Numbers, 12.

too much upon you, seeing all the congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them, why lift you up yourselves above the congregation of the Lord?"¹ God caused the earth to swallow Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, with their wives and children, alive, and consumed those two hundred and fifty princes with fire. Therefore neither Aaron, nor the people, nor any aristocracy of the chief princes of the people, but Moses alone had next

was that God required at their hands. No man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach the mountain where God talked with Moses. "Thou shalt set bounds," saith the Lord, "to the people round about, and say, Take heed to yourselves that you go not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it, whosoever toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death."² And again, "Go down, charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze."³ Out of which we may conclude that

And according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further than the bounds which are set by their several sovereigns. For the Scriptures, since God now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai, the bounds whereof are the laws of them that represent God's person on earth. To look upon them, and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear Him, is allowed, but to interpret them, that is, to pry into what God saith to him whom He appointeth to govern under Him, and make themselves judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not, is to transgress the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.

There was no prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the spirit of God, but such as Moses had approved and authorized. For there were in his time but seventy men that are said to prophesy by the spirit of God, and these were all of Moses his election, concerning whom God said to Moses, "Gather to me seventy of the elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people."⁴ To these God imparted

His spirit, but it was not a different spirit from that of Moses, for it is said, "God came down in a cloud, and took of the spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the seventy elders."⁵ But as I have shown before, Chapter thirty six, by *spirit* understood the *mind* so that the sense of the place is no other than this, that God endued them with a mind conformable and subordinate to that of Moses, that they might prophesy, that is to say, speak to the people in God's name in such manner as to set forward (as ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as was agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For they were but ministers, and when two of them prophesied in the camp, it was thought a new and unlawful thing, and as it is in the 27th and 28th verses of the same chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his spirit that they prophesied. By which it is manifest that no subject ought to pretend to prophecy, or to the spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by him whom God hath set in the place of Moses.

Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the kingdom, as being a sacerdotal kingdom, descended by virtue of the covenant to Aaron's son, Eleazar the high priest, and God declared him, next under Himself, for sovereign, at the same time that He appointed Joshua for the general of their army. For thus God saith expressly concerning Joshua, "He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel

him."⁶ Therefore the supreme power of making war and peace was in the priest. The supreme power of judicature belonged also to the high priest, for the Book of the Law was in

time of Saul, had the supreme authority. There fore the civil and ecclesiastical power were both joined together in one and the same person, the high priest, and ought to be so, in whosoever governeth by divine right, that is, by authority immediate from God.

After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is noted frequently in

¹ *Ibid* 16 3

² Exodus, 19 12

³ *Ibid* 19 21

⁴ Numbers, 11 26

⁵ *Ibid* 11 25

⁶ *Ibid* 27 21

the Book of Judges, "that there was in those days no king in Israel", and sometimes with this addition, that "every man did that which was right in his own eyes." By which is to be understood that where it is said, "there was no king" is meant, "there was no sovereign power," in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the act and exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua and Eleazar, "there arose another generation that knew not the Lord, nor the works which He had done for Israel, but did evil in the sight of the Lord, and served Baalim." And the Jews had that quality which St Paul noteth, "to look for a sign," not only before they would submit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission. Where as signs and miracles had for end to procure faith, not to keep men from violating it when they have once given it, for to that men are obliged by the law of nature. But if we consider not the exercise, but the right of governing, the sovereign power was still in the high priest. Therefore whatsoever obedience was yielded to any of the judges (who were men chosen by God extraordinarily to save His rebellious subjects out of the hands of the enemy), it cannot be drawn into argument against the right the high priest had to the sovereign power in all matters both of policy and religion. And neither the judges nor Samuel himself had an ordinary, but extraordinary calling to the government, and were obeyed by the Israelites not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour with God appearing in their wisdom, courage, or felicity. Hitherto therefore the right of regulating both the policy and the religion were inseparable.

king. For the sovereignty over the people, which was, before, not only by virtue of the divine power, but also by a particular pact of the Israelites in God, and next under Him, in the high priest, as His vicegerent on earth, was cast off by the people, with the consent of God Himself. For when they said to Samuel, "make us

and consequently in deposing the high priest of royal authority, they deposed that peculiar

thee, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them." Having therefore rejected God, in whose right the priests governed, there was no authority left to the priests but such as the king was pleased to allow them, which was more or less, according as the kings were good or evil. And for the government of civil affairs, it is manifest, it was all in the hands of the king. For in the same chapter they say they will be like all the nations, that their king shall be their

also the ordering of religion for there was no other word of God in that time by which to regulate religion but the Law of Moses, which was their civil law. Besides, we read that Solomon "thrust out Abiathar from being priest before the Lord." he had therefore authority over the high priest, as over any other subject, which is a great mark of supremacy in religion. And we read also that he dedicated the Temple, that he blessed the people, and that he himself in person made that excellent prayer, used in the consecrations of all churches and houses of prayer, which is another great mark of supremacy in religion. Again, we read that when there was question concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple, the same was not decided by the high priest, but Josiah sent both him and others to enquire concerning it, of Huldah, the prophetess, which is another mark of the supremacy in religion. Lastly, we read that David made Ishabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, officers of Israel among them westward, "in all business of the Lord, and in the service of the king." Likewise, that he made other Hebronites "rulers over the Reubenites the Gadites, and the half tribe of Manasseh" (these were the rest of Israel that dwelt beyond Jordan) "for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the king." Is not this full power, both temporal and spiritual, as they call it

* Ibid. 8. 7

* Ibid. 8. 20

* I Kings, 2. 27

* Ibid. 8

* II Kings, 22

* I Chronicles, 26. 30.

* Ibid., 26. 32.

* Judges, 2. 10, [11].

* I Samuel, 8. 5.

that would divide it? To conclude from the

(for God was their King already, and Samuel had but an authority under Him), yet did Samuel, when Saul observed not his counsel in destroying Agag as God had commanded, anoint another king, namely, David, to take the succession from his heirs Rehoboam was no idolater, but when the people thought him an

as concerned the right, yet it appeareth by the same holy history that the people understood it not, but there being amongst them a great part and probably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles, or, which is equivalent to a miracle, great abilities, or great felicity in the enterprises of their governors, gave sufficient credit either to the fame of Moses or to the colloquies between God and the

that always controlled the kings for transgressing the religion, and sometimes also for errors of state, as Jehoshaphat was reproved by the prophet Jehu for aiding the King of Israel against the Syrians, and Hezekiah, by Isaiah, for showing his treasures to the ambassadors of

the government or revolt from their obedience to their pleasure, and from thence proceeded from time to time the civil troubles, divisions, and calamities of the nation. As for example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the next generation, which had not seen the wonders of God, but were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by the covenant of a sacerdotal kingdom, regarded no more the commandment of the priest, nor any law of Moses, but did every man that which was right in his own eyes, and obeyed in civil affairs such men as from time to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour nations that oppressed them, and consulted not with God, as they ought to do, but with such men, or women, as they guessed to be prophets by their predictions of things to come, and though they had an idol in their chapel, yet if they had a Levite for their chaplain they made account they worshipped the God of Israel.

And afterwards when they demanded a king, after the manner of the nations, yet it was not

in the use of it but such as were gracious for their own natural abilities or felicities. So that from the practice of those times, there can no argument be drawn that the right of supremacy in religion was not in the kings, unless we place it in the prophets, and conclude that because Hezekiah, praying to the Lord before the cherubim, was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the prophet Isaiah, therefore Isaiah was supreme head of the Church, or because Josiah consulted Huldah the prophetess, concerning the Book of the Law, that therefore neither he, nor the high priest, but Huldah the prophetess had the supreme authority in matter of religion, which I think is not the opinion of any doctor.

During the Captivity the Jews had no Commonwealth at all, and after their return, though they renewed their covenant with God, yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras nor to any other and presently after they became subjects to the Greeks, from whose customs and demonology, and from the doctrine of the Cabalists, their religion became much corrupted in such sort as nothing can be gathered from their confusion, both in state and religion, concerning the supremacy in either. And therefore so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament, we may conclude that whosoever had the sovereignty of the Commonwealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the supreme authority in matter of God's external worship, and represented God's person, that is, the person of God the Father, though He were

which they thought was recommended to them by Moses. So that they always kept in store a pretext, either of justice or religion, to discharge themselves of their obedience whensoever they had hope to prevail. Samuel was displeased with the people, for that they desired a king

² II Chronicles, 19. 2

³ [Isaiah, 39. 3. 7]

not called by the name of Father till such time as He sent into the world His Son Jesus Christ to redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his everlasting kingdom to be saved for evermore Of which we are to speak in the chapter following.

CHAPTER XLI

Of the Office of our Blessed Saviour

WE FIND in Holy Scripture three parts of the office of the Messiah the first of a redeemer, or saviour, the second of a pastor, counsellor, or teacher, that is, of a prophet sent from God to

in their several times And to these three parts are correspondent three times For, our redemption he wrought at his first coming, by the sacrifice wherein he offered up himself for our sins upon the cross, our conversion he wrought partly then in his own person, and partly worketh now by his ministers, and will continue to work till his coming again And after his coming again shall begin that his glorious reign over his elect which is to last eternally

To the office of a redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the ransom of sin, which ransom is death, it appertaineth that he was sacrificed, and thereby bore upon his own head and carried away from us our iniquities, in such sort as God had required Not that the death of one man, though without sin, can satisfy for the offences of all men, in the rigour of justice, but in the mercy of God, that ordained such sacrifices for sin as He was pleased in His mercy to accept In the old law (as we may read, *Leviticus*, 16) the Lord required that there should, every year once, be made an atonement for the

the rest of the people he was to receive from them two young goats, of which he was to sacrifice one, but as for the other, which was the scapegoat, he was to lay his hands on the head thereof, and by a confession of the iniquities of the people, to lay them all on that head,

for the ransom of all Israel, so the death of the Messiah is a sufficient price for the sins of all

mankind, because there was no more required Our Saviour Christ's sufferings seem to be here

lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumb before the shearer, so opened he not his mouth" here he is the sacrificed goat "He hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows"; and again, "the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us all" and so he is the scapegoat "He was cut off from the land of the living for the transgression of my people". there again he is the sacrificed goat And again, "he shall bear their sins" he is the scapegoat Thus is the Lamb of God equivalent to both those goats, sacrificed, in that he died, and escaping, in his resurrection, being raised opportunely by his Father, and removed from the habitation of men in his ascension

For as much therefore as he that redeemeth hath no title to the thing redeemed, before the redemption and ransom paid, and this ransom was the death of the redeemer, it is manifest that our Saviour, as man, was not king of those that he redeemed, before he suffered death, that is, during that time he conversed bodily on the earth I say he was not then king in present, by virtue of the pact which the faithful make with him in baptism nevertheless, by the re-

take the kingdom upon him According whereunto, our Saviour himself expressly saith, "My kingdom is not of this world" Now seeing the Scripture maketh mention but of two worlds, this that is now, and shall remain to the day of judgement, which is therefore also called the

^a *Ibid.*, 53. 7

^b *Ibid.*, 53. 4.

^c *Ibid.*, 53. 6.

^d *Ibid.*, 53. 8

^e *Ibid.*, 53. 11.

^f *John*, 18. 36

^g *Matth* ev., 16. 27.

Moses' seat, all therefore whatsoever they bid you do, that observe and do',¹ he declareth plainly that he ascribeth kingly power, for that time, not to himself, but to them. And so he doth also, where he saith, 'Who made me a judge or divider over you?'² And, 'I came not to judge the world, but to save the world'.³ And yet our Saviour came into this world that he might be a king and a judge in the world to come for he was the Messiah, that is, the Christ, that is, the anointed priest and the sovereign prophet of God, that is to say, he was to have all the power that was in Moses the prophet, in the

magistrates that then were, for he commanded to obey those that sat then in Moses' chair, and to pay tribute to Cæsar, but only an earnest of the kingdom of God that was to come to those to whom God had given the grace to be his disciples and to believe in him, for which cause the godly are said to be already in the kingdom of grace, as naturalized in that heavenly kingdom.

Hitherto therefore there is nothing done or taught by Christ that tendeth to the diminution of the civil right of the Jews or of Cæsar. For as touching the Commonwealth which then

world to come, as also where it is said that at the second coming of Christ, "Ye that have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel".

If then Christ, whilst he was on earth, had no kingdom in this world, to what end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a

Which to do, he was to preach unto them that he was the Messiah, that is, the king promised to them by the prophets, and to offer himself in sacrifice for the sins of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto, and in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedient ones.

and another by teaching, and by working of miracles to persuade and prepare men to live so as to be worthy of the immortality believers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come in majesty to take possession of his Father's

had forbidden him, when he came, to manifest and declare himself. Seeing therefore he did nothing but by preaching and miracles go about to prove himself to be that Messiah he did therein nothing against their laws. The kingdom he claimed was to be in another world he taught all men to obey in the meantime them that sat in Moses' seat he allowed them to give Cæsar his tribute, and refused to take upon himself to be a judge. How then could his words or actions be seditious or tend to the overthrow of their then civil government? But God having determined his sacrifice for the redemption of His elect to their former

¹ *Ibid* 23 2, [3]

² Luke, 12 14

³ John, 12 47

⁴ *Ibid* 5 22

⁵ Matthew, 19 28

therefore it is that our Saviour saith that his

shall come in the glory of his Father with his

you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed to me, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." By which it is manifest

judges of the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here ask, seeing there is no marriage in the kingdom of heaven, whether men shall then eat and drink. What eating therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded by our Saviour where he saith, "Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which en-

life, that is to say, the enjoying of immortality, in the kingdom of the Son of Man. By which places, and many more, it is evident that our Saviour's kingdom is to be exercised by him in his human nature.

Again, he is to be king then no otherwise than as subordinate or vicergerent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wilderness, and as

with Moses is also apparent in the actions of our Saviour himself, whilst he was conversant on earth. For as Moses chose twelve princes of the tribes to govern under him; so did our Saviour choose twelve Apostles, who shall sit

to speak unto them in the name of God, so our Saviour also ordained seventy disciples to preach his kingdom and salvation to all nations. And as when a complaint was made to Moses against those of the seventy that prophesied in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it as being subservient therein to his government; so also our Saviour, when St. John complained to him of a certain man that cast out devils in his name, justified him therein, saying, "Forbid him not, for he that is not against us is on our part."^a

Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of sacraments, both of admission into the kingdom of God and of commemoration of his deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition. As the children of Israel had for sacrament of their reception into the kingdom of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of

the Jews, before the coming of our Saviour, had a rite of baptizing, that is, of washing with water all those that, being Gentiles, embraced the God of Israel. This rite St. John the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their names to the Christ, whom he preached to he already come into the world, and our Saviour instituted the same for a sacrament to be taken by all that believed in him. For what cause the rite of baptism first proceeded is not expressed formally in the Scripture, but it may be probably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses concerning leprosy, wherein the leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the camp of Israel for a certain time, after which time being judged by the priest to be clean, he was admitted into the camp after a solemn washing. And this may therefore be a type of the washing in baptism, wherein such men as are cleansed of the leprosy of sin by faith are received into the Church with the solemnity of baptism. There is another conjecture drawn from the ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case that rarely happens: and that is, when a man that was thought dead chanced to recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they would do to converse with a ghost, unless he were received again into the number of men by washing, as children new born were washed from the uncleanness of their nativity, which was a kind of new birth. This ceremony of the Greeks, in the time that Judæa was under the dominion of Alexander and the Greeks his suc-

^a Loc cit

^b Ibid, 16. 27

^c John, 6. 27

^d Deuteronomy, 18.

^e Luke, 9. 50

cessors, may probably enough have crept into the religion of the Jews But seeing it is not likely our Saviour would countenance a heathen

Lord's Supper; in which the breaking of the bread and the pouring out of the wine do keep in memory our deliverance from the misery of sin by Christ's Passion, as the eating of the Paschal Lamb kept in memory the deliverance of the Jews out of the bondage of Egypt See an

nate to the authority of his Father The same is

"He shall come in the name of the Father"

other manifestations of

represented by His Son the Christ For person being a relative to a *representer*, it is consequent to plurality of representers that there be a plurality of persons, though of one and the same substance

CHAPTER XLII

Of Power Ecclesiastical

For the understanding of power ecclesiastical, what and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the ascension of our Saviour into two parts one before and

tianity, and to direct them that were converted in the way of salvation, and after these the power was delivered again to others by these ordained, and this was done by imposition of hands upon such as were ordained, by which was signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those whom they ordained ministers of God, to advance His kingdom So that imposition of hands was nothing else but the seal of their commission to preach Christ and teach his doctrine, and the giving of the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of imposition of hands was an imitation of that which Moses did For Moses used the same ceremony to his minister Joshua, as we read, Deuteronomy, 34 9, "And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom, for Moses had laid his hands upon him" Our Saviour therefore between his resurrection and ascension gave his spirit to the Apostles, first, by breathing on them, and saying, "Receive ye the Holy Spirit", and after his ascension by sending down upon them a "mighty wind, and cloven tongues of fire", and not by imposition of hands, as neither did God lay His hands on Moses and his Apostles afterward transmitted the same spirit by imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua So that it is manifest hereby in whom the power ecclesiastical continually remained in those first times where there was not any Christian Commonwealth, namely, in them that received the same from the Apostles, by successive laying on of hands

Here we have the person of God born now the third time For as Moses and the high priests were God's representative in the Old Testament, and our Saviour himself, as man, during his abode on earth so the Holy Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles and their successors, in the office of preaching and teaching, that had received the Holy Spirit, have represented him ever since But a person (as I have shown before, Chapter thirteen) is he that is represented, as often as he is represented, and therefore God,

indeed saith, "There be three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one". but this disagreeeth not, but accordeth fitly with three persons in the proper signification of persons;

² John, 30 22
³ Acts, 2 2, 3
⁴ I John, 5 7

the power ecclesiastical was in the Apostles, and after them in such as were by them ordained to preach the gospel, and to convert men to Christ
¹ I Corinthians, 15 24

therefore it is that our Saviour saith that his

shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works." The same we may read, Mark, 13 26, and 14 62, and more expressly for the time, Luke, 22 29, 30, "I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed to me, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." By which it is manifest that the kingdom of Christ appointed to him by his Father is not to be before the Son of Man shall come in glory, and make his Apostles judges of the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man

your where he saith, "Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of Man shall give you." So that by eating at Christ's table is meant the eating of the tree of life, that is to say, the enjoying of immortality, in the kingdom of the Son of Man. By which places and many more, it is evident that our Saviour's kingdom is to be exercised by him in his human nature.

Again, he is to be king then no otherwise than as subordinate or vicegerent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wilderness, and as

up a prophet," saith the Lord, "from amongst their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words into his mouth",* and this similitude with Moses is also apparent in the actions of our Saviour himself, whilst he was conversant on earth. For as Moses chose twelve princes of the tribes to govern under him, so did our Saviour choose twelve Apostles, who shall sit

to speak unto them in the name of God, so our Saviour also ordained seventy disciples to preach his kingdom and salvation to all nations. And as when a complaint was made to Moses against those of the seventy that prophesied in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it as being subservient therein to his government, so also our Saviour, when St. John complained to him of a certain man that cast out devils in his name, justified him therein, saying, "Forbid him not, for he that is not against us is on our part."

Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of sacraments, both of admission into the kingdom of God and of commemoration of his deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition. As the children of Israel had for sacrament of their reception into the kingdom of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of circumcision, which rite, having been omitted in the wilderness, was again restored as soon as they came into the Land of Promise, so also

used in the reception of all them that gave their names to the Christ, whom he preached to be already come into the world, and our Saviour instituted the same for a sacrament to be taken by all that believed in him. For what cause the rite of baptism first proceeded is not expressed formally in the Scripture, but it may be probably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses concerning leprosy, wherein the leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the camp of Israel for a certain time, after which time being judged by the priest to be clean, he was admitted into the camp after a solemn washing. And this may therefore be a type of the washing in baptism, wherein such men as are cleansed of the leprosy of sin by faith are received into the Church with the solemnity of baptism. There is another conjecture drawn from the ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case that rarely happens and that is, when a man that was thought dead chanced to recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they would do to converse with a ghost, unless he were received again into the number of men by washing, as children new born were washed from the uncleanness of their nativity, which was a kind of new birth. This ceremony of the Greeks, in the time that Judaea was under the dominion of Alexander and the Greeks his suc-

* *Loc cit*

* *If d*, 16. 27

* *John*, 6 27

* *Deuteronomy*, 18. 18.

* *Luke*, 9. 50

cessors, may probably enough have crept into the religion of the Jew's. But seeing it is not likely our Saviour would countenance a heathen rite, it is most likely it proceeded from the legal ceremony of washing after leprosy. And for the other sacrament, of eating the Paschal Lamb, it is manifestly imitated in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; in which the breaking of the bread and the pouring out of the wine do keep in memory our deliverance from the misery of sin by Christ's Passion, as the eating of the Paschal Lamb kept in memory the deliverance of the Jew's out of the bondage of Egypt. Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and he but a lieutenant to God, it followeth that Christ, whose authority, as man, was to be like that of Moses, was no more but subordinate to the authority of his Father. The same is more expressly signified by that that he teacheth us to pray, "Our Father, let thy kingdom come", and, "For thine is the kingdom, the power, and the glory"; and by that it is said that "He shall come in the glory of his Father", and by that which St. Paul saith, "then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father",¹ and by many other most express places.

Our Saviour therefore, both in teaching and reigning, representeth, as Moses did, the person of God, which God from that time forward, but not before, is called the *Father*, and, being still one and the same substance, is one person as represented by Moses, and another person as represented by His Son the Christ. For person being a relative to a *representer*, it is consequent to plurality of representers that there be a plurality of persons, though of one and the same substance.

CHAPTER XLII

Of Power Ecclesiastical

For the understanding of power ecclesiastical, what and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the ascension of our Saviour into two parts, one before the conversion of kings and men endued with sovereign civil power, the other after their conversion. For it was long after the ascension before any king or civil sovereign embraced and publicly allowed the teaching of Christian religion.

And for the time between, it is manifest that the power ecclesiastical was in the Apostles, and after them in such as were by them ordained to preach the gospel, and to convert men to Chris-

tianity, and to direct them that were converted in the way of salvation, and after these the power was delivered again to others by these ordained, and thus was done by imposition of hands upon such as were ordained, by which was signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those whom they ordained ministers of God, to advance His kingdom. So that imposition of hands was nothing else but the seal of their commission to preach Christ and teach his doctrine, and the giving of the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of imposition of hands was an imitation of that which Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his minister Joshua, as we read, Deuteronomy, 34. 9. "And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom, for Moses had laid his hands upon him." Our Saviour therefore between his resurrection and ascension gave his spirit to the Apostles first, by breathing on them, and saying, "Receive ye the Holy Spirit," and after his ascension by sending down upon them a "mighty wind and cloven tongues of fire,"² and not by imposition of hands: as neither did God lay His hands on Moses and his Apostles afterwards transmitted the same spirit by imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So that it is manifest hereby in whom the power ecclesiastical continually remained in those first times where there was not any Christian Commonwealth, namely, in them that received the same from the Apostles, by successive laying

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ment, and our Saviour himself, as shewing his abode on earth: so the Holy Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles and their successors, in the office of preaching and teaching, that had received the Holy Spirit, have represented him ever since. But a person (as I have shown before, Chapter thirteen) is he that is represented, as often as he is represented, and therefore God, who has been represented (that is personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three persons, though neither the word *Person* nor *Trinity* be ascribed to him in the Bible. St. John indeed saith, "There be three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one"³ but this disagreeeth not, but accordeth fully with three persons in the proper signification of persons,

¹ John, 20. 22.

² Acts, 2. 3.

³ 1 John, 5. 7.

¹ 1 Corinthians, 15. 24.

which is that which is represented by another For so God the Father, as represented by Moses, is one person, and as represented by His Son, another person, and as represented by the Apostles, and by the doctors that taught by authority from them derived, is a third person, and yet every person here is the person of one and the same God But a man may here ask what it was whereof these three bore witness St John therefore tells us that they bear witness that 'God hath given us eternal life in His Son' Again, if it should be asked wherein that testimony appeareth, the answer is easy, for He hath testified the same by the miracles He wrought, first by Moses secondly by His Son himself and lastly by His Apostles that had received the Holy Spirit all which in their times represented the person of God, and either prophesied or preached Jesus Christ And as for the Apostles, it was the character of the apostleship, in the twelve first and great Apostles to bear witness of his resurrection, as appeareth expressly where St Peter, when a new Apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas Iscariot, useth these words, Of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us beginning at the baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken up from us must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection which words interpret the bearing of witness mentioned by St John There is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of witnesses in earth For he saith, 'there are three that bear witness in earth the Spirit, and the water, and the blood, and these three agree in one' that is to say, the graces of God's Spirit, and the two sacraments, baptism and the Lord's Supper, which all agree in one testimony to assure the consciences of believers of eternal life, of which testimony he saith, "He that believeth on the Son of Man hath the witness in himself" In this Trinity on earth, the unity is not of the thing, for the spirit, the water, and the blood are not the same substance, though they give the same testimony but in the Trinity of heav-

trine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this that God, who is always one and the same, was

the person represented by Moses, the person represented by his Son incarnate, and the person represented by the Apostles As represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they spoke is God, is represented by His Son, that was God and man, the Son is that God, as represented by Moses and the high priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God from whence we may gather the reason why those names *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Spirit*, in the signification of the godhead, are never used in the Old Testament for they are persons that is, they have their names from representing, which could not be till diverse men had represented God's person in ruling or in directing under Him

Thus we see how the power ecclesiastical was left by our Saviour to the Apostles, and how they were (to the end they might the better exercise that power) endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called sometimes in the New Testament *paracletus*, which signifieth an *assister* or one called to for help, though it be commonly translated a *comforter* Let us now consider the power itself, what it was, and over whom

Cardinal Bellarmine, in his third general controversy, hath handled a great many questions concerning the ecclesiastical power of the Pope of Rome, and begins with this, whether it ought to be monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical

and to persuade men to submit themselves thereunto, and, by precepts and good counsel, to teach them that have submitted what they are to do, that they may be received into the kingdom of God when it comes and that the Apostles, and other ministers of the Gospel, are our schoolmasters, and not our commanders, and their precepts not laws, but wholesome counsels, then were all that dispute in vain

I have shown already, in the last chapter,

this word, by what authority can one line be required to his officers? "As my Father sent me," so saith our Saviour, "I send you" But our Saviour was sent to persuade the Jews to return to, and to invite the Gentiles to receive, the kingdom of his Father, and not to reign in maj-

* John 20 21

* *Ibid.* 5. 11

* *Acts* 1 21, 22.

* *Ibid* 1 8.

* *Ibid* 1 10.

esty, not as his Father's lieutenant till the day of judgement

The time between the ascension and the general resurrection is called, not a reigning, but a *regeneration*, that is, a preparation of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ at the day of judgement, as appeareth by the words of our Saviour, 'You that have followed me in

your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace', * and is compared by our Saviour to fish no that e to x no no mag t e c ad an o.

ers of men, but fishers of men It is compared also to leaven, to sowing of seed, and to the multiplication of a grain of mustard seed, by all which compulsion is excluded, and consequently there can be that mak

his first coming

ment, but only upon certainty, or probability of arguments des t e f am no " e f - , - a

other the then preachers of the Gospel, saith in express words, "We have no dominion over your faith, but are helpers of your joy"

Another argument, that the ministers of Christ in this present world have no right of commanding, may be drawn from the lawful authority which Christ hath left to all princes, as well Christians as infidels St Paul saith, 'Children, obey your parents in all things, for this is well pleasing to the Lord' * And, Serv-

ants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eye service, as men pleasers, but in singleness of heart, as fearing the Lord' * this is spoken to them whose masters were infidels, and yet they are bidden to obey them in *all things* And again, concerning obedience to princes, exhorting "to be subject to the higher powers," he saith, "that all power is ordained of God", and "that we ought to be subject to them, not only for" fear of incurring their "wrath, but also for conscience sake" * And St Peter, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well, for so is the will of God" * And again St Paul, "Put men in mind to be subject to principalities, and powers, and to obey magistrates" * These princes and powers whereof St Peter and St Paul here speak were all infidels much more therefore we are to obey those Christians whom God hath ordained to have sovereign power over us How then can we be obliged to obey any minister of Christ if he should command us to do anything contrary to the command of the king or other sovereign representant of the Commonwealth whereof we are members, and by whom we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest that Christ hath not left to his ministers in this world, unless they be also endued with civil authority, any authority to command other men

But what, may some object, if a king, or a senate, or other sovereign person forbid us to be lieve in Christ? To this I answer that such forbidding is of no effect, because belief and unbelief never follow men's commands Faith is a gift of God which man can neither give nor take away by promise of rewards or menaces of torture And, if it be further asked, what if we be commanded by our lawful prince to say with our tongue we believe not, must we obey such command? Profession with the tongue is

which the prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian Naaman was converted in his heart to the God of Israel, for he saith, 'Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering nor

* Matthew, 19 28

* Ephesians, 6 15

* II Corinthians, 1 24

* Colossians, 3 20

* Ibid, 3 22

* Romans, 13 1-6

* I Peter, 2 13, 14, 15

* Titus, 3 1

sacrifice unto other gods, but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy servant, that when my master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow myself in the house of Rimmon, when I bow myself in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing." This the Prophet approved, and bid him "Go in peace." Here Naaman believed in his heart, but by bowing before the idol Rimmon, he denied the true God in effect as much as if he had done it with his lips. But then what shall we answer to our Saviour's saying, "Whosoever denieth me before men, I will deny him before my Father which is in heaven?"¹ This we may say, that whatsoever a subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to in obedience to his sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his, but his sovereign's: nor is it he that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his governor, and the law of his country. If any man shall accuse this doctrine as repugnant to true and unfeigned Christianity, I ask him, in case there should be a subject in any Christian Commonwealth that should be inwardly in his heart of the Mahomedan religion, whether if his sovereign command him to be present at the divine service of the Christian church, and that on pain of death, he think that Mahomedan obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than to obey that command of his lawful prince. If he say he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth all private men to disobey their princes in maintenance of their religion, true or false: if he say he ought to be obedient, then he alloweth to himself that which he denieth to another, contrary to the words of our Saviour, "Whatsoever you would that men should do unto you, that do ye unto them,"² and contrary to the law of nature (which is the indubitable everlasting law of God), "Do not to another that which thou wouldest not he should do unto thee."

But what then shall we say of all those martyrs we read of in the history of the Church, that they have needlessly cast away their lives? For answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the per-

son, if they have been put to death for bearing witness to this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true martyrs; for a martyr is, to give the true definition of the word, a witness of the resurrection of Jesus the Messiah, which none can be but those that conversed with him on earth, and saw him after he was risen: for a witness must have seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not good. And that none but such can properly be called martyrs of Christ is manifest out of the words of St. Peter, "Wherefore of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the baptism of John unto that same day he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a martyr" (that is, a witness) "with us of his resurrection" "where we may observe that he which is to be a witness of the truth of the resurrection of Christ, that is to say, of the truth of this fundamental article of Christian religion, that Jesus was the Christ, must be some Disciple that conversed with him, and saw him before and after his resurrection, and consequently must be one of his original Disciples: whereas they which were not so can witness no more, but that their antecessors said it, and are therefore but witnesses of other men's testimony, and are but second martyrs, or martyrs of Christ's witnesses.

He that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the history of our Saviour's life, and of the Acts or Epistles of the Apostles, or which he believeth, upon the authority of a private man, will oppose the laws

is this, that Jesus is the Christ, that is to say, he that hath redeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation, and eternal life in his glorious kingdom. To die for every tenet that serveth the ambition or profit of the clergy is not required, nor is it the death of the witness, but the testimony itself that makes the martyr: for the word signifieth nothing else but the man that beareth witness, whether he be put to death for his testimony, or not.

Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamental article, but taketh it upon him of his private authority, though he be a witness, and consequently a martyr, either primary of Christ, or secondary of his Apostles, Disciples, or their successors; yet is he not obliged to suffer death

¹ II Kings, 5: 17, 18.

² Matthew, 10: 33.

³ Luke, 6: 31.

⁴ Acts, 1: 21, 22.

for that cause, because being not called thereto, it is not required at his hands; nor ought he to complain if he loseth the reward he expecteth from those that never set him on work. None therefore can be a martyr, neither of the first nor second degree, that have not a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh, that is to say, none but such as are sent to the conversion of infidels. For no man is a witness to him that already believeth, and therefore needs no witness, but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it, Christ sent his Apostles and his seventy Disciples with authority to preach; he sent not all that believed. And he sent them to unbelievers, "I send you," saith he, "as sheep amongst wolves"; not as sheep to other sheep.

Lastly, the points of their commission, as they are expressly set down in the gospel, contain none of them any authority over the congregation.

We have first that the twelve Apostles were sent "to the lost sheep of the house of Israel," and commanded to preach "that the kingdom of God was at hand." Now preaching, in the original, is that act which a crier, herald, or other officer useth to do publicly in proclaiming of a king. But a crier hath not right to command any man. And the seventy Disciples are sent out as "Labourers, not as lords of the harvest," and are bidden to say, "The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you"; and by *kingdom* here is meant, not the kingdom of grace, but the kingdom of glory, for they are bidden to denounce it to those cities which shall not receive them, as a threatening, that \equiv shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodom than for such a city. And our Saviour telleth his Disciples, that sought priority of place, their office was to minister, even as the Son of Man came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister.* Preachers therefore have not magisterial, but ministerial power. "Be not called masters," saith our Saviour, "for one is your master, even Christ."

Another point of their commission is to "teach all nations", as it is in Matthew, 28. 19, or as in St. Mark, 16. 15, "Go into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." Teaching, therefore, and preaching is the same thing. For they that proclaim the coming of a king must

withal make known by what right he cometh, if they mean men shall submit themselves unto him. As St. Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica, when "three Sabbath days he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus is Christ." But to teach out of the Old Testament that Jesus was Christ, that is to say, king, and risen from the dead, is not to say that men are bound, after they believe it, to obey those that tell them so, against the laws and commands of their sovereigns, but that they shall do wisely to expect the coming of Christ hereafter, in patience and faith, with obedience to their present magistrates.

Another point of their commission is to "baptize, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." What is baptism? Dipping into water. But what is it to dip a man in to the water in the name of anything? The meaning of these words of baptism \equiv this. He that is baptized is dipped or washed as a sign of becoming a new man and a loyal subject to that God whose person was represented in old time by Moses, and the high priests, when He reigned over the Jews, and to Jesus Christ, His Son, God and Man, that hath redeemed us, and shall in his human nature represent his Father's person in his eternal kingdom after the resurrection, and to acknowledge the doctrine of the Apostles, who, assisted by the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, were left for guides to bring us into that kingdom, to be the only and assured way thereunto. This being our promise in baptism, and the authority of earthly sovereigns being not to be put down till the day of judgement, for that is expressly affirmed by St. Paul, where he saith, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive. But every man in his own order, Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christ's at his coming, then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power." It is manifest that we do not in baptism constitute over us another authority by which our external actions are to be governed in this life, but promise to take the doctrine of the Apostles for our direction in the way to life eternal.

The power of remission and retention of sins, called also the power of loosing and binding, and sometimes the keys of the kingdom of heav-

* Acts, 17. 2, 3.

* I Corinthians, 15. 22, 23, 24.

* Matthew, 10. 16

* Ibid., 10. 6, 7

* Luke, 10. 2.

* Ibid., 10. 11

* Ibid. 10. 11, [12]

* Matthew, 20. 28

* Ibid., 23. 10.

en, is a consequence of the authority to baptize or refuse to baptize. For baptism is the sacrament of allegiance of them that are to be re-

ting, so is recovered by the remitting of men's sins. The end of baptism is remission of sins; and therefore St. Peter, when they that were converted by his sermon on the day of Pentecost asked what they were to do, advised them to "repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus, for the remission of sins." And therefore, seeing is baptize is to declare the reception of men into God's kingdom, and to refuse to baptize is to declare their exclusion, it followeth that the power to declare them cast out, or retained in it, was given to the same Apostles, and their substitutes and successors. And therefore after our Saviour had breathed upon them, saying, "Receive the Holy Ghost," he addeth in the next verse, "Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained." By which words is not granted an authority to forgive or retain sins, simply and absolutely, as God for giveth or retaineth them, Who knoweth the heart of man and truth of his penitence and conversion, but conditionally, to the penitent and

but, on the contrary, to the aggravation of his sin. Therefore the Apostles and their successors are to follow but the outward marks of repentance, which appearing, they have no authority to deny absolution, and if they appear not, they have no authority to absolve. The same also is to be observed in baptism: for in a converted Jew or Gentile, the Apostles had not the power to deny baptism, nor to grant it to the unpenitent. But seeing no man is able to discern the truth of another man's repentance, further than by external marks taken from his words and actions, which are subject to hypocrisy, another question will arise: who is it that is constituted judge of those marks? And this question is decided by our Saviour himself. "If thy brother," saith he, "shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone, if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more. And if he shall neglect to hear

them, tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." By which it is manifest that the judgement concerning the truth of repentance belonged not to any one man, but to the Church, that is, to the assembly of the faithful, or to them that have authority to be their representant. But besides the judgement, there is necessary also the pronouncing of sentence, and this belonged always to the Apostle, or some pastor of the Church, as prolocutor, and of this our Saviour speaketh [Matthew, 18] in the eighteenth verse, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." And conformable hereunto was the practice of St. Paul where he saith, "For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such a one to Satan"; that is to say, to cast him out of the Church, as a man whose sins are not forgiven. Paul here pronounceth the sentence, but the assembly was first to hear the cause (for St. Paul was absent), and by consequence to condemn him. But in the same chapter the judgement in such a case is more expressly attributed to the assembly. "But now I have written unto you not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator," etc., "with such a one no not to eat. For what have I to do to judge them that are without? Do not ye judge them that are within?" The sentence therefore by which a man was put out of the Church was pronounced by the Apostle or pastor, but the judgement concerning the merit of the cause was in the Church, that is to say, as the times were before the conversion of kings, and men that had sovereign authority in the Commonwealth, the assembly of the Christians dwelling in the same city, as in Corinth, in the assembly of the Christians of Corinth.

This part of the power of the keys by which men were thrust out from the kingdom of God is that which is called *excommunication*, and to excommunicate is, in the original, *ἐκκλήσας* *ἐκ τοῦ οὐνοῦ*, to cast out of the synagogue; that is, out of the place of divine service; a word drawn from the custom of the Jews, to cast out of their synagogues such as they thought in man-

¹ Acts, 2. 35

² John, 20. 22.

³ Matthew, 18. 15, 16, 17.

⁴ 1 Corinthians, 5. 3, 4, 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 5. 11, 12.

ners or doctrine contagious, as lepers were by the law of Moses separated from the congregation of Israel till such time as they should be by the priest pronounced clean

The use and effect of excommunication, whilst it was not yet strengthened with the civil power, was no more than that they who were not excommunicate were to avoid the company of them that were. It was not enough to repute them as heathen, that never had been Christians,

"company with fornicators";¹ but, because that could not be without going out of the world, he restraineth it to such fornicators and otherwise vicious persons as were of the brethren, "with such a one," he saith, they ought not to keep company, "no not to eat." And this is no more than our Saviour saith, "Let him be to thee as a heathen, and as a publican."² For publicans

them for the same thing, insomuch as when our Saviour accepted the invitation of Zacchæus

communicate

As for keeping them out of their synagogues, or places of assembly, they had no power to do it but that of the owner of the place, whether he were Christian or heathen. And because all places are by right in the dominion of the Commonwealth, as well he that was excommunicated as he that never was baptized, might enter into them by commission from the civil magistrate, as Paul before his conversion entered into their synagogues at Damascus, to apprehend Christians, men and women, and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by commission from the high priest.

By which it appears that upon a Christian that should become an apostate, in a place where the civil power did persecute or not assist the Church, the effect of excommunication had nothing in it, neither of damage in this world nor of terror nor of terror, because of their unbelief, nor of damage, because they returned

thereby into the favour of the world, and in the world to come were in no worse estate than they which never had believed. The damage redounded rather to the Church, by provocation of them they cast out to a freer execution of their malice.

Excommunication therefore had its effect only upon those that believed that Jesus Christ was to come again in glory to reign over and to judge both the quick and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance into his kingdom to those whose sins were retained, that is, to those that were excommunicated by the Church. And thence it is that St. Paul calleth excommunication a delivery of the excommunicate person to Satan. For without the kingdom of Christ, all other kingdoms after judgement are comprehended in the kingdom of Satan. This is it that the faithful stood in fear of, as long as they stood excommunicate, that is to say, in an estate where in their sins were not forgiven. Whereby we may understand that excommunication in the time that Christian religion was not authorized by the civil power was used only for a correction of manners, not of errors in opinion: for it is a punishment whereof none could be sensible but such as believed and expected the coming again of our Saviour to judge the world, and they who so believed needed no other opinion, but only uprightness of life, to be saved.

There lieth excommunication for injustice, as, if thy brother offend thee, tell it him privately, then with witnesses, lastly, tell the Church, and then if he obey not, "Let him be to thee as an heathen man, and a publican."³ And there lieth excommunication for a scandalous life, as "If any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such a one ye are not to eat."⁴ But we excommunicate a man that held this foundation, that Jesus was the Christ, for difference of opinion in other points by which that foundation was not destroyed, there appeareth no authority in the Scripture, nor example in the Apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul a text that seemeth to be to the contrary: "A man that is an heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject."⁵ For a heretic is he that, being a member of the Church, teacheth nevertheless some private opinion which the Church has forbidden: and such a one, St. Paul adviseth Titus after the first and second admonition, to reject. But to reject in this place is not

¹ *Ibid* 5, 9, 10, etc.

² Matthew, 18, 17.

³ Acts, 9, 2.

⁴ Matthew, 18 [15, 17]

⁵ I Corinthians, 5, 11

⁶ Titus, 3, 10

to excommunicate the man, but to give over

ish and unlearned questions avoid. ² The word *avoid* in this place, and *reject* in the former, is the same in the original, *ῥηπαίσω* but foolish questions may be set by without excommunication. And again, "Avoid foolish questions," where the original *ῥηπαίσω*, (*set them by*) is equivalent to the former word, *reject*. There is no other place that can so much as colourably be drawn to countenance the casting out of the Church faithful men, such as believed the foundation only for a singular superstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good and pious conscience. But, on the contrary, all such places as command avoiding such disputes are written for a lesson to pastors, such as Timothy and Titus were, not to make new articles of faith by determining every small controversy, which oblige men to a needless burden of conscience, or provoke them to break the union of the Church. Which lesson the Apostles themselves observed well. St Peter and St Paul, though their controversy were great, as we may read in Galatians 2. 11, yet they did not cast one another out of the Church. Nevertheless, during the Apostles times, there were other pastors that observed it not, as Diotrephes who cast out of the Church such as St John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he took in pre-eminence ³ so early it was that vainglory and ambition had found entrance into the Church of Christ.

That a man be liable to excommunication, there be many conditions requisite, as first, that he be a member of some commonalty, that is to say, of some lawful assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church that hath power to judge of the cause for which he is to be excommunicated. For where there is no community, there can be no excommunication, nor where there is no power to judge, can there be any power to give sentence.

From hence it followeth that one Church can not be excommunicated by another for either they have equal power to excommunicate each

nate to the other as that they both have but one voice, and then they be but one Church, and the

part excommunicated is no more a Church, but a dissolute number of individual persons.

And because the sentence of excommunication importeth an advice not to keep company nor so much as to eat with him that is excommunicate, if a sovereign prince or assembly be excommunicate, the sentence is of no effect. For all subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of their own sovereign, when he requireth it, by the law of nature, nor can they lawfully either expel him from any place of his own dominion, whether profane or holy, nor go out of his dominion without his leave, much less, if he call them to that honour, refuse to eat with him. And as to other princes and states, because they are not parts of one and the same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep them from keeping company with the state excommunicate for the very institution, as it uniteth many men into one community, so it dissociateth one community from another so that excommunication is not needful for keeping kings and states asunder, nor has any further effect than is in the nature of policy itself, unless it be to instigate princes to war upon one another.

Nor is the excommunication of a Christian subject that obeyeth the laws of his own sovereign whether Christian or heathen, of any effect. For if he believe that "Jesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God," ⁴ "and God dwelleth in him, and he in God." ⁵ But he that hath the Spirit of God, he that dwelleth in God, he in whom God dwelleth, can receive no harm by the excommunication of men. Therefore, he that believeth Jesus to be the Christ is free from all the dangers threatened to persons excommunicate. He that believeth it not is no Christian. Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not liable to excommunication nor he also

which is the rule of manners, and which Christ and his Apostles have commanded us to be subject to. For the Church cannot judge of manners but by external actions, which actions can never be unlawful but when they are against the law of the Commonwealth.

If a man's father, or mother, or master be excommunicate, yet are not the children forbidden to keep them company, nor to eat with them, for that were, for the most part, oblige them not to eat at all, for of n

² II Timothy, 2. 23.

³ Titus, 3. 9.

⁴ 3 John, 9. etc.

⁵ John, 5. 1

⁶ Ibid 4. 15.

to get food, and to authorize them to disobey their parents and masters, contrary to the precept of the Apostles

In sum, the power of excommunication can not be extended further than to the end for which the Apostles and pastors of the Church have their commission from our Saviour, which is not to rule by command and coercion, but by teaching and direction of men in the way of salvation in the world to come. And as a master in any science may abandon his scholar when he obstinately neglecteth the practice of his rules, but not accuse him of injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so a teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life: but he cannot say they do him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him: for to a teacher that shall so complain may be applied the answer of God to Samuel in the like place, They have not rejected thee, but me. "Excommunication therefore, when it wanteth the assistance of the civil power, as it doth when a Christian state or prince is excommunicate by a foreign authority, is without effect, and consequently ought to be without terror. The name of *fulmen excommunicationis* (that is, the *thunder bolt of excommunication*) proceeded from an imagination of the Bishop of Rome, which first used it, that he was king of kings, as the heathen made Jupiter king of the gods, and assigned him, in their poems and pictures, a thunderbolt wherewith to subdue and punish the giants that should dare to deny his power: which imagination was grounded on two errors, one, that the kingdom of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Saviour's own words, 'My kingdom is not of this world'; the other, that he is Christ's vicar, not only over his own subjects, but over all the Christians of the world, whereof there is no ground in Scripture, and the contrary shall be proved in its due place.

St Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a synagogue of the Jews, 'as his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging, that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead: and that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ.' The Scriptures here mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the Old Testament. The men to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ, and risen again from the dead,

were also Jews, and did believe already that they were the word of God. Hereupon, as it is [Acts, 17] in the fourth verse some of them believed, and, as it is in the fifth verse, some believed not. What was the reason, when they all believed the Scripture, that they did not all believe alike, but that some approved, others disapproved, the interpretation of St Paul that cited them, and every one interpreted them to himself? It was thus: St Paul came to them without any legal commission, and in the manner of one that would not command, but persuade, which he must needs do, either by miracles: as Moses did to the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his authority in God's works, or by reasoning from the already received Scripture, that they might see the truth of his doctrine in God's word. But whosoever persuadeth by reasoning from principles written maketh him to whom he speaketh judge, both of the meaning of those principles and also of the force of his inferences upon them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were not, who else was the judge of what St Paul alleged out of Scripture? If St Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? It had been enough to have said,

I find it so in Scripture: that is to say, in your laws, of which I am interpreter, as sent by Christ. The interpreter therefore of the Scripture, to whose interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica were bound to stand, could be none: every one might believe or not believe according as the allegations seemed to himself to be agreeable or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alleged. And generally in all cases of the world he that pretendeth any proof maketh judge of his proof him to whom he addresseth his speech. And as to the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by express words to receive the determination of all hard questions from the priests and judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to be understood of the Jews that were yet unconverted.

For the conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alleging the Scriptures, which they believed not. The Apostles therefore laboured by reason to confute their idolatry, and that done, to persuade them to the faith of Christ by their testimony of his life and resurrection. So that there could not yet be any controversy concerning the authority to interpret Scripture: seeing no man was obliged, during his infidelity, to follow any man's interpretation of any Scripture except his sovereign's interpretation of the laws of his country.

* Deuteronomy, 17

¹ 1 Samuel, 8 7

² John 18 36

³ Acts, 17 2, 3

Let us now consider the conversion itself, and see what there was therein that could be cause of such an obligation. Men were converted to no other thing than to the belief of that which the Apostles preached and the Apostles preached nothing but that Jesus was the Christ, that is to say, the King that was to save them and reign over them eternally in the world to come, and consequently that he was not dead, but risen

self, or any other Apostle, was such an interpreter of the Scripture as all that became Christians ought to take their interpretation for law. For to interpret the laws is part of the administration of a present kingdom, which the Apostles had not. They prayed then, and all other pastors ever since, "Let thy kingdom come", and exhorted their converts to obey their then ethnic princes. The New Testament was not yet published in one body. Every of the evangelists was interpreter of his own gospel, and every Apostle of his own epistle, and of the Old Testament our Saviour himself saith to the Jews, "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think to have eternal life, and they are they that testify of me". If he had not meant they should interpret them, he would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the Christ. he would either have interpreted them himself, or referred them to the interpretation of the priests.

When a difficulty arose, the Apostles and eld-

Scriptures to the people, but took not from the people the liberty to read and interpret them to themselves. The Apostles sent diverse letters to the Churches, and other writings for their instruction, which had been in vain if they had not allowed them to interpret, that is, to con-

preter whose interpretation should generally be stood in but that could not be till kings were pastors, or pastors kings.

disciple, or a counsellor to his friend, without power to compel him to observe them, are nevertheless canons, because they are rules. But when they are given by one whom he that receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those canons not only rules, but laws. the question therefore here is of the power to make the Scriptures, which are the rules of Christian faith, laws.

That part of the Scripture which was first law was the Ten Commandments, written in two tables of stone and delivered by God Himself to Moses, and by Moses made known to the people. Before that time there was no written law of God, who, as yet having not chosen any people to be His peculiar kingdom, had given no law to men, but the law of nature, that is to say, the precepts of natural reason, written in every man's own heart. Of these two tables, the

alienos coram me, that is, "Thou shalt not have for gods, the gods that other nations worship, but only me" whereby they were forbidden to obey or honour as their king and governor any other God than Him that spake unto them then

any representative of their own fancying, but

lieutenants. 4 That "they should every seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour," and employ that time in doing Him public honour. The second table containeth the duty of one man towards another, as "To honour parents", "Not to kill"; "Not to commit adultery", "Not to steal"; "Not to corrupt judgement by false witness", and finally, "Not so much as to design in their heart the doing of any injury one to another." The question now is who it was that gave to these written tables the obligatory force of laws. There is no doubt but they were made laws by God Himself; but because a law obliges not, nor is law to any but to them that acknowledge it to be the act of the sovereign, how could the people of Israel, that were forbidden to approach the mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged to obedience to all those laws which Moses propounded to them?

Some of them were indeed the laws of nature, as all the second table, and therefore to be acknowledged for God's laws, not to the Israelites alone, but to all people but of those that were peculiar to the Israelites, as those of the first table, the question remains, saving that they had obliged themselves, presently after the propounding of them, to obey Moses, in these words, "Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee, but let not God speak to us, lest we die." It was therefore only Moses then, and after him the high priest, whom, by Moses, God declared should administer this His peculiar kingdom, that had on earth the power to make this short Scripture of the Decalogue to be law in the commonwealth of Israel. But Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding high priests were the civil sovereigns. Therefore hitherto the canonizing, or making of the Scripture law, belonged to the civil sovereign.

The judicial law, that is to say, the laws that God prescribed to the magistrates of Israel for the rule of their administration of justice, and of the sentences or judgements they should pronounce in pleas between man and man and the Levitical law, that is to say, the rule that God prescribed touching the rites and ceremonies of the priests and Levites, were all delivered to them by Moses only, and therefore also became laws by virtue of the same promise of obedience to Moses. Whether these laws were then written, or not written, but dictated to the people by Moses, after his forty days being with God in the Mount, by word of mouth is not expressed in the text, but they were all positive laws, and equivalent to Holy Scripture and made canonical by Moses the civil sovereign.

After the Israelites were come into the plains of Moab over against Jericho and ready to enter into the Land of Promise Moses to the former laws added diverse others which therefore are called *Deuteronomy*, that is, *Second Law*: and are, as it is written, "the words of a covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel, besides the covenant which he made with them in Horeb." For having explained those former laws in the beginning of the Book of *Deuteronomy* he added others, that begin at the twelfth Chapter and continue to the end of the twenty with of the same book. This law they were commanded to write upon great stones plastered over at their passing over Jordan: this law also was

written by Moses himself in a book, and delivered into the hands of the priests, and to the elders of Israel,* and commanded "to be put in the side of the Ark;"† for in the Ark itself was nothing but the Ten Commandments. This was the law which Moses commanded the kings of Israel should keep a copy of:‡ and this is the law which, having been long time lost, was found again in the Temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority received for the law of God. But both Moses at the writing and Josiah at the recovery thereof had both of them the civil sovereignty. Hitherto therefore the power of making Scripture canonical was in the civil sovereign.

Besides this Book of the Law, there was no other book from the time of Moses till after the Captivity, received amongst the Jews for the law of God. For the prophets, except a few, lived in the time of the Captivity itself, and the rest lived but a little before it, and were so far from having their prophecies generally received for laws as that their persons were persecuted, partly by false prophets, and partly by the kings which were seduced by them. And this book itself which was confirmed by Josiah for the law of God, and with it all the history of the works of God in the Captivity, and ark of

From hence we may see, that the laws of the Old Testament, which we have at this day were not canonical, nor law unto the Jews, till the renovation of their covenant with Christ.

* *Ibid.*, 31. 9.

* *Ibid.*, 31. 26.

* *Ibid.*, 17. 18.

* *I Kings*, 24. 26.

* Exodus, 20. 10.

* Deuteronomy 29. 1.

* *Ibid.*, 27. {2, 3}.

was the high priest, and the high priest was their civil sovereign, it is manifest that the Scriptures were never made laws, but by the sovereign civil power

By the writings of the Fathers that lived in the time before that Christian religion was received and authorized by Constantine the Emperor, we may find that the books we now have of the New Testament were held by the Christians of that time (except a few, in respect of whose paucity the rest were called *the Catholic Church*, and others *heretics*) for the dictates of the Holy Ghost, and consequently for the canon, or rule of faith: such was the reverence and opinion they had of their teachers: as generally the reverence that the disciples bear to their first masters in all manner of doctrine they receive from them is not small. Therefore there is no doubt but when St. Paul wrote to the churches he had converted, or any other Apostle or Disciple of Christ, to those which had then embraced Christ, they received those their writings for the true Christian doctrine. But in that time when not the power and authority of the teacher, but the faith of the hearer, caused them to receive it: it was not the Apostles that made their own writings canonical, but every convert made them so to himself.

But the question here is not what any Christian made a law or canon to himself, which he might again reject by the same right he received it, but what was so made a canon to them as without injustice they could not do anything contrary thereunto. That the New Testament should in this sense be canonical, that is to say, a law in any place where the law of the Commonwealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a law. For a law, as hath been already shown, is the commandment of that man, or assembly, to whom we have given sovereign authority to make such rules for the direction of our actions as he shall think fit, and to punish us when we do anything contrary to the same. When therefore any other man shall offer unto us any other rules, which the sovereign ruler hath not prescribed, they are but counsel and advice, which, whether good or bad, he that is counselled may without injustice refuse to observe, and when contrary to the laws already established, without injustice cannot ob-

received for law. For internal faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all human jurisdiction, whereas the words and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our civil obedience, are injustice both before God and man. Seeing then our Saviour hath denied his kingdom to be in this world, seeing he hath said he came not to judge, but to save the world, he hath not subjected us to other laws than those of the Commonwealth, that is, the Jews to the law of Moses, which he saith he came not to destroy, but to fulfil, and other nations to the laws of their several sovereigns, and all men to the laws of nature, the observing whereof, both he himself and his Apostles have

laws to oblige us in this world, but new doctrine to prepare us for the next, the books of the New Testament, which contain that doctrine, until obedience to them was commanded by them that God had given power to on earth to be legislators, were not obligatory canons, that is, laws, but only good and safe advice for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take and refuse at his own peril, without injustice.

Again, our Saviour Christ's commission to his Apostles and Disciples was to proclaim his kingdom, not present, but to come, and to teach all nations, and to baptize them that should believe: and to enter into the houses of them that should receive them: and where they were not received, to shake off the dust of their feet against them: but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compel them to obedience by the sword. In all which there is nothing of power, but of persuasion. He sent them out as sheep unto wolves, not as kings to their subjects. They had not in commission to

is there only law where the lawful civil power hath made it so. And there also the king, or sovereign, maketh it a law to himself, by which he subjecteth himself, not to the doctor or Apostle that converted him, but to God Himself, and His Son Jesus Christ, as immediately as did the Apostles themselves.

Matthew, 5 [17]

practise their advice, and that it were publicly

That which may seem to give the New Testament, in respect of those that have embraced Christian doctrine, the force of laws, in the times and places of persecution, is the decrees they made amongst themselves in their synods. For we read the style of the council of the Apostles, the elders, and the whole Church, in this manner, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and us, to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things," etc., which is a style that signifieth a power to lay a burden on them that had received their doctrine. Now "to lay a burden on another" seemeth the same as *to oblige*, and therefore the acts of that council were laws to the then Christians. Nevertheless, they were no more laws than are these other precepts, "Repent", "Be baptized", "Keep the Commandments", "Believe the Gospel", "Come unto me", "Sell all that thou hast", "Give it to the poor", and "Follow me", which are not commands, but invitations and callings of men to Christianity, like that of Isaiah, "Ho, every man that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, come, and buy wine and milk without money." For first, the Apostles' power was no other than that of our Saviour, to invite men to embrace the kingdom of God, which they themselves acknowledged for a kingdom, not present, but to come, and they that have no kingdom can make no laws. And secondly, if their acts of council were laws, they could not without sin be disobeyed. But we read not anywhere that they who received not the doctrine of Christ did therein sin, but that they died in their sins, that is, that their sins against the laws to which they owed obedience were not pardoned. And those laws were the laws of nature, and the civil laws of the state, whereto every Christian man had by pact submitted himself. And therefore by the burden which the Apostles might lay on such as they had converted are not to be understood laws, but conditions, proposed to those that sought salvation, which they might accept or refuse at their own peril, without a new sin, though not without the hazard of being condemned and excluded out of the kingdom of God for their sins past. And therefore of infidels, St John saith not, the wrath of God shall come upon them, but the wrath of God remaineth upon them,* and not that they shall be condemned, but that they are condemned already. Nor can it be conceived that the benefit of faith is remis-

sion of sins, unless we conceive withal that the damage of infidelity is the retention of the same sins.

But to what end is it, may some man ask, that the Apostles and other pastors of the Church, after their time, should meet together to agree upon what doctrine should be taught, both for faith and manners, if no man were obliged to observe their decrees? To this may be answered that the Apostles and elders of that council were obliged, even by their entrance into it, to teach the doctrine therein concluded, and decreed to be taught, so far forth as no precedent law, to which they were obliged to yield obedience, was to the contrary, but not that all other Christians should be obliged to observe what they taught. For though they might deliberate what each of them should teach, yet they could not deliberate what others should do, unless their assembly had had a legislative power, which none could have but civil sovereigns. For though God be the sovereign of all the world, we are not bound to take for His law whatsoever is propounded by every man in His name, nor anything contrary to the civil law, which God hath expressly commanded us to obey.

Seeing then the acts of council of the Apostles were then no laws, but counsels, much less are laws the acts of any other doctors or councils since, if assembled without the authority of the civil sovereign. And consequently, the books of the New Testament, though most perfect rules of Christian doctrine, could not be made laws by any other authority than that of kings or sovereign assemblies.

The first council that made the Scriptures we now have canon is not extant for that collection of the canons of the Apostles, attributed to Clement, the first bishop of Rome after St Peter, is subject to question for though the canonical books be there reckoned up, yet these words, *Sint vobis omnibus Clericis & Laicis Libri venerandi* etc., contain a distinction of clergy and laity that was not in use so near St Peter's time. The first council for settling the canonical Scripture that is extant is that of Laodicea, Can. 59, which forbids the reading of other books than those in the churches, which is a mandate that is not addressed to every Christian, but to those only that had authority to read anything publicly in the Church, that is, to ecclesiastics only.

Of ecclesiastical officers in the time of the Apostles, some were magisterial, some ministerial. *Magisterial* were the offices of preaching of the gospel of the kingdom of God to infidels, of administering the sacraments and divine

* Acts, 15. 28

* Isaiah, 55. 1

* John, 3. 36

* Ibid. 3. 18.

the emperors found it necessary to regulate them in order to the keeping of the peace amongst them, but by the assemblies of the Christians in every several town

The same is also confirmed by the continual practice even to this day in the election of the bishops of Rome. For if the bishop of any place had the right of choosing another to the succession of the pastoral office, in any city, at such time as he went from thence to plant the same in another place, much more had he had the right to appoint his successor in that place in which he last resided and died: and we find not that ever any bishop of Rome appointed his successor. For they were a long time chosen by the people, as we may see by the sedition raised about the election between Damasus and Ursinus; which Ammianus Marcellinus saith was so great that Juvenius the Præfect, unable to keep the peace between them, was forced to go out of the city, and that there were above a hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the church itself. And though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the whole clergy of Rome, and afterwards by the cardinals, yet never any was appointed to the succession by his predecessor. If therefore they pretended no right to appoint their own successors, I think I may reasonably conclude they had no right to appoint the successors of other bishops without receiving some new power, which none could take from the Church to bestow on them, but such as had a lawful authority, not only to teach, but to command the Church, which none could do

of another man, and differeth from a servant only in this, that servants are obliged by their condition to what is commanded them, whereas ministers are obliged only by their undertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that they have undertaken: so that both they that teach the word of God and they that administer the secular affairs of the Church are both ministers, but they are ministers of different persons. For the pastors of the Church, called "the ministers of the word,"^a are ministers of Christ, whose word it is: but the ministry of a deacon, which is called "serving of tables,"^b is a serv-

ice done to the church or congregation: so that neither any one man nor the whole Church could ever of their pastor say he was their minister; but of a deacon, whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables or distribute maintenance to the Christians when they lived in each city on a common stock, or upon collections, as in the first times, or to take a care of the house of prayer, or of the revenue, or other worldly business of the Church, the whole congregation might properly call him their minister.

For their employment as deacons was to serve the congregation, though upon occasion they omitted not to preach the Gospel, and maintain the law of Christ: as appears by the following words of St. Paul.

"the eunuch," was Philip the Deacon, not Philip the Apostle. For it is manifest that when Philip preached in Samaria, the Apostles were at Jerusalem,^c and "when they heard that Samaria had received the word of God, sent Peter and John to them";^d by imposition of whose hands they that were baptized received (which before by the baptism of Philip they had not received) the Holy Ghost.^e For it was necessary for the conferring of the Holy Ghost that their baptism should be administered or confirmed by a minister of the word, not by a minister of the Church. And therefore to confirm the baptism of those that Philip the Deacon had baptized, the Apostles sent out of their own number from Jerusalem to Samaria, Peter and John, who conferred on them that before were but baptized, those graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit, which at that time did accompany all true believers, which what they were may be understood by that which St. Mark saith, "These signs follow them that believe in my name, they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them, they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover."^f This to do was it that Philip could not give, but the Apostles could and, as appears by this place, effectually did to every man that truly believed, and was by a minister of Christ himself baptized: which power either

^a *Ibid.*, 8, 5.

^b *Ibid.*, 8, 39.

^c *Ibid.*, 8, 1.

^d *Ibid.*, 8, 14.

^e *Ibid.*, 8, 15.

^f Mark, 16, 17, [18].

¹ Acts, 14, 23.

² *Ibid.*, 6, 4.

³ *Ibid.*, 6, 2.

Christ's ministers in this age cannot confer, or else there are very few true believers, or Christ hath very few ministers

That the first deacons were chosen, not by the Apostles, but by a congregation of the disciples; that is, of Christian men of all sorts, is manifest out of Acts, 6, where we read that the Twelve, after the number of disciples was multiplied, called them together, and having told them that it was not fit that the Apostles should leave the word of God, and serve tables, said unto them, "Brethren look you out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost, and of wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business"¹ Here it is manifest that though the Apostles declared them elected, yet the congregation chose them, which also is more expressly said where it is written that "the saying pleased the whole multitude, and they chose seven," etc.²

Under the Old Testament, the tribe of Levi were only capable of the priesthood and other inferior offices of the Church. The land was divided amongst the other tribes, Levi excepted, which by the subdivision of the tribe of Joseph into Ephraim and Manasseh were still twelve. To the tribe of Levi were assigned certain cities for their habitation, with the suburbs for their cattle, but for their portion they were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their brethren. Again, the priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together with part of the oblations and sacrifices. For God had said to Aaron, "Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any part amongst them, I am thy part and thine inheritance amongst the children of Israel"³ For God being their King, and having constituted the tribe of Levi to be His public ministers, He allowed them for their maintenance the public revenue, that is to say, the part that God had reserved to Himself, which were tithes and offerings; and that it is which is meant where God saith, "I am thine inheritance." And therefore to the Levites might not unfitly be attributed the name of clergy, from Κληρος, which signifieth lot or inheritance, not that they were heirs of the kingdom of God, more than other, but that God's inheritance was their maintenance. Now seeing in this time God Himself was their King, and Moses, Aaron, and the succeeding high priests were His lieutenants, it is manifest that the right of tithes and offerings

was constituted by the civil power.

After their rejection of God in the demanding of a king, they enjoyed still the same revenue, but the right thereof was derived from that, that the kings did never take from them, for the public revenue was at the disposing of him that was the public person; and that, till the Captivity, was the king. And again, after the return from the Captivity, they paid their tithes as before to the priest. Hitherto therefore Church livings were determined by the civil sovereign.

Of the maintenance of our Saviour and his Apostles, we read only they had a purse (which was carried by Judas Iscariot), and that of the Apostles such as were fishermen did sometimes use their trade, and that when our Saviour sent the twelve Apostles to preach, he forbade them to carry gold, and silver, and brass in their purses, "for that the workman is worthy of his hire"⁴ by which it is probable their ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their employment, for their employment was "freely to give, because they had freely received",⁵ and their maintenance was the free gift of those that believed the good tidings they carried about of the coming of the Messiah their Saviour. To which we may add that which was contributed out of gratitude by such as our Saviour had healed of diseases, of which are mentioned "certain women which had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities, Mary Magdalen, out of whom went seven devils, and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward, and Susanna, and many others, which ministered unto him of their substance."⁶

After our Saviour's ascension, the Christians of every city lived in common upon the money, which was made of the sale of their lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the Apostles, of good will, not of duty,⁷ for "whilst the land remained," saith St Peter to Ananias, "was it not thine? And after it was sold, was it not in thy power?"⁸ Which sheweth he needed not have saved his land, nor his money by lying, as not being bound to contribute anything at all unless he had pleased. And as in the time of the Apostles, so also all the time downward, till after Constantine the Great, we shall find that the maintenance of the bishops and pastors of the Christian Church was nothing but the

¹ Matthew, 10 9, 20.

² *Ibid* 10 8

³ Luke, 8 2, 3

⁴ Acts, 4 34, 35

⁵ *Ibid* 5 4.

⁶ Acts, 6 3

⁷ *Ibid*, 6 5

⁸ Numbers, 18 20.

voluntary contribution of them that had embraced their doctrine. There was yet no mention of tithes: but such was in the time of Constantine and his sons the affection of Christians to their pastors, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith, describing the sedition of Damasus and Ursinus about the bishopric, that it was worth their contention, in that the bishops of those times by the liberality of their flock, and especially of matrons, lived splendidly, were carried in coaches, and were sumptuous in their fare and apparel.

But here may some ask whether the pastor were then bound to live upon voluntary contribution, as upon alms, "For who," saith St. Paul, "goeth to war at his own charges?" or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" And again, "Do ye not know that they which minister about holy things live of the things of the Temple, and they which wait at the altar partake with the altar," that is to say, have part of that which is offered at the altar for their maintenance? And then he concludeth, "Even so hath the Lord appointed that

pastors were to determine either the quantity or the kind of their own allowance, and be, as it were, their own carvers. Their allowance

because their acts were then no laws: therefore the maintenance of pastors before emperors and civil sovereigns had made laws to settle it was nothing but benevolence. They that served at the altar lived on what was offered. So may the pastors also take what is offered them by their flock, but not exact what is not offered. In what court should they sue for it who had no tribu-

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the then ministers of the Gospel, because Moses and the high priests were the civil sovereigns of the people under God, whose kingdom amongst the Jews was present; whereas the kingdom of God by Christ is yet to come.

Hitherto hath been shown what the pastors of the Church are, what are the points of their commission, as that they were to preach, to teach, to baptize, to be presidents in their several congregations, what is ecclesiastical censure, viz, excommunication, that is to say, in those places where Christianity was forbidden by the civil laws, a putting of themselves out of the company of the excommunicate, and where Christianity was by the civil law commanded, a putting the excommunicate out of the congregations of Christians, who elected the pastors and ministers of the Church, that it was the congregation, who consecrated and blessed them, that it was the pastor, what was their due revenue, that it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour, and the voluntary contributions of devout and grateful Christians. We are to consider now what office in the Church those persons have who, being civil sovereigns, have embraced also the Christian faith.

sign power civil, whether it be in one man or in one assembly of men. For it is evident to the meanest capacity that men's actions are derived from the opinions they have of the good or evil which from those actions redound unto themselves, and consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion that their obedience to the sovereign power will be more hurtful to them than their disobedience will disobey the laws, and thereby overthrow the Commonwealth, and introduce confusion and civil war; for the avoiding whereof, all civil government was ordained. And therefore in all Commonwealths of the heathen, the sovereigns have had the name of pastors of the people, because there was no subject that could lawfully teach the people, but by their permission and authority.

This right of the heathen kings cannot be thought taken from them by their conversion to the faith of Christ, who never ordained that kings, for believing in him, should be deposed, subjected to any but himself, or, which is worse, be deprived of the power necessary for the preservation of peace amongst their subjects, and their defence against foreign en-

emies And therefore Christian kings are still the supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what pastors they please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the people committed to their charge

Again, let the right of choosing them be, as before the conversion of kings, in the Church, for so it was in the time of the Apostles themselves (as hath been shown already in this chapter), even so also the right will be in the civil sovereign Christian For in that he is a Christian, he allows the teaching, and in that he is the sovereign (which is as much as to say, the Church by representation), the teachers he elects are elected by the Church And when an assembly of Christians choose their pastor in a Christian Commonwealth, it is the sovereign that electeth him, because it is done by his authority, in the same manner as when a town choose their mayor, it is the act of him that hath the sovereign power for every act done is the act of him without whose consent it is invalid And therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of history concerning the election of pastors by the people or by the clergy, they are no arguments against the right of any civil sovereign, because they that elected them did it by his authority

Seeing then in every Christian Commonwealth the civil sovereign is the supreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is committed, and consequently that it is by his authority that all other pastors are made, and have power to teach and perform all other pastoral offices, it followeth also that it is from the civil sovereign that all other pastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and other functions pertaining to that office, and that they are but his ministers, in the same manner as the magistrates of towns, judges in courts of justice, and commanders of armies are all but ministers of him that is the magistrate of the whole Commonwealth, judge of all causes, and commander of the whole militia, which is always the civil sovereign And the reason hereof is not because they that teach, but because they that are to learn, are his subjects For let it be supposed that a Christian king commit the authority of ordaining pastors in his dominions to another king (as diverse Christian kings allow that power to the Pope), he doth not thereby constitute a pastor over himself, nor a sovereign pastor over his people, for that were to deprive himself of the civil power, which, depending on the opinion men have of their duty to him, and the fear they have of punishment in another world, would

depend also on the skill and loyalty of doctors who are no less subject, not only to ambition, but also to ignorance, than any other sort of men So that where a stranger hath authority to appoint teachers, it is given him by the sovereign in whose dominions he teacheth Christian doctors are our schoolmasters to Christianity, but kings are fathers of families, and may receive schoolmasters for their subjects from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the command, especially when their teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends them nor can they be obliged to retain them longer than it is for the public good, the care of which they stand so long charged withal as they retain any other essential right of the sovereignty

If a man therefore should ask a pastor, in the execution of his office, as the chief priests and elders of the people asked our Saviour, "By what authority doest thou these things, and who gave thee this authority?" he can make no other just answer but that he doth it by the authority of the Commonwealth, given him by the king or assembly that representeth it All pastors, except the supreme, execute their charges in the right, that is, by the authority of the civil sovereign, that is, *jure civili* But the king, and every other sovereign, executeth his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority from God, that is to say, in God's right, *ut jure divini* And therefore none but kings can put into their titles, a mark of their submission to God only, *Dei gratia Rex* etc Bishops ought to say in the beginning of their mandates, "By the favour of the King's Majesty, Bishop of such a diocese or as civil ministers," In His Majesty's name For in saying, *Divina providentia*, which is the same with *Dei gratia* though disguised, they deny to have received their authority from the civil state, and slyly slip off the collar of their civil subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the Commonwealth

But if every Christian sovereign be the supreme pastor of his own subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the authority, not only to preach, which perhaps no man will deny, but also to baptize, and to administer the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, and to consecrate both temples and pastors to God's service, which most men deny, partly because they use not to do it, and partly because the administration of sacraments, and consecration of persons and places to holy uses requireth the imposition of such men's hands as by the like imposition successively from

the time of the Apostles have been ordained to the like ministry For proof therefore that Christian kings have power to baptize and to consecrate, I am to render a reason both why they use not to do it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of imposition of hands, they are

the universities Nevertheless, because the care of the sum of the business of the Commonwealth taketh up his whole time, it were not conven-

mit the ministerial offices to others under him. In the like manner our Saviour, who surely had power to baptize, baptized none himself, but sent his Apostles and Disciples to baptize So also St Paul, by the necessity of preaching in diverse and far distant places, baptized few: amongst all the Corinthians he baptized only Crispus, Gaius, and Stephanas, and the reason was because his principal charge was to preach

fewer

And as concerning imposition of hands, whether it be needful for the authorizing of a king to baptize and consecrate, we may consider thus.

Imposition of hands was a most ancient public ceremony amongst the Jews, by which was

they were so presented to him by Joseph as he was forced in doing it to stretch out his arms

¹ John, 4. 2

² 1 Corinthians, 1. 14, 16.

³ *Ibid.*, 1. 17

⁴ Genesis, 48. 14.

across) to design to whom he intended the

"to lay his hand on the head of the ram." The same is also said again, Leviticus, 1. 4, and 8. 14. Likewise Moses when he ordained Joshua to be captain of the Israelites, that is, consecrated him to God's service, "laid his hands upon him, and gave him his charge," designing and rendering certain who it was they were to obey in war And in the consecration of the Levites God commanded that "the children of Israel should put their hands upon the Levites" And in the condemnation of him that had blasphemed the Lord, God commanded that "all that heard him should lay their hands on his head, and that all the congregation should stone him" And why should they only that heard him lay their hands upon him, and not rather a priest, Levite, or other minister of justice, but that none else were able to design and demon-

it is done to the ear by a name.

And so much was this ceremony observed that in blessing the whole congregation at once, which cannot be done by laying on of hands, yet Aaron "did lift up his hand towards the people when he blessed them" And we read also of the like ceremony of consecration in temples amongst the heathen, as that the priest laid his hands on some post of the temple, all

than by words to inform the ear, in matters of God's public service

This ceremony was not therefore new in our

and pray."

According to this ancient rite, the Apostles

⁵ Exodus, 29. 10

⁶ *Ibid.*, 29. 15

⁷ Numbers, 27. 23.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 8. 10.

⁹ Leviticus, 24. 14

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 9. 22.

¹¹ Mark, 5. 23

¹² Matthew, 19. 13.

and presbyters and the presbytery itself laid hands on them whom they ordained pastors, and withal prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost, and that not only once, but sometimes oftener, when a new occasion was presented but the end was still the same, namely a punctual and religious designation of the person ordained either to the pastoral charge in general or to a particular mission So 'The Apostles prayed, and laid their hands' ¹ on the seven deacons, which was done, not to give them the Holy Ghost (for they were full of the Holy Ghost before they were chosen, as appeareth immediately before²), but to design them to that office And after Philip the Deacon had converted certain persons in Samaria, Peter and John went down "and laid their hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost" ³ And not only an Apostle, but a presbyter had this power for St Paul adviseth Timothy, Lay hands suddenly on no man ⁴, that is, design no man rashly to the office of a pastor The whole presbytery laid their hands on Timothy, as we read, I Timothy, 4 14, but this ⁵ to be understood as that some did it by the appointment of

note, by the way, that by the Holy Ghost is not meant the third person in the Trinity but the gifts necessary to the pastoral office We read also that St Paul had imposition of handstwicke, once from Ananias at Damascus at the time of his baptism, ⁶ and again at Antioch when he was first sent out to preach ⁷ The use then of this ceremony considered in the ordination of pastors was to design the person to whom they gave such power But if there had been then any

trine, that is, to use his power aright, and therefore the imposition of hands had been unnecessary, baptism itself had been sufficient But every sovereign, before Christianity, had the power of teaching and ordaining teachers and therefore Christianity gave them no new right,

but only directed them in the way of teaching truth, and consequently they needed no imposition of hands (besides that which is done in baptism) ⁸ authorize them to exercise any part of the pastoral function, as namely, to baptize and consecrate And in the Old Testament, though the priest only had right to consecrate, during the time that the sovereignty was in the high priest, yet it was not so when the sovereignty was in the king for we read that Solomon blessed the people, consecrated the Temple, and pronounced that public prayer, ⁹ which is the pattern now for consecration of all Christian churches and chapels whereby it appears he had not only the right of ecclesiastical government, but also of exercising ecclesiastical functions

From this consolidation of the right politic and ecclesiastic in Christian sovereigns, it is evident they have all manner of power over their subjects that can be given to man for the government of men's external actions, both in policy and religion, and may make such laws as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own subjects, both as they are the Commonwealth and as they are the Church for both State and Church are the same men

If they please, therefore, they may, as many Christian kings now do, commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the Pope, but then the Pope is in that point

so, if they please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an assembly of pas

and make such laws for their maintenance, either by tithes or otherwise, as they please, so they do it out of a sincere conscience, of which God only is the judge It is the civil sovereign that is to appoint judges and interpreters of the canonical scriptures for it is he that maketh them laws It is he also that giveth strength to excommunications, which but for such laws and punishments as may humble obstinate libertines, and reduce them to union with the rest of the Church, would be condemned In sum he hath the supreme power in all causes, as well ecclesi

¹ Acts 6 6

² Ibid 6 3

³ Ibid 8 17

⁴ I Timothy, 5 22

⁵ Acts, 9 17, 18

⁶ Ibid, 13 3

⁷ I Kings, 8

astical as civil, as far as concerneth actions and words, for those only are known and may be accused, and of that which cannot be accused, there is no judge at all, but God that knoweth the heart. And these rights are incident to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies for they that are the representants of a Christian people are representants of the Church for a Church and a Commonwealth of Christian people are the same thing.

Though this that I have here said, and in other places of this book, seem clear enough for the asserting of the supreme ecclesiastical power.

thought it necessary, as briefly as I can, to examine the grounds and strength of his discourse.

Of five books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth three questions: one, which is simply the best government, *monarchy, aristocracy* or *democracy* and concludeth for neither, but for a government mixed of all three, another which of these is the best government of the Church, and concludeth for the mixed, but which should most participate of monarchy, the third, whether in this mixed monarchy, St Peter had the place of monarch. Concerning his first conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved (Chapter eighteen) that all governments, which men are bound to obey, are simple and absolute. In monarchy there is but one man supreme, and all other men that have any kind of power in the state have it by his commission during his pleasure, and execute it in his name, and in

but an absolute sovereignty. And of the three sorts, which is the best is not to be disputed where any one of them is already established, but the present ought always to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best, because it is against both the law of nature and the divine positive law to do anything tending to the subversion thereof. Besides, it maketh nothing to the power of any pastor (unless he have the civil sovereignty) what kind of government is the best, because their calling is not to govern men by commandment, but to teach them and persuade them by arguments, and leave it to them to consider whether they shall embrace or reject the doctrine taught. For monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy do mark out unto us

dren

And therefore the second conclusion, concerning the best form of government of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Pope's power without his own dominions for in all other Commonwealths his power, if he have any at all, is that of the schoolmaster only, and not of the master of the family.

For the third conclusion, which is that St Peter was monarch of the Church he bringeth for his chief argument the place of St Matthew, 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church,' etc. 'And I will give thee the keys of heaven: whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.' Which place, well considered, proveth no more but that the Church of Christ hath for foundation one only article, namely, that which Peter, in the name of all the Apostles professing gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words here cited. Which that we may clearly understand we are to consider, that our Saviour preached by himself, by John Baptist, and by his Apostles, nothing but this article of faith, 'that he was the Christ', all other articles requiring faith no otherwise than as founded on that John began first, preaching only this, 'The kingdom of God is at hand'. Then our Saviour himself preached the same and to his twelve Apostles, when he gave them their commission, there is no mention of preaching any other article but that 'This was the fundamental article, that is the foundation of the

Elias, and others Jeremias, or one of the Prophets,* then he asked them all again, not Peter only, 'Whom say ye that I am?' Therefore St Peter answered for them all, 'Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God', which I said is the foundation of the faith of the whole Church, from which our Saviour takes the occasion of saying, 'upon this stone I will build my Church' by which it is manifest that by

* Matthew, 16 18, 19.

* *Ibid.* 3 2

* Matthew, 4 17

* *Ibid.* 10 7

* *Ibid.* 16 13.

* *Ibid.* 16 15

the foundation stone of the Church was meant the fundamental article of the Church's faith But why then, will some object, doth our Saviour interpose these words, "Thou art Peter"? If the original of this text had been rigidly translated, the reason would easily have appeared We are therefore to consider that the Apostle Simon was surnamed *Stone* (which is the signification of the Syriac word *cephas*, and of the Greek word *petrus*) Our Saviour therefore

to say, 'This article, that *I am the Christ*, is the foundation of all the faith I require in those that are to be members of my Church' Neither is this allusion to a name an unusual thing in common speech but it had been a strange and obscure speech, if our Saviour, intending to build his Church on the person of St Peter, had

the keys of heaven," etc., it is no more than what our Saviour gave also to all the rest of his Disciples, 'Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven And whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven' But howsoever this be interpreted, there is no doubt but the power here granted belongs to all supreme pastors, such as are all Christian civil sovereigns in their own dominions Inasmuch as if St Peter, or our Saviour himself, had converted any of them to believe him and to acknowledge his kingdom, yet because his kingdom is not of this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his subjects to none but him, or else he must have deprived him of the sovereignty to which the right of teaching is inseparably annexed And thus much in refutation of his first book, wherein he would prove St Peter to have been the monarch universal of the Church, that is to say, of all the Christians in the world

The second book hath two conclusions one, that St Peter was Bishop of Rome, and there died, the other, that the Popes of Rome are his successors, both which have been disputed by others But supposing them true, yet if by *Bishop of Rome* be understood either the monarch of the Church, or the supreme pastor of it, not

Silvester, but Constantine (who was the first Christian emperor) was that bishop, and as Constantine, so all other Christian emperors were of right supreme bishops of the Roman Empire I say, of the Roman Empire, not of all Christendom, for other Christian sovereigns had the same right in their several territories, as to an office essentially adherent to their sovereignty which shall serve for answer to his second book

In the third book he handleth the question whether the Pope be Antichrist For my part, I see no argument that proves he is so, in that sense the Scripture useth the name nor will I take any argument from the quality of Antichrist to contradict the authority he exerciseth, or hath heretofore exercised, in the dominions of any other prince or state

It is evident that the prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the Jews expected, a Messiah, that is, a Christ, that should re-establish amongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected by them in the time of Samuel when they required a king after the manner of other nations This expectation of theirs made them obnoxious to the imposture of all such as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the kingdom, and the art to deceive the people by counterfeit miracles, by hypocritical life, or by orations and doctrine plausible Our Saviour therefore, and his Apostles, forewarned men of false prophets and of false Christs False Christs are such as pretend to be the Christ, but are not, and are called properly *Antichrists* in such sense as when there happeneth a schism in the Church by the election of two Popes the one calleth the other *Antipapa*, or the false Pope And therefore *Antichrist* in the proper signification hath two essential marks one, that he denieth Jesus to be Christ, and another that he professeth himself to be Christ The first mark is set down by St John in his first Epistle, 4 3, 'Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God, and this is the spirit of Antichrist' The other mark is expressed in the words of our Saviour, 'Many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ,' and again, 'If any man shall say unto you, Lo, here is Christ, there is Christ, believe it not' And therefore Antichrist must be a false Christ, that is, some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be Christ And so of that

another usual signification of the word *Antichrist*. But of these many Antichrists, there is one special one, ὁ Αντίχριστος, the *Antichrist*,

denieth Jesus to be the Christ, I perceive not how he can be called *Antichrist*, by which word is not meant one that falsely pretendeth to be his lieutenant, or vicar general, but to be He There is also some mark of the time of this special Antichrist, as when that abominable destroyer, spoken of by Daniel,¹ shall stand in the holy place,² and such tribulation as was not since the beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again, insomuch as if it were to last long, "no flesh could be saved, but for the elect's sake those days shall be shortened,"³ (made fewer) But that tribulation is not yet come, for it is to be followed immediately by a darkening of the sun and moon, a falling of the stars, a concussion of the heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Saviour in the clouds.⁴ And therefore the Antichrist is not yet come, whereas

him but he doth it not as Christ, but as for Christ, wherein there is nothing of the Antichrist

In the fourth book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme judge in all questions of faith and manners, which is as much as to be the absolute monarch of all Christians in the world, he bringeth three propositions the first, that his judgements are infallible, the second, that he can make very laws, and punish those that observe them not the third, that our Saviour conferred all jurisdiction ecclesiastical on the Pope of Rome

For the infallibility of his judgements, he allegeth the Scriptures the first, that of Luke, 22 31, "Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired you that he may sift you as wheat, but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not, and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren" This, according to Bellarmine's exposition, is that

tion readeth that chapter shall find there is no place in the whole Scripture that maketh more against the Pope's authority than this very place The priests and scribes, seeking to kill our Saviour at the Passover, and Judas possessed with a resolution to betray him, and the day of killing the Pope as he came to a Sabbath

them was to betray him Hereupon they questioned which of them should be, and withal, seeing the next Passover their master would celebrate should be when he was king, entered into a contention who should then be the greatest man Our Saviour therefore told them that the kings of the nations had dominion over their subjects, and are called by a name in Hebrew that signifies *bountiful*, but I cannot be so to you, you must endeavour to serve one an

judging the twelve tribes of Israel" And then addressing himself to St Peter, he saith, "Simon, Simon, Satan seeks, by suggesting a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future, but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith shall not fail, thou therefore note this being converted, and understanding my kingdom as of another world, confirm the same faith in thy brethren" To which St Peter answered (as one that no more expected any authority in this world), "Lord, I am ready to go with thee, not only to prison, but to death" Whereby it is man

definitive in matter of faith, there is no more to be attributed out of this text than that Peter should continue in the belief of this point, name-

¹ Daniel, 9. 27

² Matthew, 24. 15.

³ Ibid. 24. 22.

⁴ Ibid. 24. 29.

my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." By which, as I have already

shown in this chapter, is proved no more than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the confession of Peter, which gave occasion to that speech, namely this, that *Jesus is Christ the Son of God*

The third text is John, 21 16, 17, "Feed my sheep", which contains no more but a commission of teaching And if we grant the rest of the Apostles to be contained in that name of *sheep* then it is the supreme power of teaching but it was only for the time that there were no Christian sovereigns already possessed of

by virtue of their being baptized, though without other imposition of hands For such imposition, being a ceremony of designing the person, is needless when he is already designed to the power of teaching what doctrine he will, by his institution to an absolute power over his subjects For as I have proved before, sovereigns are supreme teachers, in general, by their office, and therefore oblige themselves, by their baptism, to teach the doctrine of Christ and when they suffer others to teach their people, they do it at the peril of their own souls for it is at the hands of the heads of families that God

way of the Lord, and do justice and judgement"

The fourth place is that of Exodus, 28 30, "Thou shalt put in the breastplate of judgement, the Urim and the Thumnum" which he saith is interpreted by the Septuagint, *δηλωσις και*

given, or be it but admonition to the priest to endeavour to inform himself clearly, and give judgement uprightly, yet in that it was given to

ecclesiastical persons of

necessary to salvation But with this mitigation, he attributeth no more infallibility to the Pope than to any man that professeth Christianity, and is not to be damned for if any man err in any point, wherein not to err is necessary to salvation, it is impossible he should be saved, for that only is necessary to salvation without which to be saved is impossible What points these are I shall declare out of the Scripture in

ions of another prince, unless we shall also say a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all occasions the best workman, even then also when he hath formerly promised his work to another

Besides the text, he argueth from reason, thus If the Pope could err in necessities then Christ hath not sufficiently provided for the Church's salvation, because he hath commanded her to follow the Pope's directions But this reason is invalid, unless he show when and where Christ commanded that, or took at all any notice of a Pope Nay, granting whatsoever was given to St Peter was given to the Pope, yet seeing there is in the Scripture no command to any man to obey St Peter, no man can be just that obeyeth him when his commands are contrary to those of his lawful sovereign

Lastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope himself, that he is the civil sovereign of all the Christians in the world, and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his jurisdiction in point of manners For the civil sovereignty and supreme judicature in controversies of manners, are the same thing and the makers of civil laws are not only declarers, but also makers of the justice and in justice of actions there being nothing in men's manners that makes them righteous or unrighteous, but their conformity with the law of the sovereign And therefore when the Pope lengtheneth supremacy in controversies of manners, he teacheth men to disobey the civil sovereign,

17 12, "The man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest, that standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die, and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel." For answer whereunto we are to remember that the

disobey the civil sovereign for the time being, or any of his officers, in the execution of their places, that man shall die," etc., which is clearly for the civil sovereignty, against the universal power of the Pope.

Secondly, he allegeth that of Matthew, 16, "Whatsoever ye shall bind," etc., and interpreteth it for such binding as is attributed to the Scribes and Pharisees, "They bind heavy burdens, and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders",¹ by which is meant, he says, making of laws, and concludes thence that the Pope can make laws. But this also maketh only for the legislative power of civil sovereigns: for the Scribes and Pharisees sat in Moses' chair, but Moses next under God was sovereign of the people of Israel: and therefore our Saviour commanded them to do all that they should say, but not all that they should do, that is, to obey their laws, but not follow their example.

The third place is John, 21. 16, "Feed my sheep", which is not a power to make laws, but a command to teach. Making laws belongs to the lord of the family, who by his own discretion chooseth his chaplain, as also a schoolmaster to teach his children.

The fourth place, John, 20. 21, is against him. The words are, "As my Father sent me, so send I you." But our Saviour was sent to redeem by his death such as should believe, and by his own and his Apostles' preaching to prepare them for their entrance into his kingdom, which

suade men to expect his second coming with a steadfast faith; and in the meantime, if subjects, to obey their princes, and if princes, both to believe it themselves and to do their best to make their subjects do the same, which is the office of a bishop. Therefore this place maketh

good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay up

power. But who is there that, reading this text, can say this style of the Apostles may not as properly be used in giving counsel as in making laws? The style of a law is, "we command" but, "we think good," is the ordinary style of them

case they will not see I have shewn before (Chapter twenty five) that law is distinguished from counsel in this, that the reason of a law is taken from the design and benefit of him that prescribeth it, but the reason of a counsel, from the design and benefit of him to whom the counsel is given. But here, the Apostles aim only at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely, their salvation, not at their own benefit, for having done their endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed or not. And therefore the acts of this council were not laws, but counsels.

The sixth place is that of Romans, 13, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God", which is meant, he saith, not only of secular, but also of ecclesiastical princes. To which I answer, first, that there are no ecclesiastical princes but those that are also civil sovereigns, and their principalities exceed not the compass of their civil sovereignty; without those bounds, though they may be received for doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for princes. For if the Apostle had meant we should be subject both to our own princes and also to the Pope, he had taught us a doctrine which Christ himself hath told us is impossible, namely, to serve two masters. And though the Apostle say in another place, "I write these things being absent, lest being present I should

send St. Peter to make laws here, but to per-

¹ Matthew, 23. 4.

² Acts, 1. 6, 7.

without the civil power, is no more but a leav-
er pain to the excommunicant than to the ex-
communicate

The seventh place is I Corinthians, 4 21,

of excommunication, which is not in its own

hath broken the law, but a revenge, as upon an
enemy, or revolter, that denyeth the right of

the monarch of the Church, St Peter But sup-
pose this precept made by the authority of St.
Peter, yet I see no reason why to call it a law,

good physicians so many laws, but that it is not
the imperative manner of speaking, but an ab-
solute subjection to a person, that maketh his
precepts laws?

In like manner, the ninth place, I Timothy, 5
19, "Against an elder receive not an accusation,
but before two or three witnesses," is a wise pre-
cept, but not a law.

The tenth place is Luke, 10. 16, "He that
heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth
you, despiseth me." And there is no doubt but
he that despiseth the counsel of those that are
sent by Christ despiseth the counsel of Christ

¹ II Corinthians, 13 10

himself But who are those now that are sent by
Christ but such as are ordained pastors by law-
ful authority? And who are lawfully ordained
that are not ordained by the sovereign pastor?
And who is ordained by the sovereign pastor in
a Christian Commonwealth that is not ordained
by the authority of the sovereign thereof?
Out of this place therefore it followeth that he
which heareth his sovereign, being a Christian,
heareth Christ; and he that despiseth the doc-
trine which his king, being a Christian, author-
izeth despiseth the doctrine of Christ, which is
not that which Bellarmine intendeth here to
prove, but the contrary But all this is nothing
to a law Nay more, a Christian king, as a pastor
and teacher of his subjects makes not thereby

men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as
they would not otherwise do, and which he
ought not to command, and yet when they are
commanded, they are laws, and the external
actions done in obedience to them, without the
inward approbation, are the actions of the sov-
ereign, and not of the subject, which is in that
case but as an instrument, without any motion
of his own at all, because God hath command-
ed to obey them

The eleventh is every place where the Apos-
tle, for counsel, putteth some word by which

is, "I commend you for keeping those things I
delivered to you, as I delivered them" which
is far from signifying that they were laws, or
anything else, but good counsel And that of I
Thessalonians, 4 2, "You know what command-
ments we gave you" where the Greek word is
παρηγγελίας ἐδόκαμεν, equivalent to *παρεδωκα-
μεν*, "what we delivered to you," as in the place
next before alleged, which does not prove the
traditions of the Apostles to be any more than
counsels, though as is said in the eighth verse,
"he that despiseth them, despiseth not man, but
God" for our Saviour himself came not to
judge, that is, to be king in this world, but to
sacrifice himself for sinners, and leave doctors
in his Church, to lead, not to drive men to
Christ, who never accepteth forced actions
(which is all the law produceth), but the in-
ward conversion of the heart, which is not the
work of laws, but of counsel and doctrine

And that of II Thessalonians, 3. 14, "If any man obey not our word by this epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may be ashamed": where from the word *obey*, he would infer that this epistle was a law to the Thessalonians. The epistles of the emperors were indeed laws. If therefore the Epistle of St. Paul were also a law, they were to obey two

disobeys, nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce him, which legislators may all do, but avoid his company, that he may be ashamed whereby it is evident it was not the empire of an Apostle, but his reputation amongst the faithful, which the Christians stood in awe of.

The last place is that of Hebrews, 13. 17, "Obey your leaders, and submit yourselves to them, for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account" and here also is intended by obedience, a following of their counsel for the reason of our obedience is not drawn from the will and command of our pastors, but from our own benefit, as being the salvation of our souls they watch for, and not for the exaltation of their own power and authority. If it were meant here that all they teach were laws, then not only the Pope, but every pastor in his parish should have legislative power. Again, they that are bound to obey their pastors have no power to examine their commands. What then shall we say to St. John, who bids us "not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits whether they are of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the world?" It is therefore manifest that we may dispute the doctrine of our pastors, but no man can dispute a law. The commands of civil sovereigns are on all sides granted to be laws: if any else can make a law besides himself, all Commonwealth, and consequently all peace and justice, must cease, which is contrary to all laws, both divine and human. Nothing therefore can be drawn from these or any other places of Scripture to prove the decrees of the Pope, where he has not also the civil sovereignty, to be laws.

but between the Pope and other bishops. And

Christ, after his ascension into heaven, "gave gifts to men, some Apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors, and some teachers"; and thence infers they have indeed

yet not immediately, what lawful jurisdiction, though but civil, is there in a Christian Commonwealth that is not also *de jure divino*? For Christian kings have their civil power from God immediately, and the magistrates under Him exercise their several charges in virtue of His commission, wherein that which they do is no less *de jure divino mediato* than that which the bishops do in virtue of the Pope's ordination. All lawful power is of God, immediately in the supreme governor, and mediately in those that have authority under him: so that either he must grant every constable in the state to hold his office in the sight of God, or he must not hold that any bishop holds his so, besides the Pope himself.

But this whole dispute, whether Christ left the jurisdiction to the Pope only, or to other bishops also, if considered out of those places where the Pope has the civil sovereignty, is a contention *de lana caprina* for none of them, where they are not sovereigns, has any jurisdiction at all. For jurisdiction is the power of

also wrong, that is, to make laws, and with the sword of justice to compel men to obey his de-

disciples together, and chose twelve of them, which he named Apostles, he proveth that he elected them (all, except Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas), and gave them power and command to preach, but not to judge of causes between man and man: for that is a power which he re-

world." But he that hath not the power in hear

and determine between man and man cannot be said to have any jurisdiction at all And yet this hinders not but that our Saviour gave them power to preach and baptize in all parts of the world, supposing they were not by their own lawful sovereign forbidden for to our own sovereigns Christ himself and his Apostles have in sundry places expressly commanded us in all things to be obedient

The arguments by which he would prove that bishops receive their jurisdiction from the

have it, from their civil sovereigns, I will not omit the recital of them

The first is from Numbers, 11, where Moses, not being able alone to undergo the whole burden of administering the affairs of the people of Israel, God commanded him to choose seventy elders, and took part of the spirit of Moses, to put it upon those seventy elders by which is understood, not that God weakened the spirit of Moses, for that had not eased him at all, but that they had all of them their authority from

ereign and therefore that place proveth that bishops in every Christian Commonwealth have their authority from the civil sovereign, and from the Pope in his own territories only, and not in the territories of any other state

The second argument is from the nature of monarchy, wherein all authority is in one man, and in others by derivation from him But the government of the Church, he says, is monarchical This also makes for Christian monarchs For they are really monarchs of their own people, that is, of their own Church (for the Church is the same thing with a Christian people), whereas the power of the Pope, though he were St Peter, is neither monarchy, nor hath anything of *archical* nor *cratical*, but only of *didactical* for God accepteth not a forced, but a willing obedience

The third is from that the See of St Peter is called by St Cyprian, the *head*, the *source*, the *root*, the *sun*, from whence the authority of bishops is derived But by the law of nature, which is a better principle of right and wrong than the word of any doctor that is but a man, the civil sovereign in every Commonwealth is

the head, the source, the root, and the sun, from which all jurisdiction is derived And therefore the jurisdiction of bishops is derived from the civil sovereign

The fourth is taken from the inequality of their jurisdictions for if God, saith he, had given it them immediately, He had given as well equality of jurisdiction, as of order but we see some are bishops but of one town, some of a hundred towns, and some of many whole provinces, which differences were not determined by the command of God their jurisdiction therefore is not of God, but of man, and one has a greater, another a less, as it pleaseth the Prince of the Church Which argument, if he had proved before that the Pope had had a universal jurisdiction over all Christians, had been for his purpose But seeing that hath not been proved, and that it is notoriously known the large jurisdiction of the Pope was given him by those that had it, that is, by the emperors of Rome (for the Patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely, of being bishop of the capital city of the Empire, and seat of the emperor, claimed to be equal to him), it followeth that all other bishops have their jurisdiction from the sovereigns of the place wherein they exercise the same and as for that cause they have not their authority *de jure divino*, so neither hath the Pope his *de jure divino* except only where he is also the civil sovereign

His fifth argument is this 'If bishops have their jurisdiction immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can do nothing contrary to God's ordination, and this consequence is good and well proved "But," saith he, 'the Pope can do this, and has done it' This also is granted, so he do it in his own dominions, or in the dominions of any other prince that hath given him that power, but not universally, in right of the popedom for that power belongeth to every Christian sovereign, within the bounds of his own empire, and is inseparable from the sovereignty Before the people of Israel had, by the commandment of God to Samuel, set over themselves a king, after the manner of other nations, the high priest had the civil government, and none but he could make nor depose an inferior priest But that power

Abiathar the high priest of his office,¹ and placed Zadok in his room.² Kings therefore may in the like manner ordain and deprive bishops, as they shall think fit, for the well governing of their subjects.

His sixth argument is this: if bishops have their jurisdiction *de jure divino* that is, immediately from God, they that maintain it should bring some word of God to prove it: but they can bring none. The argument is good, I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is an argument no less good to prove the Pope himself to have no jurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince.

Lastly, he bringeth for argument the testimony of two Popes, Innocent and Leo, and I doubt not but he might have alleged, with as good reason, the testimonies of all the Popes almost since St. Peter: for, considering the love of power naturally implanted in mankind, who-soever were made Pope, he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Nevertheless, they should therein but do as Innocent and Leo did, bear witness of themselves, and therefore their witness should not be good.

In the fifth book he hath four conclusions. The first is that the Pope is not lord of all the world, the second, that the Pope is not lord of all the Christian world, the third that the Pope, without his own territory, has not any temporal jurisdiction *directly*. These three conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is that the Pope has, in the dominions of other princes, the supreme temporal power *indirectly*: which is denied, unless he mean by *indirectly* that he has gotten it by indirect means, then it is that also granted. But I understand that when he saith he hath it indirectly, he means that such temporal jurisdiction belongeth to him of right, but that this right is but a consequence of his pastoral authority, the which he could not exercise, unless he have the other with it: and therefore to the pastoral power, which he calls *spiritual*, the supreme power civil is necessarily annexed, and that thereby he hath a right to change kingdoms, giving them to one, and taking them from another, when he shall think it conduces to the salvation of souls.

Before I come to consider the arguments by which he would prove this doctrine, it will not be amiss to lay open the consequences of it, that princes and states that have the civil sovereignty in their several Commonwealths may bethink themselves whether it be convenient for them,

and conducing to the good of their subjects of whom they are to give an account at the day of judgement, to admit the same.

When it is said the Pope hath not, in the territories of other states, the supreme civil power directly, we are to understand he doth not challenge it, as other civil sovereigns do, from the original submission thereto of those that are to be governed. For it is evident, and has already been sufficiently in this treatise demonstrated, that the right of all sovereigns is derived originally from the consent of every one of those that are to be governed, whether they that choose him do it for their common defence against an enemy, as when they agree amongst themselves to appoint a man or an assembly of men to protect them, or whether they do it to save their lives, by submission to a conquering enemy. The Pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the supreme civil power over other states *directly*, denieth no more but that his right cometh to him by that way, he ceaseth not for all that to claim it another way, and that is,

pacely. But by what way soever he pretend, the power is the same, and he may, if it be granted to be his right, depose princes and states, as often as it is for the salvation of souls, that is, as often as he will: for he claimeth also the sole power to judge whether it be to the salvation of men's souls, or not. And this is the doctrine, not only that Bellarmine here, and many other doctors teach in their sermons and books, but also that some councils have decreed, and the Popes

(in the third Chapter, *De Hæreticis*), hath this canon: "If a king at the Pope's admonition, do not purge his kingdom of heretics, and being excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction within a year, his subjects are absolved of their obedience." And the practice hereof hath been seen on diverse occasions: as in the deposing of Childeric, King of France, in the translation of

of France, and in many more occurrences. I think there be few princes that consider not this as unjust and inconvenient, but I wish they would all resolve to be kings or subjects. Men cannot serve two masters. They ought therefore

¹ 1 Kings, 2. 26, 27

² *Ibid.*, 2. 35.

to ease them, either by holding the reins of government wholly in their own hands, or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the Pope, that such men as are willing to be obedient may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of *temporal* and *spiritual* power is but words. Power is as really divided, and as generously to all purposes, by sharing with another indirect power, as with a direct one. But we come now to his arguments.

The first is this, "The civil power is subject to the spiritual: therefore he that hath the supreme power spiritual hath right to command temporal princes, and dispose of their temporals in order to the spiritual. As for the distinction of temporal and spiritual, let us consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly that the temporal or civil power is subject to the spiritual. There be but two ways that those words can be made sense. For when we say one power is subject to another power, the meaning either is that he which hath the one is subject to him that hath the other, or that the one power is to the other as the means to the end. For we cannot understand that one power hath power over another power, or that one power can have right or command over another for subjection, command, right, and power are accidents, not of powers, but of persons. One power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a saddler to the art of a rider. If then it be granted that the civil government be ordained as a means to bring us to a spiritual felicity, yet it does not follow that if a king have the civil power, and the Pope the spiritual, that therefore the king is bound to obey the Pope, more than every saddler is bound to obey every rider. Therefore as from subordination of an art cannot be inferred the subjection of the professor, so from the

ual prince may command temporal princes
(where the conclusion is the same with the antecedent)

the members depend one upon another but things spiritual depend not of things temporal therefore temporal depend on spiritual, and therefore are subject to them." In which argu-

mentation there be two gross errors: one is that all Christian kings, popes, clergy, and all other Christian men make but one Commonwealth for it is evident that France is one Commonwealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, etc. And these consist of Christians, and therefore also are several bodies of Christians, that is to

which it hath not on earth for if it had, there is no doubt but that all Christendom were one Commonwealth, whose sovereign were that representant, both in things spiritual and temporal and the Pope, to make himself this representant, wanteth three things that our Saviour hath not given him, to *command* and to *judge*, and to *punish*, otherwise than, by excommunication, to run from those that will not learn of him for though the Pope were Christ's only vicar, yet he cannot exercise his government till

that he says the members of every Commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend one of another. It seems he confoundeth rather he says

man so much as cohering to another, for want of a common dependence on a known sovereign just as the members of the natural body dissolve into earth for want of a soul to hold them together. Therefore there is nothing in this similitude from whence to infer a dependence of the laity on the clergy, or of the temporal officers on the spiritual, but of both on the civil sovereign which ought indeed to direct his civil commands to the salvation of souls, but is not therefore subject to any but God Himself. And thus you see the laboured fallacy of the first argument, to deceive such men as distinguish not between the subordination of actions in the way to the end, and the subjection of

monwealth, because it is supposed to be perfect and sufficient in itself, may command any other Commonwealth not subject to it, and force it to change the administration of the government, may depose the prince, and set another in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend itself against the injuries he goes about to do them: much more may a spiritual Commonwealth command a temporal one to change the administration of their government, and may depose princes, and institute others, when they cannot otherwise defend the spiritual good."

That a Commonwealth, to defend itself against injuries, may lawfully do all that he hath here said is very true, and hath already in that which hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated. And if it were also true that there is now in this world a spiritual Commonwealth, distinct from a civil Commonwealth, then might the prince thereof, upon injury done him, or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to come, repair and secure himself by war, which is, in sum, deposing, killing, or subduing, or doing any act of hostility. But by the same reason, it would be no less lawful for a civil sovereign upon the like injuries done, or feared to make war upon the spiritual sovereign, which I believe is more than Cardinal Bellarmine would have inferred from his own proposition.

But spiritual Commonwealth there is none

justly, and believed that he was the Christ, shall, though they died *natural bodies, rise spiritual bodies* and then it is that our Saviour shall judge the world, and conquer his adversaries, and make a spiritual Commonwealth. In the meantime, seeing there are no men on earth whose bodies are spiritual, there can be no spiritual Commonwealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh, unless we call preachers, that have commission to teach and prepare men for their reception into the kingdom of Christ at the resurrection, a Commonwealth, which I have proved already to be none.

The third argument is this: "It is not lawful

to determine whether the prince be to be deposed, or not deposed."

To this I answer that both these assertions are false. For Christians, or men of what religion soever, if they tolerate not their king, whatsoever law he maketh, though it be concerning religion, do violate their faith, contrary to the divine law, both *natural* and *positive*: nor is there any judge of heresy amongst subjects but their own civil sovereign. For heresy is nothing else but a private opinion, obstinately maintained contrary to the opinion which the public person (that is to say, the representative of the Commonwealth) hath commanded to be taught. By which it is manifest that an opinion publicly appointed to be taught cannot be heresy, nor the sovereign princes that authorize them, heretics. For heretics are none but private men that stubbornly defend some doctrine prohibited by their lawful sovereigns.

But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate infidel or heretical kings, he allegeth a place in Deuteronomy where God forbiddeth the Jews, when they shall set a king over themselves to choose a stranger, and from thence inferreth that it is unlawful for a Christian to choose a king that is not a Christian. And it is true that he that is a Christian, that is, he that hath already obliged himself to receive our Saviour, when he shall come, for his king shall tempt God too much in choosing for king in this world one that he knoweth will endeavour, both by terror and persuasion, to make him violate his faith. But, it is, saith he, the same danger to choose one that is not a Christian for king and not to depose him when he is chosen. To this I say, the question is not of the danger of not deposing, but of the justice of deposing him. To choose him may in some cases be unjust but to depose him, when he is chosen is in no case just. For it is always violation of faith, and consequently against the law of nature, which is the eternal law of God. Nor do we read that any such doctrine was accounted Christian.

Dioclesian, nor Julian, nor Valens, an Arian for this cause only, that they wanted temporal forces. Perhaps so. But did our Saviour, who for calling for might have had twelve legions of immortal, invulnerable angels to assist him, want forces to depose Cæsar, or at least Pilate, that unjustly, without finding fault in him, delivered him to the Jews to be crucified? Or if the Apostles wanted temporal forces to depose

Deuteronomy, 17 [15]

Nero, was it therefore necessary for them in their epistles to the new made Christians to teach them, as they did, to obey the powers constituted over them, whereof Nero in that time was one, and that they ought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for conscience sake? Shall we say they did not only obey, but also teach what they meant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore for want of strength, but for conscience sake, that Christians are to tolerate their heathen princes, or princes (for I cannot call any one whose doctrine is the public doctrine, a heretic) that authorize the teaching of an error. And whereas for the temporal power of the Pope, he allegeth further that St Paul appointed judges under the heathen princes of those times, such as were not ordained by those princes,¹ it is not true. For St Paul does but advise them to take some of their brethren to compound their differences, as arbitrators, rather than to go to law one with another before the heathen judges, which is a whole

competent judge, or if he be, the Pope's temporal subjects may judge also of the Pope's doctrine. For every Christian prince, as I have for

and promise to keep and defend the Christian faith. This is true, for Christian kings are no more but Christ's subjects but they may, for all that, be the Pope's fellows, for they are supreme pastors of their own subjects, and the Pope is no more but king and pastor, even in Rome itself.

The fifth argument is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour, "Feed my sheep", by which was given all power necessary for a pastor, as the power to chase away wolves, such as are heretics, the power to shut up rams, if they be mad, or push at the other sheep with their horns, such as are evil, though Christian, kings, and power to give the flock convenient food from whence he inferreth that St Peter had these three powers given him by Christ. To which I answer that the last of these powers is no more than the power, or rather command, to teach. For the first, which is to chase away wolves,

that is, heretics, the place he quoteth is, "Beware of false prophets which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves."² But neither are heretics false prophets, or at all prophets nor (admitting heretics for the wolves there meant) were the Apostles commanded to kill them, or if they were kings, to depose them, but to beware of, fly, and avoid them. Nor was it to St Peter, nor to any of the Apostles, but to the multitude of the Jews that followed him into the mountain, men for the most part not yet converted, that he gave this counsel, to beware of false prophets which therefore, if it confer a power of chasing away

esteem those Christians that disobey the Church, that is, that disobey the Christian sovereign, as heathen men and as publicans. Seeing then men challenge to the Pope no authority over heathen princes, they ought to challenge none over those that are to be esteemed as heathen.

But from the power to teach only, he inferreth also a coercive power in the Pope over kings. The pastor, saith he, must give his flock convenient food: therefore the Pope may and ought

after the election of King Saul was a mere subject. The fact of St Ambrose in excommunicating Theodosius the Emperor, if it were true he did so, was a capital crime. And for the Popes, Gregory I, Gregory II, Zachary, and Leo III, their judgements are void, as given in their

¹ Mathew, 7 15

² II Kings, 11

¹ I Corinthians, 6

own cause; and the acts done by them conformably to this doctrine are the greatest crimes, especially that of Zachary, that are incident to human nature. And thus much of power ecclesiastical, wherein I had been more brief, forbearing to examine these arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been his as a private man, and not as the champion of the Papacy against all other Christian princes and states

CHAPTER XLIII

Of what is Necessary for a Man's Reception into the Kingdom of Heaven

THE most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war in Christian Commonwealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved of obeying at once both God and man then when their commandments are one contrary to the other. It is manifest enough that when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is God's, he

therefore consisteth in this, that men, when they are commanded in the name of God, know not in diverse cases whether the command be from God, or whether he that commandeth do but abuse God's name for some private ends of his own. For as there were in the Church of the Jews many false prophets that sought reputation with the people by feigned dreams and visions, so there have been in all times, in the Church of Christ, false teachers that seek reputation with the people by fantastical and false doctrines, and by such reputation, as is the nature of ambition, to govern them for their private benefit.

But this difficulty of obeying both God and the civil sovereign on earth, to those that can distinguish between what is necessary and what is not necessary for their reception into the kingdom of God, is of no moment. For if the command of the civil sovereign be such as that it may be obeyed without the forfeiture of life

eternal death, then it were madness to obey it, and the counsel of our Saviour takes place, "Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul"¹. All men therefore that would avoid both the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted for disobedience to their earthly sovereign, and those that shall be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to God, have need be taught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not, necessary to eternal salvation.

All that is necessary to salvation is contained in two virtues, *faith in Christ*, and *obedience to laws*. The latter of these, if it were perfect, were

sions, there is required at our hands now, not only obedience for the rest of our time, but also a remission of sins for the time past, which remission is the reward of our faith in Christ. That nothing else is necessarily required to salvation is manifest from this, that the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but to sinners, that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the law, nor to them, in case they repent, and believe all the articles of Christian faith necessary to salvation.

The obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all our actions the will for the deed, is a serious endeavour to obey Him, and is called also by all such names as signify that endeavour. And therefore obedience is some times called by the names of *charity* and *love*, because they imply a will to obey, and our Saviour himself maketh our love to God, and to one another, a fulfilling of the whole law, and

and sometimes by the name of *repentance*, because to repent implieth a turning away from sin, which is the same with the return of the will to obedience. Whosoever therefore unfeignedly desireth to fulfil the commandments of God, or repenteth him truly of his transgressions, or that loveth God with all his heart, and his neighbour as himself, hath all the obedience necessary to his reception into the kingdom of God: for if God should require perfect innocence, there could no flesh be saved.

But what commandments are those that God hath given us? Are all those laws which were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses the commandments of God? If they be, why are

¹ Matthew, 10. 28

cannot be obeyed, without being damned to

not Christians taught to obey them? If they be not, what others are so besides the law of nature? For our Saviour Christ hath not given us new laws, but counsel to observe those we are

on the Mount, but only expounded the laws of Moses, to which they were subject before. The laws of God therefore are none but the laws of nature, whereof the principal is that we should not violate our faith, that is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns, which we constituted over us by mutual pact one with another. And this law of God, that commandeth obedi-

ter, is there only law where the civil sovereign hath made it so, and in other places but counsel, which a man at his own peril may without injustice refuse to obey.

Knowing now what is the obedience neces-

sary points necessarily to be believed by them that shall be saved. And first, for the person whom we believe, because it is impossible to believe any person before we know what he saith, it is necessary he be one that we have heard speak. The person therefore whom Abraham Isaac, Jacob Moses, and the prophets believed was God Himself that spake unto them supernaturally, and the person whom the Apostles and Disciples that conversed with Christ believed, was our Saviour himself. But of them, to whom neither God the Father nor our Saviour ever spake it cannot be said that the person whom they believed was God. They believed the Apostles, and after them the pastors and doctors of the Church that recommended to their faith the history of the Old and New Testament so that the faith of Christians ever since our Saviour's time hath had for foundation, first, the reputation of their pastors, and afterward, the authority of those that made the Old and New Testament to be received for the rule of faith which none could do but Christian sovereigns, who are therefore the supreme pastors, and the only persons whom Christians now hear speak from God, except such as God speaketh to in these days supernaturally. But because there be many false prophets gone out into the world, other men are to examine such spirits, as St John adviseth us, "whether they be of God, or not."

And therefore, seeing the examination of doctrines belongeth to the supreme pastor, the person which all they that have no special revelation are to believe is, in every Commonwealth, the supreme pastor, that is to say, the civil sovereign.

The causes why men believe any Christian doctrine are various for faith is the gift of God, and He worketh it in each several man by such ways as it seemeth good unto Himself. The most ordinary immediate cause of our belief, concerning any point of Christian faith, is that we believe the Bible to be the word of God. But why we believe the Bible to be the word of God is much disputed, as all questions must needs be that are not well stated. For they make not the question to be, *why we believe it* but *how*

and the other side on the testimony of the private spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For how shall a man know the infallibility of the Church but by knowing first the infallibility of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own private spirit to be other than a belief grounded upon the authority and arguments of his teachers or upon a presumption of his own gifts? Besides, there is nothing in the Scripture from which can be inferred the infallibility of the Church, much less, of any particular Church and least of all, the infallibility of any particular man.

It is manifest therefore, that Christian men do not know, but only believe the Scripture to be the word of God and that the means of making them believe, which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according to the way of

they have not heard? And how shall they hear

our parents in their houses, and our pastors in the churches which also is made more mani-

¹ I John, 4 1

² Romans, 10 17

³ Ibid., 10 14, 15

fest by experience For what other cause can there be assigned why in Christian Commonwealths all men either believe or at least profess the Scripture to be the word of God, and in other Commonwealths scarce any, but that in Christian Commonwealths they are taught it from their infancy, and in other places they are taught otherwise?

But if teaching be the cause of faith, why do not all believe? It is certain therefore that faith is the gift of God, and He giveth it to whom He will Nevertheless, because to them to whom He giveth it, He giveth it by the means of teachers, the immediate cause of faith is hearing In a school, where many are taught, and some profit, others profit not, the cause of learning in them that profit is the master, yet it cannot be thence inferred that learning is not the gift of God All good things proceed from God, yet cannot all that have them say they are inspired, for that implies a gift supernatural, and the immediate hand of God, which he that pretends to, pretends to be a prophet, and is subject to the examination of the Church

But whether men know, or believe, or grant the Scriptures to be the word of God, if out of such places of them as are without obscurity I shall show what articles of faith are necessary, and only necessary, for salvation, those men must needs know, believe, or grant the same

The *unum necessarium*, only article of faith, which the Scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation is this, that *Jesus is the Christ*. By the name of *Christ* is understood the King which God had before promised by the prophets of the Old Testament to send into the world, to reign (over the Jews and over such of other nations as should believe in him) under Himself eternally, and to give them that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam Which, when I have proved out of Scripture, I will further show when, and in what sense, some other articles may be also called necessary.

For proof that the belief of this article, *Jesus is the Christ*, is all the faith required to salva-

tion, that hath already been shewed in the

he was saluted King when he entered into Jerusalem, that he forewarned them to beware of all others that should pretend to be Christ; that he was taken, accused, and put to death for saying he was King, that the cause of his condemnation, written on the cross, was *JESUS OF NAZARETH, THE KING OF THE JEWS* All which tend to no other end than this, that men should believe that *Jesus is the Christ*. Such therefore was the scope of St. Matthew's Gospel But the scope of all the evangelists, as may appear by reading them, was the same Therefore the scope of the whole Gospel was the establishing of that only article. And St. John expressly makes it his conclusion, "These things are written, that you may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God."

My second argument is taken from the subject of the sermons of the Apostles, both whilst our Saviour lived on earth, and after his ascension The Apostles in our Saviour's time were sent to preach the kingdom of God for neither there, nor Matthew, 10. 7, giveth he any commission to them other than this, "As ye go, preach, saying, the kingdom of heaven is at hand", that is, that Jesus is the Messiah, the

to the rulers of the city, crying, These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also, whom Jason hath received And these all do contrary to the decrees of Cæsar, saying that there is another king, one Jesus" And out of the second and third verses of the same chapter, where it is said that St. Paul, "as his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus [whom he preached] is Christ"

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¹ John, 2

² Luke,

Nor could St Paul have said (1 Cor., 1 21), "It pleased God by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe" nor could St Paul himself have been saved much less have been so great a doctor of the Church so suddenly, that never perhaps thought of transubstantiation, nor purgatory, nor many other articles now obtruded

The fourth argument is taken from places express, and such as receive no controversy of interpretation, as first, John, 5 39, 'Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they that testify of me' Our Saviour here speaketh of the Scriptures only of the Old Testament, for the Jews at that time could not search the Scriptures of the New Testament, which were not written But the

and the like Therefore to believe that this Jesus was, he was sufficient to eternal life but more than sufficient is not necessary and consequently no other article is required Again, 'Whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall not die eternally' Therefore to believe in Christ is faith sufficient to eternal life, and consequently no more faith than that is necessary But to believe in Jesus, and to believe that Jesus is the Christ, is all one, as appeareth in the verses immediately following For when our Saviour had said to Martha, "Believest thou this?" she answereth, 'Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the world' Therefore this article alone is faith sufficient to life eternal and

ye might have life through his name" There, to believe that *Jesus is the Christ* is faith sufficient to the obtaining of life, and therefore

no other article is necessary Fourthly, I John, 4 2, Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God" And I John, 5 1, Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God" And verse 5, 'Who

Therefore this article believed, *Jesus is the Christ*

man, 'Thy faith hath saved thee, the cause he saith it is some confession which directly, or by consequence, implieth a belief that *Jesus is the Christ*

man shall say unto you, Lo, here is Christ, or there, believe it not, for there shall arise false Christs and false prophets and shall shew great signs and wonders etc Here, we see this article, *Jesus is the Christ* must be held, though he that shall teach the contrary should do great miracles The second place is Galatians, 1 8, 'Though we, or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that we have preached unto you let him be accursed' But the gospel which Paul and the other Apostles preached was only this article, that *Jesus is the Christ* therefore for the belief of this article,

therefore only fundamental A fourth Mat

I will build my Church from whence I infer that this article is that on which all other doc
[Matthew, 16 16]

¹ 1 Corinthians, 1 21

² John, 11 26

³ *Ibid*

⁴ *Ibid*, 11 27

trines of the Church are built, as on their foundation. A fifth is I Corinthians, 3, 11, 12, etc., "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, every man's work shall be made manifest, for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is. If any man's work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burnt, he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire." Which words, being partly plain and easy to understand, and partly allegorical and difficult, out of that which is plain may be inferred that pastors that teach this foundation, that *Jesus is the Christ*, though they draw from it false consequences (which all men are sometimes subject to), they may nevertheless be

fore the belief of this article is sufficient, and by consequence, there is no other article of faith necessarily required to salvation.

Now for the part which is allegorical, as that "the fire shall try every man's work," and that they "shall be saved, but so as by fire," or "through fire" (for the original is *διὰ πυρός*), it maketh nothing against this conclusion which I have drawn from the other words that are plain. Nevertheless, because upon this place

the Prophet Zechariah, who, speaking of the restoration of the kingdom of God, saith thus, "Two parts therein shall be cut off, and die, but the third shall be left therein, and I will

through that fire unhurt, and be therein (as silver and gold are refined by the fire from their dross) tried, and refined from their idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the

true God.¹ Alluding whereto, St. Paul here saith that "the day" (that is, the day of judgement,

then they that have built false consequences on the true foundation shall see their doctrines condemned, nevertheless they themselves shall be saved, and pass unhurt through this universal fire, and live eternally, to call upon the name of the true and only God. In which sense there is nothing that accordeth not with the rest of Holy Scripture, or any glimpse of the fire of purgatory.

But a man may here ask, whether it be not as necessary to salvation to believe that God is Omnipotent Creator of the world, that *Jesus Christ is risen*, and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the last day, as to believe that *Jesus is the Christ*. To which I answer, they are, and so are many more articles; but they are such as are contained in this one, and may be deduced from it, with more or less difficulty. For who is there that does not see that they who believe *Jesus to be the Son of the God of Israel*, and that the Israelites had for God the Omnipotent Creator of all things, do therein also believe that God is the Omnipotent Creator of all things? Or how can a man believe that *Jesus is the king that shall reign eternally*, unless he believe him also risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot exercise the of-

obtain remission of sins to the penitent, and consequently to bring them into the kingdom of heaven.

Now that I have shown that all the obedience required to salvation consisteth in the will to obey the law of God, that is to say, in repentance, and all the faith required in the same is comprehended in the belief of this article, *Jesus is the Christ*; I will further allege those places of the Gospel that prove that all that is necessary to salvation is contained in both these joined together. The men to whom St. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost, next after the ascension of our Saviour, asked him, and the rest of the Apostles, saying, "Men and breth-

¹ II Peter, 3.

¹ Zechariah, 13, 8, 9.

ren, what shall we do?"¹ To whom St Peter answered, "Repent, and be baptized every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost"² Therefore repentance and baptism, that is, believing that *Jesus is the Christ*, is all that is necessary to salvation. Again, our Saviour being asked by a certain ruler, "What shall I do to inherit eternal life?"³ answered, "Thou knowest the commandments, Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Honour thy father and thy mother"⁴ which when he said he had observed, our Saviour added, "Sell all thou hast, give it to the poor, and come and follow me", which was as much as to

justify in that sense in which to justify is the same as that to denominate a man just, and not in the signification of discharging the law, whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust

But a man is then also said to be justified when his plea, though in itself insufficient, is accepted, as when we plead our will, our endeavour to fulfil the law, and repent us of our failings, and God accepteth it for the performance of itself. And because God accepteth not the will for the deed, but only in the faithful, it is therefore, faith that makes good our plea, and in this sense it is that faith only justifies so that *faith* and *obedience* are both necessary to salvation, yet in several senses each of them is said to justify

Having thus shown what is necessary to salvation, it is not hard to reconcile our obedience to God with our obedience to the civil sovereign, who is either Christian or infidel. If he be a Christian, he alloweth the belief of this article, that *Jesus is the Christ*, and of all the articles that are contained in, or are by evident consequence deduced from it which is all the faith

the just therefore faith and justice (that is, the will to be just, or repentance) are all that is necessary to life eternal. And our Saviour preached, saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand, repent and believe the Evangel,⁵ that is, the good news that the Christ was come. Therefore to repent, and to believe that *Jesus is the Christ*, is all that is required to salvation

Seeing then it is necessary that faith and obedience (implied in the word *repentance*) do both concur to our salvation, the question by which of the two we are justified is impertinently disputed. Nevertheless, it will not be impertinent to make manifest in what manner each of them contributes thereunto, and in what sense it is said that we are to be justified by the one and by the other. And first, if by *righteousness* be understood the justice of the works themselves, there is no man that can be saved, for there is none that hath not transgressed the law of God. And therefore when we are said to be justified by works, it is to be understood of the will, which God doth always accept for the work itself, as well in good as in evil men. And in this sense only it is that a man is called *just*,

laws of God for besides the laws of nature and the laws of the Church, which are part of the civil law (for the Church that can make laws is the Commonwealth), there be no other laws divine. Whosoever therefore obeyeth his Chris

consequences, that is to say, make some superstrutions of hay or stubble, and command the teaching of the same, yet seeing St Paul says he shall be saved, much more shall he be saved that teacheth them by his command, and much more yet, he that teaches not, but only believes his lawful teacher. And in case a subject be forbidden by the civil sovereign to profess some of

taith, which before he was not. So that justice

a private man judge, when the question is of his own obedience? Or shall any man judge but

¹ Acts, 2 37

² *Ibid*, 2 38

³ Luke, 18 18

⁴ *Ibid* 18 20

⁵ Romans, 1 17.

⁶ Mark, 1 15

the two, St Peter or St Paul, err in a super-

structure, when St Paul withstood St Peter to his face? There can therefore be no contradiction between the laws of God and the laws of a Christian Commonwealth

And when the civil sovereign is an infidel, every one of his own subjects that resisteth him sinneth against the laws of God (for such are the laws of nature), and rejecteth the counsel of the Apostles that admonisheth all Christians to obey their princes, and all children and servants to obey their parents and masters in all things. And for their faith, it is internal and invisible, they have the license that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it. But if they do, they ought to expect their reward in heaven, and not complain of their lawful sovereign, much less make war upon him. For he that is not glad of any just occasion of martyrdom has not the faith he professeth, but pretends it only, to set some colour upon his own contumacy. But what infidel king is so unreasonable as, knowing he has a subject that waiteth for the second coming of Christ, after the present world shall be burnt, and intendeth then to obey Him (which is the intent of believing that Jesus is the Christ), and in the meantime thinketh himself bound to obey the laws of that infidel king, which all Christians

are obliged in conscience to do, to put to death or to persecute such a subject?

And thus much shall suffice, concerning the kingdom of God and policy ecclesiastical. Wherein I pretend not to advance any position of my own, but only to show what are the consequences that seem in me deducible from the principles of Christian politics (which are the

scure or controverted interpretation, and to allege none but in such sense as is most plain and agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible, which was written for the re-establishment of the kingdom of God in Christ

For it is not the bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true light by which any writing is to be interpreted, and they that insist upon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive no thing from them clearly, but rather, by casting atoms of Scripture as dust before men's eyes, make everything more obscure than it is, an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth but their own advantage

THE FOURTH PART

Of the Kingdom of Darkness

CHAPTER XLIV

Of Spiritual Darkness from Misinterpretation of Scripture

BESIDES these sovereign powers, divine and human, of which I have hitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of another power, namely, that of 'the rulers of the darkness of this world,'¹ "the kingdom of Satan,"² and 'the principality of Beelzebub over demons,'³ that is to say, over phantasms that appear in the air for which cause Satan is also called "the prince of the power of the air,"⁴ and, because he ruleth in the darkness of this world, "the prince of this world,"⁵ and in consequence here unto they are called

demons of darkness, and these

nothing else but a confederacy of deceivers that, to obtain dominion over men in this present world endeavour

As men that are utterly deprived from their nativity of the light of the bodily eye have no idea at all of any such light, and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light than he hath at some time or other perceived by his outward senses so also is it of the light of the gospel, and of the light of the understanding, that no man can conceive there is any greater

degree of it than that which he hath already attained unto And from hence it comes to pass that men have no other means to acknowledge their own darkness but only by reasoning from the unforeseen mischances that befall them in their ways The darkest part of the kingdom of Satan is that which is without the Church of God, that is to say, amongst them that believe not in Jesus Christ But we cannot say that therefore the Church enjoyeth, as the land of Goshen, all the light which to the performance of the work enjoined us by God is necessary Whence comes it that in Christendom there has been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such jostling of one another out of their places, both by foreign and civil war, such stumbling at every little aspersion of their own fortune, and every little eminence of that of other men, and such diversity of ways in running to the same mark, *felicity*, if it be not night amongst us, or at least a mist? We are therefore yet in the dark

The enemy has been here in the night of our natural ignorance, and sown the tares of spiritual errors and that, first, by abusing and putting out the light of the Scriptures for we err, not knowing the Scriptures Secondly, by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets, that is to say, their fabulous doctrine concerning demons, which are but idols, or phantasms of the brain, without any real nature of their own, distinct from human fancy, such as are dead men's ghosts and faeries, and other matter of old wives' tales Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture diverse relics of the religion, and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle Fourthly, by mingling with both these, false or uncertain traditions, and feigned or uncertain history And so we come to err, by giving heed to seducing spirits, and the demonology of such as speak lies in hypocrisy, or, as it is in the original, "of those that play the part of liars,"⁶ with a seared conscience that is, contrary to their own knowl

⁶ I Timothy, 4. 1, 2.

edge Concerning the first of these, which is the seducing of men by abuse of Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this chapter

The greatest and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either consequent or subservient, is the wresting of it to prove that the kingdom of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that, being dead, are to rise again at the last day whereas the kingdom of God was first instituted by the ministry of Moses, over the Jews only, who were therefore called his peculiar people, and ceased afterward, in the election of Saul, when they refused to be governed by God any more, and demanded a king after the manner of the nations, which God Himself consented unto, as I have more at large proved before, in the thirty fifth Chapter After that time, there was no other kingdom of God in the world, by any pact or otherwise, than He ever was, is, and shall be king of all men and of all creatures, as governing according to His will, by His infinite power Nevertheless, He prom-

repentance and amendment of life And not only so, but He invited also the Gentiles to come in, and enjoy the happiness of His reign, on the same conditions of conversion and repentance And He promised also to send His Son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by his doctrine to receive him at his second coming which second coming not being, the kingdom of God is not yet come, and we are not now under any other kings by pact but our civil sovereigns, saving only that Christian men are already in the kingdom of grace, inasmuch as they have already the promise of being received at his coming again

Consequent to this error, that the present Church is Christ's kingdom, there ought to be some one man, or assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour, now in heaven, speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his person to all Christians, or diverse men, or diverse assemblies that do the same to diverse parts of Christen-

tors of the place (when the Scripture gives it to none but to civil sovereigns), comes to be so passionately disputed that it putteth out the light

of nature, and causeth so great a darkness in men's understanding that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience

Consequent to this claim of the Pope to vicar general of Christ in the present Church (sup-

gratia in his title, and that then only he made king by the favour of God when he is crowned by the authority of God's universal viceregent on earth, and that every bishop, whosoever be his sovereign, taketh at his consecration an oath of absolute obedience to the Pope Consequent to the same is the doctrine of the fourth Council of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the Third (Chapter 3. *De Hæreticis*), "That if a

of their obedience" Whereby *heresies* are understood all opinions which the Church of Rome hath forbidden to be maintained And by this means, as often as there is any repugnancy between the political designs of the Pope and other Christian princes, as there is very often, there

whom they had themselves placed there; and,

another man's ambition

From the same opinion, that the present Church is the kingdom of God, it proceeds that pastors, deacons, and all other ministers of the Church take the name to themselves of the *clergy*, giving to other Christians the name of *laity*, that is, simply *people*. For *clergy* signifies those whose maintenance is that revenue which God, having reserved to Himself during His reign over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of Levi (who were to be His public ministers, and had no portion of land set them out to live on, as their brethren) to be their inheritance The Pope therefore (pretending the present Church to be, as the realms of Israel, the kingdom of God), challenging to himself and his subordinate ministers the like revenue as the inheritance of God, the name of *clergy* was suitable to that claim And thence it is that tithes and other tributes paid to the Levites as

God's right, amongst the Israelites, have a long time been demanded and taken of Christians by ecclesiastics, *jure divino*, that is, in God's right By which means, the people everywhere were obliged to a double tribute; one to the

chantment. To consecrate is, in Scripture, to

during the sacerdotal reign of God, the tithes and offerings were the whole public revenue.

From the same mistaking of the present Church for the kingdom of God came in the distinction between the *civil* and the *canon* laws the civil law being the acts of sovereigns in their own dominions, and the canon law being the acts of the Pope in the same dominions Which canons, though they were but canons, that is, the laws of the Church, were

came rules commanded, and the emperors themselves, to avoid greater mischiefs, which the people blinded might be led into, were forced to obey them.

Roman Church tolerated in their religion as far forth as in the exercise and profession thereof they offend not against the civil power whereas in a Christian

ger for professing the religion of his own country, as an infidel, or rather more, inasmuch as they that are not against Christ are with him

From the same it is that in every Christian state there are certain men that are exempt, by

in many places bear so great a proportion to the common people as, if need were, there might be raised out of them alone an army sufficient for any war the Church militant should employ them in against their own or other princes

A second general abuse of Scripture is the turning of consecration into conjuration, or en-

chantment. But when by such words the nature or quality of the thing itself is pretended to be changed, it is not consecration, but either an extraordinary work of God, or a vain and impious conjuration. But seeing, for the frequency of pretending the change of nature in their consecrations, it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other than a conjuration or incantation, whereby they would have men to believe an alteration of nature that is not, contrary to the testimony of man's sight and of all the rest of his senses As for example, when the priest, instead of consecrating bread and wine to God's peculiar service in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper (which is but a separation of it from the common use to signify, that is, to put men in mind of, their redemption by the Passion of Christ, whose body was broken and blood shed upon the cross for our transgressions), pretends that by saying of the words of our Saviour, "This is my body," and "This is my blood," the nature of bread is no more there, but his very body, notwithstanding there appeareth not to the sight or other sense of the receiver anything that appeared not before the consecration The Egyptian conjurers, that are said to have turned their rods to serpents, and the water into blood, are thought but to have deluded the senses of the spectators by a false show of things, yet are esteemed enchanters But what should we have thought of them if there had appeared in their rods nothing like a serpent, and in the water enchanted with blood nothing like blood

had been both enchantment and lying And yet in this daily act of the priest, they do the very same, by turning the holy words into the manner of a charm, which produceth nothing new to the sense; but they face us down, that it hath turned the bread into a man, nay, more, into a God, and require men to worship it as if it were our Saviour himself present,

God and Man, and thereby to commit most gross idolatry. For if it be enough to excuse it of idolatry to say it is no more bread, but God; why should not the same excuse serve the Egyptians, in case they had the faces to say the leeks

nor, though so taken, can it extend any further than to the bread which Christ himself with his own hands consecrated. For he never said that of what bread soever any priest whatsoever should say, "This is my body," or "This is Christ's body," the same should presently be transubstantiated. Nor did the Church of Rome ever establish this transubstantiation, till the time of Innocent the Third; which was not above five hundred years ago, when the power of Popes was at the highest, and the darkness of the time grown so great, as men discerned not the bread that was given them to eat, especially when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the cross, as if they would have men believe it were transubstantiated, not only into the body of Christ, but also into the wood of his cross, and that they did eat both together in the sacrament.

The like incantation, instead of consecration, is used also in the sacrament of baptism where the abuse of God's name in each several person, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the cross at each name, maketh up the charm. As first, when they make the holy water, the priest saith, "I conjure thee, thou creature of water, in the name of God the Father Almighty, and in the name of Jesus Christ His only Son our Lord, and in virtue of the Holy Ghost, that thou become conjured water, to drive away all

and depart from the place wherein thou art sprinkled, and every unclean spirit be conjured by him that shall come to judge the quick and

oil." And for the infant that is to be baptized, he is subject to many charms: first, at the church door the priest blows thrice in the child's face,

and says, "Go out of him, unclean spirit, and give place to the Holy Ghost the Comforter." As if all children, till blown on by the priest, were demoniacs. Again, before his entrance into the church, he saith as before, "I conjure thee, etc., to go out, and depart from this servant of God", and again the same exorcism is repeated once more before he be baptized. These and some other incantations are those that are used instead of benedictions and consecrations in administration of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper; wherein everything that serveth to those holy uses, except the unhallowed spittle of the priest, hath some set form of exorcism.

Nor are the other rites, as of marriage, of extreme unction, of visitation of the sick, of consecrating churches, and churchyards, and the like, exempt from charms, inasmuch as there is in them the use of enchanted oil and water, with the abuse of the cross, and of the holy

Another general error is from the misinterpretation of the words *eternal life*, *everlasting death*, and the *second death*. For though we read plainly in Holy Scripture that God created Adam in an estate of living for ever, which was conditional, that is to say, if he disobeyed not His commandment, which was not essential to human nature, but consequent to the virtue of the tree of life, whereof he had liberty to eat, as long as he had not sinned, and that he was thrust out of Paradise after he had sinned, lest he should eat thereof, and live for ever; and that Christ's Passion is a discharge of sin to all that believe on Him, and by consequence, a restitution of eternal life to all the faithful, and to them only: yet the doctrine is now and hath been a long time far otherwise, namely, that every man hath eternity of life by nature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal. So that the flamm-

to need the sacrificing of Christ for the recover

lasting death. To salve this, it is said that by second and everlasting death is meant a second and everlasting life, but in torments, a figure never used but in this very case.

Christ at that time are yet alive, or else that the kingdom of God must be now in this present world. And then there is another place more difficult: for when the Apostles after our Saviour's resurrection, and immediately before his ascension, asked our Saviour, saying, "Wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?" he answered them, "It is not for you to know the times and the seasons, which the Father hath put in His own power; but ye shall receive power by the coming of the Holy Ghost upon you, and ye shall be my[martyrs] witnesses both in Jerusalem, and in all Judæa, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth" which is as much as to say, My kingdom is not yet come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come, for it shall come as a thief in the night, but I will send you the Holy Ghost, and by him you shall have power to bear witness to all the world, by your preaching of my resurrection, and the works I have done, and the doctrine I have taught, that they may believe in me, and expect eternal life, at my coming again. How does this agree with the coming of Christ's kingdom at the resurrection? And that which St Paul says, "That they turned from idols, to serve the living and true God, and to wait for His Son from heaven"; where "to wait for His Son from heaven" is to wait for his coming to be king in power, which were not necessary if his kingdom had been then present. Again, if the kingdom of God began, as Beza on that place would have it, at the resurrection, what reason is there for Christians ever since the resurrection to say in their prayers, "Let thy kingdom come"? It is therefore manifest that the words of St Mark are not so to be interpreted. There be some of them that stand here, saith our Saviour, that shall not

But they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them interpret first the like words of our Saviour to St Peter concerning St John, "If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?"* upon which was

grounded on those words; but left as a saying not understood The same difficulty is also in the place of St. Mark. And if it be lawful to conjecture at their meaning, by that which immediately follows, both here and in St. Luke, where the same is again repeated, it is not improbable to say they have relation to the Transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following, where it is said that "After six days Jesus taketh with him Peter, and James, and John" (not all, but some of his Disciples), "and leadeth them up into an high mountain apart by themselves, and was transfigured before them. And his raiment became shining, exceeding white as snow, so as no fuller on earth can white them And there appeared unto them Elias with Moses, and they were talking with Jesus," etc. So that they saw Christ in glory and majesty, as he is to come, inasmuch as "they were sore afraid" And thus the promise of our Saviour was accomplished by way of vision For it was a vision, as may probably be inferred out of St. Luke, that reciteth the same story, and saith that Peter and they that were with him were heavy with sleep * but most certainly out of Matthew 17. 9, where the same is again related; for our Saviour charged them, saying, "Tell no man the vision until the Son of Man be risen from the dead" Howsoever it be, yet there can from thence be taken no argument to prove that the Kingdom of God taketh beginning till the day of judgement

As for some other texts to prove the Pope's

[illegible]

As for the sites of consecration, though they depend for the most part upon the discretion

^a Luke 9:28

¹ Acts, i 6.

² 1 Thessalonians, I 9, 10.

* Mark, 9: 1

* John, 21: 22.

and judgement of the governors of the Church, and not upon the Scriptures, yet those governors are obliged to such direction as the nature of the action itself requireth, as that the ceremonies, words, and gestures be both decent and significant, or at least conformable to the action. When Moses consecrated the tabernacle, the altar, and the vessels belonging to them, he anointed them with the oil which God had commanded to be made for that purpose¹ and they were holy. There was nothing exorcized, to drive away phantasms. The same Moses (the civil sovereign of Israel), when he consecrated Aaron (the high priest) and his sons, did wash them with water (not exorcized water), put their garments upon them, and anointed them with oil, and they were sanctified, to minister unto the Lord in the priest's office, which was a simple and decent cleansing and adoration.

before all the congregation of Israel, and having blessed them, he gave thanks to God for putting into the heart of his father to build it, and for giving to himself the grace to accomplish the same, and then prayed unto Him, first, to accept that house, though it were not suitable to His infinite greatness, and to hear the prayers of His servants that should pray therein, or (if they were absent) towards it, and lastly, he offered a sacrifice of peace offering and the house was dedicated.² Here was no procession, the King stood still in his first place, no exorcized water, no *Asperges me*, nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon another occasion but a decent and rational speech, and such as in making to God a present of his new built house was most conformable to the occasion.

We read not that St John did exorcize the water of Jordan, nor Philip the water of the river wherein he baptized the eunuch, nor that any pastor in the time of the Apostles did take him spittle and put it to the nose of the person to be baptized, and say, *in odorem suavitatis*, that is, 'for a sweet savour unto the Lord', wherein neither the ceremony of spittle, for the uncleanness, nor the application of that Scripture, for the levity, can by any authority of man be justified.

To prove that the soul, separated from the body, liveth eternally, not only the souls of the

elect, by especial grace, and restoration of the eternal life which Adam lost by sin, and our Saviour restored by the sacrifice of himself to the faithful, but also the souls of reprobates, as a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind, without other grace of God but that which is universally given to all mankind, there are diverse places which at the first sight seem sufficiently to serve the turn but such as when I compare them with that which I have before (Chapter thirty eight) alleged out of the fourteenth of Job seem to me much more subject to a diverse interpretation than the words of Job.

And first there are the words of Solomon,

other text directly against it) this interpretation that God only knows, but man not, what becomes of a man's spirit when he exireth,

to dust again, who knoweth that the spirit of man goeth upward and that the spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth?³ That is,

he was not for God took him' which is expounded, Hebrews, 11 5, 'He was translated, that he should not die, and was not found, because God had translated him. For before his translation, he had this testimony, that he pleased God' making as much for the immortality of the body as of the soul, proveth that this his translation was peculiar to them that please God, not common to them with the wicked, and depending on grace, not on nature. But on the contrary, what interpretation shall we give, besides the literal sense of the words of Solomon, "That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts even one thing befalleth them, as the one dieth, so doth the other, yea, they have all one breath [one spirit], so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast, for all is vanity." By the literal sense, here is no natural immortality of the soul, nor yet any repugnancy with the life eternal, which the elect shall enjoy by grace. And, 'Better is he

¹ Ecclesiastes, 12 7

² Ibid 3 20, 21

³ Ibid 3 19

¹ Exodus, 40 [9]

² II Kings, 8

immortal, were a hard saying; for then to have an immortal soul were worse than to have no soul at all. And again, "The living know they shall die, but the dead know not anything";* that is, naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.

Another place which seems to make for a natural immortality of the soul is that where our Saviour saith that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living: but this is spoken of the promise of God, and of their certitude to rise again, not of a lifeless-

But there be other places of the New Testament where an immortality seemeth to be directly attributed to the wicked. For it is evident that they shall all rise to judgement. And it is said besides, in many places, that they shall go into 'everlasting fire, everlasting tormente'

And yet I can find nowhere that any man shall live in torments everlastingly. Also, it seemeth hard to say that God, who is the Father of mercies, that doth in heaven and earth all that He will, that hath the hearts of all men in His disposing, that worketh in men both to do and to will, and without whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good nor repentance of evil, should punish men's transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture that men can imagine, and more. We are therefore to consider what the meaning is of *everlasting fire*, and other the like phrases of Scripture.

I have shown also that the word *everlasting* is used in many places of the Bible, and that it is not always used in the same sense. For example, in the following passages:

Isid. 4. 3

*Isid. 9. 5.

God, neither ending nor death.

had not sinned, there is no place of Scripture to prove it, save only these places concerning eternal torments, which may otherwise be interpreted.

From whence may be inferred that, as the elect after the resurrection shall be restored to the estate wherein Adam was before he had sinned; so the reprobate shall be in the estate that Adam and his posterity were in after the sin committed, saying that God promised a redeemer to Adam, and such of his seed as should trust in him and repent: but not to the

but in a second and everlasting death, in the proper and natural sense of the word *death*. The fire or torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna, Tophet, or in what place soever, may continue forever, and there may never want wicked men to be tormented in them, though not every nor any one eternally. For the wicked, being left in the state of sin, are

and consequently may engender perpetually, after the resurrection, as they did before: for there is no place of Scripture to the contrary. For St Paul, speaking of the resurrection, understandeth it only of the resurrection to life eternal, and not the resurrection to punishment.* And of the first, he saith that the body is "sown in corruption, raised in incorruption, sown in dishonour, raised in honour; sown in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body." There is no such thing can be said of the bodies of them

*I Corinthians, 15.

that rise to punishment. So also our Saviour, when he speaketh of the nature of man after the resurrection, meaneth the resurrection to life eternal, not to punishment. The text is Luke, 20 verses 34, 35, 36, a fertile text. "The chil-

dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage
neither can they die any more; for they are
as the angels, and are like unto the angels.

in marriage, that is, corrupt and generate successively, which is an immortality of the *kind*, but not of the *persons* of men. they are not worthy to be counted amongst them that shall obtain the next world, and an absolute resurrection from the dead, but only a short time, as inmates of that world; and to the end only to receive condign punishment for their contumacy. The elect are the only children of the resurrection, that is to say, the sole heirs of eternal life: they only can die no more. It is they that are equal to the angels, and that are the children of God, and not the reprobate. To the reprobate there remaineth after the resurrection a *second* and *eternal* death, between which resurrection and their second and eternal death is but a time of punishment and torment, and to last by succession of sinners thereunto as long as the kind of man by propagation shall endure, which is eternally.

Upon this doctrine of the natural eternity of separated souls is founded, as I said, the doctrine of purgatory. For supposing eternal life by grace only, there is no life but the life of the

hard straining, he has wrested those places to the proof of a purgatory whereas it is manifest that the ceremonies of mourning and fasting, when they are used for the death of men whose life was not profitable to the mourners, they are used for honour's sake to their persons, and

the Old Testament, there is not so much as any show or colour of proof. He brings in every text wherein there is the word *anger*, or *fire*, or *burning*, or *purging*, or *cleansing*, in case any of the fathers have but in a sermon rhetorically applied it to the doctrine of purgatory, already believed. The first verse of Psalm 37, "O Lord, rebuke me not in thy wrath, nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure" what were this to purgatory, if Augustine had not applied the *wrath* to the fire of hell, and the *displeasure* to that of

those times intended to adorn or extend their sermons or commentaries, haled to their purposes by force of wit?

But he allegeth other places of the New Testa-

after their death because after he had fasted to procure the recovery of his own child, as soon as he knew it was dead, he called for meat. Seeing then the soul hath an existence separate from the body, and nothing can be obtained by men's fasting for the souls that are already either in heaven or hell, it followeth that there be some souls of dead men that are neither in heaven nor in hell, and therefore they must be in some third place, which must be purgatory. And thus with

world to come, and I expected it, yet the creature
But what then can I expect? It is the same old
Saviour's word, "I will have mercy on him who
to be reconciled to us all the day long."
unanimously agreed, and so it was done.

confess the profoundness of the Scripture to be

tween the easiness of our Saviour in bearing with offences done to him while he himself taught the world, that is when he was on earth, and the severity of the pastors after him, against those which should deny their authority which was from the Holy Ghost. As if he should say, you that deny my power nay you that shall crucify me, shall be pardoned by me, as often as you turn unto me by repentance but if you deny the power of them that teach you here after, by virtue of the Holy Ghost, they shall be inexorable, and shall not forgive you, but persecute you in this world, and leave you without absolution (though you turn to me, unless you turn also to them), to the punishments, as much as lies in them, of the world to come. And so the words may be taken as a prophecy

in such difficult places), perhaps there may be place left after the resurrection for the repentance of some sinners. And there is also another place that seemeth to agree therewith. For considering the words of St. Paul, 'What shall they do which are baptized for the dead if the dead rise not at all? Why also are they baptized for the dead?' a man may probably infer, as some have done that in St. Paul's time there was a custom, by receiving baptism for the dead, (as men that now believe are sureties and undertakers for the faith of infants that are not capable of believing) to undertake for the persons of their deceased friends, that they should be ready to obey and receive our Saviour for their king at his coming again and then the forgiveness of sins in the world to come has no need of a purgatory. But in both these interpretations there is so much of paradox that I trust not to them but propound them to those that are thoroughly versed in the Scripture, to inquire if there be no clearer place that contradicts them. Only of this much, I see evident Scripture to persuade me that there is neither the word nor the thing of purgatory, neither in this nor any other text, nor anything

that can prove a necessity of a place for the soul without the body, neither for the soul of Lazarus during the four days he was dead, nor for the souls of them which the Roman Church

man, and renew his inanimate and rotten carcass into a glorious, spiritual, and immortal body

Another place is that of I Corinthians, 3 where it is said that they which build stubble, hay, etc., on the true foundation, their work shall perish, but they themselves shall be saved, but as through fire" this fire he will have to be the fire of purgatory. The words, as I have said before, are an allusion to those of Zechariah, 13

in the end shall not be consumed, but be refined: that is, depose their erroneous doctrines and traditions and have them, as it were, singed off and shall afterwards call upon the name of the true God. In like manner, the Apostle saith of them that, holding this foundation, *Jesus is the Christ*, shall build thereon some other doctrines that be erroneous, that they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world, but shall pass through it to salvation, but so as to see and relinquish their former errors. The builders are the pastors, the foundation, that *Jesus is the Christ* the stubble and hay, false consequences drawn from it through ignorance or frailty, the gold silver, and precious stones are their true doctrines, and their refining or

A third place is that of I Corinthians 13 [29] before mentioned concerning baptism for the dead out of which he concludeth first, that prayers for the dead are not unprofitable and out of that, that there is a fire of purgatory but neither of them rightly. For of many interpretations of the word *baptism*, he approveth this in the first place, that by *baptism* is meant, metaphorically, a baptism of penance and that men are in this sense baptized when they fast and pray, and give alms, and so baptism for the dead, and prayer for the dead, is the same thing. But this is a metaphor, of which there is no example, neither in the Scripture nor in any other

use of language, and which is also discordant to the harmony and scope of the Scripture. The word *baptism* is used for being dipped in one's own blood, as Christ was upon the cross, and as most of the Apostles were, for giving testimony of him.¹ But it is hard to say that prayer, fasting and alms have any similitude with dipping. The same is used also, Matthew, 3. 11 (which seemeth to make somewhat for purgatory), for a purging with fire. But it is evident the fire and purging here mentioned is the

more precious than of gold that perisheth,

shall try every man's work of what sort it is."⁴

interpreted of the same, and then there will be no necessity of the fire of purgatory.

Another interpretation of baptism for the dead is that which I have before mentioned, which he preferreth to the second place of probability and thence also he inferreth the utility of prayer for the dead. For if after the resurrection such as have not heard of Christ, or not believed in him, may be received into Christ's kingdom, it is not in vain, after their death, that their friends should pray for them till they should be risen. But granting that God, at the prayers of the faithful, may convert unto him some of those that have not heard Christ preached, and consequently cannot have rejected Christ, and that the charity of men in that point cannot be blamed, yet this concludeth nothing for purgatory, because to rise from death to life is one thing, to rise from purgatory to life is another, as being a rising from life to life, from a life in torments to a life in joy.

A fourth place is that of Matthew, 5. 25 "Agree with thine adversary quickly, whilst thou art in the way with him, lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid

the uttermost farthing." In which allegory, the offender is the sinner, both the adversary and the judge is God, the way is this life, the prison is the grave, the officer, death, from which the sinner shall not rise again to life eternal, but to a second death, till he have paid the utmost farthing, or Christ pay it for him by his Passion, which is a full ransom for all manner of sin, as well lesser sins as greater crimes, both being made by the Passion of Christ equally venial.

The fifth place is that of Matthew, 5. 22 "Whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be guilty in judgement. And whosoever shall say to his brother, *Raca* shall be guilty in the council. But whosoever shall say, *Thou fool*, shall be guilty to hell fire." From which words he inferreth three sorts of sins, and three sorts of punishments, and that none of those sins but the last, shall be punished with hell fire, and consequently, that after this life there is punishment of lesser sins in purgatory. Of which inference there is no colour in any interpretation that hath yet been given of them. Shall there be a distinction after this life of courts of justice, as there was amongst the Jews in our Saviour's time, to hear and determine diverse sorts of crimes, as the judges and the council? Shall not all judicature appertain to Christ and his Apostles? To understand therefore this text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but jointly with the words precedent and subsequent. Our Saviour in this chapter interpreteth the Law of Moses which the Jews thought was then fulfilled when they had not transgressed the grammatical sense thereof, howsoever they had transgressed against the sentence or meaning of the legislator. Therefore, whereas they thought the sixth Commandment was not broken but by killing a man, nor the seventh, but when a man lay with a woman not his wife, our Saviour tells them, the inward anger of a man against his brother, if it be without just cause, is homicide. You have heard saith he, the Law of Moses, "Thou shalt not kill," and that "Whosoever shall kill shall be condemned before the judges," or before the session of the Seventy. But I say unto you, to be angry with one's brother without cause, or to say unto him *Raca* or *Fool*, is homicide, and shall be punished at the day of judgement, and session of Christ and his Apostles, with hell fire. So that those words were not used to distinguish between diverse crimes, and diverse courts of justice, and diverse punishments, but to tax the distinction between sin and sin, which the Jews drew not from the difference of the will in obey-

¹ Mark, 10. 38, and Luke, 12. 50

² Zechariah, 13. 9

³ 1 Epistle, 1. 7

⁴ 1 Corinthians, 3. 13

ing God, but from the difference of their temporal courts of justice, and to show them that

ent, courts at the day of judgement This considered, what can be drawn from this text to maintain purgatory, I cannot imagine

The sixth place is Luke, 16 9 "Make ye

tion of saints departed But the sense is plain, that we should make friends with our riches, of the poor, and thereby obtain their prayers whilst they live "He that giveth to the poor lendeth to the Lord"

The seventh is Luke, 23 42 "Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom" Therefore, saith he, there is remission of sins after this life But the consequence is not good Our Saviour then forgave him and at his coming again in glory, will remember to raise him again to life eternal

The eighth is Acts, 2 24, where St Peter saith of Christ, 'that God had raised him up, and loosed the pains of death, because it was not possible he should be holden of it' which he interprets to be a descent of Christ into purgatory, to loose some souls there from their torments whereas it is manifest that it was Christ that was loosed It was he that could not be holden of death or the grave and not the souls in purgatory But if that which Beza says in his notes on this place be well observed there is none that will not see that instead of *pains*, it should be *pains* and then there is no further cause to seek for purgatory in this text

CHAPTER XLV

Of Demonology and other Relics of the Religion of the Gentiles

THE impression made on the organs of sight by lucid bodies either in one direct line or in many lines reflected from opaque, or refracted in the

whence the impression proceedeth, which imagination is called *sight* and seemeth not to be a mere imagination but the body itself without

ceiveth but himself, because there is indeed no such thing without him, but only a motion in the interior organs, pressing by resistance outward, that makes him think so And the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call *imagination* and *memory*, and in sleep, and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by sickness or violence, a *dream*, of which things I have already spoken briefly in the second and third Chapters

This nature of sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to natural knowledge, much less by those that consider not things so remote (as that knowledge is) from their present use, it was hard for men to conceive of those images in the fancy and in the sense otherwise than of things really without us which some, because they vanish away, they know not whither nor how, will have to be absolutely incorporeal, that is to say, immaterial or forms without matter (colour and figure, without any coloured or figured body), and that they can put on airy bodies, as a garment, to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes, and others say, are bodies and living creatures, but made of air, or other more subtle and ethereal matter, which is then when they will be seen, condensed But both of them agree on one general appellation of them, *demons* As if the dead of whom they dreamed were not inhabitants of their own brain, but of

ordinary apparition of the sun, of the quantity of about a foot, the demon or ghost of that great sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world and by that means have feared them, as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to do them good or harm, and consequently,

poets, as principal priests of the heathen religion, were specially employed or revered to the public peace, and the obedience of subjects necessary thereunto, and to make some of them good demons, and others evil, the one as a spur to the observance, the other as reins to withhold them from violation of the laws

What kind of things they were to whom they attributed the name of *demons* appeareth partly in the genealogy of their gods, written by Hesiod, one of the most ancient poets of the

Grecians, and partly in other histories, of which I have observed some few before, in the twelfth Chapter of this discourse

The Grecians, by their colonies and conquests, communicated their language and writings in to Asia, Egypt, and Italy, and therein, by necessary consequence, their demonology, or, as St Paul calls it, their *doctrines of devils* and by that means the contagion was derived also to the Jews, both of Judæa and Alexandria, and other parts, where into they were dispersed But the name of *demon* they did not, as the Grecians, attribute to spirits both good and evil, but to the evil only and to the good demons they gave the name of the *Spirit of God*, and esteemed those who were possessed by a devil

on that is, a *devil* And therefore they called *demoniacs* that is, possessed by the devil, such as we call *madmen* or *lunatics*, or such as had the falling sickness, or that spoke anything which they for want of understanding, thought absurd As also of an unclean person in a notorious degree, they used to say he had an unclean spirit, of a dumb man, that he had a dumb devil and of a blind man, that he had a blind devil

answered, "Thou hast a devil who goeth about to kill thee?" Whereby it is manifest that the Jews had the same opinions concerning phantasms namely, that they were not phantasms that is idols of the brain, but things real, and independent on the fancy

Which doctrine, if it be not true, why, may some say, did not our Saviour contradict it and teach the contrary? Nay, why does He use on diverse occasions such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? To this I answer that, first, where Christ saith, 'A spirit hath not flesh and bone' though he show that there be spirits yet he denies not that they are bodies And where St Paul says, 'We shall rise spiritual bodies,' he acknowledgeth the nature of spirits, but that

[1 Timothy, 4 1]

Matthew, 11 18

John, 8 52

John 7 20

Luke 24 39

1 Corinthians, 15 44

mandeth him to go out of a man, if by the *devil* be meant a disease, as frenzy, or lunacy or a corporeal spirit, is not the speech improper? Can diseases hear? Or can there be a corporeal spirit in a body of flesh and bone, full already

madness or lunacy he cureth is no more improper than was his rebuking of the fever, or of the wind and sea for neither do these hear or than was the command of God to the light, to the firmament, to the sun, and stars, when He commanded them *to be*, for they could not hear before they had a being But those speeches are not improper, because they signify the power of God's word no more therefore is it improper to command madness or lunacy, under the appellation of *devils* by which they were then commonly understood to depart out of a man's body To the second, concerning their being incorporeal, I have not yet observed any place of Scripture from whence it can be gathered that any man was ever possessed with any other corporeal spirit but that of his own by which

dove is said by St Matthew to have been *led up* by the Spirit into the wilderness, and the same is recited, Luke, 4 1, in these words, 'Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, was led in the Spirit into the wilderness' whereby it is evident that by *Spirit* there is meant the Holy Ghost This cannot be interpreted for a possession for Christ and the Holy Ghost are but one and the same substance which is no possession of one substance, or body by another And whereas in the verses following he is said to have been taken up by the devil into

mountain = high enough, according to the lit

Matthew, 4 1

eral sense to show him one whole hemisphere. What then can be the meaning of this place, other than that he went of himself into the wilderness, and that this carrying of him up and down, from the wilderness to the city, and from thence into a mountain, was a vision? Conformable whereunto is also the phrase of St. Luke, that he was led into the wilderness, not *by* but *in* the Spirit: whereas, concerning his being taken up into the mountain and unto the pinnacle of the temple, he speaketh as St. Matthew doth, which smeth with the nature of a vision.

Again, where St. Luke says of Judas Iscariot that 'Satan entered into him, and thereupon that he went and communed with the chief priests, and captains, how he might betray Christ unto them,' it may be answered that by the entering of Satan (that is, the *enemy*) into him is meant the hostile and traitorous intention of selling his Lord and Master. For as by the *Holy Ghost* is frequently in Scripture understood the graces and good inclinations given by the Holy Ghost, so by the *entering of Satan* may be understood the wicked cogitations and designs of the adversaries of Christ and his Disciples. For as it is hard to say that the devil was entered into Judas, before he had any such hostile design, so it is impertinent to say he was first Christ's enemy in his heart, and that the devil entered into him afterwards. Therefore the entering of Satan and his wicked purpose, was one and the same thing.

But if there be no immaterial spirit, nor any possession of men's bodies by any spirit corporeal, it may again be asked why our Saviour and his Apostles did not teach the people so, and in such clear words as they might no more doubt thereof. But such questions as these are more curious than necessary for a Christian man's salvation. Men may as well ask why Christ, that could have given to all men faith, piety, and all manner of moral virtues, gave it to some only, and not to all: and why he left the search of natural causes and sciences to the natural reason and industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man supernaturally, and many other such questions, of which nevertheless there may be alleged probable and pious reasons. For as God, when He brought the Israelites into the Land of Promise, did not secure them therein by subduing all the nations round about them, but left many of them, as thorns in their sides, to awaken from time to time their piety and industry: so our Saviour, in conduct-

ing us toward his heavenly kingdom, did not destroy all the difficulties of natural questions, but left them to exercise our industry and reason, the scope of his preaching being only to show us this plain and direct way to salvation.

elect and to save them from their enemies eternally to which the opinion of possession by spirits or phantasms is no impediment in the

of all questions which may be raised to trouble us in the performance of God's commands, we may as well complain of Moses for not having set down the time of the creation of such spirits, as well as of the creation of the earth and sea, and of men and beasts. To conclude, I find in Scripture that there be angels and spirits, good and evil, but not that they are incorporeal, as are the apparitions men see in the dark, or in a dream or vision, which the Latins call *spectra* and took for *demons*. And I find that there are spirits corporeal, though subtle and invisible, but not that any man's body was possessed or inhabited by them and that the bodies of the saints shall be such, namely, spiritual bodies, as St. Paul calls them.

Nevertheless, the contrary doctrine, namely, that there be incorporeal spirits, hath hitherto so prevailed in the Church that the use of exorcism (that is to say, of ejection of devils by conjuration) is thereupon built, and, though rarely and faintly practised, is not yet totally given over. That there were many *demoniacs* in the primitive Church, and few madmen, and other such singular diseases, whereas in these times we hear of, and see many madmen, and few *demoniacs*, proceeds not from the change of nature, but of names. But how it comes to pass that whereas heretofore the Apostles, and after them for a time the pastors of the Church, did cure those singular diseases, which now they are not seen to do, as likewise, why it is not in the power of every true believer now to do all that the faithful did then, that is to say, as we read, 'in Christ's name to cast out devils, to speak with new tongues, to take up serpents, to drink deadly poison without harm taking, and to cure the sick by the laying on of their hands,'* and all this without other words but 'in the name of Jesus,' is another question.

* Mark, 16. 17, [18]

* Luke, 22. 3, 4

and consequently, that when they sought authority and riches, and trusted to their own subtlety for a kingdom of this world, these supernatural gifts of God were again taken from them

Another relic of Gentilism is the worship of images neither instituted by Moses in the Old, nor by Christ in the New Testament, nor yet

those appearances that remain in the brain from the impression of external bodies upon the organs of the senses, which are commonly called *idols*

son why St Paul says, 'We know that an idol is nothing at all in the world'

without place, habitation, motion, or existence, but in the mind

permitted to worship and pray to images (which are representations of their own fancies), they had had no further dependence on the true God of whom there can be no similitude, nor on His prime ministers Moses and the high priests, but every man had governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter eversion of the Commonwealth and their own destruction for want of union And therefore the first law of God was they should not take for gods *alienos deos* that is the gods of other nations but that only true God who vouchsafed to commune with Moses and by him to give them laws and directions for their peace and for their salvation from their enemies And the second was that they should not make to themselves any image to worship, of their own invention For it is the same deposing of a king to submit to another king whether he be set up

[1 Corinthians, 8 4]

by a neighbour nation or by ourselves

The places of Scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of images to worship them, or to set them up at all in the places where God is worshipped, are, first, two examples, one of the cherubim over the Ark of God, the other of the brazen serpent secondly, some texts where by we are commanded to worship certain creatures for their relation to God, as to worship

those places, to prove that which is pretended, I must first explain what is to be understood by *worshipping* and what by *images* and *idols*

I have already shown in the twentieth Chapter of this discourse, that to honour is to value

but dishonour Him, by any value less than infinite And thus honour is properly of its own nature secret, and internal in the heart But the inward thoughts of men, which appear outwardly in their words and actions are the signs of our honouring and these go by the name of *worship*

ship whether those words and actions be sincere or feigned and because they appear as signs of honouring are ordinarily also called *honour*

The worship we exhibit to those we esteem to be but men as to kings and men in authority, is *civil worship* but the worship we exhibit to that which we think to be God whatsoever the words ceremonies, gestures or other actions be is *divine worship* To fall prostrate before

vine and civil worship, not in the intention of the worshipper, but in the words δουλεία and λατρεία, deceive themselves For whereas there be two sorts of servants that sort which is of those that are absolutely in the power of their masters, as slaves taken in war, and their issue,

beasts, were called Δούλοι, that is properly, *slaves*, and their service, Δουλεία, the other, which is of those that serve for hire, or in hope of benefit from their masters, voluntarily, are called Οἷτες, that is, *domestic servants*, whose service the masters have no further right than is contained in the covenants made betwixt them. These two kinds of servants have thus much common in them both, that their labour is appointed them by another: and the word Λατρία is the general name of both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether as a slave or a voluntary servant. So that Λατρεία

because we are God's slaves, Λατρεία, because we serve Him: and in all kinds of service is contained, not only obedience, but also worship, that is, such actions, gestures, and words as signify honour.

An *image*, in the most strict signification of the word, is the resemblance of something visible: in which sense the fantastical forms, apparitions or seemings of visible bodies to the sight, are only images, such as are the show of a man or other thing in the water, by reflection or refraction, or of the sun or stars by direct vision in the air, which are nothing real in the things seen, nor in the place where they seem to be, nor are their magnitudes and figures the same with that of the object, but changeable, by the variation of the organs of sight, or by glasses: and are present oftentimes in our imagination, and in our dreams, when the object is absent, or changed into other colours, and shapes, as things that depend only upon the fancy. And these are the images which are originally and most properly called *ideas* and *idols*: and derived from the language of the Grecians, with whom the word εἶδω signifieth *to see*. They are also called *phantasms*, which is in the same language, *apparitions*. And from these images it is that one of the faculties of man's nature is called the *imagination*. And from hence it is manifest that there neither is, nor can be, any image made of a thing invisible.

It is also evident that there can be no image of a thing infinite: for all the images and phantasms that are made by the impression of things visible are figured. But figure is a quantity every way determined, and therefore there can be no image of God, nor of the soul of man, nor of spirits, but only of bodies visible, that is, bodies

that have light in themselves, or are by such enlightened.

And whereas a man can fancy shapes he never saw, making up a figure out of the parts of diverse creatures, as the poets make their centaurs, chimeras, and other monsters never seen: so can he also give matter to those shapes, and make them in wood, clay, or metal. And these are also called *images*, not for the resemblance of any corporeal thing, but for the resemblance of some fantastical inhabitants of the brain of the maker. But in these idols, as they are originally in the brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or molten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for which the material body made by art may be said to be the image of the fantastical idol made by nature.

But in a larger use of the word *image* is contained also any representation of one thing by another. So an earthly sovereign may be called the image of God, and an inferior magistrate the image of an earthly sovereign. And many times in the idolatry of the Gentiles there was little regard to the similitude of their material idol to the idol in their fancy, and yet it was called the image of it. For a stone unhewn has been set up for Neptune, and diverse other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their gods. And at this day we see many images of the Virgin Mary, and other saints, unlike one another, and without correspondence to any one man's fancy, and yet serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for, which was no

together, as it happeneth for the most part.

But the name of *idol* is extended yet further in Scripture, to signify also the sun, or a star, or any other creature, visible or invisible, when they are worshipped for gods.

Having shown what is *worship*, and what an *image*, I will now put them together, and examine what that *idolatry* is which is forbidden in the second Commandment, and other places of the Scripture.

metal, or some other visible creature), or a phantasm of the brain for the resemblance or representation whereof the matter was formed and figured, or both together as one animate

body composed of the matter and the phantasm, as of a body and soul

To be uncovered, before a man of power and authority, or before the throne of a prince, or in such other places as he ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to worship that man or prince with civil worship, as being a sign, not of honouring the stool or place, but the person, and is not idolatry. But if he that doth it should suppose the soul of the prince to be in the stool,

er, or for anything which God only can do for us, is divine worship, and idolatry. On the other side if a king compel a man to it by the terror of death, or other great corporal punishment, it is not idolatry, for the worship which the sovereign commandeth to be done unto himself by the terror of his laws is not a sign that he that obeyeth him does inwardly honour him as a god, but that he is desirous to save himself from death, or from a miserable life and that

because how wise or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man can not from thence argue that he approveth it, but that he doth it for fear, and that it is not his act, but the act of his sovereign.

To worship God in some peculiar place, or turning a man's face towards an image or determinate place, is not worship or honour the place or image, but to acknowledge it holy, that is to say, to acknowledge the image or the place to be set apart from common use for that is the meaning of the word *holy* which implies no new

way to worship God before the brazen serpent, or for the Jews, when they were out of their own country, to turn their faces, when they prayed, toward the temple of Jerusalem, or for Moses to put off his shoes when he was

God's use, or for Christians to worship in the churches which are once solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose by the authority of the king or other true representant of the Church. But to worship God as animating or inhabiting such image or place, that is to say, an infinite substance in a finite place, is idolatry for such finite gods are but idols of the brain, nothing real, and are commonly called in the Scripture by the names of *vanity*, and *lies*, and *nothing*. Also to worship God, not as animating, or present in the place or image, but to the end to be put in mind of Him, or of some works of His, in case the place or image be dedicated or set up by private authority, and not by the authority of them that are our sovereign pastors, is idolatry. For the Commandment is "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image." God commanded Moses to set up the brazen serpent, he did not make it to himself, it was not therefore against the Commandment. But the making of the golden calf

rant either from God their Sovereign, or from Moses that was His lieutenant.

The Gentiles worshipped, for gods, Jupiter and others that, living, were men perhaps that had done great and glorious acts, and, for the children of God, diverse men and women, supposing them gotten between an immortal deity and a mortal man. This was idolatry, because they made them so to themselves, having no authority from God, neither in His eternal law of reason, nor in His positive and revealed will. But though our Saviour was a man, whom we also believe to be God immortal and the Son of God, yet this is no idolatry, because we build not that belief upon our own fancy or judgment, but upon the word of God revealed in the Scriptures. And for the adoration of the Eucharist, if the words of Christ, This is my body signify that he himself, and the seem

not by inherent sanctity, but by separation to

body, for the Gentiles also held God to be omnipotent, and might upon that ground no less excuse their idolatry, by pretending, as well as others, a transubstantiation of their wood and stone into God Almighty

Whereas there be, that pretend divine inspiration to be a supernatural entering of the Holy Ghost into a man, and not an acquisition of

be so worshipped Therefore the safest way is to believe that by the descending of the dove upon the Apostles, and by Christ's breathing on them when he gave them the Holy Ghost, and by the giving of it by imposition of hands are understood the signs which God hath been pleased to use, or ordain to be used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to preach His kingdom, and in their conversation, that it might not be scandalous, but edifying to others

Besides the idolatrous worship of images, there is also a scandalous worship of them, which is also a sin, but not idolatry For *idolatry* is to worship by signs of an internal and real honour, but *scandalous worship* is but

the fear of death or other grievous punishment, and is nevertheless a sin in them that so worship, in case they be men whose actions are

as the example of those we regard not, works not on us at all, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution, and consequently are no causes of our falling

If therefore a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others or any other, of whose knowledge there is a great opinion, do external honour to an idol for fear unless he make his fear

of eminent reputation for knowledge in Christian doctrine, do the same, and another follow him, this is no scandal given (for he had no cause to follow such example), but is a pretence of scandal which he taketh of himself for an excuse before men For an unlearned man that is in the power of an idolatrous king or state, if commanded on pain of death to worship before an idol, he detesteth the idol in his heart he doth well, though if he had the fortitude to suffer death, rather than worship it, he should do better But if a pastor, who is Christ's messenger has undertaken to teach Christ's doctrine to all nations, should do the same, it were not only a sinful scandal, in respect of other Christian men's consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge

The sum of that which I have said hitherto, concerning the worship of images, is this, that he that worshippeth in an image, or any creature, either the matter thereof, or any fancy of his own which he thinketh to dwell in it, or both together, or believeth that such things hear his prayers, or see his devotions, without ears or eyes committeth idolatry And he that counterfeiteth such worship for fear of punishment if he be a man whose example hath power amongst his brethren, committeth a sin But he that worshippeth the Creator of the world before such an image, or in such a place as he hath not made or chosen of himself, but taken from the commandment of God's word, as the Jews did in worshipping God before the cherubim, and before the brazen serpent for a time, and in or towards the temple of Jerusalem, which was also but for a time, committeth not idolatry

Now for the worship of saints, and images, and relics, and other things at this day practised in the Church of Rome, I say they are not allowed by the word of God nor brought into the Church of Rome from the doctrine there taught but partly left in it at the first conversion of the Gentiles, and afterwards countenanced and confirmed, and augmented by the bishops of Rome

As for the proofs alleged out of Scripture, namely, those examples of images appointed by God to be set up, they were not set up for the people or any man to worship, but that they should worship God himself before them, as before the cherubim over the Ark, and the brazen serpent For we read not that the priest or any other did worship the cherubim But contrarily we read that Hezekiah broke in pieces the brazen serpent which Moses had

set up¹ because the people burnt incense to
 it. For these things are not to be set up.

them because the words of the second Com-
 mandment, "Thou shalt not make to thyself
 any graven image," etc., distinguish between
 the images that God commanded to be set
 up and those which we set up to ourselves.
 And therefore from the cherubim or brazen
 serpent, to the images of man's devising, and
 from the worship commanded by God, to the
 will we have spoken, and have bled,

and that miracles have been done by them,
 which they apprehend as done by the saint,

which they have spoken, and have bled,
 and that miracles have been done by them,
 which they apprehend as done by the saint,

which they have spoken, and have bled,
 and that miracles have been done by them,
 which they apprehend as done by the saint,

which they have spoken, and have bled,
 and that miracles have been done by them,
 which they apprehend as done by the saint,

which they have spoken, and have bled,
 and that miracles have been done by them,
 which they apprehend as done by the saint,

of any of them, maketh not an image of God,
 but of his own phantasm, which is making of
 an idol. I say not, that to draw a picture after a
 fancy is a sin, but when it is drawn, to hold it
 for a representation of God is against the sec-
 ond Commandment, and can be of no use but
 to worship. And the same may be said of the
 images of angels, and of men dead, unless as
 monuments of friends, or of men worthy re-
 membrance for such use of an image as not
 worship of the image, but a civil honouring of
 the person, not that is, but that was: but when
 it is done to the image which we make of a
 saint, for no other reason but that we think he
 heareth our prayers, and is pleased with the
 honour we do him, when dead and without
 sense, we attribute to him more than human
 power, and therefore it is idolatry.

Seeing therefore there is no authority, neither
 in the Law of Moses nor in the Gospel, for the
 religious worship of images or other represen-
 tations of God which men set up to themselves,
 or for the worship of the image of any creature
 in heaven, or earth, or under the earth, and
 whereas Christian kings, who are living repre-
 sentants of God, are not to be worshipped by
 their subjects by any act that signifieth a great-
 er esteem of his power than the nature of mor-
 tal man is capable of, it cannot be imagined
 that the religious worship now in use was
 brought into the Church by misunderstanding
 of the Scripture. It resteth therefore that it was
 left in it by not destroying the images them-
 selves in the conversion of the Gentiles that
 worshipped them.

The cause whereof was the immoderate es-
 teem and prices set upon the workmanship of
 them, which made the owners, though convert-
 ed from worshipping them as they had done re-
 ligiously for demons, to retain them still in
 their houses, upon pretence of doing it in the
 honor of Christ, of the Virgin Mary, and of the
 Apostles and other the pastors of the primitive
 Church, as being easy, by giving them new
 names to make that an image of the Virgin
 Mary and of her Son our Saviour, which before
 perhaps was called the image of Venus and
 Cupid, and so of a Jupiter to make a Barnabas,
 and of Mercury, a Paul, and the like. And as
 worldly ambition, creeping by degrees into the
 pastors, drew them to an endeavour of pleas-
 ing the new made Christians, and also to a
 liking of this kind of honour, which they also
 might hope for after their decease, as well as
 those that had already gained it: so the wor-
 shipping of the images of Christ and his Apo-

¹ 1 Kings 18 4

² Exodus, 32 [4]

³ Genesis, 31 30

ties grew more and more idolatrous, save that somewhat after the time of Constantine diverse emperors, and bishops, and general councils observed and opposed the unlawfulness thereof, but too late, or too weakly.

The canonizing of saints is another relic of Gentilism: it is neither a misunderstanding of Scripture, nor a new invention of the Roman Church, but a custom as ancient as the Commonwealth of Rome itself. The first that ever was canonized at Rome was Romulus, and that upon the narration of Julius Proculus, that swore before the Senate he spoke with him after his death, and was assured by him he dwelt in heaven, and was there called *Quirinus*, and would be propitious to the state of their new city: and thereupon the Senate gave public testimony of his sanctity. Julius Cæsar, and other emperors after him, had the like testimony, that is, were canonized for saints: for by such testimony is *canonization* now defined, and is the same with the *apothéosis* of the heathen.

It is also from the Roman heathen that the popes have received the name and power of *Pontifex Maximus*. This was the name of him that in the ancient Commonwealth of Rome had the supreme authority under the Senate and people of regulating all ceremonies and doctrines concerning their religion: and when Augustus Cæsar changed the state into a monarchy, he took to himself no more but this of fice, and that of tribune of the people (that is to say, the supreme power both in state and religion) and the succeeding emperors enjoyed the same. But when the Emperor Constantine lived, who was the first that professed and authorized Christian religion, it was consonant to his profession to cause religion to be regulated, under his authority, by the bishop of Rome: though it do not appear they had so soon the name of *Pontifex*: but rather that the succeeding bishops took it of themselves, to countenance the power they exercised over the bishops of the Roman provinces. For it is not any privilege of St. Peter, but the privilege of the city of Rome, which the emperors were always willing to uphold, that gave them such authority over other bishops, as may be evidently seen by that, that the bishop of Constantinople, when the Emperor made that city the seat of the Empire, pretended to be equal to the bishop of Rome, though at last, not without contention, the Pope carried it, and became the *Pontifex Maximus*, but in sight only of the Emperor, and not without the bounds of the Empire, nor anywhere after the Emperor

had lost his power in Rome, though it were the Pope himself that took his power from him. From whence we may by the way observe that there is no place for the superiority of the Pope over other bishops, except in the territories whereof he is himself the civil sovereign, and where the emperor, having sovereign power civil, hath expressly chosen the Pope for the chief pastor under himself of his Christian subjects.

The carrying about of images in procession is another relic of the religion of the Greeks and Romans, for they also carried their idols from place to place, in a kind of chariot, which was peculiarly dedicated to that use, which the Latins called *thensa* and *vehiculum Deorum*, and the image was placed in a frame, or shrine, which they called *ferculum*. And that which they called *pompa* is the same that now is named *procession* according whereunto, amongst the divine honours which were given to Julius Cæsar by the Senate, this was one, that in the pomp, or procession, at the Circæan games, he should have *thensam et ferculum*, a sacred chariot and a shrine, which was as much as to be carried up and down as a god, just as at this day the popes are carried by Switzers under a canopy.

To these processions also belonged the bearing of burning torches and candles before the images of the gods, both amongst the Greeks and Romans. For afterwards the emperors of Rome received the same honor, as we read of Caligula that at his reception to the Empire he was carried from Misenum to Rome in the

to Alexandria with incense, and with casting

these gods. And in process of time the devout but ignorant people did many times honour their bishops with the like pomp of wax candles, and the images of our Saviour and the saints, constantly, in the church itself. And thus came in the use of wax candles, and was also established by some of the ancient councils.

The heathens had also their *aqua lustralis* that is to say, *holy water*. The Church of Rome imitates them also in their *holy days*. They had their *bacchanalia* and we have our *wakes* answering to them, their *saturnalia* and we our *carnevals* and Shrove Tuesday's liberty of servants, their procession of *Præput*, we

our fetching in, erection, and dancing about *Maypoles*, and dancing is one kind of worship. They had their procession called *Ambarvalia*, and we our procession about the fields in the *Rogation week*. Nor do I think that these are all the ceremonies that have been left in the Church, from the first conversion of the Gentiles, but they are all that I can for the present call to mind. And if a man would well observe that which is delivered in the histories, concerning the religious rites of the Greeks and Romans, I doubt not but he might find many more of these old empty bottles of Gentilism

tail in time to break them

CHAPTER XLVI

Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy and Fabulous Traditions

By ph in 1644

generation of the same, to the end to be able to produce, as far as matter and human force permit, such effects as human life requireth. So the geometrician, from the construction of figures, findeth out many properties thereof, and from the properties, new ways of their construction, by reasoning, to the end to be able to measure land and water, and for infinite other uses. So the astronomer, from the rising, setting, and moving of the sun and stars in diverse parts of the heavens, findeth out the causes of day and night, and of the different seasons of the year, whereby he keepeth an account of time, and the like of other sciences.

By which definition it is evident that we are not to account as any part thereof that original knowledge called *experience*, in which consisteth prudence, because it is not attained by reasoning, but found as well in brute beasts as in man, and is but a memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of every little circumstance, altering the effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most prudent. whereas nothing is produced by reasoning a right, but general, eternal, and immutable truth.

Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false conclusions, for he that reasoneth aright in words he understandeth can never conclude an error.

Nor to that which any man knows by super

natural revelation, because it is not acquired by reasoning.

Nor that which is gotten by reasoning from the authority of books, because it is not by reasoning from the cause to the effect, nor from the effect to the cause, and is not knowledge, but faith.

The faculty of reasoning being consequent to the use of speech, it was not possible but that there should have been some general truths found out by reasoning, as ancient almost as language itself. The savages of America are not without some good moral sentences, also they have a little arithmetic, to add and divide in numbers not too great, but they are not therefore philosophers. For as there were plants of corn and wine in small quantity dispersed in the fields and woods, before men knew their virtue, or made use of them for their nourishment, or planted them apart in fields and vine

there was no method, that is to say, no sowing nor planting of knowledge by itself, apart from the weeds and common plants of error and conjecture. And the cause of it being the want of leisure from procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves against their neighbours, it was impossible, till the erecting of great Commonwealths, it should be otherwise. Leisure is the mother of philosophy and Commonwealth, the mother of peace and leisure. Where first were great and flourishing cities,

greater perhaps than Lucca or Geneva, had never peace but when their fears of one another were equal, nor the leisure to observe anything but one another. At length, when war had united many of these Grecian lesser cities into

After the Athenians, by the overthrow of the Persian armies, had gotten the dominion of the world, and thereby of all the lands and seas

abroad, had little else to employ themselves in but either, as St Luke says, 'in telling and hearing news,'¹ or in discoursing of philosophy publicly to the youth of the city. Every master took some place for that purpose. Plato, in certain public walks called *Academia*, from one *Academus*, Aristotle in the walk of the temple of Pan, called *Lycæum*; others in the *Stoa* or covered walk, wherein the merchants' goods were brought to land; others in other places, where they spent the time of their leisure in teaching or in disputing of their opinions; and some in any place where they could get the youth of the city together to hear them talk. And this was it which *Carneades* also did at Rome, when he was ambassador, which caused *Cato* to advise the Senate to dispatch him quickly for fear of corrupting the manners of the young men that delighted to hear him speak, as they thought, fine things.

From this it was that the place where any of them taught and disputed was called *schola*, which in their tongue signifieth *leisure*, and their disputations, *diatribæ*; that is to say, *passing of the time*. Also the philosophers themselves had the name of their sects, some of them, from these their schools; for they that followed Plato's doctrine were called *Academics*; the followers of Aristotle, *Peripatetics*, from the walk he taught in; and those that *Zeno* taught, *Stoics*, from the *Stoa*; as if we should denominate men from *More fields*, from *Paul's Church*, and from the *Exchange*, because they meet there often to prate and loiter.

Nevertheless, men were so much taken with this custom, that in time it spread itself over all Europe, and the best part of Africa, so as there were schools, publicly erected and maintained, for lectures and disputations, almost in every Commonwealth.

There were also schools, anciently, both before and after the time of our Saviour, amongst the Jews; but they were schools of their law. For though they were called *synagogues*; that is to say, congregations of the people, yet, inasmuch as the law was every Sabbath day read, expounded, and disputed in them, they differed not in nature, but in name only, from public schools, and were not only in Jerusalem, but

in every city of the Gentiles where the Jews inhabited. There was such a school at Damascus, whereinto Paul entered, to persecute. There were others at Antioch, Iconium and Thessalonica, whereinto he entered, to dispute. And such was the synagogue of the Libertines, Cyrenians, Alexandrians, Cilicians; and those of

Stephen.

But what has been the utility of those schools? What science is there at this day acquired by

Plato that was the best philosopher of the Greeks, forbade entrance into his school to all that were not already in some measure geometricians. There were many that studied that science to the great advantage of mankind; but there is no mention of their schools, nor was there any sect of geometricians, nor did they then pass under the name of philosophers. The natural philosophy of those schools was rather a dream than science, and set forth in senseless and insignificant language, which cannot be avoided by those that will teach philosophy without having first attained great knowledge in geometry. For nature worketh by motion,

philosophy is but a description of their own passions. For the rule of manners, without civil gov-

but every one doth, as far as he dares, whatso-

to puzzle such as should go about to pose them. To conclude, there is nothing so absurd that the old philosophers (as Cicero saith, who was one of them) have not some of them maintained. And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which now is called Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, nor more repugnant to government than

¹ Acts, 17. 21

² Ibid. 6. 9.

much of that he hath said in his *Politics*; nor

the end of every seventh year, at the Feast of the Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that they might hear and learn it.² Therefore the reading of the law (which was in use after the Captivity) every Sabbath day ought to have had no other end but the acquainting of the people with the Commandments which they were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the prophets. But it is manifest, by the many reprehensions of them by our Saviour, that they corrupted the text of the law with their own

prophesied. So that by their lectures and disputations in their synagogues, they turned the doctrine of their law into a fantastical kind of philosophy, concerning the incomprehensible nature of God and of spirits, which they compounded of the vain philosophy and theology of the Grecians, mingled with their own fancies, drawn from the obscurer places of the Scripture, and which might most easily be wrested to their purpose, and from the fabulous traditions of their ancestors.

That which is now called a *University* is a joining together, and an incorporation under one government, of many public schools in one and the same town or city, in which the principal schools were ordained for the three profes-

sion and since the authority of Aristotle is only current there, that study is not properly philosophy (the nature whereof dependeth not on authors), but *Aristotelity*. And for geometry, till of very late times it had no place at all, as being subservient to nothing but rigid truth. And if any man by the ingenuity of his own nature had attained to any degree of perfection therein, he was commonly thought a magician, and his art diabolical.

Now to descend to the particular tenets of vain philosophy, derived to the Universities, and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from blindness of understanding, I shall first consider their principles. There is a certain *philosophia prima* on which all other philoso-

² Deuteronomy, 31. 10

phy ought to depend, and consisteth principally in right limiting of the significations of such appellations, or names, as are of all others the most universal, which limitations serve to avoid ambiguity and equivocation in reasoning, and are commonly called *definitions*, such are the

tion, passion, and diverse others, necessary to

for title. But it is in another sense, for there it signifieth as much as "books written or placed after his natural philosophy" but the Schools take them for books of supernatural philosophy for the word *metaphysics* will bear both these senses. And indeed that which is there written is for the most part so far from the

From these metaphysics, which are mingled with the Scripture to make School divinity, we are told there be in the world certain essences separated from bodies, which they call *abstract essences*, and *substantial forms*, for the interpreting of which jargon, there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place

part of body is likewise body, and nath the like

though that name in common speech be given to such bodies only as are visible or palpable; that is, that have some degree of opacity but for spirits, they call them *incorporeal*, which is a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety be attributed to God Himself.

in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth best His nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour Him

To know now upon what grounds they say there be essences abstract or substantial forms, we are to consider what those words do properly signify. The use of words is to register to ourselves, and make manifest to others, the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. Of which words, some are the names of the things conceived as the names of all sorts of bodies that work upon the senses and leave an impression in the imagination. Others are the names of the imaginations themselves, that is to say of those ideas or mental images we have of all things we see or remember. And others again are names of names, or of different sorts of speech as *universal plural singular* are the names of names, and *definition affirmation negation true false, syllogism interrogation promise covenant*, are the names of certain forms of speech. Others serve to show the consequence or repugnance of one name to another, as when one saith, "a man is a body," he intendeth that the name of *body* is necessarily consequent to the name of *man*, as being but several names of the same thing *man* which consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word *is*. And we use the verb *is* so the Latins use their verb *est* and the Greeks their *εστιν* through all its declinations. Whether all other nations of the world have in their several languages a word that answereth to it, or not, I cannot tell, but I am sure they have not need of it for the placing of two names in order may serve to signify their consequence, if it were the custom (for custom is it that gives words their force), as well as the words *is* or *be* or *are*, and the like.

And if it were so that there were a language without any verb answerable to *est* or *is* or *be*, yet the men that used it would be not a jot the less capable of *inferring*, *concluding*, and of all kind of reasoning than were the Greeks and Latins. But what then would become of these terms, of *entity essence essential essentiality*, that are derived from it, and of many more that

conceive the consequence of one name or attribute in another as when we say, "a man is a living body," we mean not that the man is one thing, the living body another, and the *is*, or being, a third, but that the man and the living body is the same thing, because the consequence,

"If he be a man, he is a living body," is a true consequence, signified by that word *is*. There fore, *to be a body, to walk, to be speaking, to live, to see* and the like infinitives, also *corporeity, walking, speaking, life, sight* and the like, that signify just the same, are the names of nothing, as I have elsewhere more amply expressed.

But to what purpose, may some man say, is such subtlety in a work of this nature, where

doctrine of "separated essences," built on the

ed stick. For it is upon this ground that, when a man is dead and buried, they say his soul, that is his life, can walk separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground, they say that the figure, and colour, and taste of a piece of bread has a being there, where they say there is no bread. And upon the same ground they say that faith, and wisdom, and other virtues are sometimes poured into a man, sometimes blown into him, from heaven, as if the virtuous and their virtues could be asunder, and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependence of subjects on the sovereign power of their country. For who will endeavour to obey the laws, if he expect obedience to be poured or blown into him? Or who will not obey a priest, that can make God rather than his sovereign, nay, than God Himself? Or who that is in fear of ghosts will not bear great respect to those that can make the holy water that drives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the errors which are brought into the Church from the entities and essences of Aristotle which it may be he knew to be false philosophy, but wrote it as a thing consonant to and corroborative of, their reli-

ing they will have these forms in be real they are obliged to assign them some place. But because they hold them incorporeal, without all dimension of quantity, and all men know that place is dimension, and not in be filled but by that which is corporeal, they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they

are not indeed anywhere *circumscriptive*, but *definitive* which terms being mere words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass only in Latin, that the vanity of them may be concealed For

same And in particular, of the essence of a man, which, they say, in his soul, they affirm it to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part, how small soever, of his body and yet no more soul in the whole body

it will believe the existence of an incorporeal soul, separated from the body

And when they come to give account how an incorporeal substance can be capable of pain, and be tormented in the fire of hell or purgatory, they have nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire can burn souls

Again, whereas motion is change of place, and incorporeal substances are not capable of place, they are troubled to make it seem possible how a soul can go hence, without the body, to heaven, hell, or purgatory, and how the ghosts of men (and I may add, of their clothes which they appear in) can walk by night in churches, churchyards, and other places of sepulture

of *eternity*, they will not have it to be an endless succession of time, for then they should not be able to render a reason

they nor any else understand, no more than they would a *hic stans* for an infinite greatness of place

And whereas men divide a body in their thought, by numbering parts of it, and in numbering those parts, number also the parts of the place it filled, it cannot be but in making many parts, we make also many places of those parts, whereby there cannot be conceived in the mind of any man more or fewer parts than there are

places for yet they will have us believe that by the Almighty power of God, one body may be at one and the same time in many places, and many bodies at one and the same time in one place, as if it were an acknowledgement of the Divine Power to say, that which is, is not, or that which has been, has not been And these

divine and incomprehensible Nature, whose

tributes of honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end and without number, in the same manner as when a man ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak, to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat, and, with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity

Then for *physics* that is, the knowledge of the subordinate and secondary causes of natural events, they render none at all but empty words If you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally downwards toward the earth, and others go naturally from it, the Schools will tell you, out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink downwards are *heavy*, and that this heaviness is it that causes them to descend But if you ask what they mean by *heaviness*, they will define it to be an endeavour to go to the center of the earth so that the cause why things sink downward is an endeavour to be below, which is as much as to say that bodies descend, or ascend, because they do Or they will tell you the center of the earth is the place of rest and conservation for heavy things, and therefore they endeavour to be there as if stones and metals had a desire, or could discern the place they would be at, as man does, or loved rest, as

another, they say, when it seems less, it is *condensed*, when greater, *rarefied* What is that *condensed* and *rarefied*? Condensed is when there is in the very same matter less quantity than before, and rarefied, when more As if there could be matter that had not some deter

mined quantity, when quantity is nothing else but the determination of matter, that is to say, of body, by which we say one body is greater or lesser than another by thus, or thus much. Or as if a body were made without any quantity at all, and that afterwards more or less were put into it, according as it is intended the body should be more or less dense.

For the cause of the soul of man, they say, *creatur infundendo* and *creando infunditur* that is, "It is created by pouring it in," and 'poured in by creation'

For the cause of sense, an ubiquity of *species*, that is, of the shows or apparitions of objects, which when they be apparitions to the eye is sight, when to the ear, hearing, to the palate, taste, to the nostril, smelling, and to the rest of the body, feeling

For cause of the will to do any particular action, which is called *volunt* they assign the fac

the power the cause of the act as if one should assign for cause of the good or evil acts of men their ability to do them

And in many occasions they put for cause of natural events, their own ignorance, but disguised in other words as when they say, for tune is the cause of things contingent, that is, of things whereof they know no cause and as when they attribute many effects to occult qualities, that is, qualities not known to them, and therefore also as they think, to no man else

the operation by which they are produced

If such metaphysics and physics as this be not vain philosophy, there was never any, nor need ed St Paul to give us warning to avoid it

And for their moral and civil philosophy, it hath the same or greater absurdities. If a man do an action of injustice, that is to say, an action contrary to the law, God, they say, is the prime cause of the law and also the prime cause of that and all other actions, but no cause at all of the injustice, which is the inconformity of the action to the law. This is vain philosophy

sions before they know their premises, pretending to comprehend that which is incomprehensible, and of attributes of honour to make

attributes of nature, as this distinction was made to maintain the doctrine of free will, that is of a will of man not subject to the will of God

Aristotle and other heathen philosophers de fine good and evil by the appetite of men, and well enough, as long as we consider them governed every one by his own law for in the condition of men that have no other law but their

trine still practised, and men judge the goodness or wickedness of their own and of other men's actions, and of the actions of the Common

bound by vow to that simple obedience to their superior to which every subject ought to think himself bound by the law of nature to the civil sovereign. And this private measure of good is a doctrine, not only vain, but also pernicious to the public state

It is also vain and false philosophy to say the work of marriage is repugnant to chastity or continence, and by consequence to make them moral vices, as they do that pretend chastity and

altar and administration of the Eucharist, a continual abstinence from women, under the name of continual chastity, continence, and purity. Therefore they call the lawful use of wives want of chastity and continence, and so make marriage a sin, or at least a thing so impure and unclean as to render a man unfit for the altar. If the law were made because the use of wives is incontinence, and contrary to chastity, then all marriage is vice. If because it is a thing too impure and unclean for a man consecrated to God, much more should other natural, necessary, and daily works, which all men do, render men unworthy to be priests, because they are more unclean

philosophy, nor yet upon the preference of single life to the estate of matrimony, which proceeded from the wisdom of St Paul, who perceived how inconvenient a thing it was for those that

in those times of persecution were preachers of

though he can neither write nor read, does not

and priests of after times, to make themselves, (the clergy, that is to say,) sole heirs of the kingdom of God in this world, to which it was necessary to take from them the use of marriage because our Saviour saith that at the coming of his kingdom the children of God "shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but shall be as the angels in heaven", that is to say, spiritual. Seeing then they had taken on them the name of *spiritual*, to have allowed them selves when there was no need, the propriety of wives had been an incongruity

From Aristotle's civil philosophy, they have learned to call all manner of Commonwealths but the popular (such as was at that time the state of Athens) *tyranny*. All kings they called *tyrants* and the aristocracy of the thirty governors set up there by the Lacedæmonians that

simply, but a *monarch*. But when afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of government was abolished, the name began to signify, not only the thing it did before, but with it the hatred which the popular states bore towards it as also the name of *king* became odious after the deposing of the kings in Rome, as being a thing natural to all men to conceive some great fault to be signified in any attribute that is given in despite, and to a great enemy. And when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the democracy, or aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgraceful names to express their anger in, but call readily the one *anarchy* and the other *oligarchy* or the *tyranny of a few*. And that which offendeth the

that is, words and paper, without the hands and swords of men? And this is of the number of pernicious errors for they induce men, as oft as they like not their governors, to adhere to those that call them tyrants, and to think it lawful to raise war against them and yet they are many times cherished from the pulpit, by the clergy

There is another error in their civil philosophy (which they never learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the heathen), to extend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the very thoughts and consciences of men, by examination and inquisition of what they hold, notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and actions. By which men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment. It is true that the civil magistrate, intending to employ a minister in the charge of teaching, may enquire of him if he be content to preach such and such doctrines, and, in case of refusal, may deny him the employment but to force him to accuse himself of opinions, when his actions are not by law forbidden, is against the law of nature, and especially in them who teach that a man shall be damned to eternal and extreme torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an article of the Christian faith. For who is there (that knowing there is so great danger in an error) whom the natural care of himself compelleth not to hazard his soul upon his own judgement,

mission from the representant thereof, to inter

bitrary government for which they give evil names to their superiors, never knowing (till perhaps a little after a civil war) that without such arbitrary government such war must be perpetual and that it is men and arms, not words and promises, that make the force and power of the laws

And therefore this is another error of Aristotle's politics, that in a well-ordered Commonwealth not men should govern, but the laws. What man that has his natural senses,

For none of them deny but that in the power of making laws is comprehended also the power of explaining them when there is need. And are not the Scriptures, in all places where they are law, made law by the authority of the Commonwealth and, consequently, a part of the civil law?

Of the same kind it is also when any but the sovereign restraineth in any man that power which the Commonwealth hath not restrained as they do that impropriate the preaching of

gospel to one certain order of men, where the laws have left it free. If the state give me leave to preach or teach, that is, if it forbid me not, no man can forbid me. If I find myself amongst the idolaters of America, shall I that a Christian, though not in orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ, till I have received orders from Rome? Or when I have preached, shall not I answer their doubts and expound the Scriptures to them, that is, shall I not teach? But for this may some say, as also for administering to them the sacraments, the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient mission, which is true. But this is true also that for whatsoever a dispensation is due for the necessity, for the same there needs no dispensation when there is no law that forbids it. Therefore to deny these functions to those to whom the civil sovereign hath not denied them is a taking away of a lawful liberty, which is contrary to the doctrine of civil government.

More examples of vain philosophy, brought into religion by the doctors of School divinity, might be produced but other men may if they please observe them of themselves. I shall only add this, that the writings of School divines are nothing else for the most part, but insignificant trains of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise used than in the common use of the Latin tongue such as would pose Cicero and Varro, and all the grammarians of ancient Rome. Which, if any man would see proved, let him (as I have said once before) see whether he can translate any School divine into any of the modern tongues, as French, English, or any other copious language for that which cannot in most of these be made intelligible is not intelligible in the Latin. Which insignificance of language, though I cannot note it for false philosophy, yet it hath a quality not only to hide the truth but also to make men think they have it, and desist from further search.

Lastly, for the errors brought in from false or uncertain history, what is all the legend of fictitious miracles in the lives of the saints and all the histories of apparitions and ghosts alleged by the doctors of the Roman Church to make good their doctrines of hell and purgatory, the power of exorcism, and other doctrines which have no warrant, neither in reason nor Scripture, as also all those traditions which they call the unwritten word of God, but old wives' fables? Whereof, though they find dispersed somewhat in the writings of the ancient Fathers, yet those Fathers were men that might too easily believe false reports. And the producing of their

opinions for testimony of the truth of what they believed hath no other force with them that, according to the counsel of St. John,² examine spirits than in all things that concern the power of the Roman Church (the abuse whereof either they suspected not, or had benefit by it), to discredit their testimony in respect of too rash belief of reports which the most sincere men without great knowledge of natural causes, such as the Fathers were, are commonly the most subject to for naturally, the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes. Gregory the Pope and St. Bernard have some what of apparitions of ghosts that said they were in purgatory, and so has our Bede but nowhere I believe, but by report from others. But if they, or any other, relate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not thereby confirm the more such vain reports, but discover their own infirmity or fraud.

With the introduction of false, we may join also the suppression of true philosophy by such men as neither by lawful authority nor sufficient study are competent judges of the truth. Our own navigations make manifest, and all men learned in human sciences now acknowledge, there are antipodes and every day it appeareth more and more that years and days are determined by motions of the earth. Nevertheless, men that have in their writings but supposed such doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for and against it have been punished for it by authority ecclesiastical. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they be true. Let therefore the truth be first examined by competent judges, or confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary. Is it because they be contrary to the religion established? Let them be silenced by the laws of those to whom the teachers of them are subject, that is, by the laws civil for disobedience may lawfully be punished in them that against the law teach even true philosophy. Is it because they tend to disorder in government, as countenancing rebellion or sedition? Then let them be silenced, and the teachers punished, by virtue of his power to whom the care of the public quiet is committed, which is the authority civil. For whatsoever power ecclesiastics take upon themselves (in any place where they are subject to the state) in their own right, though they call it *God's right*, is but usurpation.

² 1 John, 4. 1.

CHAPTER XLVII

*Of the Benefit that proceedeth from such
Darkness and to whom it accrueeth*

CICERO maketh honourable mention of one of the CASSII a severe judge amongst the Romans, for a custom he had in criminal causes, when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient, to ask the accusers *cui bono* that is to say what profit, honour, or other contentment

benefit of the act on. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine who they may be that have possessed the people so long in this part of Christendom with these doctrines contrary to the peaceable societies of mankind

And first to this error that the present Church now militant on earth is the kingdom of God (that is the kingdom of glory, or the land of promise not the kingdom of grace, which is but a promise of the land), are annexed these worldly benefits first, that the pastors and teachers of the Church are entitled

between him and other princes (charmed with the word *power spiritual*) to abandon their lawful sovereigns which is in effect a universal monarchy over all Christendom. For though they were first invested in the right of being supreme teachers of Christian doctrine by and under Christian emperors within the limits of the Roman Empire (as is acknowledged by themselves) by the title of *Pontifex Maximus* who was an officer subject to the civil state yet after the Empire was divided and dissolved it was not hard to obtrude upon the people already subject to them another title, namely the right of St Peter not only to save entire their pretended power, but also to extend the same over the same Christian provinces, though no more united in the Empire of Rome. This benefit of a universal monarchy, considering the desire of men to bear rule, is a sufficient presumption that the Popes that pretended to it and for a long time enjoyed it were the authors of the doctrine by which it was obtained namely that the Church now on earth is the kingdom of

Christ. For that granted, it must be understood that Christ hath some lieutenant amongst us by whom we are to be told what are his commandments

After that certain Churches had renounced this universal power of the Pope, one would expect, in reason, that the civil sovereigns in all those Churches should have recovered so much of it as (before they had unadvisedly let it go) was their own right and in their own hands. And in England it was so in effect saving that

if not a supremacy, yet an independency on the civil power and they but seemed to usurp it, inasmuch as they acknowledged a right in the king to deprive them of the exercise of their functions at his pleasure

But in those places where the presbytery took that office, though many other doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught, yet this doctrine that the kingdom of Christ is already come and that it began at the resurrection of our Saviour, was still retained. But *cui bono*? What profit did they expect from it? The same which the popes expected to have a sovereign power over the people. For what is it for men to excommunicate their lawful king but to keep him from all places of God's public service in his own kingdom and with force to resist him when he with force endeavoureth to correct them? Or what is it without authority from the civil sovereign to excommunicate any person but to take from him his lawful liberty that is to usurp an unlawful power over their brethren? The authors therefore of this darkness in religion are the Roman and the Presbyterian clergy

To this head I refer also all those doctrines that serve them to keep the possession of this

mands?

Secondly, that all other bishops, in what Commonwealth soever, have not their right neither immediately from God, nor mediately from

(for so are Bishops) that have their dependence on the Pope and owe obedience to him, though he be a foreign prince, by which means he is able, as he hath done many times to raise a civil

war against the state that submits not itself to be governed according to his pleasure and interest

Thirdly, the exemption of these and of all other priests, and of all monks and friars, from the power of the civil laws. For by this means, there is a great part of every Commonwealth that enjoy the benefit of the laws and are protected by the power of the civil state, which nevertheless pay no part of the public expense, nor are liable to the penalties, as other subjects, due to their crimes and, consequently, stand not in fear of any man, but the Pope, and adhere to

ters, that is, elders) the name of *sacerdotes*, that is sacrificers, which was the title of the civil

power over all Christians that Moses and Aaron had over the Jews, that is to say, all power, both civil and ecclesiastical, as the high priest then had

Fifthly, the teaching that matrimony is a sacrament giveth to the clergy the judging of the lawfulness of marriages, and thereby, of what children are legitimate, and consequently, of

For if a king be a priest, he cannot marry and transmit his kingdom to his posterity, if he be not a priest, then the Pope pretendeth this authority ecclesiastical over him, and over his people

Seventhly, from auricular confession they obtain, for the assurance of their power, better intelligence of the designs of princes and great persons in the civil state than these can have of the designs of the state ecclesiastical

Eighthly by the canonization of saints, and declaring who are martyrs, they assure their power in that they induce simple men into an obstinacy against the laws and commands of their civil sovereigns, even to death, if by the Pope's excommunication they be declared heretics or enemies to the Church, that is, as they interpret it, to the Pope

Ninthly, they assure the same, by the power they ascribe to every priest of making Christ, and by the power of ordaining penance, and of remitting and retaining of sins

Tenthly, by the doctrine of purgatory, of jus-

tification by external works, and of indulgences, the clergy is enriched

Eleventhly, by their demonology, and the use of exorcism, and other things appertaining thereto, they keep, or think they keep, the people more in awe of their power

Lastly, the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the School men, taught in the universities (which have been all erected and regulated by the Pope's authority), serve them to keep these errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the *ignis fatuus* of vain philosophy for the light of the Gospel

To these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark doctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly to the setting up of an unlawful power over the lawful sovereigns of Christian people, or for the sustaining of the same when it is set up, or to the worldly riches, honour, and authority of those that sustain it. And therefore by the aforesaid rule of *cui bono* we may justly pronounce for the authors of all this spiritual darkness, the Pope, and Roman clergy, and all those besides that endeavour to settle in the minds of men this erroneous doctrine, that the Church now on earth is that Kingdom of God mentioned in the Old and New Testament

But the emperors, and other Christian sovereigns, under whose government these errors and the like encroachments of ecclesiastics upon their office at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions and of the tranquillity of their subjects, though they suffered the same for want of foresight of the sequel, and of insight into the designs of their teachers may nevertheless be esteemed accessaries to their own and the public damage. For without their authority there could at first no seditious doctrine have been publicly preached. I say they might have hindered the same in the beginning but when the people were once possessed by those spiritual men, there was no human remedy to be applied that any man could invent. And for the remedies that God should provide, who never faileth in His good time to destroy all the machinations of men against the truth we are to attend His good pleasure that suffereth many times the prosperity of His enemies, together with their ambition, to grow to such a height as the violence thereof openeth the eyes, which the wariness of their predecessors had before sealed up, and makes men by too much grasping let go all, as Peter's net was broken by the

struggling of too great a multitude of fishes, whereas the impatience of those that strive to resist such encroachment, before their subjects' eyes were opened, did but increase the power

done it, he was not likely to have succeeded in the empire. But I blame those that, in the beginning when their power was entire, by suffering such doctrine to be forced

without the titles of all Christian sovereigns, to ride and tire both them and their people, at their pleasure

modesty, sincerity, and other virtues of the Apostles whom the people, converted, obeyed out of reverence, not by obligation. Their consciences were free, and their words and actions subject to none but the civil power. Afterwards the presbyters

it to be thought the people were thereby obliged to follow their doctrine, and, when they refused to keep them company (that was then called *excommunication*), not as being infidels, but as being disobedient and this was the first knot upon their liberty. And the number of presbyters increasing, the presbyters of the chief city or province got themselves an authority over the parochial presbyters and approved

the emperors were grown weak, by the privileges of St Peter) over all other bishops of the Empire which was the third and last knot, and the whole *synthesis* and *construction* of the pontifical power

And therefore the *analysis* or *resolution* is by the same way, but beginneth with the knot that was last tied as we may see in the dissolution of the preterpolitical Church government in England. First, the power of the popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth, and the bish

ops, who before exercised their functions in

and so was the second knot dissolved. And almost at the same time, the power was taken also from the Presbyterians and so we are reduced to the independency of the primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best which, if it be without contention and without measuring the doctrine of Christ by our affection to the person of his minister (the fault which the Apostle reprehended in the Corinthians), is perhaps the best first, because there ought to be no power over the consciences of men but of the word it

in them, who teach there is such danger in every little error, to require of a man endued with reason of his own to follow the reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men, which is little better than to venture his salvation at cross and pile. Nor ought those teachers to be displeased with this loss of their ancient authority for there is none should know better than they that power is preserved by the same virtues by which it is acquired that is to say, by wisdom, humility, clearness of doctrine, and sincerity of conversation and not by suppression of the natural sciences, and of the morality of natural reason, nor by obscure language nor by arrogating to themselves more knowledge than they make appear nor by pious frauds, nor by such other faults as in the pastors of God's Church are not only faults, but also scandals, apt to make men stumble one time or other upon the suppression of their authority

But after this doctrine that the Church now militant is the kingdom of God spoken of in the Old and New Testament was received in the world, the ambition and canvassing for the offices that belong thereunto, and especially for that great office of being Christ's lieutenant, and the pomp of them that obtained therein the principal public charges, became by degrees so evident that they lost the inward reverence due to the pastoral function insomuch as the wisest men of them that had any power in the civil state needed nothing but the authority of their

princes to deny them any further obedience. For, from the time that the Bishop of Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for bishop universal, by pretence of succession to St. Peter, their

will easily perceive that the papacy is no other than the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof for so did the papacy start up on a sudden out of the ruins of that heathen power.

The language also which they use, both in the churches and in their public acts, being Latin, which is not commonly used by any nation now in the world, what is it but the ghost of the old Roman language?

The fairies in what nation soever they con-

clerastics likewise in whose dominions soever they be found acknowledge but one universal king the Pope.

The ecclesiastics are spiritual men and ghostly fathers. The fairies are spirits and ghosts. Fairies and ghosts inhabit darkness, solitudes, and graves. The ecclesiastics walk in obscurity of doctrine, in monasteries, churches, and church yards.

The ecclesiastics have their cathedral churches, which, in what town soever they be erected, by virtue of holy water, and certain charms called *exorcisms* have the power to make those towns, cities, that is to say, seats of empire. The fairies also have their enchanted castles, and certain gigantic ghosts, that domineer over the regions round about them.

The fairies are not to be seized on, and brought to answer for the hurt they do. So also the ecclesiastics vanish away from the tribunals of civil justice.

The ecclesiastics take from young men the use of reason, by certain charms compounded of metaphysics, and miracles, and traditions, and abused Scripture, whereby they are good

their enchantment, the old wives have not determined. But the operatories of the clergy are well enough known to be the universities, that received their discipline from authority pontifical.

When the fairies are displeased with any body, they are said to send their elves to pinch them. The ecclesiastics, when they are displeased with any civil state, make also their elves, that is, superstitious, enchanted subjects, to pinch their princes by preaching sedition, or one prince, enchanted with promises, to pinch another.

The fairies marry not, but there be amongst them *incubi* that have copulation with flesh and blood. The priests also marry not.

The ecclesiastics take the cream of the land, by donations of ignorant men that stand in awe of them, and by tithes. So also it is in the fable of fairies, that they enter into the dairies, and feast upon the cream, which they skim from the milk.

What kind of money is current in the kingdom of fairies is not recorded in the story. But the ecclesiastics in their receipts accept of the same money that we do, though when they are to make any payment, it is in canonizations, indulgences, and masses.

To this and such like resemblances between the papacy and the kingdom of fairies may be added this, that as the fairies have no existence but in the fancies of ignorant people, rising from the traditions of old wives or old poets, so the spiritual power of the Pope (without the bounds of his own civil dominion) consisteth only in the fear that seduced people stand in of their excommunications, upon hearing of false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations of the Scripture.

It was not therefore a very difficult matter for Henry the Eighth by his exorcism, nor for Queen Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who knows that this spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by missions through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yield him little fruit, may not return, or rather, an assembly of spirits worse than he enter and inhabit this clean swept house, and make the end thereof worse than the beginning? For it is

mischief

In what shop or operatory the fairies make

to say, concerning the doctrine of the fouries. Which, when I have reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the censure of my country.

A REVIEW, and CONCLUSION

FROM the contrariety of some of the natural faculties of the mind, one to another, as also of one passion to another, and from their reference to conversation, there has been an argument taken to infer an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of civil duty. The severity of judgement, they say, makes men censorious and unapt to pardon the errors and infirmities of other men; and on the other side, celerity of fancy makes the thoughts less steady than is necessary to dis-

out it, the resolutions of men are rash, and their sentences unjust; and yet if there be not powerful eloquence, which procureth attention and consent, the effect of reason will be little. But these are contrary faculties, the former being grounded upon principles of truth, the other upon opinions already received, true or false, and upon the passions and interests of men, which are different and mutable.

And amongst the passions *courage* (by which I mean the contempt of wounds and violent death) inclineth men to private revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsettling of the public peace; and *timorousness* many times disposeth to the desertion of the public defence. Both these, they say, cannot stand together in the same person.

And to consider the contrariety of men's opinions and manners in general, it is, they say, impossible to entertain a constant civil amity with all those with whom the business of the world constrains us to converse: which business consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority.

To which I answer that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities: for by education and discipline, they may be and are sometimes reconciled. Judgement and fancy may have place in the same man, but by turns, as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt were sometimes fastened to their labour of making bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather straw: so also may the judgement sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration, and the fancy at another time wandering about the world. So also

reason and eloquence (though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet in the moral) may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of error, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the laws, and not fearing a public enemy, nor between abstaining from injury, and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such inconsistency of human nature with civil duties as some think. I have known clearness of judgement, and largeness of fancy, strength of reason, and graceful elocution, a courage for the war, and a fear for the laws, and all eminently in one man, and that was my most noble and honoured friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin, who hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civil war, in the public quarrel, by an undiscerned and an undiscerning hand.

To the Laws of Nature declared in the fifteenth Chapter, I would have thus added: *that every man is bound by nature as much as in him lieth to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace.* For he that pretendeth a right of nature to pre-

it inculcated and remembered.

And because I find by diverse English books lately printed that the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men in what point of time it is that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror, nor what is conquest, nor how it comes about that it obliges men to obey his laws: therefore for further satisfaction of men therein, I

within the guards and garrisons of the enemy, for it is then that he hath no longer protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution. Seeing therefore such contribution is everywhere, as a thing inevitable, notwithstanding it be an assistance to the enemy, esteemed lawful, is total submission, which is but an assistance to the enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful. Besides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their submission or composition an assistance, but rather a detriment, to the enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation of a subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a soldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new power, as long as the old one keeps the field and giveth him means of subsistence, either in his armies or garrisons for in this case, he can not complain of want of protection and means to live as a soldier. But when that also fails, a soldier also may seek his protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it, and may lawfully submit himself to his newmaster. And so much for the time when he may do it lawfully, if he will. If therefore he do it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true subject for a contract lawfully made cannot lawfully be broken.

By this also a man may understand when it is that men may be said to be conquered, and in what the nature of conquest, and the right of a conqueror consisteth for this submission is it implieth them all. Conquest is not the victory itself but the acquisition, by victory, of a right over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain is overcome but not conquered he that is taken and put into prison or chains is not conquered, though overcome for he is still

a subject, and not before. The Romans used to say that their general had *pacified* such a province, that is to say, in English, *conquered* it, and that the country was *pacified* by victory when the people of it had promised *imperata facere*,

by promise; tacit, by other signs. As, for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an express promise, because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable, yet if he live under their protection openly, he is understood to submit himself to the govern-

ment but if he live there secretly, he is liable to anything that may be done to a spy and enemy of the state. I say not, he does any injustice (for acts of open hostility bear not that name), but that he may be justly put to death. Like wise, if a man, when his country is conquered, be out of it, he is not conquered, nor subject but if at his return he submit to the government, he is bound to obey it. So that conquest, to define it, is the acquiring of the right of sovereignty by victory. Which right is acquired in the people's submission, by which they contract with the victor, promising obedience, for life and liberty.

In the twenty ninth Chapter I have set down for one of the causes of the dissolutions of Com-

them justify the war by which their power was at first gotten, and whereon, as they think, their right dependeth, and not on the possession. As if, for example, the right of the kings of England did depend on the goodness of the cause of William the Conqueror, and upon their lineal and directest descent from him, by which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the

time raise against them and their successors. Therefore I put down for one of the most effectual seeds of the death of any state, that the conquerors require not only a submission of men's actions to them for the future, but also an approbation of all their actions past, when there is scarce a Commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.

And because the name of tyranny signifieth nothing more nor less than the name of sovereignty, be it in one or many men, saying that they that use the former word are understood to be angry with them they call *tyrants*, I think the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny

of the cause of a conqueror, the reproach of the cause of the conquered is for the most part necessary but neither of them necessary for the obligation of the conquered. And thus much I

have thought fit to say upon the review of the first and second part of this discourse

In the thirty fifth Chapter, I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture that in the Commonwealth of the Jews, God Himself was made the Sovereign, by pact with the people, who were therefore called His "peculiar people," to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God reigned, not by their consent, but by His own power and that in this kingdom Moses was God's lieutenant on earth, and that it was he that told them what laws God appointed them to be ruled by. But I have omitted to set down who were the officers appointed to do execution especially in capital punishments, not then thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration as I find it since. We know that

power, or given to those in whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardness of heart concurred to make them sue for such an office. But amongst the Israelites it was a positive law of God their Sovereign that he that was convicted of a capital crime should be stoned to death by the people, and that the witnesses should cast the first stone, and after the witnesses, then the rest of the people. This was a law that designed who were to be the executioners, but not that any one should throw a stone at him before conviction and sentence, where the congregation was judge. The witnesses were nevertheless to be heard before they proceeded to execution, unless the fact were committed in the presence of the congregation itself, or in sight of the lawful judges, for then there needed no other witnesses but the judges themselves. Nevertheless, this manner of proceeding, being not thoroughly understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, in some cases, by a right of zeal, as if the executions done upon offenders in the kingdom of God in old time proceeded not from the sovereign command, but from the authority of private zeal which if we consider the texts that seem to favour it, is quite contrary.

First, where the Levites fell upon the people that had made and worshipped the golden calf, and slew three thousand of them, it was by the

not by right of private zeal their crime was committed in the sight of the assembly, there needed no witness, the law was known, and he the heir apparent to the sovereignty, and, which is the principal point, the lawfulness of his act depended wholly upon a subsequent ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt. And this presumption of a future ratification

law or commission, may lawfully do it, and pro

to idolatry, that is to say, in the kingdom of God to a renouncing of his allegiance forbids to conceal him, and commands the accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to cast the first stone at him,^a but not to kill him before he be condemned. And the process against idolatry is exactly set down for God there speaketh to the

shall bring him before the judges of the town and all the people of the town shall stone him.^b Lastly, by pretence of these laws it was that St Stephen was stoned and not by pretence of

sion, is against both the justice and peace of a Commonwealth

In the thirty sixth Chapter I have said that it is not declared in what manner God spoke su

^a Numbers, 25 6, 7, [8]

^b *Ibid* 35 30

^c Deuteronomy, 13 8, [9]

^d *Ibid* 17 4 5, 6

^e *Ibid*, 21 18 21

you, they that heard it did not all bring him before Moses, who put him under

pernatually to Moses not that He spoke not to
 that mes by dreams and visions, and by a
 for the
 mer
 cy seat is expressly . . . words,
 'From that time forward, when Moses entered
 into the Tabernacle of the congregation to speak
 with God, he heard a voice which spake unto
 him from over the mercy seat, which is over the
 . . . testimony, from between the cheru
 . . . declared

ner of God's speaking . .
 His speaking to other prophets, as to samuel
 and to Abraham to whom He also spoke by a
 voice (that is, by vision), unless the difference
 consist in the clearness of the vision For 'face
 . . . and 'mouth to mouth,' cannot be
 and in-
 ure
 ee not yet,
 but the principles of and proper,
 and the ratiocination solid For I ground the
 and both the duty and
 of
 te
 the new

selves and consonant to the

 that by writing or public discourse, or by their
 eminent actions have already engaged them
 selves to the maintaining of contrary opinions,
 they will not be so easily satisfied For in such
 cases, it is natural for men at one and the same
 time, both to proceed in reading and to lose
 their attention in the search of objections to
 that they had read before of which in a time
 wherein the interests of men are changed (see-
 ing much of that doctrine which serveth to the
 of a new government must needs
 dis-
 ut be
 very many

In that part which treateth of a Christian
 Commonwealth, there are some new doctrines
 which, it may be, in a state where the contrary
 were already fully determined, were a fault for
 a subject without leave to divulge, as being a
 usurpation of the place of a teacher But in this
 'Numbers, 7 89.

men call not only for peace, but also

 liberation, is no more
 be put into new casks, that both may be pre-
 And I suppose that then when

 errors before new

There is nothing I distrust more than my
 elocution which nevertheless I am confident
 mischances of the press) is not

 judgement, grounded
 first, all truth of doctrine dependeth either upon
 reason or upon Scripture, both which give cred
 it to many, but never receive it from any writer
 Secondly, the matters in question are not of fact

 and others which makes their testimonies in
 sufficient Fourthly, such opinions as are taken
 only upon credit of antiquity are not intrinsic

ulent design that men stick their corrupt doc-
 trine with the cloes of other men's wit Sixthly,
 I find not that the ancients they cite took it for
 an ornament to do the like with those that
 wrote before them Seventhly, it is an argu-
 ment of indigestion, when Greek and Latin
 sentences unchewed come up again as they use
 to do, unchanged Lastly, though I reverence
 those men of ancient time that either have
 written truth perspicuously, or set us in a bet-
 ter way to find it out ourselves, yet to the an-
 tiquity itself I think nothing due For if we will
 reverence the age, the present is the oldest if
 the antiquity of the writer, I am not sure that
 generally they to whom such honour is given
 were more ancient when they wrote than
 that am writing but if it be well con-
 sidered the praise of ancient authors proceedeth
 from the reverence of the dead but from the
 titution and mutual envy of the living
 To conclude there is nothing in this
 discourse, nor in that I wrote before of this
 subject in Latin, as far as I can perceive
 contrary either to the word of God or to good

judgement of the same belongeth For seeing the Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from whence the preachers and the gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit and in their conversation) upon the people,

sons in their purposes against the state, and be the less grieved with the contributions necessary for their peace and defence, and the governors themselves have the less cause to maintain at the common charge any greater army than is necessary to make good the public liberty against the invasions and encroachments of foreign enemies

And thus I have brought to an end my discourse of civil and ecclesiastical government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other design than to set before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience, of which the condition of human nature, and the laws divine, both natural and positive, require an inviolable observation

erament, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new), yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the public judge of doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of public peace And in this hope I return to my interrupted speculation of bodies natural wherein, if God give me health to finish it, I hope the novelty will as much please as in the doctrine of this artificial body it useth to offend For such truth as opposeth no man's profit nor pleasure is to all men welcome

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